Antipathy to God

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Antipathy towards the possibility that God exists is a common attitude, which has recently been clearly expressed by Thomas Nagel. This attitude is presumably irrelevant to the question whether God does exist. But it raises two other interesting philosophical issues. First, to what extent does this attitude motivate irrational belief? And secondly, how should the attitude be evaluated? This paper investigates that latter issue. Is the hope that God does not exist a morally proper hope? I simplify this question by interpreting the relevant attitude as an aversion towards the Christian picture of the world coupled with a preference for the naturalist atheistic picture. And comparing the content of those two world pictures, I argue that the attitude, though partly explicable, is morally unjustifiable, for clearly recognisable reasons. Regardless, then, of further concerns about the doxastic influence of this attitude, we ought to be ashamed of our antipathy to God, which reflects badly upon us.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)13-24
Number of pages12
JournalSophia
Volume54
Issue number1
Early online date2014
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2015

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Deity
Antipathy
Philosophical Issues
Aversion
Naturalists
World picture
Thomas Nagel

Cite this

McLean, Graeme. / Antipathy to God. In: Sophia. 2015 ; Vol. 54, No. 1. pp. 13-24.
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Antipathy to God. / McLean, Graeme.

In: Sophia, Vol. 54, No. 1, 04.2015, p. 13-24.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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AU - McLean, Graeme

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