Abstract
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility |
| Editors | Nick Trakakis, Daniel Cohen |
| Place of Publication | Newcastle, UK |
| Publisher | Cambridge Scholars Publishing |
| Pages | 247-264 |
| Number of pages | 18 |
| Edition | 13 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9781847188670 |
| Publication status | Published - 2008 |
Fingerprint
Cite this
}
Addiction is No Excuse. / Cohen, Daniel; Saling, Lauren.
Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. ed. / Nick Trakakis; Daniel Cohen. 13. ed. Newcastle, UK : Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008. p. 247-264.Research output: Book chapter/Published conference paper › Chapter
TY - CHAP
T1 - Addiction is No Excuse
AU - Cohen, Daniel
AU - Saling, Lauren
N1 - Imported on 12 May 2017 - DigiTool details were: publisher = Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008. editor/s (773b) = Nick Trakakis and Daniel Cohen; Issue no. (773s) = 13; Parent title (773t) = Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility; No. of chapters (773w) = 13.
PY - 2008
Y1 - 2008
N2 - Addiction is commonly considered to be a powerful methodological foil for the analysis of moral responsibility. It is thought that responsibility, inter alia, must involve just those psychological features lacking in addicts because addiction seems, intuitively, to be a good excuse. In this paper we argue that this methodology has not been successful. Various models have been proposed to characterize addiction. However, none of these models successfully distinguishes addiction from weakness of will. Because weakness of will, unlike addiction, is not intuitively a good excuse, the various models of addiction entail the surprising result that addiction, too, is not a good excuse. But if addiction is no excuse, it provides no clear guidance regarding the conditions of moral responsibility.
AB - Addiction is commonly considered to be a powerful methodological foil for the analysis of moral responsibility. It is thought that responsibility, inter alia, must involve just those psychological features lacking in addicts because addiction seems, intuitively, to be a good excuse. In this paper we argue that this methodology has not been successful. Various models have been proposed to characterize addiction. However, none of these models successfully distinguishes addiction from weakness of will. Because weakness of will, unlike addiction, is not intuitively a good excuse, the various models of addiction entail the surprising result that addiction, too, is not a good excuse. But if addiction is no excuse, it provides no clear guidance regarding the conditions of moral responsibility.
KW - Addiction
KW - Free will
KW - Moral responsibility
M3 - Chapter
SN - 9781847188670
SP - 247
EP - 264
BT - Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility
A2 - Trakakis, Nick
A2 - Cohen, Daniel
PB - Cambridge Scholars Publishing
CY - Newcastle, UK
ER -