Questioning two assumptions in the Metaphysics of Technological Objects

Sadjad Soltanzadeh

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

There are at least two assumptions which, except for very few occasions, have not been discussed by philosophers who have written on the metaphysics of technological objects. The first assumption is that to be a technology is an absolute matter and that all technological objects are equally technological. The second assumption is that the property of being technological is abstracted from existing things which happen to have this property in common. I appeal to the definition of technological objects as problem-solving physical instruments to show that (i) things can be technological to different degrees, and that (ii) the property of being technological is more fundamental than being a technology.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)127-135
Number of pages9
JournalPhilosophy and Technology
Volume29
Issue number2
Early online date2015
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2016

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Metaphysics
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Soltanzadeh, Sadjad. / Questioning two assumptions in the Metaphysics of Technological Objects. In: Philosophy and Technology. 2016 ; Vol. 29, No. 2. pp. 127-135.
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Questioning two assumptions in the Metaphysics of Technological Objects. / Soltanzadeh, Sadjad.

In: Philosophy and Technology, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2016, p. 127-135.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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