

Trinity, aseity, and the commensurability of the incommensurate One

Jacqueline Service

A contiguous thread of reflection throughout Sonderegger's article, "The God we worship; the worship we owe God"¹ is how the uncontainable God may relate to "not-God," without either restraining the infinite nature of God, nor capitulating to pantheistic logic. Sonderegger ascribes to the apophatic tradition, a tradition that cautiously categorises the divine attributes by what God *is not* (*via negativa*), the theological construction of a "sharp and shining barrier between Creator and creature" in order to "safeguard against pantheism."² Central to such theology is that God is not the creation. God is ontologically distinct from creation. God is not the greater, more replete version of the created order; God is of an utterly different order of Being. Sonderegger's paper agrees with such apophatic conclusions regarding the distinction between God and not-God. However, it does so through the Scriptural compulsion of a *positive* theology. For Sonderegger, God's inner dynamic perfections (*ad intra*), disclosed through the scriptural narrative of God's positive relation with the world (*ad extra*), determine that "God cannot be exhaustively understood as over-against creation . . . the negative Attributes of God must in the end, and properly, be positive."³

Jacqueline Service is Lecturer in Theology at Alphacrucis College, Sydney, Australia. Her PhD (Charles Sturt University) focused on the relationship between the doctrine of God and social justice, including international aid and development. She is currently a trustee for the International Anglican Order of the Cross. This article has been peer reviewed.

Consistent with her theological method, Sonderegger's essay "The God we worship; the worship we owe God" introduces the seemingly incongruous logic of upholding God's radical ontological distinction from the creature alongside the scriptural attestation that the "one God . . . can come into our presence and we in His."⁴ In this manner, she raises a teasingly nascent contemplation: how are we to arrive at a coherence between "Divine Aseity and His Sojourn among his creatures"?⁵ Such a question provokes two valid reservations regarding aseity and its relation to the doctrine of God. First, does the notion of divine aseity impel a non-biblical characterisation of God as a non-relational being? And second, is aseity a metaphysical interloper that conceptually prevents God receiving enrichment from that which is created? On these questions hinge the disquiet introduced in Sonderegger's paper—namely, is the notion of aseity and the incommensurate distinction of God to humanity incompatible with the revelation of the Christian God?

Whilst initiating this question, Sonderegger's essay ultimately does not articulate the logic of retaining divine aseity as necessary for Christian theology. Such an articulation has begun to be cultivated in her subsequent *Systematic Theology*, and that through a contemplation of the Oneness of Divinity. As such, this paper explores, alongside her necessary retrieval of the classical divine perfections, the congruity between the incommensurability of *Triune* aseity and God's relationality towards creation. Specifically, it is argued that the triune dynamism of God's self-sufficient being is the grounding context for perceiving the profound distinction, as well as profound communion, between the Creator and creature.

The theological importance of aseity

Before attending to the heart of our discussion, it is necessary to define some key propositions. Divine aseity (God is self-sufficient), alongside immutability (God cannot change) and impassibility (God cannot suffer) are related constructs that stem from the founding metaphysic of divine simplicity. Divine simplicity, the locus of Aristotelian and Platonic thought, conceptualises the notion of "divine" perfection.⁶ Simplicity renders the divine free of composition and is invoked to preserve the undividedness of divine ontology, necessary for divine perfection. Dolezal defines simplicity in an apophatic sense, "as God's *lack* of parts . . . he is [not] physically, logically, or metaphysically composite."⁷ This means that there is "no diversity or change or multiplicity of parts, or accidents, or . . . any other forms" in

the divine essence.⁸ Dolezal, regarding simplicity as the lack of composition by substance or accidents,⁹ explains its *theological* importance:

If God were to be so determined one would have to say that there are aspects of God's being that are true in virtue of something other than his divine substance. That is, God as *divine* would not be sufficient to account for the full range of his actuality—he would depend upon something non-divine (i.e. the accident) for some aspect of his being. The doctrine of God's simplicity aims to rule out just such dependence.¹⁰

The idea that God depends on something outside of God for divinity introduces the notion of deficiency in God's being. Positing the concept that God is contingent on not-God has, therefore, traditionally been rendered incompatible with the perfection of divine being. Such a notion was held to undermine a Christian revelation of the self-sufficiency of divinity. It is from this fundamental notion of the perfection of divinity that the correlate of aseity receives its clarification, as, “the conviction that God is the one reality that exists *a se* (from and of himself) and is dependent on nothing outside of himself for his essence and existence.”¹¹

John Webster defined aseity in relation to the doctrine of creation *ex nihilo*, arguing “no perfection of God would be lost, no triune bliss compromised, were the world not to exist.”¹² Simply put, the Creator is not contained within the creation, the Creator is before it (Col 1:17) and is, therefore, not dependent on anything other than Godself for God's being. As such, divine aseity functions theologically to maintain the distinction between Creator and creature, and to posture the creature in its complete contingency on the Creator. McCall highlights such a concept from Scripture, arguing that, “only God says ‘I Am’ (Ex 3:14); everything else that exists says ‘I am because . . .’ God alone exists *a se*; everything else that exists does so in reliance upon him.”¹³

The problem: aseity and non-relationality?

The delineation between the *uncreated* Creator and created being is, therefore, as Webster argues, not a “distinction within created being but one between different orders of being.”¹⁴ Sonderegger's article accedes to such a definition of aseity, yet also expands the idea in what she terms a

“more radical way” as the incommensurate nature of God to His creatures.¹⁵ Setting aside Sonderegger’s lack of definitional nuance between the terms of incommensurability and aseity in her paper, she describes a commonality of terms that do not

Simply affirm that God and world are like apples and oranges, incomparable in pricing say, or use in pies. We affirm rather that there is not larger category in which the two *relata* can be contained, no common term or reality that can join them together.¹⁶

It is from this logic that Sonderegger raises what could be mistaken as her overall conclusion: that a

strict and relentless Doctrine of Incommensurability [and on her own conflation, aseity] in the Doctrine of God will dictate that God himself cannot . . . Tabernacle among us, standing at our right hand, nor we with Him.¹⁷

Such a conclusion regarding aseity and God’s relationality has indeed been made by modern theologians; here the alleged contradiction of divine aseity alongside divine relationality has been the foundation for calls for a wholesale rejection of the classical divine perfections. Alongside Sonderegger’s claim that it is “widespread in modern theology, that God is Incommensurate with His cosmos,”¹⁸ Vanhoozer describes “the demise of the classical paradigm,”¹⁹ and Goetz heralds the “rise of a new orthodoxy.”²⁰ This “new orthodoxy” rejects the classical divine perfections, including simplicity and aseity, as untenable propositions for the Christian God who intimately relates with creation. In her *Systematic Theology*, however, Sonderegger opposes, in consonance with a growing chorus of theologians,²¹ such a “new orthodoxy.” Rather, the first volume of her Systematics advocates for “compatibilism”; a conceptualisation that upholds the classical perfections in harmony with the intimacy of the God-world relation.²²

The contemporary rejection of aseity

The contemporary argument to cast-off divine aseity as merely a Greek metaphysic foreign to Scripture and incongruent with a “biblical” relational God²³ are what Holmes refers to as the “enemies” in Sonderegger’s project.²⁴ These voices, “most significantly Moltmann and Jenson,” shape their rejection

of the classical perfections on the basis that God's actions in the world "impact God's being."²⁵ Such a conclusion is the necessary result of a chain of logic that conflates the economic and immanent Trinity and advocates that God's relationship *with* the creature is determinative for God's being. On such a basis, theologians conclude that a strict ontological difference between God and humanity must be equated with a restriction on God's relationality towards the creature, and vice versa. Modern theologians misconstrue divine aseity as imputing solitariness, narcissism, self-indulgence, and non-relationality to the nature of God, and, therefore, reject such a divine perfection. For example, LaCugna's rejection of aseity was based on her view that God's perfection is "the perfection of love, of communion, of personhood," perfections that are the "antithesis of self-sufficiency."²⁶ For LaCugna, God is "alive in communion with the creature,"²⁷ where God's love, communion and personhood is derived through relationship with the creature, rendering God contingent on not-God. The proposition that God is self-sufficient was necessarily rejected. Disability theologian Nancy Eiesland followed a similar logic to LaCugna, regarding aseity as incompatible with a God who is in relationship with the creature. Eiesland coupled "belief in the transcendence of God constituted as radical otherness"²⁸ (in other words, on Sonderegger's terms, aseity or incommensurability) with a "god whose attention we cannot get."²⁹ LaCugna and Eiesland both regarded divine relationality and aseity as mutually exclusive. Therefore, God is dependent on not-God to be God and, necessarily, must not be self-sufficient.

Such a position is, however, not a logical inevitability. Hunsinger identifies the error of equating divine commitment "with strong dependence"—"as if a metaphysically independent God could not freely commit himself to the world, or as if God's free commitment to the world necessarily made him dependent upon it."³⁰ Such an alleged logical incongruence was, likewise, highlighted by Barth, who argued:

While He [God] could be everything only for Himself (and His life would not on that account be pointless, motionless and unmotivated, nor would it be any less majestic or any less the life of love), He wills—and this is for us the ever-wonderful twofold dynamic of his love—to have it not only for Himself, but also for us.³¹

The Trinity and relational distinction

At the heart of Sonderegger's disquieted question—can God sojourn with his people and retain divine aseity?—lies an enquiry regarding the criteria of relationality. The modern theological rejection of aseity is indeed premised on an assumption that “otherness” or “distinction” is at odds with communion. As will we see, however, various theologians have argued that distinction is a necessary component of relatedness. These theologians contend, from the context of God's own Triune life, and in unison with upholding the classical perfections,³² that distinction is ontologically constitutive for relationality. The starting point for such a logic is that divinity is commensurate with, or constituted by, the relations of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The relations of the Trinity are not prior to the divine essence, nor is the divine essence prior to the triune relations.³³ Rather, the Triune relations of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, as the essence of unified divinity, are the dynamic abundance of the pure act (*purus actus*) of God's Triune life.³⁴ Dolezal clarifies:

Insofar as the divine relations are identical with the divine nature we may say that God is relation itself and, as such, God is more intimately and perfectly personal and relational than any creature.³⁵

Using such a concept, Pannenberg argued that the unity of the Triune God is constituted through *self-distincting* relations of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. In other words, the fact that the Father is not the Son, the Son is not the Father (and so forth) is integral to the dynamism of divine communion. Pannenberg's argument found its logic by arguing that

“person” is a relational, correlative term: one gains one's personality by giving oneself to one's counterpart; thus, identity is gained *in separation from*, yet also in dependence on, the other.³⁶

He, therefore, concluded that the concept of hypostatic mutual self-distinction was integral to triune actualisation; divine difference was essential to divine relationality—the “Father is the Father only vis-à-vis the Son; the Son is Son only vis-à-vis the Father; the Spirit is Spirit only as the bond of community of Father and Son.”³⁷

Russian Orthodox theologian Sergeï Bulgakov also argued that the intra-trinitarian relations were constituted through a movement of self-giving and

receipt between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. Such a movement, Bulgakov argued, requires hypostatic distinction, where God's being is "realised dynamically, as the eternal act of Trinitarian self-positing in another."³⁸ Bulgakov recognised that there must be distinction between the Divine Persons to uphold the logic of dynamic Triune relationality. On this basis, he perceived the grounds for God's communion with humanity; God is "free to commune with what is not God because God's life is one of self-positing as self-revelation."³⁹ In other words, God reveals Godself to the "other" of humanity because the nature of God's being is an eternal revelation of the self-sufficient love between the "other" relations of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. The grounding of the unfathomable communion between the "other" of God and humanity is bridgeable and possible because, in God's divinity is the fullness of relationality through hypostatic distinction. Hans Urs Von Balthasar, likewise, located "distance" (*Abstand*) or "otherness" as commensurate with the unity of the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, stating, that such distance was "constitutive for the life of the Trinity."⁴⁰ Von Balthasar, would, likewise, conclude that God's self-sufficient being was the ontological basis for God to be able to commune with the not-God of creation, without annihilating the "other," nor changing divinity, because genuine relationality, as demonstrated in the revelation of the triune God, has distinction at its core.⁴¹

Distinction and the human-divine communion

Understanding that God acts in the world (economic Trinity) in a manner consistent with who God is in Godself (immanent Trinity) is the basis to understand that God's relationality and intimacy with the world is consistent with who God eternally is. This would mean that distinction between God and not-God is not a hinderance to divine-human communion, but rather reveals, in the very act of creation, the ontology of divine relationality. Contra to "popular" theology, divine aseity or incommensurability, is not the attribute of unrelatable divinity, but is rather the necessary distinction for the most enigmatic of communions, that between God and not-God. To put this another way, we might say that a relational God, the "God-for-us" must be *a priori* distinct from us for a relationship to exist; God must be God apart from us "in order for there to be a God-for-us."⁴² Such a God we say is self-sufficient and ontologically incommensurate with the creation. Creation, unlike divinity, is not simple in its relations, does not have self-sufficiency, is not replete in and for itself, is not pure act but is subject to

development and potentiality, is not infinite but subject to temporality and time. Simply put, if we are going to be honest in our appraisal of ourselves as created-beings we would have to say there is an incommensurability between God and not-God.

There is a clear ontological dissimilarity of natures, but one which is bridgeable from the divine side. Relationality between God and not-God is possible, not by diluting or setting aside a doctrine of incommensurability,⁴³ but by allowing the dynamism of God's triune life to reveal the possibility of communion with the incommensurate One. Such an understanding postures the creature as contingent on God to bridge the incommensurable distance between God and not-God. Hart elucidates Gregory of Nyssa's contemplation of such a concept:

Gregory's grasp of the radical ontological disparity between God and creation is balanced by his understanding of the union of God with creation in the economy of salvation . . . despite the ontological distance between God and creation: . . . [Gregory shows] that it is not an uncrossable abyss but a genuine distance, reconciled and yet preserved in the incarnate Logos, crossed from the divine side so that it may be crossed forever from the side of the creature, and by showing that God who is infinite, for this reason, cannot be made absent by any distance.⁴⁴

Sonderegger, likewise, perceives that

Deity is not repugnant to the cosmos, nor paradoxical to it. We do not find a *contradiction* or opposition between the One Lord and all the He has made. Rather, the Divine Reality is compatible with the cosmos.⁴⁵

Whilst Sonderegger is right to say there is no "contradiction" between God and not God, (indeed there is a correspondence that is presumed by the scriptural injunction to "be imitators of God" (Eph. 5:1)), we may still uphold an incommensurate distinction without succumbing to a notion that "God Himself . . . cannot Tabernacle among us."⁴⁶ Although the subject of further contemplation, I agree that Sonderegger's hunch that "a thorough-going Doctrine of God as Spirit" is key, not in diluting a negative doctrine

of incommensurability, but in perceiving, through a positive Trinitarian theology, the commensurability of the Incommensurate One.

Aseity, love, and freedom

A Christian interpretation of divine aseity posits that God does not need the creation to be a relational and loving God because God is eternally, within the simplicity of the immanent Trinity, the fullness and abundance of all life, love and relationality. As Webster articulates:

the triune God could be without the world; no perfection of God would be lost, no triune bliss compromised, were the world not to exist; no enhancement of God is achieved by the world's existence.⁴⁷

The theological significance of divine aseity is not to establish an impenetrable barrier to God's perfection, but rather to preserve the concept of God as perfect love. Not that God loves, implying that God might also choose not to love, but that God *is*, in the replete nature of God's triune being, love (1 John 4:8). Love is relational and this is first and eternally expressed within the Triune relations of God. In the aseity of God, love is not a reaction to the world, as if God's love requires some kind of prod to express itself but is rather the demonstration of the fullness of the Triune God's eternal self-sufficient being. One does not need to make God's being contingent on the creation for God to be God, or for God's love to be made manifest. One need only to understand that the world "is the realm where God, in all his wholly otherness as God . . . is present and acts" as love.⁴⁸ Without such a principle one could argue that God is narcissistic and deficient, using creation for God's own completion. On this logic God's love for the creation would be necessitated rather than free gift, thus undermining the very notion that love is voluntarily given to the "other." The importance of the concept that God is fullness of being "for Himself" is, likewise, the very basis upon which God can come to the world offering "fullness of life" (John 10:10) to the other of not-God. Indeed, if God is not self-sufficient how would God ever be humanity's sufficiency?

Human participation in divine aseity

There is one component of Webster's definition of aseity—no enhancement of God by the creature—that does, however, retain a theological dilemma

of the type Sonderegger considers. Sonderegger notes the difficulty of conceptualising God's aseity in light of the "Presence of Almighty God to His creatures, most especially to His creatures in prayer."⁴⁹ The problem here is that the notion of aseity appears to preclude creaturely prayer and worship from being received by the divine. Webster's formulae of no enhancement of God by the creature fails to adequately articulate the nature of the relation between God and his people that is supremely manifested in worship. Webster's definition reflects a determination to preserve God's aseity by disallowing any concept implying deficiency in God's being that requires enhancement by the creation. Such a stance is understandable given some theologies that mythologise God through pantheistic and panentheistic tendencies foreign to Christianity. As I have argued, there is no deficiency within God. God is replete in the abundance of the divine self-sufficient life of Trinity. However, envisaging the relationality of God towards, and enhanced by, the renewed creature is not the affirmation of a depletion or deficiency within God that requires satisfaction. Divine aseity does not prevent an understanding that God receives from and gives to that which is created, *it merely precludes that God is determined or made replete by the interaction*. Rather, redeemed humanity through prayer and worship enhances that which is fully enhanced, magnifies that which is magnificent, and enriches that which is antecedently rich. Simply put, the creature participates in the life of God, but God does not become God because of creaturely participation. Daniel Hardy astutely articulated this notion thus: creation's "praise perfects perfection."⁵⁰ Such a nuanced concept allows us to retain the traditional Christian understanding of divine aseity as denoting God with no composition from the world, while simultaneously removing the possibility for the doctrine of aseity to be interpreted as inhibiting God's dynamic involvement with the world or rendering creaturely praise redundant.

Concluding remarks

Sonderegger's article prompts a discussion regarding the seemingly logical pull of conflating divine aseity with a restriction on human-divine relationality. Following Sonderegger's lead, I have attempted here to articulate the metaphysical and theological possibility of a "way to speak about Trinity in the midst of the Temple."⁵¹ This "way" may be discerned in harmony with divine aseity—the divine perfection that simultaneously upholds the notion of "the One, Triune God, *apart* from and *with* the world."⁵² God's triune being has

indeed been affirmed as “apart” from the world in God’s awesomely incommensurate distinct perfection from the creation. Nevertheless, we have also affirmed that God, whilst ontologically distinct from the creature, is “with” the world. In fact, God’s distinction from the creature, rather than being incongruous with communion, is the ontological basis for God’s intimate relationality with us. Triune aseity is not a divine attribute set against the creation, but rather guards the radical theological possibility of the incommensurable commensurability of God and not-God.

Endnotes

- 1 Throughout this paper, references to Katherine Sonderegger “The God we worship; the worship we owe God” are to the essay presented in this edition of *St Mark’s Review*.
- 2 Sonderegger, “The God we worship.”
- 3 Sonderegger, “The God we worship.”
- 4 Sonderegger, “The God we worship.”
- 5 Sonderegger undertakes a more replete consideration in Katherine Sonderegger, *Systematic Theology Vol 1, The Doctrine of God* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2015).
- 6 Stephen Pickard, *The In-Between God: Theology, Community and Discipleship* (Hindmarsh: ATF Press, 2011), 196.
- 7 James E. Dolezal, *God Without Parts: Divine Simplicity and the Metaphysics of God’s Absoluteness* (Eugene: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2011), 31.
- 8 Peter Lombard, *Sentences 1*, Dist. VIII.3, accessed September 18, 2016, <http://www.franciscan-archive.org/lombardus/I-Sent.html>.
- 9 James E. Dolezal, “Trinity, Simplicity and the Status of God’s Personal Relations,” *International Journal of Systematic Theology* 16, no 1. (2014): 81.
- 10 Dolezal, “Trinity, Simplicity,” 81. Emphasis in original.

- 11 J.W. Richards, *The Untamed God: A Philosophical Exploration of Divine Perfection, Simplicity and Immutability* (Downers Grove, IL: Intervarsity Press, 2003), 33.
- 12 John Webster, "Trinity and Creation," *International Journal of Systematic Theology* 12, no. 1 (2010): 12.
- 13 Tom McCall, "Holy Love and Divine Aseity in the Theology of John Zizioulas," *Scottish Journal of Theology*, 61, no. 2 (2008): 196, doi:10.1017/S0036930608003955.
- 14 Webster, "Trinity and Creation," 12.
- 15 Sonderegger, "The God we worship."
- 16 Sonderegger, "The God we worship."
- 17 Sonderegger, "The God we worship." I will set aside, for the moment, Sonderegger's contemplation of a weaker version of incommensurability, and merely take up, on her own terms, the interchangeability of her utilisation of "incommensurability" and "aseity" that occurs in her essay—the subject of this journal.
- 18 Sonderegger, "The God we worship."
- 19 Kevin J. Vanhoozer, *Nothing Greater, Nothing Better: Theological Essays on the Love of God* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001), 7.
- 20 R. Goetz, "The Suffering God: The Rise of a New Orthodoxy," *Christian Century* 103, no. 13 (1986): 385.
- 21 See, for example, Thomas G. Weinandy, *Does God Suffer?* (T & T Clark: Edinburgh: 2000), David Bentley Hart, *The Beauty of the Infinite: The Aesthetics of Christian Truth* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans 2003); Paul Molnar, *Divine Freedom and the Doctrine of the Immanent Trinity* (T & T Clark, London, 2002).
- 22 Sonderegger, *Systematic Theology*, xix.
- 23 Colin Gunton, *Act & Being: Towards a Theology of The Divine Attributes* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 3.
- 24 Christopher R. J. Holmes, "Honouring Scripture's Living Lord: Katherine Sonderegger on the Divine Attributes," *Pro Ecclesia* 27, no. 1 (2018): 45.
- 25 Holmes, "Katherine Sonderegger on the Divine Attributes," 45.
- 26 Catherine Mowry LaCugna, *God for Us: The Trinity and Christian Life*. (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1991), 304.
- 27 LaCugna, *God for Us*, 304.
- 28 Nancy Eiesland, *The Disabled God: Toward a Liberatory Theology of Disability* (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1994), 104.

- 29 Eiesland, *The Disabled God*, 105.
- 30 George Hunsinger, "Election and Trinity: Twenty-Five Theses on the Theology of Karl Barth," *Modern Theology* 24, no. 2 (2008): 177.
- 31 Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, vol II/1, trans. G. W. Bromiley et al., (London: T & T Clark, 2009), 280–81.
- 32 For further argumentation see Jacqueline Service, "Divine Self-Enrichment and Human Well-Being: A Systematic Theological Inquiry, with Special Reference to Development and Humanitarian Aid," (PhD Diss., Charles Sturt University, 2018), 156–214.
- 33 Stephen R. Holmes, "'Something Much Too Plain to Say': Towards a Defence of the Doctrine of Divine Simplicity," *Neue Zeitschrift für systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie* 43, no. 1 (2001): 152.
- 34 Dolezal, "Trinity, Simplicity," 88.
- 35 Dolezal, "Trinity, Simplicity," 94.
- 36 Veli-Matti Kärkkäinen, "The Trinitarian Doctrines of Jürgen Moltmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg in the Context of Contemporary Discussion," in *The Cambridge Companion to Trinity*, ed. Peter Phan (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 231. My italics.
- 37 Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Jesus, God and Man*, trans. Duane Priebe and Lewis L. Wilkins (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1968), 180.
- 38 Sergei Bulgakov, *The Lamb of God*, trans. Boris Jakim (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002), 94.
- 39 Aristotle Papanikolaou, "Sophia, Apophasis, and Communion: The Trinity in Contemporary Orthodox Theology," in *The Cambridge Companion to the Trinity*, 45.
- 40 Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory vol. IV*, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1994), 326–27.
- 41 von Balthasar, *Theo-Drama, vol. IV*, 326–27.
- 42 Thomas G. Weinandy, *The Father's Spirit of Sonship: Reconceiving the Trinity* (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1995), 130.
- 43 Some of Sonderegger's statements in her essay, "The God we worship" imply that divine incommensurability is a doctrinal hindrance to divine relationality with the creature. For example, she argues, "Still less can we erect a Doctrine of the One, Triune God through strict Incommensurability . . . To be sure, a weaker version of the Incommensurate will aid an investigation of the God-world relation."
- 44 Hart, *The Beauty of the Infinite*, 198–99.

- 45 Sonderegger, *Systematic Theology*, xix.
- 46 Sonderegger, "The God we worship."
- 47 Webster, "Trinity and Creation," 12.
- 48 Weinandy, *The Father's Spirit*, 130.
- 49 Sonderegger, "The God we worship."
- 50 Daniel W. Hardy, *Jubilate: Theology in Praise*, ed. David Ford (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1984), 6.
- 51 Sonderegger, "The God we worship."
- 52 Sonderegger, "The God we worship." My italics.