Abstract
While morality prohibits us from creating miserable children, it does not require us to create happy children. I offer an actualist explanation of this apparent asymmetry. Assume that for every possible world W, there is a distinct set of permissibility facts determined by the welfare of those who exist in W. Moral actualism says that actual-world permissibility facts should determine one's choice between worlds. But if one doesn't know which world is actual, one must aim for subjective rightness and maximize expected actual-world permissibility. So, because one should expect actual people to be worse off than they could have been if one creates a miserable child, creating a miserable child is subjectively impermissible. And because one should expect actual people to be at least as well off as they could have been if one fails to create a happy child, failing to create a happy child is subjectively permissible.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 70-89 |
Number of pages | 19 |
Journal | Utilitas |
Volume | 32 |
Issue number | 1 |
Early online date | 18 Sept 2019 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 2020 |