Conspiracy Theories and Conspiracy Theorising

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    86 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    The dismissive attitude of intellectuals toward conspiracy theorists is considered and given some justification. It is argued that intellectuals are entitled to an attitude of prima facie skepticism toward the theories propounded by conspiracy theorists, because conspiracy theorists have an irrational tendency to continue to believe in conspiracy theories, even when these take on the appearance of forming the core of degenerating research program. It is further argued that the pervasive effect of the 'fundamental attribution error' can explain the behavior of such conspiracy theorists. A rival approach due to Brian Keeley, which involves the criticism of a subclass of conspiracy theories on epistemic grounds, is considered and found to be inadequate.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)131-150
    Number of pages20
    JournalPhilosophy of the Social Sciences
    Volume32
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Jun 2002

    Fingerprint

    intellectual
    attribution
    criticism
    Theorists
    Conspiracy
    Conspiracy Theory
    Skepticism
    Research Program
    Justification
    Criticism
    Rivals
    Fundamental
    Attribution

    Cite this

    @article{10d06e88c0d2437ab2a99089c659f534,
    title = "Conspiracy Theories and Conspiracy Theorising",
    abstract = "The dismissive attitude of intellectuals toward conspiracy theorists is considered and given some justification. It is argued that intellectuals are entitled to an attitude of prima facie skepticism toward the theories propounded by conspiracy theorists, because conspiracy theorists have an irrational tendency to continue to believe in conspiracy theories, even when these take on the appearance of forming the core of degenerating research program. It is further argued that the pervasive effect of the 'fundamental attribution error' can explain the behavior of such conspiracy theorists. A rival approach due to Brian Keeley, which involves the criticism of a subclass of conspiracy theories on epistemic grounds, is considered and found to be inadequate.",
    author = "Stephen Clarke",
    note = "Imported on 12 Apr 2017 - DigiTool details were: month (773h) = June 2002; Journal title (773t) = Philosophy of the Social Sciences. ISSNs: 0048-3931;",
    year = "2002",
    month = "6",
    doi = "10.1177/004931032002001",
    language = "English",
    volume = "32",
    pages = "131--150",
    journal = "Philosophy of the Social Sciences",
    issn = "0048-3931",
    publisher = "SAGE Publications Inc.",
    number = "2",

    }

    Conspiracy Theories and Conspiracy Theorising. / Clarke, Stephen.

    In: Philosophy of the Social Sciences, Vol. 32, No. 2, 06.2002, p. 131-150.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    TY - JOUR

    T1 - Conspiracy Theories and Conspiracy Theorising

    AU - Clarke, Stephen

    N1 - Imported on 12 Apr 2017 - DigiTool details were: month (773h) = June 2002; Journal title (773t) = Philosophy of the Social Sciences. ISSNs: 0048-3931;

    PY - 2002/6

    Y1 - 2002/6

    N2 - The dismissive attitude of intellectuals toward conspiracy theorists is considered and given some justification. It is argued that intellectuals are entitled to an attitude of prima facie skepticism toward the theories propounded by conspiracy theorists, because conspiracy theorists have an irrational tendency to continue to believe in conspiracy theories, even when these take on the appearance of forming the core of degenerating research program. It is further argued that the pervasive effect of the 'fundamental attribution error' can explain the behavior of such conspiracy theorists. A rival approach due to Brian Keeley, which involves the criticism of a subclass of conspiracy theories on epistemic grounds, is considered and found to be inadequate.

    AB - The dismissive attitude of intellectuals toward conspiracy theorists is considered and given some justification. It is argued that intellectuals are entitled to an attitude of prima facie skepticism toward the theories propounded by conspiracy theorists, because conspiracy theorists have an irrational tendency to continue to believe in conspiracy theories, even when these take on the appearance of forming the core of degenerating research program. It is further argued that the pervasive effect of the 'fundamental attribution error' can explain the behavior of such conspiracy theorists. A rival approach due to Brian Keeley, which involves the criticism of a subclass of conspiracy theories on epistemic grounds, is considered and found to be inadequate.

    U2 - 10.1177/004931032002001

    DO - 10.1177/004931032002001

    M3 - Article

    VL - 32

    SP - 131

    EP - 150

    JO - Philosophy of the Social Sciences

    JF - Philosophy of the Social Sciences

    SN - 0048-3931

    IS - 2

    ER -