TY - JOUR
T1 - Openness, Accidentality and Responsibility
AU - Cohen, Daniel
N1 - Imported on 12 Apr 2017 - DigiTool details were: Journal title (773t) = Philosophical Studies: an international journal for philosophy in the analytic tradition. ISSNs: 0031-8116;
PY - 2006
Y1 - 2006
N2 - In this paper, I present a novel argument for scepticism about moral responsibility. Unlike traditional arguments, this argument doesn't depend on contingent empirical claims about the truth or falsity of causal determinism. Rather, it is argued that the conceptual conditions of responsibility are jointly incompatible. In short, when an agent is responsible for an action, it must be true both that the action was non-accidental, and that it was open to the agent not to perform that action. However, as I argue, an action is only non-accidental in those cases where it isn't open to the agent not to perform it.
AB - In this paper, I present a novel argument for scepticism about moral responsibility. Unlike traditional arguments, this argument doesn't depend on contingent empirical claims about the truth or falsity of causal determinism. Rather, it is argued that the conceptual conditions of responsibility are jointly incompatible. In short, when an agent is responsible for an action, it must be true both that the action was non-accidental, and that it was open to the agent not to perform that action. However, as I argue, an action is only non-accidental in those cases where it isn't open to the agent not to perform it.
KW - Free Will
KW - Moral Responsibility
U2 - 10.1007/s11098-004-7793-2
DO - 10.1007/s11098-004-7793-2
M3 - Article
SN - 0031-8116
VL - 127
SP - 581
EP - 597
JO - Philosophical Studies
JF - Philosophical Studies
IS - 3
ER -