What, and Where, Luck Is: A Response to Jennifer Lackey

Neil Levy

    Research output: Contribution to journalArticle

    18 Citations (Scopus)

    Abstract

    In 'What Luck Is Not', Lackey presents counterexamples to the two most prominent accounts of luck: the absence of control account and the modal account. I offer an account of luck that conjoins absence of control to a modal condition. I then show that Lackey's counterexamples mislocate the luck: the agents in her cases are lucky, but the luck precedes the event upon which Lackey focuses, and that event is itself only fortunate, not lucky. Finally I offer an account of fortune. Fortune is luck-involving, and therefore easily confused with luck, but it is not itself lucky.
    Original languageEnglish
    Pages (from-to)489-497
    Number of pages9
    JournalAustralasian Journal of Philosophy
    Volume87
    Issue number3
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2009

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