Abstract
In a recent paper in Religious Studies, Clarke criticizes Mumford's definition of a miracle as it fails to recognize a supernatural agent capable of intent. Clarke believes that in order for an event to qualify as a miracle a supernatural agent must intend it. It is my aim to dismiss this qualification and demonstrate how Mumford's intent-neutral definition is less problematic. I will do this by examining each of the three cases against Mumford's definition and give reason to reject Clarke's criticism and his own definition of a miracle.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Pages (from-to) | 465-469 |
| Number of pages | 5 |
| Journal | Religious Studies |
| Volume | 39 |
| Issue number | 4 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - Oct 2003 |
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Cite this
Luck, M. (2003). In Defence of Mumford's Definition of a Miracle. Religious Studies, 39(4), 465-469. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0034412503006607