Abstract
Protecting software supply chains from malicious packages is paramount in the evolving landscape of software development. Attacks on the software supply chain involve attackers injecting harmful software into commonly used packages or libraries in a software repository. For instance, JavaScript uses Node Package Manager (NPM), and Python uses Python Package Index (PyPi) as their respective package repositories. In the past, NPM has had vulnerabilities such as the event-stream incident, where a malicious package was introduced into a popular NPM package, potentially impacting a wide range of projects. As the integration of third-party packages becomes increasingly ubiquitous in modern software development, accelerating the creation and deployment of applications, the need for a robust detection mechanism has become critical. On the other hand, due to the sheer volume of new packages being released daily, the task of identifying malicious packages presents a significant
challenge. To address this issue, in this paper, we introduce a metadata-based malicious package detection model, MeMPtec. This model extracts a set of features from package metadata information. These extracted features are classified as either easy-to-manipulate (ETM) or difficult-to-manipulate (DTM) features based on monotonicity and restricted control properties. By utilising these metadata
features, not only do we improve the effectiveness of detecting malicious packages, but also we demonstrate its resistance to adversarial attacks in comparison with existing state-of-the-art. Our experiments indicate a significant reduction in both false positives (up to 97.56%) and false negatives (up to 91.86%).
challenge. To address this issue, in this paper, we introduce a metadata-based malicious package detection model, MeMPtec. This model extracts a set of features from package metadata information. These extracted features are classified as either easy-to-manipulate (ETM) or difficult-to-manipulate (DTM) features based on monotonicity and restricted control properties. By utilising these metadata
features, not only do we improve the effectiveness of detecting malicious packages, but also we demonstrate its resistance to adversarial attacks in comparison with existing state-of-the-art. Our experiments indicate a significant reduction in both false positives (up to 97.56%) and false negatives (up to 91.86%).
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | WWW 2024 - Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference |
Subtitle of host publication | Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference 2024 |
Publisher | Association for Computing Machinery, Inc (ACM) |
Pages | 1779-1789 |
Number of pages | 11 |
ISBN (Electronic) | 9798400701719 |
ISBN (Print) | 9798400701719 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 13 May 2024 |
Event | 33rd ACM Web Conference, WWW 2024 - Singapore, Singapore Duration: 13 May 2024 → 17 May 2024 |
Publication series
Name | WWW 2024 - Proceedings of the ACM Web Conference |
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Conference
Conference | 33rd ACM Web Conference, WWW 2024 |
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Country/Territory | Singapore |
City | Singapore |
Period | 13/05/24 → 17/05/24 |