Addiction is No Excuse

Daniel Cohen, Lauren Saling

Research output: Book chapter/Published conference paperChapter

Abstract

Addiction is commonly considered to be a powerful methodological foil for the analysis of moral responsibility. It is thought that responsibility, inter alia, must involve just those psychological features lacking in addicts because addiction seems, intuitively, to be a good excuse. In this paper we argue that this methodology has not been successful. Various models have been proposed to characterize addiction. However, none of these models successfully distinguishes addiction from weakness of will. Because weakness of will, unlike addiction, is not intuitively a good excuse, the various models of addiction entail the surprising result that addiction, too, is not a good excuse. But if addiction is no excuse, it provides no clear guidance regarding the conditions of moral responsibility.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEssays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility
EditorsNick Trakakis, Daniel Cohen
Place of PublicationNewcastle, UK
PublisherCambridge Scholars Publishing
Pages247-264
Number of pages18
Edition13
ISBN (Print)9781847188670
Publication statusPublished - 2008

Fingerprint

Excuse
Addiction
Weakness of Will
Moral Responsibility
Guidance
Methodology
Responsibility
Psychological

Cite this

Cohen, D., & Saling, L. (2008). Addiction is No Excuse. In N. Trakakis, & D. Cohen (Eds.), Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility (13 ed., pp. 247-264). Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing.
Cohen, Daniel ; Saling, Lauren. / Addiction is No Excuse. Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. editor / Nick Trakakis ; Daniel Cohen. 13. ed. Newcastle, UK : Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008. pp. 247-264
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Cohen, D & Saling, L 2008, Addiction is No Excuse. in N Trakakis & D Cohen (eds), Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. 13 edn, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, Newcastle, UK, pp. 247-264.

Addiction is No Excuse. / Cohen, Daniel; Saling, Lauren.

Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. ed. / Nick Trakakis; Daniel Cohen. 13. ed. Newcastle, UK : Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2008. p. 247-264.

Research output: Book chapter/Published conference paperChapter

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Cohen D, Saling L. Addiction is No Excuse. In Trakakis N, Cohen D, editors, Essays on Free Will and Moral Responsibility. 13 ed. Newcastle, UK: Cambridge Scholars Publishing. 2008. p. 247-264