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Post-Conflict Civilian Police Reform: 1999 to 2007

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ABSTRACT

Civilian police have been deployed as part of peacekeeping missions since the 1960s. However, little is known or understood about the role of civilian police or how they contribute to security, local civilian police reform or nation building. The mandates, deployment processes, strategic performance and achievements of fifteen United Nations and eight European Union missions that either commenced or were completed between 1999 and 2007 that included civilian police are examined and analysed to develop a civilian police peacekeeping model. The police reform model developed from the research is a flexible and generic framework that can be applied to future civilian police peacekeeping or reform missions.

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Post-Conflict Civilian Police Reform: 1999 to 2007

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Introduction

Since the United Nations first deployed civilian police more than 50 years ago, the inclusion of civilian police in peacekeeping missions has become an accepted mantra by both academia and practitioners. After a lull of approximately two decades, the number of civilian police on peacekeeping operations has increased from 1,677 officers in 1994 to more than 10,000 officers in 2009 (United Nations, 2010). Since then, the role of civilian police continues to evolve from one of monitoring general elections, providing training and basic security to one of patrolling and the capacity development of local police. However, their role is not sufficiently understood by policy and decision-makers.

Despite the extensive amount of literature that has examined the role of the military in peacekeeping and intervention operations, there is little literature or information available that investigates the role and the work of the civilian police in peacekeeping, or the methods that they use to assist in the reformation of local police.

The purpose of this article is to present the findings of the research into the role that the civilian police play in the post-conflict context, especially in regard to their role in reforming indigenous police. This article is based on the examination of twenty-three United Nations and European Union peacekeeping missions which took place between 1999 and 2007. The aim of the research was to develop responsive operational tools and policies that would support the effective use of deployed civilian police in their delivery of service and in their development of the indigenous police.

Is There a Need to Understand the Civilian Police Role in Peacekeeping?

The deployment of international civilian police to a post-conflict zone is a fundamental part of peacekeeping and is vital to the commencement of the reconstruction of a society. Police play a central role in establishing a sense of

security and stability in the lives of people living in post-conflict nations. According to Schmidl (1998, p. 3), '[p]olice play a crucial role in securing the transfer from war to peace, enabling the people to return to their 'normal' lives'. However, when deployed into the post-conflict situation, police must ensure that their role is consistent with democratic policing and democratic development (Wiatrowski and Pino, 2008).

The increased level of complexity of peacekeeping missions has changed the role that civilian police play from one of mentoring the post-conflict nation police to one of developing institutional police capacity, supporting reform, and the restructuring and rebuilding of local police (Hills, 2009; Murtaugh, 2010). Hills (2009, p. 79), maintains that 'eleven of the twelve missions authorised since 1999 refer to monitoring, reforming and rebuilding local police'.

The major problem experienced in the governance of peacekeeping missions is the use of Western democratic policing models, ideologies and technologies by international policing deployments. When using Western democratic policing models, members of international police usually fail to take into account the local context and culture. Using Western forms of policing raises a number of theoretical and practical questions about imposing such models on post-conflict nations. The imposition of Western models also raises questions about the changing role of the nation state (Garland, 1996), the governance of intervention or reform policing, and the growing use of the police as modes and models of social and state governance (Bayley and Shearing, 2001).

Police reform is acknowledged as being a crucial element when establishing a sense of security and when developing a post-conflict nation. While the principles and practices of capacity development can be applied in most development assistance programmes, there are additional challenges when developing or rebuilding police capacity in weak, post-conflict or failed countries. In such situations, rapid capacity development is critical, but it is also where the environment is least conducive to the evaluation of technical assistance programmes, or to successes.

Determining how police change during reform programmes can provide substantiation and perspective to policy deliberations when identifying,

constructing, implementing, and maintaining forms of policing. This in turn, contributes to a nation's intended objectives (Bayley 1995; 2006). Examining how police change during national stabilization post-conflict will provide a better understanding of state and political development and the relationship between reform and police institutions. However, in the past, police missions have been vague in describing their tasks, goals and objectives. This has led to divergent interpretations of mandates, instances of mission creep, and an absence of performance measurement frameworks.

The United Nations and the European Union have struggled to develop useful indicators for measuring the progress made towards a mission achieving its short and long term goals and objectives, in both local police reform and when establishing a public sense of security. Regular progress assessments and evaluations are critical for improving the activities of deployed police and for guiding strategic planning and mission direction. Regular assessments can also provide the lessons to be learned for future missions.

The lack of mission specific goals and objectives has been further exacerbated by the fact that efforts to measure the success of the United Nation's long term police reform programmes have traditionally been ad hoc and inconsistent (Smith, Holt and Durch, 2007). The lack of knowledge of police performance measurement held by report writers compounds this issue. Despite the establishment of the United Nations Best Practices Unit, it is unclear as to what degree the United Nations have been able to develop performance measures and incorporate the lessons they have learned from previous missions into current missions. Report writers who lack the knowledge of police performance measurement compound this issue. Despite the establishment of the United Nations Best Practices Unit, it is unclear as to what degree the United Nations have been able to develop performance measures and incorporate the lessons they have learned from previous missions into current missions.

The construction of widely accepted definitions is the second area of police reform that requires further understanding and research. A number of missions use statements that may be understood at a political level, but generally the statements are wide ranging and do not comprise of any technical frameworks that would assist practitioners. For example, the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and

Herzegovina (UNMIBH) tasked the police component of the mission to assist with downsizing the local police force and to reorganise the force by using 'internationally recognised standards of law enforcement' (Durch, 2006, p. 72).

Another critical question in relation to indigenous police reform concerns the absence of the establishment and implementation of practical service delivery frameworks that provides effective local security and stability. Implementing these frameworks 'increase[s] the efficacy and effectiveness of specific interventions and initiatives that contribute to sustainable reform and capacity building' (Griffiths, Dandurand and Chin, 2005, p. 7).

Past experience in assisting post-conflict nations has demonstrated the benefits of deploying civilian police in association with a co-ordinated and coherent justice and penal reform programme (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2007). The police play a linking role in this approach, and, as such, provide a means of developing sector-wide strategies. The contribution of civilian police is significant in providing stability and allows a dysfunctional political environment to change by moving the devastated country away from a military regime towards a civilian or democratic political system (McFarlane and Maley, 2001).

Research Methodology

Mission mandates, deployment processes, strategic performance and achievements of fifteen United Nations and eight European Union peacekeeping missions, were reviewed and analysed in the research project. These missions either commenced or were completed between 1999 and 2007, and the principle task of the civilian police component of the mission was to reform the local police. The list of the missions, the country that the peacekeepers were deployed to and the date of the deployment are presented in Appendix A.

The twenty-three peacekeeping missions that were included in the study represent a rich and disparate sample of cases. Eleven of these missions took place in Africa, three in Europe, three in South Asia, two in the Caribbean and one each in Eurasia and the Middle East. The sample included many internationally renown and devastating examples of intra-state conflict and perpetrated civilian atrocities. Given the geographical array and operational depth of the twenty-three case-study

missions, it was believed that it should be possible to develop general conclusions about police reform following conflict.

A structured and focused comparison of the twenty-three case studies enabled a common format for discussion and analysis to take place. This form of case-study investigation has been called 'controlled comparison' (George, 1979) and was selected as the most appropriate approach because of the small sample size and because it enabled change to be measured in missions over time. The small sample size of this project did not enable an in-depth statistical analysis to be completed. Furthermore, the project was based on the extraction of qualitative information rather than quantitative data.

Each of the twenty-three case studies was examined using the following seven headings:

- Background to the mission
- Mandate of the mission
- Mission deployment environment
- The actions of the mission (output)
- Mission implementation (model)
- What the mission achieved (outcome)
- How was the mission evaluated

The headings that were used in the research were designed to provide a framework for eliciting and summarising the information obtained from the literature search templates and enabled the inputs, outputs and the outcomes of each mission to be considered. The headings also offered a logical presentation structure and a construct for ensuring that no potentially valuable qualitative data was passed over (Druckman and Stern, 1997).

The project analysed the differences in the approaches taken over time across the aggregate missions rather than comparing approaches across the cases. Comparing the twenty-three missions would not have provided information about any improvements or deterioration in the local police reform programmes (Jones, Wilson, Rathmell and Riley, 2005). This approach was selected as the post-conflict countries studied suffered from different forms of unrest, and because they were at different stages of reconstruction when the mission began.

The goal of the research was to identify a new civilian police peacekeeping reform model. A model was able to be designed by examining the official documentation of both the United Nations and the European Union that pertained to the twenty-three missions.

Critique of Civilian Police in Peacekeeping Missions 1999 to 2007

The development of the role of peacekeeping can be seen in the changes of form and in the detail of the missions' mandates. Early mission mandates were principally military focused and the civilian police were minor actors. When civilian policing was included in early United Nations missions, the SMART (Support, Monitoring, Advising, Reporting and Training) concept was used in the mandate implementation process. In comparison, civilian police in European Union authorised peacekeeping operations have always undertaken a significant role. The inclusion of civilian policing in United Nations missions was seen as a vital component and signified a conceptual change in a mission's strategic structure when compared to the historic situation where 'civilian police issues were typically more of an afterthought' (Greener, 2009, p. 2).

The role of civilian police changed fundamentally when police were granted executive authority during the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) and the United Nations Assistance Mission in East Timor (UNTAET) in the late 1990's. This was a significant step as civilian police within a mission became responsible for local law enforcement. However, since 1999, civilian police executive authority has become the standard in the majority of United Nations missions.

The reform of indigenous police has been included in the state building component of missions since the mid-1990's. However, there is little empirical understanding of the implementation (Druckman and Stern, 1997) of police reform, what it should include and how it should be undertaken. There is also little understanding as to what a mission can accomplish, or how to assess whether a mission has achieved its goals (Druckman and Stern, 1997).

Mission mandates do not provide a definition of peacekeeping and provide little or no substantive guidance (Raush, 2002) to civilian police as to how they should carry out their duties. Mandates have become more comprehensive and specific,

and are rarely limited to one activity. Further, mission success has not been defined nor has there been any agreement as to how the performance of a mission should be measured. Any evaluation of a peacekeeping mission should include the achievements of the international police in relation to their mandated objectives and their success in reforming the indigenous police.

Despite the increase in the number of conflict interventions and post-conflict states throughout the world, Botes and Mitchell (1995) claim that the success of these missions has been both minimal and disappointing. There is little evidence that police reform and capacity development efforts have resulted in sustainable outcomes (Griffiths, et. al., 2005). The obstacles in achieving order and stability during a nation's rebuilding process are extensive and are more political and social than justice related. The lack of success is due principally to the difficulty in implementing effective reforms and because institutions take time to develop to a level where there is confidence in their delivery of service. Furthermore, there is little substantiation as to whether there has been any measureable improvement in the performance of indigenous police by the implementation of capacity or service improvement police reform programmes.

Although policy and academic communities have sought to define 'police reform', little theory has been developed in relation to reforming the roles of police and their functions in post-conflict nations and even less on how to implement any proposed reform programme (Call, 2003; Pino and Waitrowski, 2006). The majority of literature that examines police capacity development discusses the issue in general terms and is characterized by universal perceptions about best practice and lessons learned rather than being based on accepted theory and processes. As Bayley (1995; 2006) claims, there is much debate, enterprise, difficulty and uncertainty as to how to reform and democratize police in countries that have experienced transitions from authoritarian, totalitarian and oppressive forms of governance to democracy. The lack of a shared definition and understanding means that planners, policy makers and practitioners have no explicit knowledge as to how to reform police agencies or how to measure the success of the reform programmes that have been implemented. Owing to this lack of knowledge, police reforms in post-conflict nations have been based on foreign policing models and experiences which have not generally taken the local

culture or context into account. This problem has been exacerbated by the number of national police officers deployed to post-conflict nations to assist with the reform of the police who inevitably replicate their own understanding of, and use of Western policing models.

The evaluation of police reform programmes requires differentiation between alternative perspectives. These alternative perspectives include human rights, military, law enforcement, economic or democratization (Call, 2003). Effectiveness and accountability of local police forces are the two main elements of police reform in post-conflict nations (Call, 2003).

One of the main goals is capacity development, but this is only one aspect of post-conflict police reform. Any intervention programme requires a systematic approach to the capacity building initiative to ensure that a desired sustainable individual and organizational change takes place. A capacity building programme should provide a framework which assists in the reform of the police to enhance their accountability and transparency. This will enable the local police to achieve their goals efficiently and effectively. Such an approach extends beyond providing technical assistance directly to the police. The approach taken must be firmly connected to the whole of government reform framework process.

The problem of measuring police performance in a post-conflict situation is inherently difficult because of the absence of quality data and availability of sufficient resources. These deficiencies render most statistical organisational performance evaluation techniques impossible (Bajraktari, Boutellis, Gunja, Harris, Kapsis, Kaye, and Rhee, 2006). Effective reform and development programmes should include specifically designed frameworks that will assist the police to increase the efficacy and effectiveness of specific programme interventions and initiatives that contribute to sustainable capacity development (Wing, 2004).

Given these uncertainties in designing, implementing and measuring police reform and capacity development programmes in a post-conflict situation, it would be erroneous to recommend only one evaluation framework or model. The transformational period during the police reform post-conflict provides a unique opportunity for researchers to examine the role of police officers, the agency

change within these situations, and how they transform during democratic consolidation.

The practical and political problems from previous peacekeeping missions are summarized and presented in Appendix B. The problems are listed under five major peacekeeping topic areas identified from the literature; Police Mission Planning, The Mission, Local Police Capacity, Policing Approach, Programme Evaluation. Included under each of the topic areas are the topic's respective 'Mission Component' problems and the issue which caused the 'Component Problem'.

A Civilian Police Capacity Development Model

The examination of the twenty-three case study missions within the seven framework headings outlined above enables the information that was obtained to be interpreted and analysed further. The second stage of analysis was to apply a thirty-nine question template, developed from the initial literature review, to the information that was gathered under the seven headings. The thirty-nine questions were aggregated under the five major peacekeeping topic areas identified from the literature and are presented in Appendix C. The headings identified the different stages of a mission or the actions taken during a mission.

The purpose of the application of the thirty-nine questions was not to identify whether an individual mission was successful or whether a mission was successful in comparison to another. The purpose of the questions was to provide a framework for developing a new civilian police peacekeeping model which incorporates the lessons learned from the twenty-three case studies.

This approach did not prescribe mission success but allowed an individual mission's success to be measured on an individual basis depending on the political and operational context experienced (Druckman and Stern, 1997). This method of analysis was used in order to form a basis of comparison that would allow any differences between the missions to be identified.

The process provides a platform from which lessons may be learned and enables the development of a new model that may be used for police reform within intervention missions.

The Current Police Peacekeeping Model (1999-2007)

The application of the thirty-nine questions enabled the twenty-three case studies to be analysed individually; by the deployment institution and in aggregate. The application of the questions enabled gaps in the information obtained from United Nations and the European Union missions to be identified. This approach also enabled the trends across the missions to be presented, and the identification of the civilian police peacekeeping model used during the period from 1999 to 2007.

The civilian police peacekeeping model used during the period 1999 to 2007, which was identified from the application of the thirty-nine questions, is presented in Appendix D. The model highlighted a number of deficiencies in the twenty-three case study missions, especially in regard to the crucial areas of pre-deployment planning, the strategic direction of the mission, performance measures, local participation in planning and mission evaluation.

All of the twenty-three missions were based on an adopted mandate, but very few developed a strategic plan or pre-deployment plan based on the mandate. The European Union was better however, in this regard than the United Nations. This is where any problems encountered on a mission began, especially when identifying the direction that the mission should take, how its performance or achievements would be measured and when the mission would be completed.

Table 1 provides a summary of the four variables – strategic plan, strategic aim, objectives and performance measures – which was gathered from the application of four questions contained in the thirty-nine question template. These four variables should combine to make-up the strategic framework for each of the twenty-three missions. Only two missions, EUPOL COPPS (European Union Police Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support) and UAMID (United Nations and African Union Mission in Darfur), had a comprehensive strategic framework which comprised of all four variables. Approximately half of the twenty-three missions had a strategic plan or a strategic aim, and eight had both.

The biggest deficiency identified in the strategic framework of the missions was the setting of performance measures and the identification of objectives. Only five missions included objectives in their mandate and only four missions contained performance measures.

All of the European Union missions had at least one of the strategic variables, but four of the fifteen United Nations missions did not identify any of the four variables in their mandates.

Table 1: Summary of Missions Strategic Framework

	Short Title	Strategic Plan	Strategic Aim	Objectives	Performance Measures
1	EUROAFGHAN	Y	N	Y	N
2	UNMIBH	Y	Y	N	N
3	EUPM	Y	Y	N	N
4	ONUB	Y	Y	N	N
5	UNOCI	N	Y	N	N
6	MONUC	N	N	N	Y
7	EUPOL Kinshasa	N	Y	Y	N
8	EUPOL RD Congo	N	Y	N	N
9	EUPOL PROXIMA	N	Y	N	N
10	EUPAT	N	Y	N	N
11	MIPONUH	N	N	N	N
12	MINUSTAH	N	N	N	N
13	UNMIK	Y	Y	N	N
14	UNMIL	Y	Y	N	N
15	EUPOL COPPS	Y	Y	Y	Y
16	UNOMSIL	Y	Y	N	N
17	UNAMSIL	Y	N	N	N
18	UNMIS	Y	Y	Y	N
19	UNAMID	Y	Y	Y	Y
20	EU AMIS	N	Y	N	N
21	UNTAET	N	N	N	N
22	UNMISSET	N	N	N	N
23	UNMIT	N	N	Y	Y

The completion of a mission strategic plan would have provided a basis for mission planners and management to develop specific measurable objectives, and for a local police reform plan to be developed.

Identification of a New Police Peacekeeping Model

The process for developing a model for police reform in post-conflict or transitioning countries was based on the analysis of the twenty-case studies of the United Nations and European Union missions which commenced or was completed between 1999 and 2007.

Two prominent variables from a planning perspective were found. These variables influence the likelihood of a mission's success. The first variable is the reason for the United Nations or the European Union involvement and the establishment of the mission. These foundational reasons affected each mission's

operations, structure and objectives. The second variable, which was heavily influenced by the first variable, is the mandate of the mission. The mandate becomes the mission's prime planning, resourcing and deployment document.

Although the mandate of a mission needs to be clear, it also needs the support of the influential Powers within the United Nations or the European Union and needs to be accepted by the nation (Durch, 1993) receiving the intervention. 'An ambiguous or incomplete mandate can indeed make a straightforward mission difficult, or a difficult mission impossible, but the clearest mandate in the world cannot make an impossible mission more feasible' (Durch, 1993, p. 26).

However, a mandate that is less than clear may have its benefits. A non-specific mandate allows the mission some flexibility in interpreting the details of the mandate and allows flexibility in the application of the operational components of the mission. An imprecise mandate can also provide an advantageous political dimension by allowing states to support the mandate without endorsing specific actions taken under the mandate (Durch, 1993).

The reform of the security sector is one aspect of the mandate that needs to be clearly defined and specific, as any reform of the military or security service agencies will affect the proposed reform of the local police. The reform of policing systems will be caught up in the wider discussion of the provision of national security, but any mission must include a timeframe in which it will achieve its mandated objectives. The sustainable capacity development of the local police may take decades to achieve and this should be considered when identifying the roles and the domains of individual components of the security sector.

The review of the literature identifies five distinct phases to a civilian police component of a peacekeeping or intervention mission:

- stabilisation of the environment;
- the recreation of local institutions of governance (Dobbins, et. al., 2005);
- sustainable development of local institutions;
- responsibility for the delivery of police services handed to the local police as soon as possible (Joulwan and Schoonmaker, 1998); and
- the completion and the departure of the mission.

Two final points should be highlighted in this discussion. Policymakers and academics have sought to define 'police reform', but there is no single, widely shared understanding of the concept (Call, 2003). The lack of definition as to what 'police reform' means creates a situation where there is no understanding as to the direction reform should take, what should be achieved, how the programme should be achieved or how the programme should be measured or evaluated. The problem with using the word 'reform' in the post-conflict context is that by its very nature, it presumes that whatever indigenous police organisation that currently exists, is inadequate and requires modification (Call, 2003; Hills, 2009).

The second major consideration in post-conflict indigenous police reform is the type of service delivery model that should be implemented. Are Western models of policing appropriate for countries that do not share similar cultural orientations (Bayley and Perito, 2010)? The problem is that even Western nations do not have many policing models from which they can draw upon to restructure the police of the post-conflict nation. Such models should begin by focusing on elements critical to democratic policing (Greener, 2009). Reformers presume that the population of a post-conflict nation value Western democratic forms of policing and as Tonry (2007) notes, any evidence of a successful introduction of Western policing models in post-conflict nations is inconclusive.

The use of Western policing models in reforming indigenous post-conflict police may mean that reformers need to consider the issues more deeply and reassess democratic policing priorities (Goldsmith, 2009), values, structures and strategies. The complexity and the size of modern Police reform missions can, according to Greener (2009) 'mean too much focus on the material aspects of policing versus the all-important practice of policing' (p. 116). The complexity of a mission is due to the multi-faceted components within the reform programme. This complexity affects not only police advisors but several other developmental agencies. The more reflective the approach is to reform, the more emphasis placed on the skills of the mission planners and the police advisors on the ground. Police advisors must be able to adapt their experiences to the post-conflict environment and be able to consider sustainable structures that are more suitable to the context. The majority of the civilian police component of the twenty-three missions that were included in the research concentrated on the training of indigenous police

officers to the detriment of institutional sustainable capacity development and strengthening. The United Nations and the European Union civilian police reform programme should include the training of indigenous police, as this is an important element. However, the training needs to include comprehensive, culturally-based, sustainable, restructuring, reorganising and process review elements.

A comprehensive approach requires not only skills in policing, but also skills in governance and public sector management. Due to the complexity of this police reform approach, collaboration from other skilled actors is required if it is to be successful. Attempting to introduce change or reform to a police agency is difficult as they are ‘notoriously conservative and resilient institution[s]’ (Hills, 2009, p. 212) whether they are Western or indigenous. Viewing police reform in isolation from other justice sector agencies will undermine the programme’s effectiveness. Further skills will assist with the entrenched and resilient nature of the police culture and consequent problems of reform (Hills, 2009). As Ioannides (2007, p. 372, as quoted in Hills, 2009) notes, police reform has become a ‘piecemeal, incremental, administrative and technical exercise’ (p. 212).

Police Mission Planning

Initial planning for the civilian police component of a mission should commence before the mandate has been approved by the respective institutional Council. Upon approval of the mandate, the planning should commence in earnest. The plan should be comprehensive, itemising a Road Map of the proposed civilian police mission and the indigenous police reform programme. The plan should highlight what the civilian police component is to achieve, its aim or mission statement and should include:

- an environmental scan and the strategy for what follows upon the completion of the reform programme;
- the compilation of the matrix of three levels; tactical, operational and strategic/ individual, institution and environment;
- the inclusion of an implementation process and change management methodology;

- the identification of measureable phases, milestones, timeframes, benchmarks, goals and objectives;
- the number of personnel required, a list of personnel skills, resources and responsibilities;
- an evaluation framework, including performance indicators, and an adaptability or re-focusing strategy; and
- a communications strategy.

A comprehensive plan will provide a strategic vision for the operation and communicate the direction of the mission to all staff. The plan must be completed prior to deployment of personnel, as once the mission begins, there will not be time and the staff may not be inclined to undertake the required analysis. However, the final plan must be designed to be flexible in its foundation to allow for unforeseen events in the field and for the phases or projects to be run in parallel. According to Hills (2009), there is little understanding as to how the different phases of a reform programme relate to each other. This is one of the main reasons why mission planners and evaluators need to critically assess the short, medium and long-term implications of an indigenous police reform programme.


To allow for differences in each mission, the comprehensive and informed planning approach should be divided into three broad stages:

- pre-deployment or mission start-up;
 - mandate implementation; and
 - mandate completed (mission handover, withdrawal, or liquidation)
- (adapted from United Nations Peacekeeping Best Practice Section, 2008).

Figure 1 presents a comprehensive reform programme planning process for the civilian police component of a mission. The process starts with the drafting of a Pre-deployment Plan (PDP) which is based on the intelligence from the conflict, the current situation of the country involved and from an Environmental Scan of the country. This Pre-deployment Plan forms the basis for developing the indigenous Police Reform Plan (PRP). Both the PDP and the PRP form the Mission Plan and the specific Police Reform Programme (PoRP). The PoRP will

contain comprehensive strategies, objectives and a performance measurement framework.

Figure 1: Proposed Mission Civilian Police Component Reform Programme Planning Process



The Mission

Some of the major problems facing missions centre on the deployment of civilian police officers. Missions need to comprise of experienced and well trained officers, not only in civilian policing, but in the environment and culture of the post-conflict country. The number of officers, the length of deployment and the rotation of personnel form the basis for the planning of and the design of the mission. Too few a number of officers make it difficult to provide a secure environment and to implement a reform programme, and too large a number places a serious burden on mission logistics, training, administration and management.

Local Police Capacity

A principle issue in determining local police capacity is the decision as to whether to keep the existing organisation or whether to start from scratch and establish a

new organisation. A common conclusion in literature (Jones, et. al., 2005; Carothers, 2006; Stromseth, Wippman and Brooks, 2006; Call 2007) is that dismantling the old and creating new police organisations from scratch seems to be more successful than institutionalising new practices and concepts in existing organisations.

The Police Reform Plan needs to take into account the capacity of the organisation and the ability of the indigenous officers to absorb the proposed changes. This is a principle issue because a successful implementation of the Reform Plan requires the vertical and horizontal inclusion and integration of all stakeholders in the process (Marenin, 2005).

The Policing Approach

The majority of missions that are currently active have identified the introduction of Community or Democratic Policing as their major objective. It appears that these concepts have been accepted uncritically into peace operations without an analysis of their potential advantages or limitations in a post-conflict context (Mobekk, 2002; Hills, 2009). While Community and Democratic Policing may be appropriate in a post-conflict situation, it should not be used just because it is a popular concept or because it was used in the police advisers' home country.

Community Oriented Policing has become the accepted policing approach by law enforcement in Western countries. However, its benefits and effectiveness are widely debated. There is little agreement as to its empirical definition. Furthermore, Community Policing has been identified as being an elusive concept and little is known about its applicability in the context of transitioning or post-conflict nations. The application of Community Policing has not been examined in the post-conflict context (Mobekk, 2002).

The appropriateness of introducing the Community Policing concept in a post-conflict nation must be considered and evaluated, rather than accepting that it is the best solution (Mobekk, 2002). Community Policing may not be the best approach in some post-conflict countries. Some members of the public in post-conflict nations may not be comfortable with law enforcement wanting to be closer to the community. In some quarters, such an approach may be interpreted as spying (Mobekk, 2002).

Programme Evaluation

The tools to assess post-conflict law enforcement reform programmes are limited and it is often difficult to collect good social and crime data or information in transitioning and post-conflict countries. However, the evaluation framework should be developed so that it assesses and measures the reform programme outcomes, not only its outputs. This will result in a more comprehensive evaluation of the reform programme which will include the assessment of both qualitative and quantitative performance measures. According to Jones, et. al. (2005, p. xxi), one of the advantages of using outcome measures is that they ‘encourage experimentation by local managers’. Such experimentation will ensure that the reform programme is adapting to unforeseen changes in the implementation of the programme and to any challenges that may arise.

However, Call (2007) notes that there is no ‘single yardstick’ that can be used to measure police reform efforts. Any programme evaluation framework should be developed in parallel with the initial mission planning and should be based on the mission’s strategic goals, objectives and implementation. Such a comprehensive evaluation approach will require the collection and assessment of data during each phase of the implementation of the reform plan and will require the creation of input, output and outcome performance measures and benchmarks.

Regular progress evaluations or assessments of the reform programme will provide information for improving practical and operational activities in the field, and provide lessons and best practices for future missions (Smith, et. al., 2007). The development of best practices is crucial for the planning and identification of future police reform strategies, programmes and activities. Such an adaptive and flexible evaluation should also provide a foundation for the development of operational frameworks from which an assessment programme for future missions can also be developed.

Summary of a New Police Peacekeeping Model

The components of a police peacekeeping model have been developed from an analysis of the case studies of the twenty-three missions. The proposed model would address both the practical and the political problems that were identified in the case study analysis. The proposed New Civilian Police Peacekeeping Model

(NCPPM) presented in Appendix E contains five main topic areas identified in the literature and thirteen components.

The NCPPM is comprehensive, but has been developed to be flexible, depending on the environment and situation leading to the intervention, and is capable of being adapted to any future civilian police mission and reform programme. The New Model is not based on one principle policing approach, but is primarily focused on the culture of the nation receiving the assistance. The comprehensiveness of the NCPPM will place specific emphasis on the build-up of intelligence prior to the mission, the environmental scan, an enhanced mission planning process and the implementation of a structure evaluation process.

This more robust model will require changes in the mission mandate development process and the contents of the document. Future Mission mandates will need to include high-level and strategic information relating to the five main sections of the NPPM (Police Mission Planning, The Mission, Local Police Capacity, Policing Approach and Programme Evaluation) to enable the model to be developed and implemented.

Conclusion

There are two fundamental issues which are pivotal to the success of any police reform programme. Further research is required in order to identify how these issues could be included in any future peacekeeping mission or police post conflict reform programme. The first issue is the development of doctrine and strategies for the police reform component of a peacekeeping mission. The doctrine developed would form the basis for planning, recruiting and deploying police officers and for measuring the success of the implementation of the programme in the field.

The second issue concerns the structure of the mission. Historically, except for police only missions, both the United Nations and the European Union have structured their missions so that the civilian police component is ranked below, and often answerable to the military mission commander. This structure could be interpreted as the post-conflict nation still being in a state of hostility (Greener, 2009). An alternative to this approach is to have future missions led by the police as was the case in the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI)

or of the mission being ‘handed over’ to civilian police at an identified stage. The change in the structure of the mission and the increased emphasis on policing would alter ‘the overall trajectory’ (Greener, 2009, p. 128) of the mission and the police reform programme.

The proposed New Civilian Police Peacekeeping Model (NCPPM) is a dynamic flexible police reform framework which takes into account the culture of the nation being assisted. The NCPPM relies heavily on the gathering of intelligence prior to the mission, an environmental scan of the country and an enhanced mission planning process. According to Call (2008, p. 380), interveners that overemphasise state capacity over state design tend to implement reform programmes that consist of training and advising. This tendency enhances the ‘human and material capacity of state ministries and agencies’ while taking ‘for granted the prevailing design of state institutions’. Accepting the existing functions of an indigenous civilian police organisation will ‘diminish the chances of a culturally or socially ill-fitting model’ (Call, 2008, p. 380) being promoted by reformers. The model proposed will remove the tendency of both academics and practitioners approaching police reform as a technical exercise devoid of local history, culture and political risk.

The findings of the research which is discussed in this article does not offer any straight forward answers to the challenges of reforming indigenous civilian police organisations in post-conflict nations. However, there is a need for deploying institutions and academics to accept that the emphasis of peacekeeping missions has changed and that the profile and the role of civilian police needs to increase to the equivalency to that of the military.

The proposed model developed by this research is one step in this direction. Although each mission is a response to a different situation in a cultural, political and practical sense, the new civilian police reform model takes this into account and offers a flexible and generic framework that appears to be applicable to a wide variety of post-conflict situations. The new model allows both institutions and practitioners to think about police reform more holistically and is one aspect in providing a foundation for the sustainable capacity development of the post-conflict nation.

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Appendix A: Twenty-Three Case Study Missions, short title, country of intervention and start and finish dates

	Mission Full Title	Short Title	Country	Mission Date*
1	The European Union Police Mission to Afghanistan	EUPOL AFGHANISTAN	Afghanistan	30/05/07 to present
2	United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina	UNMIBH	Bosnia and Herzegovina	21/12/95 to 31/12/02
3	European Union Police Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina	EUPM	Bosnia and Herzegovina	01/01/03 to present
4	United Nations Operation in Burundi	ONUB	Burundi	21/05/04 to 31/12/06
5	United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire	UNOCI	Cote d'Ivoire	27/02/04 to present
6	Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République démocratique du Congo	MONUC	Democratic Republic of Congo	24/02/99 to 30/06/10
7	European Union Police Mission to Kinshasa	EUPOL Kinshasa	Democratic Republic of Congo	09/12/04 to 30/06/07
8	European Union Police Mission to the Democratic Republic of Congo	EUPOL RD Congo	Democratic Republic of Congo	12/06/07 to present
9	European Police Mission to the Republic of Macedonia	EUPOL PROXIMA	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)	29/09/03 to 14/12/05
10	European Union Police Advisory Team in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia	EUPAT	Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM)	24/11/05 to 14/06/06
11	United Nations Police Mission in Haiti	MIPONUH	Haiti	20/11/97 to 15/03/00
12	United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti	MINUSTAH	Haiti	30/04/04 to present
13	United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo	UNMIK	Kosovo	10/06/99 to present
14	United Nations Mission in Liberia	UNMIL	Liberia	19/09/03 to present
15	European Union Police Co-ordinating Office for Palestinian Police Support	EUPOL COPPS	Palestinian Territories	18/06/05 to present
16	United Nations Observers Mission in Sierra Leone	UNOMSIL	Sierra Leone	13/07/98 to 22/10/99
17	United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone	UNAMSIL	Sierra Leone	22/10/99 to 31/12/05
18	United Nations Mission in the Sudan	UNMIS	Sudan	24/03/05 to present
19	United Nations and African Union Mission in Darfur	UNAMID	Sudan	31/07/07 to present
20	European Union and African Union Mission to Sudan and Darfur	EU AMIS	Sudan/Darfur	20/07/05 to 31/12/07
21	United Nations Mission in East Timor	UNTAET	Timor-Leste	12/10/99 to 20/05/02
22	United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor	UNMISSET	Timor-Leste	20/05/02 to 20/05/05
23	United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste	UNMIT	Timor-Leste	25/08/06 to present

*Present = as at 15 June 2010

Appendix B: Practical and Political Problems in Previous Peacekeeping Missions

Police Mission Planning	
Mission Component	Component Problem
Pre-mission planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Failure to match ends (desired outcomes) with means (inputs)
Personnel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inconsistent quality and skills
Mission Mandate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unrealistic • Vague
The Mission	
Deployment ¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not timely • Completed in stages
Security ¹	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Failure to establish a sense of security
Local Police Capacity	
Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Inadequate planning, management and support • Lack of qualified staff
Mentoring and monitoring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Poor training standards • Western curriculum
Policing Approach	
Reform Programme Plan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non-existent • Inappropriate doctrines • No performance measures or evaluation process
All-of-Government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Failure to include comprehensive approach
Policing Approach	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Use of Western models
Modernisation Plan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Non-existent • No strategic vision
Programme Evaluation	
Programme Assessment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Half-hearted attempt • No best practice process
Programme Evaluation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Not undertaken

(Adapted from Bayley, 2006; Bayley and Perito, 2010; Durch, 1993, 2006; Jakobsen, 2006; Greener, 2009; Hills, 2009)

¹ – From author

Appendix C: Thirty-Nine Question Template

Police Mission Planning

1. What was the duration of the Mission?
2. Function of Mission
3. What was the reason for the Mission?
4. What was the Form of the Mission?
5. Were Police involved in the pre-deployment planning?
6. Did Police prepare a pre-deployment plan?
7. What was the type of reform and/or capacity development of local police identified in the Mandate?
8. What was the Mission principle achievement identified in the Mandate?
9. What was the Mission Police Component principle task identified in the Mandate?
10. What were the further directions to the Mission Police Component identified in the Mandate?
11. Was there a 'Plan' (strategic/deployment/reform/capacity development)?
12. What was the strategic 'Aim' of the Mission?
13. What were the strategic 'objectives' (KPI's)?
14. Was there any performance measures or performance framework included in the Mandate?

The Mission

15. At what stage of the Mission were Police deployed?
16. Original authorised number of police deployed
17. Were there increases in police numbers during the Mission?
18. What was the classification of the country where deployed police officers originated?
19. What was the Military's Mandated role?

Local Police Capacity

20. Were the local police and military to be re-integrated?
21. Reform/Capacity Development Details
22. Was there a Reform/CD/project Plan?
23. Was the plan developed with local participation?
24. What was the Aim and Objectives?
25. Was there a performance measurement framework for the reform/CD plan?
26. What was the timeframe for implementing the reform/CD plan?
27. What was the model used in the reform/CD plan?
28. What was the change management methodology?
29. Was this programme/project part of a comprehensive reform of criminal justice system?

Policing Approach

30. Were Mission Police embedded with local police or stand-alone/parallel?
31. Did Mission Police undertake joint Patrol with local police?
32. Was new legislation was used to assist the Mission Police?
33. What was the policing model introduced?

Programme Evaluation

34. Was the Mission evaluated or assessed?
35. What was the evaluation or assessment method?
36. What was the principle problem identified by the Mission in implementing the Mandate?

37. Did the Mission Police Component identify that achieved their Mandate?
38. Was the Mission identified by the UN or EU as being successful?
39. What was the method used to identify the success of the Mission?

Appendix D: Current Police Peacekeeping Model (1999-2007)

Police Mission Planning	
Model Component	Component Requirement
Mission Duration	Majority of missions are short-term 2 to 3 years
Mission Form	Combined with Military
Mission Function	Support or reform local police
Pre-deployment Plan	Not always developed or police not involved
Reform Specified in Mandate	Either mentoring or monitoring, or specific to the mission
Principle Achievement	To implement a specific Agreement or Plan
Principle Task	Reform local police
Further Direction	Not identified
Strategic Plan	Developed on some missions
Strategic Aim	Usually not included but some missions identified aim as to assist or develop local police
Strategic Objective(s)	Not developed
Performance measures	Not developed
The Mission	
Deployment Stage	Usually within one month of Mandate being adopted
Increased Police Numbers During Mission	Some missions Police numbers were increased
Police Officer Country of Origin	Usually Police Officers originated from developed or developing countries
Military's Role	Usually to provide security for the Mission Police Component
Local Police Capacity	
Local Police re-integrated	A few missions
Police Reform Plan Developed	The majority of missions
Local Participation involved in Planning	No
Aim of Reform Plan	Not identified in Reform Plan
Reform Plan Performance Measures	Not identified in Reform Plan
Reform Timeframe	Usually short. Less than 5 years
Reform Model	Mentoring, monitoring, training and advising
Reform Change Management Method	Co-ordinated or in phases
Police Reform Part of Government Reform	Not identified
Policing Approach	
Embedded with Local Police	The majority of missions
Undertook Joint Patrols	Very few missions
Introduced New Legislation	Very few missions

Police Model Introduced	Not identified, but if identified, was community policing, civilian policing or democratic policing
Programme Evaluation	
Method Used to Evaluate Mission	Very few missions or evaluation was undertaken by deploying institution
Achieved Mission Mandate	Some missions identified or stated simply as Mandate was achieved

Appendix E: The Components of a New Police Peacekeeping Model

Police Mission Planning	
Model Component	Component Requirement
Pre-mission planning	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Pre-deployment Plan (PDP) developed • Prepared 'by Police for Police' • Prepared in consultation with the wider mission (Mission Plan) and indigenous Government/Police • Includes Concept of Operations and Strategic Plan (vision, aim, objectives) • Includes a performance measurement framework • Contingencies • 'Plan to exit' • Sustainable
Personnel	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Training requirements of Civilian Police Advisors • Skills and competencies appropriate for mission
Mission Mandate	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Realistic and achievable with allocated resources • Comprehensive but not detailed and inflexible • Provides high level description of mission direction
The Mission	
Deployment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Timely deployment of civilian police • Appropriate number of civilian police for situation • Appropriate mixture of developed and under-developed origin civil police officer advisers
Security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Stabilise the environment • Restore order • 'Reassurance' policing and patrols • Establish Rule of Law
Local Police Capacity	
Training	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • At all levels within the organisation (recruit, officer, supervisor, middle management and executive) • Appropriate culturally based curriculum • Links in with culturally based policing approach • Appropriately qualified police trainers
Mentoring and monitoring	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Embedded qualified advisers • Maximum of 1:5 ratio (civilian police advisers to indigenous police) • Equivalent or higher rank than indigenous officer • Mentoring programme developed as part of the Strategic Plan with performance measures • Based on individual development plan
Policing Approach	
Reform Programme	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Based on a thorough evaluation of indigenous

Plan	<p>police organization</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Detailed Police Reform Plan (PRP) and Indigenous Police Reform Programme (RoRP) developed • Implemented in measureable sustainable phases • Designed to be flexible to meet unforeseen issues • Phased Implementation Plan with the PRP (contains performance measures) • Change management model • Is sustainable capacity develop based (individual and organisation) • Includes strategic direction, objectives and performance measurement framework • First Phase includes dismantling of existing indigenous civilian Police organisation and re-integration of officers following vetting, certifying and training • Second Phase includes developing a new civilian Police organization
All-of-government	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Includes relationships and linkages with other government reform programme • Comprehensive Justice Sector approach (including Police, Courts, Prisons and Probation)
Policing Approach	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Appropriately culturally based • Appropriate crime approach e.g. Eck Problem Solving Triangle • Could be modified Western approach e.g. Community Oriented Policing
Modernisation Plan	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Phased and measured approach to technology introduction • Intelligence framework
Programme Evaluation	
Programme Assessment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Programme assessed at completion of each stage • Assessed against Reform Programme Plan and Implementation Plan objectives and measures • Feeds back into Reform Programme Plan • Quarterly Mission review to ensure programme objectives are being achieved
Programme Evaluation	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Complete independent Mission and Reform Programme evaluation



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