TY - CHAP
T1 - Biological sciences
AU - Miller, Seumas
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2018, The Author(s).
PY - 2018
Y1 - 2018
N2 - Developments in the biological sciences have produced great benefits, including in relation to the control of diseases. However, in the recent and not so recent past, a number of governments have sought to develop biological weapons, e.g. the large-scale biological weapons program in the Soviet Union from 1946 to 1992. Moreover, there have been a number of acts, or attempted acts, of bioterrorism, notably by the Aum Shinrikyo in Japan. Techniques of genetic engineering have been available for some time to enhance the virulence, transmissibility and so on of naturally occurring pathogens. Recent developments in synthetic genomics have exacerbated the problem even further. Accordingly, there is the very real possibility of malevolent individuals or groups acquiring pathogens that have enhanced virulence and transmissibility and releasing them into the environment with catastrophic consequence. Some obvious regulatory measures that might be considered in relation to dual use issues include: regulations providing for mandatory physical safety and security of the storage, transport and physical access to samples of pathogens, equipment, laboratories etc.; mandatory licensing of dual-use technologies/techniques/pathogen samples; mandatory education and training; mandatory personnel security regulation e.g. background checks; censorship.
AB - Developments in the biological sciences have produced great benefits, including in relation to the control of diseases. However, in the recent and not so recent past, a number of governments have sought to develop biological weapons, e.g. the large-scale biological weapons program in the Soviet Union from 1946 to 1992. Moreover, there have been a number of acts, or attempted acts, of bioterrorism, notably by the Aum Shinrikyo in Japan. Techniques of genetic engineering have been available for some time to enhance the virulence, transmissibility and so on of naturally occurring pathogens. Recent developments in synthetic genomics have exacerbated the problem even further. Accordingly, there is the very real possibility of malevolent individuals or groups acquiring pathogens that have enhanced virulence and transmissibility and releasing them into the environment with catastrophic consequence. Some obvious regulatory measures that might be considered in relation to dual use issues include: regulations providing for mandatory physical safety and security of the storage, transport and physical access to samples of pathogens, equipment, laboratories etc.; mandatory licensing of dual-use technologies/techniques/pathogen samples; mandatory education and training; mandatory personnel security regulation e.g. background checks; censorship.
KW - Biological Weapons
KW - Collective Moral Responsibility
KW - Intellectual Inquiry
KW - Malevolent Individuals
KW - Mandatory Licensing
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?scp=85103956707&partnerID=8YFLogxK
UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85103956707&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-92606-3_8
DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-92606-3_8
M3 - Chapter (peer-reviewed)
AN - SCOPUS:85103956707
SN - 9783319926056
T3 - SpringerBriefs in Ethics
SP - 105
EP - 114
BT - Dual use science and technology, ethics and weapons of mass destruction
A2 - Miller, Seumas
PB - Springer
CY - Cham, Switzerland
ER -