The Moral Status of Virtual Artefacts In Computer Games

In this paper I examine the question concerning the Moral Status of Virtual Artefacts in Computer Games: What is, if any, the moral status of virtual artefacts such as virtual swords (vswords), v-wands, v-buildings, avatars, v-apparel, v-cars, etc., in computer games? Following Floridi (2007), I argue initially and in agreement with Floridi that artefacts generally and in my case virtual artefacts (Varts) existing in computer games can be correctly conceived as informational objects. As such, such virtual artefacts can be correctly conceived as moral patients deserving of some prima facie minimal moral consideration in their own right and independently of the moral and legal rights-claims, if any, that the creators and/or owners of those Varts might have to them. In this paper I will be primarily concerned with the moral status of Varts as such and not with the question concerning the moral or legal rights that computergame players or other stake-holders may or may not have to Varts.