Rational Capacities, Resolve, and Weakness of Will

Daniel Cohen, Toby Handfield

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

7 Citations (Scopus)
4 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

In this paper we present an account of practical rationality and weakness of will in terms of rational capacities. We show how our account recti'es various shortcomings in Michael Smith's related theory. In particular, our account is capable of accommodating cases of weak-willed behaviour that are not 'akratic', or otherwise contrary to the agent's better judgement. Our account differs from Smith's primarily by incorporating resolve: a third rational capacity for resolute maintenance of one's intentions. We discuss further two ways to explain the importance of resolve to practical rationality: one based on Richard Holton's recent work, and an alternative, non-consequentialist account.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)907-932
Number of pages26
JournalMind
Volume119
Issue number476
Early online date2010
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2011

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Weakness of Will
Practical Rationality
Intentions

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Cohen, Daniel ; Handfield, Toby. / Rational Capacities, Resolve, and Weakness of Will. In: Mind. 2011 ; Vol. 119, No. 476. pp. 907-932.
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Rational Capacities, Resolve, and Weakness of Will. / Cohen, Daniel; Handfield, Toby.

In: Mind, Vol. 119, No. 476, 2011, p. 907-932.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

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