Incommensurability, slight pains and God

Morgan Luck

doi:10.1007/s11153-013-9416-3

Incommensurability, slight pains and God

Morgan Luck

Humanities and Social Sciences

Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › peer-review

Abstract

I will consider how the notion of incommensurability, as championed by Parfit (Reasons and persons, 1984), Griffin (Well-being: its meaning, measurement and importance, 1986), Chang (Ethics 112:659'688, 2002), and Hare (Philos Perspect 23:165'176, 2009), might affect both the argument from slight pain (which suggests God's non-existence can be inferred from the merest stubbing of one's toe) and Leibniz's reply to this argument. I conclude that the notion of incommensurability may ultimately strengthen Leibniz's general position.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	79-85
Number of pages	7
Journal	International Journal for Philosophy of Religion
Volume	75
Issue number	2
Early online date	2013
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s11153-013-9416-3
Publication status	Published - Apr 2014

Access to Document

10.1007/s11153-013-9416-3

Fingerprint Dive into the research topics of 'Incommensurability, slight pains and God'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this

@article{d4f0f84e8b114050a7c12da9220e3d86,

title = "Incommensurability, slight pains and God",

abstract = "I will consider how the notion of incommensurability, as championed by Parfit (Reasons and persons, 1984), Griffin (Well-being: its meaning, measurement and importance, 1986), Chang (Ethics 112:659'688, 2002), and Hare (Philos Perspect 23:165'176, 2009), might affect both the argument from slight pain (which suggests God's non-existence can be inferred from the merest stubbing of one's toe) and Leibniz's reply to this argument. I conclude that the notion of incommensurability may ultimately strengthen Leibniz's general position.",

keywords = "God, Incommensurability, Slight pain, Leibniz",

author = "Morgan Luck",

note = "Includes bibliographical references.",

year = "2014",

month = apr,

doi = "10.1007/s11153-013-9416-3",

language = "English",

volume = "75",

pages = "79--85",

journal = "International Journal for Philosophy of Religion",

issn = "0020-7047",

publisher = "Springer Netherlands",

number = "2",

}

TY - JOUR

T1 - Incommensurability, slight pains and God

AU - Luck, Morgan

N1 - Includes bibliographical references.

PY - 2014/4

Y1 - 2014/4

N2 - I will consider how the notion of incommensurability, as championed by Parfit (Reasons and persons, 1984), Griffin (Well-being: its meaning, measurement and importance, 1986), Chang (Ethics 112:659'688, 2002), and Hare (Philos Perspect 23:165'176, 2009), might affect both the argument from slight pain (which suggests God's non-existence can be inferred from the merest stubbing of one's toe) and Leibniz's reply to this argument. I conclude that the notion of incommensurability may ultimately strengthen Leibniz's general position.

AB - I will consider how the notion of incommensurability, as championed by Parfit (Reasons and persons, 1984), Griffin (Well-being: its meaning, measurement and importance, 1986), Chang (Ethics 112:659'688, 2002), and Hare (Philos Perspect 23:165'176, 2009), might affect both the argument from slight pain (which suggests God's non-existence can be inferred from the merest stubbing of one's toe) and Leibniz's reply to this argument. I conclude that the notion of incommensurability may ultimately strengthen Leibniz's general position.

KW - God

KW - Incommensurability

KW - Slight pain

KW - Leibniz

U2 - 10.1007/s11153-013-9416-3

DO - 10.1007/s11153-013-9416-3

M3 - Article

VL - 75

SP - 79

EP - 85

JO - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion

JF - International Journal for Philosophy of Religion

SN - 0020-7047

IS - 2

ER -