TY - JOUR
T1 - Understanding the risks of China-made CCTV surveillance cameras in Australia
AU - Bernot, Ausma
AU - Smith, Marcus
N1 - Publisher Copyright:
© 2023 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group.
PY - 2023/8/24
Y1 - 2023/8/24
N2 - In the global interconnected economy, China-made information-collecting technologies such as closed-circuit television (CCTV) surveillance cameras have become popular products for routine video-based surveillance. Hikvision and Dahua are the two largest global suppliers of CCTV cameras, with both companies supplying their products to over 200 countries. Despite their popularity, national security concerns are commonly cited when adopting these cameras, citing manufacturer links with the Communist Party of China (CPC), cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and sales recorded in the Xinjiang region, that has records of human rights violations. This paper is structured in three parts: first, we explore the predominance of China-made information-gathering technologies in Australia; second, we summarise common national security concerns usually associated with China-based technology manufacturers; and third, we propose regulatory measures to regulating China-made CCTV cameras in Australia. The paper suggests that while state and Federal decision-makers are free to remove Chinese CCTV surveillance cameras, they should avoid overt politisation. Overall, a stronger focus should be placed on evaluating cybersecurity risks of Internet of Things (IoT) information-collecting technologies and considering their timely and effective regulation from the perspective of individual and national interests.
AB - In the global interconnected economy, China-made information-collecting technologies such as closed-circuit television (CCTV) surveillance cameras have become popular products for routine video-based surveillance. Hikvision and Dahua are the two largest global suppliers of CCTV cameras, with both companies supplying their products to over 200 countries. Despite their popularity, national security concerns are commonly cited when adopting these cameras, citing manufacturer links with the Communist Party of China (CPC), cybersecurity vulnerabilities, and sales recorded in the Xinjiang region, that has records of human rights violations. This paper is structured in three parts: first, we explore the predominance of China-made information-gathering technologies in Australia; second, we summarise common national security concerns usually associated with China-based technology manufacturers; and third, we propose regulatory measures to regulating China-made CCTV cameras in Australia. The paper suggests that while state and Federal decision-makers are free to remove Chinese CCTV surveillance cameras, they should avoid overt politisation. Overall, a stronger focus should be placed on evaluating cybersecurity risks of Internet of Things (IoT) information-collecting technologies and considering their timely and effective regulation from the perspective of individual and national interests.
KW - surveillance; national security; CCTV; China’s Party–state; privacy; data security; IoT;
KW - national security
KW - data security
KW - privacy
KW - China’s Party–state
KW - surveillance
KW - IoT
KW - CCTV
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U2 - 10.1080/10357718.2023.2248915
DO - 10.1080/10357718.2023.2248915
M3 - Article
SN - 1465-332X
VL - 77
SP - 380
EP - 398
JO - Australian Journal of International Affairs
JF - Australian Journal of International Affairs
IS - 4
ER -