TY - CHAP
T1 - Joint actions
T2 - We-mode and I-mode
AU - Miller, Seumas
PY - 2023/5
Y1 - 2023/5
N2 - Raimo Tuomela has a good deal to say about the we-mode and the I-mode in relation to joint actions and related phenomena. Moreover, he also invoked the notion of a pro-group I-mode. However, it is not always entirely clear what the basis of these distinctions is and whether, ultimately, the distinction between the we-mode and the pro-group I-mode can be satisfactorily made out. If not then, since pro-group I-mode is a species of I-mode, the fundamental distinction between we-mode and I-mode is called into question. In this paper, firstly, I explore these distinctions and Raimo Tuomela’s understanding of them. Secondly, I contrast Tuomela’s conception with my own strict individualist I-mode account and argue inter alia that since the notion of we-mode (at least as articulated by Tuomela) cannot satisfactorily be distinguished from a pro-group I-mode then to this extent and contra Tuomela we should prefer an account of collective intentions and related we-mode phenomena, including so-called we-reasons, purely in terms of I-mode and, therefore, in strict individualist terms.
AB - Raimo Tuomela has a good deal to say about the we-mode and the I-mode in relation to joint actions and related phenomena. Moreover, he also invoked the notion of a pro-group I-mode. However, it is not always entirely clear what the basis of these distinctions is and whether, ultimately, the distinction between the we-mode and the pro-group I-mode can be satisfactorily made out. If not then, since pro-group I-mode is a species of I-mode, the fundamental distinction between we-mode and I-mode is called into question. In this paper, firstly, I explore these distinctions and Raimo Tuomela’s understanding of them. Secondly, I contrast Tuomela’s conception with my own strict individualist I-mode account and argue inter alia that since the notion of we-mode (at least as articulated by Tuomela) cannot satisfactorily be distinguished from a pro-group I-mode then to this extent and contra Tuomela we should prefer an account of collective intentions and related we-mode phenomena, including so-called we-reasons, purely in terms of I-mode and, therefore, in strict individualist terms.
UR - https://link.springer.com/content/pdf/bfm:978-3-031-22626-7/1?pdf=chapter%20toc
UR - https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-031-22626-7_4
UR - https://link.springer.com/book/10.1007/978-3-031-22626-7#toc
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-031-22626-7_4
DO - 10.1007/978-3-031-22626-7_4
M3 - Chapter (peer-reviewed)
SN - 9783031226250
T3 - Philosophers in Depth
SP - 59
EP - 78
BT - Tuomela on sociality
A2 - Garcia-Godinez, Miguel
A2 - Mellin, Rachael
PB - Palgrave Macmillan
ER -