Abstract: A critical discussion on the terrorist doctrine of 'kill one, frighten ten thousand' and how it has shifted to one that is aimed at inflicting mass casualties. The discussion weighs up what this change means in terms of coercive political influence. The article uses a critical analytic approach, employing a simple PEST framework to focus its discussion on a number of key media factors that appear at the centre of this change. The article argues that the shift in tactic to mass killings ...

URLs:

FT: http://dx.doi.org/10.1350/pojo.2014.87.3.660

A critical discussion on the terrorist doctrine of “kill one, frighten ten-thousand” and how it has shifted to one that is aimed at inflicting mass casualties. The discussion weighs-up what this change means in terms of coercive political influence. The paper used a critical analytic approach employing a simple PEST framework to focus its discussion on a number of key media factors that appear at the center of this change. The paper argues that the shift in tactic to mass killings has the potential to reach more people and inflect greater fear and anxiety.

Keywords: terrorism; counterterrorism; new terrorism; terrorist doctrine

INTRODUCTION
Terrorism has been a feature of political conflict ever since people began disagreeing about important issues—whether they were political, economic, or religious. History is profuse with examples dating from the earliest civilizations, through to the present (Wardlaw, 1982, pp.18–24). Conflicts between those who have power and those who lack it have often given rise to asymmetrical warfare. Guerrilla warfare is one form of this tactic; another is terrorism.

Although fundamentally different, these forms of asymmetrical warfare share the common tactic of projecting power through means other than direct confrontation on a battlefield, in whatever form that “battlefield” may be. That is not to say that belligerents on both sides of a conflict will not engage in an exchange of force—what it does mean is that the weaker force is likely to use what is termed fourth generation warfare, or irregular combat.

Traditionally, terrorists used what has become known as the doctrine of “kill one, frighten ten-thousand” (Sun Tzu) as their lever in this mismatch of strength of force. This could be argued to be the first pillar in the philosophy of terrorism. It allowed an undermanned and under-resourced opposition to engage a much large opponent to catalyse for political change.

Although this has been the underlining basis for much terrorist action around the world, a change began to be observed in the 1990s with what has since been termed the New Terrorism (Lesser, Hoffman, Arquilla, et al., 1999). This evolution in tactics has seen terrorists engage in acts of violence that go well beyond the killing of small numbers of people, to situations that are characterized by the killing of hundreds, and in the case of the attacks of September 11, 2001, thousands of people. While it is acknowledged that the concept of a New Terrorism is not universally accepted by all scholars (Crenshaw, 2008; Duyvesteyn, 2004; Piazza, 2009; Spencer, 2006; Tucker, 2001), nonetheless one of the propositions of the New Terrorism is that the phenomena is grounded in acts of increased destruction, and hence this perspective facilitates a point for comparison for this study.
FOCUS OF THE STUDY

The supposition has been that large-scale, mass attacks yield more influence in an asymmetrical conflict. This hypothesis has been acknowledged not only in some of the recent literature (Field, 2009, pp.195–207), but pre-dating the September 11, 2001 attacks (for instance, see Sloan, 1998, pp.173–193). Therefore, this study questioned whether the change in the scale of killings by terrorists has the potential to produce political influence beyond that of the doctrine of killing targets on a smaller scale. Although the intuitive answer to this question suggests that it would, this study conducted a transparent assessment of this proposition in order to corroborate what has been postulated in various instinctive observations in the subject literature (for example, see Lesser, Hoffman, Arquilla, et al., 1999).

BACKGROUND TO ASYMMETRICAL WARFARE

Prunckun (2005, p.60) reminded us that “first generation warfare was characterized by the age of Napoleon: forces armed with guns operating in close-order formations to defeat cavalry and infantry who were armed with swords and bayonets. Second generation warfare was the age of firepower, managed in such a way that enabled an army to win through attrition. Third generation warfare saw the advent of decentralized attacks based on manoeuvrability and strategy.” Whereas, fourth generation warfare is much more irregular. In the main, it comprises asymmetric operations “... in which a vast mismatch exists between the resources and philosophies of the combatants and in which the emphasis is on bypassing an opposing military force...” (Vest, 2001)

Fourth generation warfare is the tactic that terrorists use. McEwen (1986, p.62) explains that terrorism is in fact a form of psychological operation (i.e. a tactic) that projects its violent impact beyond the immediate victims—generating fear in the wider population to achieve its political objective (Terrorists attacks have been equated to a form of blackmail in order to achieve their goals that could not be achieve by legitimate means (see, Laqueur 2001, p.226). The cornerstone for producing this widespread fear and anxiety, as has been documented (Nacos, 2007), is the terrorists’ ability to communicate. Kropotkin referred to this as “propaganda by deed” (cited in Rapoport, p.50). This is traditionally done via the mass media. Arguably, without media coverage terrorists would not be able to promote their “message,” and fail.

Traditional Terrorism

The chief purpose of terrorism is to use a violent act as a way to gain publicity (Hoffman, 2006, p.131). Publicity, in turn, is intended to generate fear and this fear it is hoped will translate into political pressure, coercing political leaders to bow to the “demands” of the terrorist perpetrators. Unlike, conventional warfare, it is not the complete destruction of the opposition that is sought by the violence, but intimidation—that is, the bending of the opposition’s will. It is noteworthy that there is a distinction between publicity to achieve a political end, and publicity to bring attention to a political issue. For instance, the 1972 Munich massacre could be argued to have been an attempt to place the issue of Palestine on the political agenda, rather than necessarily an attempt to achieve an “outcome” per se. (West, 2013).

Jenkins reasoned that, “Terrorist attacks are often carefully choreographed to attract the attention of the electronic media and the international press... Terrorism is aimed at people watching, not the actual victims. Terrorism is theatre (Jenkins, 1974, p.4).” As a result, terrorists not only weigh-up the where and when questions in the planning stages of an operation, but also the types of violence to be employed, as well as to what degree this violence should be exercised. These are all questions that are judiciously considered by terrorists because wholesale indiscriminate fatalities were once seen to potentially “...
undermine the legitimacy of their cause and drive away sympathetic supporters” (Simon and Benjamin, 2009, p.199).

It could be argued that this traditional terrorist approach recognized boundaries set by strategic objectives, political realities, and to some extent ethical mores (see the discussion below on the Weather Underground). Although analysts for many years have predicted the use of weapons of mass destruction (Wilkinson, 1977, pp.198–206), the evidence in favor of terrorists embracing their use as a tactic was lacking (Hoffman, 1995, p.279). In the past, it appears that terrorists contained any urge to use nuclear/radiological, chemical or biological weapons out of recognition—articulated or not—that they would lose potential support faster than it could be gained. Hoffman (2006, p.271) observed that, “This new generation of terrorists . . . is not only characterized by more salient theological influences, but in some cases has embraced millenarian, if not apocalyptic aims.” Although said, to date there is no evidence of such an attack being carried out.

**New Terrorism**

In contrast to traditional terrorism, proponents of the so-called New Terrorism hold that one of the factors of this phenomena is the prominence of the use of weapons of mass destruction because its aim is to inflict indiscriminate mass fatalities—and if this objective is not achieved; it seeks to inflict indiscriminate mass casualties (e.g. Boston Marathon bombings on April 15, 2013). Simply put, the New Terrorism uses tactics that are more lethal in order to manifestly increase the number of victims. This has been indelibly portrayed through the events of 11 September 2001—all of which went well beyond any previous attack perpetrated by a traditional terrorist group.

With traditional terrorism, terrorists used violence in a functional way to affect a strategic position. In comparison, the New Terrorism is centered on achieving “symbolic violence” and because of this it fails to have a clearly defined tactical objective (Hoffman, 1993, 12–29). Discriminate terrorist operations are directed against specific targets, whereas indiscriminate operations are directed against a populace (Mullins, 1988, pp. 144–146).

It has been postulated that practitioners of the New Terrorism have adopted an indiscriminate approach because they believe that their actions are divinely sanctioned, thus they have little regard for public opinion (Juergensmyer, 2000, pp.218–223)—it is a radical religious end-state that is sought (Laqueur, 1999, p.101). Analysts such as Mockaitis (2004, p.22) have argued that the ethical restraints that held terrorists—such as the Weather Underground—in check, have vanished. The term “total war” has been used to describe the notional objective of eliminating their religious opponents (e.g. jihadism—”holy war”—as practised by radical jihadists) through the increased political influence of this tactic (Cilluffo and Tomarchio, 1998, pp.440–442).

**APPROACH TO THE CRITICAL DISCUSSION**

In order to set the context for the critical discussion, two historical case studies were selected to facilitate our understanding in the shift from the “first pillar of terror” to the now evolved doctrine of mass causalities. As exemplars of these two approaches, the Weather Underground Organization and al-Qaeda, were selected. These groups were considered to demonstrate a marked contrast to their approach to terrorism and as such could be considered to be at the opposite ends of the “atrocity scale”—the former avoided casualties whereas the latter sought to maximize death and destruction.

Using these cases to establish context, a critical discussion of the political, economic, social and technological factors (PEST) relating to the changes in the current environment were conducted. This critique began with the generation of a list of possible media related issues (i.e. factors) that could impact (i.e. influence) the New Terrorism. The number of
factors consider adequate to assess changes in the environment were deemed to be six. These were generated through a process of brainstorming. The resulting factors were collated under the representative headings of the PEST mnemonic (Prunckun, 2014).

ANAMNESIS OF TWO TERRORIST PARADIGMS

Weather Underground

The Weather Underground was the informal name given to an American left-wing radical group that operated between 1969 and until the end of the Vietnam War in 1975. (Although the group operated beyond this time, it has been argued it was “disintegrating.” See, Berger, 2006) The group’s formal name was Weather Underground Organization. The group was established by students at the University of Michigan calling themselves, simply, Weathermen. It was a faction of the Students for a Democratic Society—another radical left-wing organization that was opposed to the war in Vietnam and a supporter of the civil rights movement.

The overarching goal of the Weathermen was to overthrow the US Government by installing a revolutionary government in its place. The political objective was to discard what it saw as imperialist policies and instead pursue the building of a classless society based on communist principles.

The essence of the group’s belligerent actions against the US Government consisted of public demonstrations that began in October 1969 under the banner of the “Days of Rage.” This was followed in 1970 with the issuing of a "Declaration of a State of War" against the United States Government and followed-up by a long running bombing campaign that ran from 1971 until just before the fall of Saigon in 1975. The group also aided the Folsom prison escape of the high-profile anti-establishment figure Dr Timothy Leary in 1970 (Leary, 1983).

The bombings that the group carried-out can be seen as its chief terrorist action. But according to the doctrine of kill one, frighten ten-thousand; the group did not adhere to this tactic at all. In fact, it issued evacuation warnings prior to the detonations of their bombs and these warnings were accompanied with political communiqués that identifying the target and the reasons for the protest (Mullins, 1988, p. 21). As a result, no one was ever killed in relation in any of the group’s terrorist acts. (Although three members of the group were inadvertently killed while constructing a bomb in the Greenwich Village townhouse in which they lived. See, Ayers, 2001, pp.183–185)

The first bombing was on March 1, 1971 and the target was the United States Capitol building. This, they said in their communiqué, was a protest to the America’s invasion of Laos. The second bombing was on May 19, 1972 and targeted the Pentagon building as a reprisal to the bombing raids to Americans were carrying-out on Hanoi. The last bombing incident took place on January 29, 1975 and was aimed at US Department of State building as a further protest to the escalation of the Vietnam War. But once the United States signed the peace accord in 1973, the group and its political ambitions atrophied in line with much of the radical ideology and actions of other left-wing groups. The Weathermen never achieved its goal of bringing down the American Government.

Al-Qaeda

Al-Qaeda is the now infamous name for a global terrorist group (originally a core but now with affiliates and off-shoots) that is known around the world (alternative spellings include al-Qa’ida and al-Qa’ida). Its English translation is said to be The Base and it was created by Osama bin Laden after the defeat of former Soviet Union that had occupied Afghanistan (Farwaz, 2009). The militant Islamic organization was therefore formed as an opposition force. Funded in large part by “...a core group of financial facilitators who raised money from a variety of donors and other fundraisers, primarily in the Gulf countries and particularly in Saudi
Arabia,” (National Commission, 2004, p.170) it comprised members from countries from around the world, and thus could be described as a “stateless army” (Magstadt, 2013, p.137). It has been designated as a terrorist organization by Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and New Zealand (in the world-wide intelligence community, these countries are known as the “Five Eyes.” See, Prunckun, 2014) as well as Russia, the European Union, NATO, the United Nations Security Council and many other countries (Maras, 2013, p.19).

The group believes in a strict interpretation of sharia law—the moral code and religious law of Islam—and calls for a global Jihad (Adiong, 2012, pp.253–258). The group’s attacks have been characterized by simultaneous assaults on innocent people that often feature suicide by the attacker(s). These attacks are distinguished by the use of weapons of large-scale destruction. This is because al-Qaeda believes that the indiscriminate killing of civilians is religiously sanctioned under the doctrines espoused by Salafist jihadists (Meijer, 2009). In essence, al-Qaeda imagines a pan-Islamic world free from all foreign influences which will create a new Islamic caliphate.

DISCUSSION

Political
There are a number of key factors that present themselves as being central to the political implications concerning media coverage of terrorist events. Considered are radical political actions, including the high profile intimidation of opinion makers (e.g. the fatwa against Salman Rushdie), the events leading up to and surrounding the so-called Arab Spring, the long running insurgency in Syria, the detonations of vehicle-borne bombs in Iraq, and the Boston Marathon bombing and subsequent street shoot-outs in April 2013.

Economic
Economic factors center on access to the Internet and the social media web sites that are found on the World Wide Web. The factors point to low cost access to these facilities as well as low cost of having to produce propaganda material for uploading to these sites. Associated with this is the relatively low cost of audio and video equipment to capture images and sounds. Uploading can be done via the Internet but also via mobile telephones (cell phones), which can be done live as events unfold. As many of these electronic files are large, the cost of storing them for future use is so inexpensive that it is not an issue (e.g. perhaps as low as $2 per 4GB of data).

Social
The factors identified as major social determinates focused on being viewed and sharing personal experiences. The first, which is almost a cliché, is that the world has evolved since the 1960s when terrorists would hijacked commercial aircraft and divert them to Cuba. At that time air travel was, in relative trims, expensive and limited to business travellers and socially well-off. Communication was limited—event long-distance phone calls were a rare thing to make.

This issue leads into the other factors in the list—the rapid exchange of ideas and the opportunity and willingness the share personal experiences. Both, inexpensive air travel and access to social media on the Internet can be attributed to facilitating these developments. The consequence of this is that people living in areas that were out-of-the-way in terms of physical isolation or socially remote, are now part of the geography for the exchange of ideas as part of a two-way dialogue.

There is a growing number of public places that now have CCTV (city and suburb streets and parks, as well as car dash mounted camera for observing roads), and there are also a growing number of private places that have CCTV (e.g. company parking areas). The
images are now available and given the factors just canvassed, are being shared globally, especially on social media.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political</th>
<th>Economic</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Intimidation of opinion makers (e.g.</td>
<td>• Inexpensive to produce content to post</td>
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<td>Salman Rushdie)</td>
<td>to social media sites.</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Arab Spring</td>
<td>• Almost anyone can afford to have</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Insurgency in Syria</td>
<td>access to the Internet (even if on a</td>
</tr>
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<td>• Boston Marathon bombing and associated</td>
<td>temporary or occasional basis)</td>
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<tr>
<td>street gun-fights</td>
<td>• Low cost distribution of propaganda</td>
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<td>• Vehicle-borne bombings in Iraq</td>
<td>video, photographs and messages, via</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Public slaying of a soldier in</td>
<td>social media</td>
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<tr>
<td>Woolwich, London (low-tech/high-impact)</td>
<td>• Low cost for purchase of video and</td>
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<td></td>
<td>camera equipment for capturing images</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Low cost for sending audio and images</td>
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<td></td>
<td>via mobile telephony worldwide (van</td>
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<td></td>
<td>be live)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Low cost mass storage of audio and</td>
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<td></td>
<td>images on electronic media</td>
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<tr>
<th>Social</th>
<th>Technological</th>
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<tr>
<td>• We live in a global community</td>
<td>• More media outlets provide coverage</td>
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<tr>
<td>• There is a rapid exchange of ideas</td>
<td>of events</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>through social media</td>
<td>• New technologies — Facebook,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• There is an extensive exchange of</td>
<td>Twitter, blogs, and other social media</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>personal experiences through</td>
<td>• Move to satellite and Internet radio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>inexpensive air travel</td>
<td>rather than shortwave radio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Local cultures that were once “isolated”</td>
<td>• Satellite TV (i.e. not relying totally on</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>are now influenced by worldwide trends</td>
<td>terrestrial TV stations)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Public acceptance of CCTV in public</td>
<td>• Deployment of CCTV now able to be</td>
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<tr>
<td>areas</td>
<td>done by non-technical people (i.e. off-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• There is a willingness of people to</td>
<td>the-shelf)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>share visual images and personal</td>
<td>• Easy to use audio and video equipment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>stories in public forums, especially</td>
<td>(e.g. Google Glass and a wide range of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>social media</td>
<td>commercial audio/video digital</td>
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<td></td>
<td>recording equipment)</td>
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Table 1: Summary of the PEST discussion factors

**Technological**

The key technical factors deemed to have an impact on the way terrorists exploit public media includes the growing number of outlets that provide coverage of events. At one time these were newspapers/magazine, radio and television. Now with social media and the Internet (e.g. email), “news” can be transmitted via outlets that were never thought of before—e.g. Facebook, Twitter, blogs, and other social media sites. There is also satellite radio transmission as well as TV transmissions that are able to broadcast into countries and regions because there is no reliance on terrestrial broadcast stations. And the capturing of
audio and video via CCTV (as well as monitoring equipment) can be performed by people with little or no technical skills simply by unpacking the equipment from the retailer’s box.

**CONCLUSION**

This paper considered whether the change in the scale of killings by the adaptation of the philosophy of the New Terrorism had, arguably, produce political influence beyond that of the traditional doctrine of killing small numbers of targets. Although the subject literature suggested that this was the case, this critique looked at this proposition in order to seek some corroboration.

The traditional terrorist approach was that “you don’t have to win the war, just break the opposition’s will.” The mechanism for doing this was to seek media coverage of any physical attack so that fear and anxiety are spread throughout the target population. Two exemplars were examined as a contextual basis for the study—the Weather Underground and al-Qaeda.

It was acknowledged that the ability for terrorists to garner media attention is pivotal to the success or failure of their mission. As then-British Prime Minister, the late-Baroness Thatcher expressed it succinctly when she said: democracies “. . .must try to find ways to starve the terrorist and the hijacker of the oxygen of publicity on which they depend” (Thatcher, 1985).

If the metaphor of a volume control dial on an audio system could be used as a means of demonstrating the impact the doctrine of kill one, frighten ten-thousand might have on a public audience, then its argued here that the “message,” in the form of a violent terrorist act, will still be “heard.” However, using this metaphor, it will be heard at a greater distance and heard by more people.

The fact that people are killed infuses a degree of shock and whether it is one or one-hundred, in terms of the metaphor, the media factors canvassed in this study suggest that it has the potential to wield all the political influence of traditional terrorism, but to a greater degree. The paper argues that the shift in tactic to mass killings has the potential to reach more people and inflect greater fear and anxiety. Therefore, this critical discussion concludes what has been asserted in the literature for some time—whether the killings are small-scale or large, the first pillar of terrorism still stands.

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