TY - CHAP
T1 - The condition of last resort
AU - Uniacke, Suzanne
PY - 2018/1/1
Y1 - 2018/1/1
N2 - Just War theory specifies that recourse to war must be a last resort. This specification accords with a more general aim to limit the occurrence of war by articulating demanding conditions under which war can be morally legitimate. Although it has critics among contemporary Western philosophers, the condition of last resort is widely accepted as a basic element of Just War theory. It is not itself an issue of dispute between historical as opposed to contemporary Just War theorists, or between traditional as opposed to revisionist Just War theorists. The defensibility of “last resort” as a necessary condition of legitimate recourse to war will depend on how the condition is best interpreted and on its moral rationale. Last Resort: Interpretation, Rationale, Acceptability Three philosophical questions about the condition of last resort rise at the most basic level: How should we interpret this condition? What is its moral rationale? Should we accept last resort as a necessary condition of legitimate recourse to war? These questions are interrelated. For instance, a defensible interpretation of last resort as a condition of jus ad bellum is shaped by what we take the moral rationale of this condition to be. In the other direction, the moral considerations that ground the requirement that recourse to war be a last resort have a significant bearing on how we should interpret this condition. An account of what last resort requires and implies, both in theory and in practice, is directly relevant to whether this condition ought to be accepted as necessary to legitimate recourse to war. The answers to these philosophical questions are highly significant to whether a condition of last resort should be adopted in policy or incorporated as part of international law. They are also relevant to how this condition is to be applied in practice. In this chapter I address these three philosophical questions. Before doing so it is important to acknowledge that the interpretation and the rationale and justification of last resort as a condition of jus ad bellum depend on what we take war to be: according to Just War theory recourse to war must be a last resort because of what war is and does.
AB - Just War theory specifies that recourse to war must be a last resort. This specification accords with a more general aim to limit the occurrence of war by articulating demanding conditions under which war can be morally legitimate. Although it has critics among contemporary Western philosophers, the condition of last resort is widely accepted as a basic element of Just War theory. It is not itself an issue of dispute between historical as opposed to contemporary Just War theorists, or between traditional as opposed to revisionist Just War theorists. The defensibility of “last resort” as a necessary condition of legitimate recourse to war will depend on how the condition is best interpreted and on its moral rationale. Last Resort: Interpretation, Rationale, Acceptability Three philosophical questions about the condition of last resort rise at the most basic level: How should we interpret this condition? What is its moral rationale? Should we accept last resort as a necessary condition of legitimate recourse to war? These questions are interrelated. For instance, a defensible interpretation of last resort as a condition of jus ad bellum is shaped by what we take the moral rationale of this condition to be. In the other direction, the moral considerations that ground the requirement that recourse to war be a last resort have a significant bearing on how we should interpret this condition. An account of what last resort requires and implies, both in theory and in practice, is directly relevant to whether this condition ought to be accepted as necessary to legitimate recourse to war. The answers to these philosophical questions are highly significant to whether a condition of last resort should be adopted in policy or incorporated as part of international law. They are also relevant to how this condition is to be applied in practice. In this chapter I address these three philosophical questions. Before doing so it is important to acknowledge that the interpretation and the rationale and justification of last resort as a condition of jus ad bellum depend on what we take war to be: according to Just War theory recourse to war must be a last resort because of what war is and does.
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UR - http://www.scopus.com/inward/citedby.url?scp=85047994274&partnerID=8YFLogxK
U2 - 10.1017/9781316591307.007
DO - 10.1017/9781316591307.007
M3 - Chapter (peer-reviewed)
AN - SCOPUS:85047994274
SN - 9781107152496
SN - 9781316606629
T3 - Cambridge handbooks in philosophy
SP - 98
EP - 113
BT - The Cambridge handbook of the just war
A2 - May, Larry
PB - Cambridge University Press
ER -