Dividing harm

Esben Overland

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    6 Citations (Scopus)
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    Abstract

    In this paper I argue that mere causal contribution to harm is morally significant on two counts: a) innocent aggressors have a duty to bear additional costs to help protect their potential victims, as compared to the duty innocent bystanders are expected to bear, and correspondingly; b) it is permissible to use more force against innocent aggressors, as used in self-defense and defense of others, than innocent bystanders. The paper has two parts. First I aim to demonstrate the intuitive plausibility of this proposal and what I call 'the asymmetrical fair share procedure.' According to this procedure, innocent aggressors have a duty to take on a fair share of the harm if dividing it is possible, and a fair share of the risk of being harmed if redistribution of harm is impossible. In the second part, I develop a contractual account explaining why mere contribution is morally significant.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)547-566
    Number of pages20
    JournalJournal of Moral Philosophy
    Volume8
    Issue number4
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2011

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    Harm
    Bystander
    Redistribution
    Costs
    Plausibility
    Self-defense
    Asymmetrical
    Causal

    Cite this

    Overland, Esben. / Dividing harm. In: Journal of Moral Philosophy. 2011 ; Vol. 8, No. 4. pp. 547-566.
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    Dividing harm. / Overland, Esben.

    In: Journal of Moral Philosophy, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2011, p. 547-566.

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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    AB - In this paper I argue that mere causal contribution to harm is morally significant on two counts: a) innocent aggressors have a duty to bear additional costs to help protect their potential victims, as compared to the duty innocent bystanders are expected to bear, and correspondingly; b) it is permissible to use more force against innocent aggressors, as used in self-defense and defense of others, than innocent bystanders. The paper has two parts. First I aim to demonstrate the intuitive plausibility of this proposal and what I call 'the asymmetrical fair share procedure.' According to this procedure, innocent aggressors have a duty to take on a fair share of the harm if dividing it is possible, and a fair share of the risk of being harmed if redistribution of harm is impossible. In the second part, I develop a contractual account explaining why mere contribution is morally significant.

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