Incommensurability, slight pains and God

Research output: Contribution to journalArticlepeer-review

Abstract

I will consider how the notion of incommensurability, as championed by Parfit (Reasons and persons, 1984), Griffin (Well-being: its meaning, measurement and importance, 1986), Chang (Ethics 112:659'688, 2002), and Hare (Philos Perspect 23:165'176, 2009), might affect both the argument from slight pain (which suggests God's non-existence can be inferred from the merest stubbing of one's toe) and Leibniz's reply to this argument. I conclude that the notion of incommensurability may ultimately strengthen Leibniz's general position.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)79-85
Number of pages7
JournalInternational Journal for Philosophy of Religion
Volume75
Issue number2
Early online date2013
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Apr 2014

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Incommensurability, slight pains and God'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this