



200511886

Public servants or partisan dirt diggers?

Inside the Government Members Secretariat

Wayne Errington and Peter van Onselen

ABSTRACT: *The concept of the public relations (PR) state was introduced to Australia by Ian Ward in an article in the Australian Journal of Communication (2003). Ward described the increasing resources being devoted to a whole-of-government approach to communications strategy. The Government Members Secretariat (GMS) was established in 1996 when the Howard government came to power. The purpose of the GMS is to assist government MPs to run their offices and disseminate government and party information to them. Responsibility for the GMS was transferred in 1998 from the Department of Finance and Administration to the Chief Whip's Office, effectively making it unaccountable to the parliament. The GMS came under public scrutiny in 2004 when the opposition alleged that it played a role in government 'dirt digging' on the opposition. This episode brought unprecedented and unwanted attention to this small but important cog in the government's PR infrastructure. The allegations of dirt digging, however, are a distraction from the real influence of the GMS. Its importance lies in the way it connects the government's national communications strategy with individual members of parliament, most notably those members in marginal seats. This allows government policy releases, advertising, and other communication on behalf of the executive to be made timely and relevant to the grassroots House of Representatives campaigns that help win elections. The GMS is a prime example of the way that government and party communication strategies have become inextricably linked.*

Wayne Errington, School of Social Sciences and Liberal Studies, Charles Sturt University, Australia; Peter van Onselen, School of International, Cultural and Community Studies, Edith Cowan University, Australia.

Introduction

The PR state concept had its genesis in the United Kingdom, when Deacon and Golding observed in 1994 the 'massive expansion of the public relations state' and the blurring of

Public servants or partisan dirt diggers?

25

the 'conventional distinction between public information and party propaganda' (cited in Ward, 2003, p. 25). Also with respect to the UK, Franklin noted the growth of PR professionals across all government agencies (1994). Since that time, the use of PR strategies by governments in Britain and elsewhere has been refined and expanded. The idea has since been encapsulated with respect to Australia by Young: 'The PR state is a system obsessed with political marketing and advertising and taxpayers get to pay for it' (2004, p. 79).

The PR state is just one symptom of the widespread professionalisation of political communication and election campaigns around the world. Panebianco identified the rise of the 'electoral-professional' party, with its reduced ideological orientation and increased role for professional campaigners at the expense of the party membership (1988, p. 264). It is developments like those used in the PR state that allow parties to become less dependent on their members for campaigning. Professionalisation ultimately impinges upon the relationship between political parties and the state, with governing parties relying heavily on publicly-funded communications units, like the GMS, involved in 'packaging' policy (Franklin 1994, p. 7). Australian parties also rely heavily on the resources provided by the parliament to members and senators for the operation of their offices and the funding of their campaigns.

Former head of Britain's Government Information Service, Bernard Ingram, presented an insider's view of the growth of communications professionals inside successive governments (2003). He nominated 11 September 2001, when a departmental media advisor reacted to the attacks on New York and Washington by e-mailing colleagues that 'it's now a very good day to get out anything we want to bury,' as the nadir of the spin merchants and their obsession with government advantage (2003, p. 228). Ingram believes that the British public has come to expect to be conned by government communications, to the detriment of politics and the operation of government.

The emphasis of many of these studies has been on the selling of public policy; the Thatcher government's failed attempt to introduce a poll tax in the case of Deacon and Golding stands as an example. Ward notes a number of criticisms of the PR state thesis, including the need to understand the use of PR by non-state actors seeking to influence the public policy process, and the emphasis in studies of political communication on elections, which are 'extremely unrepresentative periods' (Davis, cited in Ward 2003, p. 26). As Ward notes, PR

methods have been used extensively during the period of the Howard government to promote such policies as the Goods and Services Tax.¹ However, this paper looks at the role of the PR state in assisting more directly with the government's goal of winning elections. In an era of perpetual election campaigning, the selling of public policy cannot be easily divorced from the government's electoral strategy. The GMS plays an essential coordinating role in that effort.

PR is the attempt to garner favourable media coverage of the client organisation. The aim of PR is to do this by exploiting opportunities in the free media, through press releases and conferences, and through contacts with journalists and editors (Turner, 2002, p. 219). PR professionals tend to exclude advertising from their methods, since getting the media to carry your message for nothing is both cheaper and more effective. Government and political party communication strategies, however, tend to integrate advertising and PR methods. Advertising, then, tends to be included in the ambit of the PR state concept. As a former senator and veteran of political campaigns in Australia has noted, parties maximise the influence of both methods by coordinating them:

For penetration and effectiveness, paid advertising must complement earned media. The leader's message of the day should be reinforced by the television commercials of the night.
(Noel Crichton-Brown, 2005)

The PR state encompasses a host of communication methods and agencies aimed at promoting the government and its policies. These include media advisors (the platform-neutral term for press secretaries) employed at all levels of government, including backbenchers' offices,² public service media units, and coordinating agencies such as the Government Communications Unit based in the Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet (PMC). The PR state also makes use of private agencies including PR consulting firms (some of which specialise in politics) and advertising agencies, media monitoring firms, and polling companies.

Methodology

This article outlines the development and role of the GMS in coordinating the government communications strategies developed within the executive (public service public affairs sections and ministerial offices), with the electoral strategies of Coalition Members of Parliament and candidates. A primary source of information for this article is the

authors' observations of the activities of the GMS while working for various government members (both backbenchers and the executive)³ and is supplemented by publicly available information such as answers to parliamentary questions, media stories, and parliamentary reports. This article is part of a wider study into the contemporary functioning of Australian party politics within the framework of professional election campaigning. Interviews with over thirty parliamentarians and their staffers have been conducted for the wider study. Such interviews, referred to in part in this article, were given either on the record or anonymously. The sensitive nature of party practices divulged in some interviews required anonymity on occasion.

What is the Government Members Secretariat?

According to Special Minister of State, Eric Abetz, the GMS 'provides information and resource support to private members' (Abetz, 2004). Former head of the GMS Gerard Wheeler described its role as follows:


The Government Members Secretariat was established to provide training and support to Members, Senators, Ministers and their staff to assist them in servicing their constituents and ensuring the efficient and effective operation of electorate offices. Training programmes are conducted in areas of activity relevant to Members and Senators. A number of staff from the GMS also travel out to electorate offices to provide assistance for staff who are unable to travel to Canberra. (Wheeler, 2003)

Both descriptions seem to present an innocuous set of tasks. However, in the context of the government's overall communication strategy, and the importance of local marginal seat campaigns that complement the national campaign, the GMS is a crucial organisation.

Ward outlined the history of the GMS, rising from the ashes of its oft-criticised predecessor, the Hawke-Keating government's National Media Liaison Unit (dubbed aNiMaLs). Journalists employed by the latter were charged with supporting the government's effort, across all departments, to publicise its activities. A more controversial role, and one that raised the ire of the then opposition, was to monitor the public pronouncements of the opposition, and disseminate anything useful or embarrassing. On coming to power in 1996, the Howard government kept its promise to abolish aNiMaLs, but quickly realised that it needed to replicate many of its functions (Ramsey, 2004). One solution was to increase the communication support staff throughout the ministry (Ray, 1998, p. 195). The GMS was established in the ministerial wing of Parliament House just a month after the election of

the government. Today it is located near the parliamentary cafeteria, behind a snowed glass door and windows. Ward notes Grattan's comment that 'spin requires a very good filing system, and a very good monitoring procedure' (2003, p. 30). One of the reasons that government media units do not attract the attention that aNiMaLs did is that those functions are now diffused throughout the executive and legislative arms of the government. The GMS has a coordinating rather than a monitoring role.

Figure 1: Role and relationship of the GMS within government and party



While the GMS has a relatively small number of staff, it plays an important role in keeping government members informed of communication strategy. There are two key sources of direction for the GMS, the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) and the party secretariat. The Government Communications Unit, officially responsible for the expensive government advertising campaigns, implements the decisions of the Ministerial Committee on Government Communications (Ward 2003, p. 35). It is through the PMO and other ministers that the GMS finds out about key government communications decisions, rather than through the public service agencies themselves. The PMO, the party secretariat, and the GMS then develop party tactics such as the time and place of announcements, campaign literature, and advertising, to complement the official government strategy. In turn, these party tactics feed back into the decisions of the Ministerial Committee. The

GMS is then responsible for ensuring that all government members and candidates have the information and resources to take advantage of official government communication in their own campaigns as they see fit.

The GMS plays a central role in the information that the arms of government distribute, without being the agent of that information. That is, it filters and checks information before it is circulated into the public domain, without actually housing the responsibility for the distribution of the information. This is why the budget and staffing allocations of the GMS are not higher. By structuring operations in this way, the government has been able to develop a highly effective PR unit in the GMS without raising scrutiny of its cost. The budget increases for PR state activities have been shared across departments, ministerial offices, and through entitlements increases. Thus, while the GMS is only slightly larger in its staffing than the opposition's Media Unit (which has seven staff), its ability to integrate the official government communication strategy into its operation, and its access to the resources of ministerial offices and media monitoring paid for by government departments (see below), make it a much more formidable organisation.

The importance of the close relationship between the GMS and the PMO, and the party organisation of the Liberal Party, cannot be underestimated. Gerard Wheeler, then political adviser in the PMO, transferred to head up the GMS prior to the 2004 election (Kerr, 2004). Prior to the 2001 election, Dawn Crosby, wife of then Federal Liberal Party Director, Lynton Crosby, was in charge of the organisation (Howard Government Directory, 2001, p. 113). While the GMS is officially located in the Whip's Office, part of the legislature, its staffing and function have made it unambiguously a creature of the executive. That is, the GMS releases information to backbenchers with the same level of care as it does to the general public. It generally provides a one-way flow of information from government ministers and other strategists to MPs. Backbenchers tend to be informed of key government announcements only shortly before they are publicised (Payne, 2001).

The publicity surrounding the budget provides an example of this process. Backbenchers and their staff are as keen as journalists to find out what is in the budget papers (the ones they will shortly vote for), but only get to see them on the afternoon of the Treasurer's budget speech. At the same time, the GMS circulates the positive selling points

of the budget for MPs to publicise in their electorates. MPs use this information in media interviews, press releases, in direct contact with their constituents, and in their electorate newsletters.

This distribution of uniform electorate materials to backbench MPs is a vital part of modern political campaigning. Direct mail becomes the final medium for the government's message through this process. The GMS closely consults with the PMO and the senior branch of the party organisational wing, as to both the design and timing of materials distributed to MPs and candidates. The fact that information is sent by the GMS to candidates—not just MPs—illustrates the point that the lines between government and party activities are blurred.

The GMS has an operating budget of AUD1.3 million per annum and houses a total of 11 full time staffers (Ramsay, 2004). However, it does not speak to the public. When we contacted the GMS in the collection of information for this research, we were told that 'the GMS does not speak to the public' (Anonymous GMS staffer, 2003). Confidential interviews with parliamentary staffers therefore form a substantial basis for information regarding its operation. The size of the budget for the GMS is not in itself an indicator of its importance for MPs and candidates. For example, direct mail is designed on computer systems and distributed to MPs electronically for them to print and distribute using their parliamentary entitlements and/or party funds. It is at this point that party databases housing information about elector particulars become operationally significant. The value of this coordination lies in the regularity and uniformity of the messages delivered by the GMS, as well as the suitability of the message as assessed by the close linkages between the GMS, party organisation, and prime ministerial advisors.

The role of the GMS links with the use by government MPs of their sophisticated party databases. The Coalition database is known as 'Feedback'. The electoral database of the Coalition stores information on the constituents of each House of Representatives seat. The information gathered in the databases, such as the policy preferences and party identification of individual voters, is used by candidates for House seats to tailor correspondence to swinging voters and to identify potential party supporters. Party organisations aggregate the information in the databases and use it to conduct polls and focus groups of swinging voters and to tailor policy development and campaign strategies.⁴ The collection of data on Feedback usage, as well as the training of staffers in its use, is organised by GMS staff. For example, a GMS staff member with the job title 'Database Training

Officer' is also the signed author of a Feedback Audit Summary sent to a government MP with the letterhead title 'Feedback' (*Feedback Audit Summary*, 2002. Confidential letter to Liberal MP). This also illustrates the blurred lines between government and party activities.

The operation of staffing inside the GMS is of particular importance. The Howard Government Directory is an internal document distributed to MPs and their staff. It lists the contact details and roles of staffers and MPs, as well as those of organisational staffers and staffers in the GMS. GMS staffers have titles such as 'Senior Co-ordinator', 'Database Training Co-ordinator', 'Database Training Officer', 'Communications Officer', and 'Training Co-ordinator'. These titles reflect the role the GMS performs in communicating with, and training, electorate office staff. In order to provide accessible assistance, the after-hours and mobile telephone numbers of GMS staff are listed in the handbook (at page 113).

Although the GMS plays a leading role in the training and operation of Feedback, Feedback software is owned by a registered company known as Parakeelia. Parakeelia was registered as a company in 1989 and lists Ron Walker (former Liberal organisational treasurer), Andrew Robb (former Federal Director and now MP for Goldstein), and one other person as company shareholders and trustees of the Liberal Party of Australia (Wiese-Bockmann, 2004). Again, the GMS plays a coordinating role, allowing individual MPs to use their parliamentary entitlements to maximum benefit.

The GMS: Dirt digging or distribution?

The GMS came under scrutiny in 2004 when opposition leader Mark Latham accused the government of running a 'dirt unit' (Yaxley, 2004). The claims failed to hit their mark because the role of the GMS is to distribute dirt, more so than dig it up. This is illustrated in the specificity of staffing titles in the GMS. The digging is primarily done by researchers and advisers spread throughout ministerial offices. As long as the major parties agree not to allow ministerial staffers to appear before parliamentary committees, they will remain unaccountable and thereby able to perform this role unencumbered, even when the 'research' involved has nothing whatsoever to do with the ministerial office within which they are situated (for a thorough account of the accountability or otherwise of ministerial staffers, see Holland, 2002).

Mr Latham accused a staffer from cabinet minister Kevin Andrew's

office of visiting Liverpool in search of information on Latham's record as mayor of Liverpool (Yaxley, 2004). It's difficult to disagree with Latham's assessment that government staff would be better deployed working on worthwhile policies for the country (Latham, 2004). With a rise in the prevalence of the perpetual campaign and the PR state, a role for partisan staffers assisting with policy development by ministerial departments is readily available.

The GMS is run by the government Chief Whip's Office, putting it out of reach of Senate Estimates Committees, unlike its predecessor. Opposition Senator John Faulkner argued that 'an outfit like aNiMaLS or the current Government Members Secretariat ought to be subject to the most thorough of parliamentary scrutiny' (Faulkner, 2004). It is perhaps not surprising that Senator Faulkner's concerns regarding the lack of parliamentary scrutiny concerning aNiMaLS has only now been heightened with his return to the opposition benches. The point is nonetheless valid. Without a structure of accountability for the GMS outside the party in government, oversight of the party databases used to keep track of the interest of electors (see van Onselen & Errington, 2004a), the government's entire direct mail design, funding, and distribution lists are beyond scrutiny. The GMS avoids parliamentary scrutiny, while databases avoid Freedom of Information or Privacy Act scrutiny (see van Onselen & Errington, 2004b)

The media monitoring function of the GMS's predecessor, aNiMaLS has been contracted to commercial operators such as Reham and Media Monitors (Barns 2004, p. 2). The production of media clippings either listed daily or distributed via e-mail alerts, though expensive, can be done by such independent organisations without compromising the partisan political environment. Ministerial offices are provided with a paper bundle of media clippings collected and distributed by such agencies each day. They are also sent electronic updates of major news stories affecting their portfolio throughout the course of the day. It is the subsequent task of determining the appropriate government response to such information that requires a partisan element. The GMS continues to perform this role in concert with the organisational senior staff and the PMO and ministerial offices. The role of individual ministerial press secretaries has increased in this respect. Under the structure of aNiMaLS, such press secretary roles were less important. The 'on message'⁵ information and brochures the GMS produces are distributed by the GMS to MPs and candidates for uniformed comment in response to the opposition as required.⁶

Throughout this process, the GMS ensures that party election strategy is clearly linked to the wider government communications strategy. For example, generic pamphlets including the line 'Strengthening Medicare' were distributed during the 2004 campaign, shortly after a controversial and expensive government advertising campaign designed to ensure the public that changes to the Medicare system were indeed 'Strengthening Medicare'. One such brochure, attached to this article as an Appendix, was electronically sent to all Liberal MPs across the country. The publishing layout was set by the GMS as were the 'on message' statements and quotes carried in the brochure. By pre-arranging the layout, electorate offices do not have to waste time debating and deciding on a layout that may not be as professional as that determined by the GMS. By pre-determining the statements and quotes in the brochure, the GMS is ensuring that individual electorate offices do not overcommit their electorate to, for example, statements that may embarrass the government. This is one aspect of a wider professionalisation of political practice in Australia, and again illustrates the blurring of the line between government and party.

Generic brochures circulated by the GMS do have sections devoted to ensuring that individual electorate offices can sell their local message in addition to the statewide or nationwide campaign message. For example, the brochure in the Appendix has sections provided for the MP to be mentioned as part of 'John Howard's Liberal team', as well as room for the name of the particular electorate to be inserted. It also has a section on the left side of the brochure for candidate particulars, with the order and content pre-determined by the GMS. Such content includes community organisation involvement and length of time spent living in the electorate. Of course this micro-managing of the distribution of campaign messages cannot entirely guard against locally based error. Interviewees have expressed ongoing concerns over MPs's offices sending out literature with spaces left blank. Each individual electorate office must also apply a commonsense approach to the generic brochures they are sent. For example, if an MP has been living in the electorate for only a short period, the local side of the party organisation would be expected to amend the brochure accordingly, removing that descriptive point. In this respect, the communications side of correspondence with the GMS by electorate officers is valuable.

The GMS and the 2004 federal election: Campaign techniques

With the announcement of an election, the formal campaign period begins. The 2004 federal election saw a six-week campaign, the first such lengthy campaign since 1984. More typically, campaigns are 31 days in length. The major parties prepare 31-day campaign plans, which include preparations for various campaigning techniques to be used. Importantly, the major parties set up a secure website as an assistance point for MPs and candidates across the country. The GMS, in conjunction with the federal and state secretariats, is responsible for its management.

The 2004 federal election saw the use of both innovative and traditional campaign techniques. Sarah Miskin from the Department of Parliamentary Services has written a research note outlining how such techniques were used (2005). She identifies tele-marketing and the Internet as two primary examples of innovative techniques used. The Liberal Party used telephone messaging for the first time in a federal election in Australia. Usually associated with 'getting out the vote' in non-compulsory voting nations like the USA, telephone messaging is a questionable form of campaign advertising in Australia. Its usage by the Liberal Party did not carry an authorisation tag as required under the *Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918* and the *Broadcasting Services Act 1992* (Miskin, 2005). In the case of the Liberal Party, the GMS is responsible for the management of the messages it places on its Internet site. It is responsible for this in conjunction with the party's federal secretariat. With respect to traditional techniques, Miskin highlighted advertising and direct mail as the two most significant examples. As previously mentioned, direct mail is facilitated by party databases. The GMS plays a substantial role in the training and updating of Feedback. While each localised campaign is responsible for the compilation of data in the database, it is the GMS that train staff in its use, as well as overseeing the extent to which each district is adequately identifying issues and voting intentions of constituents.

During the formal campaign period, management of the secure party website is the primary responsibility of the GMS. The secure website houses various generic brochures, as discussed previously, covering a series of issues. It also houses generic press release 'shells' for local campaigns to download and insert their particulars into before distributing to local media. The GMS ensures that brochures and press releases are cleared by the secretariat and the PMO. The secure site also provides a daily update of the 'message of the day', uploaded by

the GMS, for MPs and candidates to ensure that their activities remain consistent with those of the central campaign. The outsourced media monitoring information, referred to previously, is pared back by the GMS and uploaded onto the site regularly throughout the day. Each day of the campaign, the GMS is available to local MPs and candidates to answer questions as well as authorise material to be distributed. The 2004 election was the third election at which the GMS performed this function.

Conclusion: The heart of the PR state

Although relatively small in terms of resources and staffing, the GMS plays a central role in the Coalition government's communication strategy. It is the centrality of the GMS combined with its access to senior government operators that make it function so successfully. Historically, MPs's offices have always responded particularly promptly to a call from the PMO. In modern Australian politics, a call from the GMS now elicits a similar response. This is in no small way a consequence of the overlap in seniority of functioning and personnel between the offices.

The close relationship between the PMO, the party secretariat, and the GMS allows the government to maximise the benefits of the PR state by integrating the official government communication strategy with grassroots campaigns for seats in the House of Representatives. As the examples from the 2004 election show, the government has become quite adept at this process. The distinction between government and party has therefore been significantly blurred.

The GMS demonstrates that the PR state can have a real impact on the operations of government. The fact that the GMS operates in the paradigm of the executive arm of government gives it enormous influence. This influence is one of style and image in party presentation more so than the substance of sound public policy. Such campaigning presentation has long been a part of major party practice in both Australia and around the world. However, the proximity of the GMS brings these campaign activities too close to governance. In the period in which the GMS has operated, we have seen a rise in the use of party databases, and a proliferation in the streamlining of government MP correspondence with the electorate. In the modern context, a whole-of-government approach, streamlined by the GMS, has blurred the lines between party and government. It has also sacrificed a significant amount of autonomy among government backbenchers in their

correspondence with the electorate. These concerning developments demand close observation in the coming years.

Notes

1. For example, in the use of government advertising with respect to the 'A New Tax System (GST)' advertising campaign. This campaign cost AUD118.7million from 1998-2000 (Grant, 2004, p. 2).
2. Backbenchers are entitled to three electorate officers under Parliamentary Entitlements Allowances. Invariably, at least one of these officers is dedicated to media advice, liaising with local media and, if possible, the wider state and national media outlets.
3. Both authors observed the GMS's operation in their staffing capacity, using interviews since their departures from federal government staffing to better understand its operation.
4. For further information on the operation and design of Feedback, see van Onselen and Errington (2004a).
5. 'On message' is a term the parties use to refer to MPs and candidates sticking to the prescribed script. During political campaigns, parties try to present uniform messages daily to ensure that red herring ideas and issues do not dilute the message the senior party strategists are trying to deliver through the media. This is the raw edge of the all-important PR role of using media outlets to distribute a party message without using only advertising.
6. The pervasiveness of the GMS can be seen in its response to our research for the ANZCA 2005 Conference. When calling senate offices to establish duty senator roles in campaigning, the GMS sent an e-mail to all government staffers and MPs within 24 hours of the beginning of the telephone survey we were conducting to advise staffers and MPs that they were not to disclose such activities (confidential interview, 2005).

References

- Abetz, E. (2004). Interview with ABC Radio, *The World Today*. 5 July.
- Anonymous GMS Staffer. (2003). Telephone conversation, 4 September 2003
- Barns, G. (2004). Inside the propaganda machine. *Australian Politics Online*. Retrieved July 20, 2004, from <http://www.apo.org.au>.
- Confidential interview. (2005). *Federal government staffer*, 6 January.
- Corrado, A. (2000). Running backwards: The congressional money chase. In T. Mann & N. Ornstein (Eds), *The permanent campaign and its future*. Washington: AEI Press.
- Crichton-Brown, N. (2005). *Crikey*. Retrieved February 11, 2005, from <http://www.crikey.com.au>.

- Faulkner, J. (2004). Interview with Channel Nine, Dirt diggers, *Sunday*, 11 July.
- Feedback audit summary*. (2002). Confidential letter to Liberal MP.
- Franklin, B. (1994). *Packaging politics: Political communication in Britain's media democracy*, London: Edward Arnold.
- Grant, R. (2004). Federal government advertising, *Research Note*. No.62. June 2004. Parliamentary Library: Department of Parliamentary Services.
- Holland, I. (2002). Accountability of ministerial staff?, *Information and Research Services*, Research Paper No. 19, 2001-02. Department of the Parliamentary Library.
- Howard Government Directory, (2001). Produced by the *Office of Stewart McArthur MP, Government Whip*, 10th Edition March.
- Ingram, B. (2003). *The wages of spin*. London: John Murray.
- Kerr, C. (2004). When is it news, or is that dirt? *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 11 July.
- Latham, M. (2004). Interview with ABC Radio, *The World Today*. 6 July.
- Miskin, S. (2005). Campaigning in the 2004 federal election: innovations and traditions, *Department of Parliamentary Services*, Research Note No.30.
- Panbianco, A. (1988). *Political parties: Organization and power*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Payne, M. (2002). Liberal Party Senator, *Interview with author*.
- Ramsay, A. (2004). Some projects, PM, that need explaining, *The Sydney Morning Herald*, 7 July.
- Ray, R. (1998). *Senate Hansard*, 3 March 1998, p.195. Parliament House, Canberra
- Turner, G. (2002). Public relations. In S. Cunningham and G.Turner (Eds), *The media and communications in Australia*. Sydney: Allen and Unwin.
- van Onselen, P. & Errington, W. (2004a). Electoral databases: big brother or democracy unbound? *The Australian Journal of Political Science*, 39(2), 349-366.
- van Onselen, P. and Errington, W. (2004b). Privacy legislation, political party exemption and constituent databases, *Privacy Law Bulletin*, 1(3), 43-47.
- Ward, I. (2003). An Australian PR state? *Australian Journal of Communication*, 30(1), 25-42.
- Wheeler, G. (2003). E-mail communication with author, 5 September.
- Wiese-Bockmann, M. (2004). Lib 'sale' of poll data may break law, *The Australian*, 17 August.
- Yaxley, L. (2004). Report for ABC Radio PM, 6 July.
- Young, S. (2004). *The persuaders: Inside the hidden machine of political advertising*, Sydney: Pluto Press.

Family Photo here

About {Candidate Name}

- Married to XXX and have Xnumber of children, XXX, XXX, XXX.
- Lived in the electorate X years
- Has worked as XXX manager for XXX company.
- President of XXX
- Involved in XXX community group.
- Volunteer at XXX
- Actively involved in the community with XXX
- Experience in XXX
- Has a XXX University degree
- Awarded XXX for XXX

Candidate portrait here



{Candidate Name} is a part of John Howard's Liberal team in {Electorate} that is committed to:

- Keeping interest rates low
- Strengthening Medicare
- Supporting older Australians
- Standards in schools
- Tough on Drugs
- More apprenticeships
- Supporting our Defence Forces
- New anti-terrorism laws
- Protecting our borders
- Providing safer roads
- Work for the Dole

Printed & authorized by and with the compliments of

{Candidate Name}

Liberal for {Electorate}

Address Line 1

Address Line 2

Tel: 0000 0000 Fax: 0000 0000

Email: candidate@electorate.com.au

{Candidate NAME}

Candidate Photo here

Liberal for {Electorate}

