Finking Frankfurt

Daniel Cohen, Toby Handfield

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

21 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

Michael Smith has resisted Harry Frankfurt's claim that moral responsibility does not require the ability to have done otherwise. He does this by claiming that, in Frankfurt cases, the ability to do otherwise is indeed present, but is a disposition that has been ''nked' or masked by other factors. We suggest that, while Smith's account appears to work for some classic Frankfurt cases, it does not work for all. In particular, Smith cannot explain cases, such as the Willing Addict, where the Frankfurt devise ' e.g. the addiction ' is intrinsic to the agent.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)363-374
Number of pages12
JournalPhilosophical Studies
Volume135
Issue number3
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Sep 2007

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