Abstract
In this paper, I evaluate an argument offered by Per Norström in section 8 of his paper Knowing how, knowing that, knowing technology. The argument is for the proposition that some instance of knowing how is not an instance of knowing that; the instance in question being one of technological know-how. This conclusion contradicts Stanley and Williamson's proposal that all instances of knowing how are instances of knowing that. I provide reason to think that there are problems with Norström's argument.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 573-579 |
| Number of pages | 7 |
| Journal | Philosophy and Technology |
| Volume | 28 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2015 |
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