Luck and History-Sensitive Compatibilism

Neil Levy

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    5 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    Libertarianism seems vulnerable to a serious problem concerning present luck, because it requires indeterminism somewhere in the causal chain leading to directly free action. Compatibilism, in contrast, is thought to be free of this problem, as not requiring indeterminism in the causal chain. I argue that this view is false: compatibilism is subject to a problem of present luck. This is less of a problem for compatibilism than for libertarianism. However, its effects are just as devastating for one kind of compatibilism, the kind of compatibilism which is history-sensitive, and therefore must take the problem of constitutive luck seriously. The problem of present luck confronting compatibilism is sufficient to undermine the history-sensitive compatibilist's response to remote ' constitutive ' luck.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)237-251
    Number of pages15
    JournalPhilosophical Quarterly
    Volume59
    Issue number235
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2009

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