Abstract
I will consider how the notion of incommensurability, as championed by Parfit (Reasons and persons, 1984), Griffin (Well-being: its meaning, measurement and importance, 1986), Chang (Ethics 112:659'688, 2002), and Hare (Philos Perspect 23:165'176, 2009), might affect both the argument from slight pain (which suggests God's non-existence can be inferred from the merest stubbing of one's toe) and Leibniz's reply to this argument. I conclude that the notion of incommensurability may ultimately strengthen Leibniz's general position.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 79-85 |
Number of pages | 7 |
Journal | International Journal for Philosophy of Religion |
Volume | 75 |
Issue number | 2 |
Early online date | 2013 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Apr 2014 |