Against Norstrom's argument for technological knowing how not being an instance of knowing that

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

Abstract

In this paper, I evaluate an argument offered by Per Norström in section 8 of his paper Knowing how, knowing that, knowing technology. The argument is for the proposition that some instance of knowing how is not an instance of knowing that; the instance in question being one of technological know-how. This conclusion contradicts Stanley and Williamson's proposal that all instances of knowing how are instances of knowing that. I provide reason to think that there are problems with Norström's argument.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)573-579
Number of pages7
JournalPhilosophy and Technology
Volume28
Issue number4
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2015

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abstract = "In this paper, I evaluate an argument offered by Per Norstr{\"o}m in section 8 of his paper Knowing how, knowing that, knowing technology. The argument is for the proposition that some instance of knowing how is not an instance of knowing that; the instance in question being one of technological know-how. This conclusion contradicts Stanley and Williamson's proposal that all instances of knowing how are instances of knowing that. I provide reason to think that there are problems with Norstr{\"o}m's argument.",
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Against Norstrom's argument for technological knowing how not being an instance of knowing that. / Luck, Morgan.

In: Philosophy and Technology, Vol. 28, No. 4, 2015, p. 573-579.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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