Abstract
Among theories of personal identity over time, the simple view has not been popular among philosophers, but it nevertheless remains the default view among non-philosophers. It may be construed either as the view that nothing grounds a claim of personal identity over time, or that something quite simple (a soul perhaps) is the ground. If the former construal is accepted, a conspicuous difficulty is that the condition of causal dependence between person-stages is absent. But this leaves such a view open to an objection from the failure to provide a condition of individuation. If, on the other hand something like a soul is said to ground personal identity over time, such an account turns out to be more suited to a kind of continuity view.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 183-208 |
Number of pages | 26 |
Journal | Philosophical Papers |
Volume | 39 |
Issue number | 2 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - Jul 2010 |