Game theory and the self-fulfilling climate tragedy

Matthew Kopec

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

    3 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Game theorists tend to model climate negotiations as a so-called ‘tragedy of the commons’. This is rather worrisome, since the conditions under which such commons problems have historically been solved are almost entirely absent in the case of international greenhouse gas emissions. In this paper, I will argue that the predictive accuracy of the tragedy model might not stem from the model’s inherent match with reality but rather from the model’s ability to make self-fulfilling predictions. I then sketch some possible ways to dispel the tragedy, including (1) recognising some ways the assumptions of the model fail, (2) taking seriously recent work suggesting that increasing greenhouse gas emissions is not in most nations’ own self-interest, and (3) preferring alternative models like collective risk dilemmas, bargaining games, or cooperative models.

    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)203-221
    Number of pages19
    JournalEnvironmental Values
    Volume26
    Issue number2
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - Apr 2017

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