Earlier Coordination of Employment & Skills Development
In post-conflict countries:
A case study of Afghanistan to develop a model
E & SD programme using Project Cycle Management &
a Logical Framework Approach

by
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for the award of the
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The price one pays for pursuing any profession or calling is an intimate knowledge of its ugly side. The most dangerous creation of any society is the man who has nothing to lose.

James Baldwin

Integrating thought with action effectively has plagued philosophers, frustrated social scientists, and eluded professional practitioners for years. It is one of the most prevalent and least understood problems of our age. Universities have shunned it on the grounds that effective action was too practical or – the best kiss of death – vocational.

Chris Argyris & Donald Schon

The current educational regime is based on a certain view about what kind of knowledge is important: “knowing what as opposed to knowing how.”

Matthew Crawford
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Certificate of Authorship

I, Robert William Duffy, hereby declare that this submission is my own work and that to the best of my knowledge and belief, it contains no material previously published or written by another person nor material which to a substantial extent has been accepted for the award of any other degree or diploma at Charles Sturt University or any other educational institution, except where due acknowledgement is made in the thesis. Any contribution made to the research by colleagues with whom I have worked at Charles Sturt University or elsewhere during my candidature is fully acknowledged.

I agree that this thesis be accessible for the purpose of study and research in accordance with the normal conditions established by the Executive Director, Library Services or nominee, for the care, loan and reproduction of theses.*

.................................................. 11 February, 2011
Signature Date

* Subject to confidentiality provisions as approved by the university
Other relevant data | Most recent data | Previously
--- | --- | ---
Population | 24,500,000 (CSO 2007) | 14,606,400 (UNFPA 1990)
Under-five mortality (probability of dying between birth and exactly five years of age expressed per 1,000 live births) | 191 p/1,000 (MoPH/WHO/UNICEF 2008) | 260 p/1,000 (UNICEF 1990)
Maternal mortality | 1,600 per 100,000 live births (second-highest in the world) (MoPH, 2002, UNICEF 2000-2006) | 41 years (UNICEF 1990)
Life expectancy | 43 years (UNICEF 2006) | 41 years (UNICEF 1990)
Global acute malnutrition | 16% in children aged 6 to 59 months (UNICEF nutrition rapid assessment, May - June 2008) | 16% in children aged 5-59 months (UNICEF 1990)
Percentage of population living on less than $1 per day | 42% (UNDP) | 68% (UNDP)
Proportion of population without sustainable access to an improved drinking water source | 68% (UNDP) | 68% (UNDP)
IDPs | 235,000 (UNHCR 2009) | 232,000 (UNHCR 2008)
Refugees | **In-country** | **Abroad**
 |  | 2,780,000 (mostly in Pakistan and Iran)
ECHO Vulnerability and Crisis Index score (V/C) | 3/3 (most severe) | 3/3 (most severe)
2007 UNDP Human Development Index score | 0.345 (ranking 174th out of 178 countries) | 0.345 (ranking 174th out of 178 countries)
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a number of anonymous participants and reviewers
for their assistance, time and patience during the collection of
the information they have willingly provided
in the hope that countries affected by similar conflicts
can recover more rapidly and in doing so
improve the lives of ordinary people.
Abbreviations & Acronyms

ACBAR Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief
ACEG Afghan Carpet Exporter’s Guild
ACLEDA Association of Cambodian Local Economic Development Agencies
ADB Asian Development Bank
AGEF Association of Experts in the Fields of Migration & Development Cooperation
AGTTP Afghan German Technical Training Programme
ALC Afghan Labour Code
ANDS Afghanistan National development Strategy
ANQA Afghanistan National Qualification Authority
ANSCO Afghanistan National Standard Classification of Occupations
APSDEP Asia Pacific Skills Development Programme
AREU Afghanistan Research & Evaluation Unit
ARTF Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund
ASCO Afghanistan Standard Classification of Occupations
ASDP Afghanistan Skills Development Project
AusAID Australian Government Overseas Aid Program
BAAG British Agencies Afghanistan Group
BMZ Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation & Development (Germany)
BSP Basic Skills Project (Cambodia)
CARE Care International (Afghanistan)
CCA Common Country Assessment (UNDP)
CCF Common Country Framework (UNDP)
CEMA Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (USSR)
CESP Committee on Education & Skills Policy (Afghanistan)
CGAP Consultative Group to Assist the Poor
CPCR Commission for Post-Conflict Reconstruction
CPN Communist Party Nepal
CRD Council for reconstruction and Development (Lebanon)
CSO Central Statistics Office (Afghanistan)
CTA Chief technical Advisor
CTEVT Council for Technical Education & Vocational Training (Nepal)
CTSC Cluster Training & Support Centre (US Govt. programme)
DDR Disarmament, Demobilization & Reintegration
DFID Department for International Development (United Kingdom)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DIDG</td>
<td>Dutch Directorate General for International Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOE</td>
<td>Department of Labour (Kosovo)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E&amp;SD</td>
<td>Employment &amp; Skills Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Commission</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECOMOG</td>
<td>Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EDSWA</td>
<td>Employment Creation through Skills Development for War Affected Afghans</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ETF</td>
<td>European Training Foundation (Italy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E&amp;WO</td>
<td>Employers’ and Workers Organizations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GTZ</td>
<td>Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (^1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IANDS</td>
<td>Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAWG</td>
<td>Inter Agency Working Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBRD</td>
<td>International Bank for Reconstruction &amp; Development [WB/IDA]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICG</td>
<td>International Crisis Group (WB/IBRD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDA</td>
<td>International Development Association (WB/IBRD)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IDDR(S)</td>
<td>Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO</td>
<td>International Labour Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ILO-AMEP</td>
<td>ILO Afghan Micro-Finance for Employment Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IOM</td>
<td>International Office of Migration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRC</td>
<td>International Rescue Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISAF</td>
<td>International Security Assistance Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ISI</td>
<td>Inter Services Intelligence organization (Pakistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITC</td>
<td>International Training Centre (ILO, Turin Italy)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JCMB</td>
<td>Joint Coordination and Management Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JBIC</td>
<td>Japan Bank for International Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>Japanese International Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KOICA</td>
<td>Korean International Cooperation Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFA</td>
<td>Logical Framework Approach</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFM</td>
<td>Logical Framework Matrix</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMA</td>
<td>Labour Market Assessment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMI</td>
<td>Labour Market Information</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LMIAU</td>
<td>Labour Market Information &amp; Analysis Unit (Afghanistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LR</td>
<td>Learning resources</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) To be known as the German International Cooperation (GIZ) as of January 2011.
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Name</th>
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<tr>
<td>LURD</td>
<td>Liberians United for Reconciliation &amp; Democracy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MISFA</td>
<td>Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MODEL</td>
<td>Movement for Democracy in Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOE</td>
<td>Ministry of Education (Afghanistan &amp; Lebanon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOF</td>
<td>Ministry of Finance (Afghanistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOFA</td>
<td>Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Afghanistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOHE</td>
<td>Ministry of Higher education (Afghanistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOLSAMD</td>
<td>Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs &amp; Disabled (Afghanistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOTVE</td>
<td>Ministry of Technical and Vocational Education (Lebanon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOY&amp;S</td>
<td>Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sport (Liberia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MRRD</td>
<td>Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOWA</td>
<td>Ministry of Women’s Affairs (Afghanistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEEP</td>
<td>National Emergency Employment Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>NFPL</td>
<td>National Patriotic Front of Liberia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Non-Government Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPC</td>
<td>National Project Coordinator (Lebanon)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NPP</td>
<td>National Priority Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NQF</td>
<td>National Qualifications Framework</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NRAP</td>
<td>National Rural Access Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSD&amp;MLP</td>
<td>National Skills Development &amp; Market Linkages Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTVETA</td>
<td>National Technical &amp; Vocational Education &amp; Training Authority (Afghanistan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NTVETB</td>
<td>National Technical &amp; Vocational Education &amp; Training Board</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ODM</td>
<td>Overseas Development ministry (UK)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OECD</td>
<td>Organization for Economic Cooperation &amp; Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OEEC</td>
<td>Organization for European Economic Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORT</td>
<td>World ORT International Cooperation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OXFAM</td>
<td>Oxford Famine Relief International</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIP</td>
<td>Public Investment Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIU</td>
<td>Project Implementation Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PMU</td>
<td>Project Monitoring Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRT</td>
<td>Provincial Reconstruction Team</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SAB</td>
<td>Solidarite Afghanistan Belgique</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCA</td>
<td>Swedish Committee for Afghanistan</td>
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<tr>
<td>SCO</td>
<td>Standard Classification of Occupations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDA</td>
<td>Sanayee Development Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEAMEO</td>
<td>The Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Small &amp; Medium Enterprise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SP</td>
<td>Social Partner</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEP</td>
<td>Training for Employment Project (Liberia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOR</td>
<td>Terms of Reference</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TREE</td>
<td>Training for Rural Economic Empowerment (ILO-Liberia)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TVET</td>
<td>Technical Vocational Education &amp; Training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNAMA</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Afghanistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNDESA</td>
<td>United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UND</td>
<td>United Nations Development Programme</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNESCO</td>
<td>United Nations Educational, Scientific &amp; Cultural Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNHCR</td>
<td>United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNICEF</td>
<td>United Nations Children’s Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNIDO</td>
<td>United Nations Industrial Development Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNMIK</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Kosovo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOPS</td>
<td>United Nation’s Office of Project Services</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNORSA</td>
<td>United Nations Operations Research /Systems Analyst</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNSECORD</td>
<td>United Nations Security Coordination Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAid</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>World Bank (IBRD/IDA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YES</td>
<td>Youth Employment Service (Liberia)</td>
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ABSTRACT

“This aim of the research was to investigate whether earlier intervention by donors, United Nations’ agencies and Non Government Organizations would improve coordination of technical assistance interventions related to Employment and Skills Development (ES&D) in post-conflict countries. Based on earlier experience the author observed that E&SD activities were not given high priority in the immediate aftermath of civil and international conflicts and as a result coordination of E&SD was not being efficiently undertaken...

The initial research reviewed various theories of development and a grounded theory approach was adopted. The author also reflected on experience as a participant observer in a number of countries including Afghanistan, Albania, Bosnia Herzegovina, Cambodia, Kosovo, Lebanon, Liberia and Nepal. More directed research was then carried out specific to Afghanistan. Related Afghanistan E&SD projects were reviewed and interviews held with key informants to determine their perceptions and opinions concerning earlier intervention and coordination.

From those discussions a case study approach was considered best suited to the circumstances. Analysis of the key institutions in the region that may have an interest in assisting a post-conflict Afghanistan Government was undertaken using descriptor phrases and words. This revealed that none indicated any planned activities in the post-conflict area. Questions were formulated for a wider national audience. When distributed however the response to requests for interviews, information and data was poor. The approach was amended and heavy reliance placed on review of existing and contemporary documentation from national and international sources and contact by Email and landline.

The results of the situation analysis were mixed. The E&SD system was seen to be fragmented, poorly resourced, without proper policies and, in the case of the formal stream, very traditional in that there were few if any linkages with the labour market. Conversely the non-formal and informal system, supported by the National Skills Development Programme with sub-contracted non government organization offering short demand-led courses had a more market-friendly approach. However in each instance the curricula, skills testing and quality assurance standards were not known.
Added to this the research revealed that there was a lack of coordination with and between key Government ministries delivering services related to E&SD. The research revealed that the ad-hoc approach by the Government and the unilateral approaches of some donor interventions by various members of the international aid community resulted in less than optimal utilization of scarce resources.

This absence of a coordinated approach following the conflict period is evidenced by repeated and ongoing requests over extended periods for international financial assistance and technical cooperation to provide resources for skills development programmes to match the priority sectors of the national labour market.

The findings were that capacity exits within international organizations to have standard procedures in place that would, if developed a refined continuously with government collaboration, be adaptable and form the basis for post-conflict development of a national employment and skills development system. Such procedures if judiciously monitored during the conflict would then reduce the inefficient use of donor and government resources when peace is established. As a means of establishing a programme framework using Project Cycle Management procedures that incorporate a Logical Framework Matrix (LFM) is advocated as a planning model. This framework would then provide a sound foundation for coordinating individual donor inputs to the overall employment and skills development system“.
CHAPTER ONE

BACKGROUND

1.1 The aim of the research

The aim of this research was to use the experience of post-conflict Afghanistan as a case study to investigate the factors that may influence the timing, efficiency, effectiveness and relevance of employment and skills development (E&SD) interventions by governments and international agencies in post-conflict countries.

The findings contribute to a model identifying the most appropriate timing, intervention points, and coordination strategies to provide technical assistance for an earlier and more effective E&SD implementation. Recommendations in the form of a Logical Framework Matrix (LFM) have been made to improve the coordination of these interventions.

Chapter One discusses the aim and emphasis of the research. The researcher’s profile is followed by a summary of countries I have visited that have been impacted by some form of serious conflict. Key E&SD issues are described. The limitations when doing such research, both from an academic and security perspective are explained. In Chapter Two the context in which international technical assistance is offered is outlined including background to the conflict in Afghanistan. The reasons for choosing a case study methodology, the questions, the scope of the research, an outline of project cycle management and the logical framework approach follows in Chapter Three. Chapter Four covers documentation reviews, sources of international technical assistance available and a model framework within which appropriate policies, a strategy and implementation can be developed. Chapter Five describes the context, the various categories of those requiring direct and immediate income-earning opportunities, the sectors of the economy requiring labour, the dispersion of the labour force, the classification of occupations and sources of technical assistance available. Data collected and analysis of the situation in Afghanistan is covered in Chapter Six. Project design models, options and limitations are included along with a model logical framework at the policy level in Chapter Seven followed by recommendations for further research in Chapter Eight.
1.2 Researcher profile

The experiences which underpin the specific research issues investigated in this research, and which provide an experiential context for the issues raised in the following analysis, are directly relevant to the discussion in the thesis. The primary method of investigation was ‘participant research’ and observation. It is therefore both appropriate and essential to outline the background from which the specific questions raised in the thesis originated.

I was an Australian federal government public servant for fifteen years, first as a tradesman fitter machinist, toolmaker and finally as a technical instructor and training centre manager. International employment as an apprentice training specialist commenced in private sector mining companies in the 1970s in Papua New Guinea, Indonesia, and Mexico and in the late 1980s in Zambia. This experience provided a valuable insight into the legal and industrial relationships between government, statutory bodies and major multi-national enterprises.

I spent the early 1980’s working with a variety of United Nations (UN) and multi-national agencies as a training and development practitioner. During a ten-year period the focus was on the development of projects that addressed a variety of problems at the training institution level. This included the design, construction, equipping and staff development programme of a network of 12 vocational education schools in Thailand, plus a number of in-plant training centres for the mining industry. This involved liaison with various bodies including the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), UN agencies, government ministries, employers’ and workers’ organizations and private sector multi-national enterprises.

The influence of national policies, strategies and the implementation of projects that would support those policies became a major factor in work undertaken in the 1990’s. Governments and donors insisted on a more holistic and multi-disciplinary approach to technical assistance; additional emphasis was being placed on the increased participation of stakeholders at an earlier stage of project development. Donors insisted on more transparent processes to develop, implement, monitor and evaluate internationally funded programmes and projects. In the mid 1990’s the work was skewed towards the analysis of national E&SD systems in a variety of countries in Asia.
Pacific, the Middle East, and Eastern Europe. By 1997 my focus turned to assisting countries with advice on E&SD strategies and systems when emerging from civil or international conflict and natural disasters. I have been in a position to assess first-hand the impact of well-funded but frequently parochial and/or risk-averse approaches that are applied when delivering technical assistance to developing countries. In a number of instances the technical assistance was implemented without taking into account (i) the lack of capacity of existing personnel, (ii) the time needed to assess, modify and change existing E&SD systems and (iii) most importantly the infrastructure and finances required for post-project sustainability. Working for the private sector, development banks, national governments and UN agencies has provided an opportunity to reflect on the various experiences. The resulting and ever-evolving framework within which technical assistance is provided for post-conflict countries provided the impetus to write this thesis.

1.3 Selected post-conflict Employment & Skills Development interventions

As indicated in the section above, experiences as an ES&D consultant informs the specific analysis and discussion in this thesis of the situation in Afghanistan. As comparisons of the policies, strategies and actual success rates of implementation of E&SD in other countries classified as post-conflict, bear on the position in Afghanistan they have been included below. The following brief summaries of previous ES&D interventions are based on personal experience. These experiences are presented to indicate that general evidence exists for the need for an earlier and more holistic approach that reflects unique conditions found in each instance. This provides background evidence for the position argued in this thesis with specific reference to Afghanistan.

The following is provided to clarify what is meant when referring to a “post-conflict” country.

Discussion on what constitutes a post conflict condition is discussed by Brown, et al. (2007:5-6) who describe a series of peace milestones and possible indicators of progress. These include (i) cessation of hostilities and violence, (ii) signing of political/peace agreements, (iii) demobilization, disarmament and reintegration, (iv) refugee repatriation, (v) establishing a functioning state, (vi) achieving reconciliation and societal integration and (vii) economic recovery. The researcher has used the
following as a basis for determining when it is considered appropriate to commence any significant E&SD intervention. There is (i) an elected government in place that is recognized by its own people and the international community, (ii) there is a multi-ministry structure, (iii) there is an established public service, (iv) essential services are being delivered by professional-level civil servants throughout the country and (v) civil society has a voice in decision-making.

1.3.1 Republic of Albania.

Following the death of Enver Hoxha in 1985 a change from a pro-communist government in power since the second world-war to the current socialist government brought with it many changes in the country. However it was concluded that the capacity of those in responsible for guiding the country’s post-conflict development strategy was limited. (Academy of Science, 1998:40) After 12 years of mismanagement by the incumbent Socialist party and repeated calls for the elimination of corruption, a civil war erupted following a failed government supported pyramid investment scheme in which many small investors lost their life savings. This civil war resulted in international intervention. Of interest to this thesis was the realization that there was a massive unemployment problem and an almost total absence of adequately funded venues to provide training for those without skills. It was acknowledged that there was a need for a more responsive and non-formal E&SD system to be developed. A proposal was prepared in 1997 based on the Logical Framework Approach that contained seventeen projects at an estimated cost of US$ 25 million to be committed over 10 years. This proposal was largely ignored, possibly because the UN and the Government considered there were more urgent disarmament, reintegration and reconstruction priorities. As a planning tool however the ILO persisted and received support from the tripartite members for this to be considered. ²

Large numbers of unemployed school-leavers, unskilled youth and a large number of adult unemployed following retrenchments in the public service were a source of social unrest. When preparing a project proposal in 1999 the Head of the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs indicated that unemployment was estimated to be between 35 & 40 percent, inflation at 33 percent and as many as 16,000 public servants were retrenched.

² Members of the Government, the employers’ and Workers’ Organizations’ make up what the ILO defines as a tripartite structure.
In 1999 as part of an overall development strategy I conducted an assessment of the vocational education and training system on behalf of the European Training Foundation (ETF), an organization that is funded by the European Commission (EC) and based in Turin, Italy. The resulting assessment report suggested, as a first priority, that the existing duplication of resources between ministries involved in E&SD should be assessed. A more economic approach was sought to coordinate, rationalize and utilize the institutionalized budget for each ministry. The intention was to align the technical education qualifications being offered by the Ministry of Education with the skills development competency certificates issued by the Ministry of Labour. The recognition would be based on competencies to be written on authenticated certificates.

The intention was to create employer confidence in the two skills development systems by acknowledging that the levels of skills being offered to future employers were accredited regardless of the differences between either ministry. Embracing the complete national qualifications framework system, as being used in countries like Australia, Jamaica, New Zealand, and South Africa was not an immediate objective, more a long-term goal. Concerns were expressed as to the resources needed. I prepared a draft of a project to establish a National Vocational Education and Training Council in 1999.

It was recommended that a cost-benefit analysis should be carried out before committing the resources required for a fully-fledged E&SD system. The need for consensus between the major stakeholders, namely the tripartite partners plus stronger national institutions with the capacity to manage any such intervention was flagged. A series of five workshops were conducted over a 15 month period in the ILO’s International Training Centre (ITC) in Turin Italy. Members included representatives of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Labour, the universities plus the peak bodies representing employers’ and workers’ organizations. However these individuals were not able to make decisions without consultation and further discussion with their respective superiors. The result was that each subsequent workshop needed to reflect and modify the earlier steps taken to ensure that the hosts in Tirana “owned” any eventual product. The final workshop resulted in a draft logical framework matrix that reflected the opinions and concerns of the members, a draft white paper and recommendations for the drafting of legislation. In addition a proposal was submitted

for grant funding from UNDP to establish a national approach to coordinate E&SD activities under a council/board or commission with its own act and regulations. A separate workshop was conducted in Tirana in October 1999 to refine an earlier proposal to strengthen the National Employment Service. The ITC of the ILO then withdrew its support.

In 2000 the proposal was taken up in by the European Unions’ Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization project. However it should be noted that the National Vocational Education and Training Agency was established based on a cabinet decision number 273 in 2006. This lack of commitment by the international community resulted in a delay of almost seven years in establishing a national system of E&SD coordination. (ETF, 2003:11-13)

The recent research by the ILO into the efficacy of national qualifications frameworks (NQFs) as a tool for bringing about reform is being undertaken to understand to what extent establishing an NQF is the best strategy for achieving a country’s desired policy objectives. The document argues that rather than borrowing external policies and imposing them, a national policy learning approach that acknowledges the problems within a country is more efficacious. (ILO, 2009:3)

1.3.2 Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina

Bosnia Herzegovina erupted into civil war between 1992 and 1995 when the minority Serbian government attempted to subdue the Muslim population who were demanding the right to secession from Yugoslavia. Over a three year period this resistance led to changes in the way basic services were provided, changed the population dynamics of many towns and villages and imposed severe restrictions of the Muslim population. Intervention by the UN and the USA resulted in the Dayton Peace Accords in 1995. The Dayton Agreement divides Bosnia and Herzegovina roughly equally between the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Bosnian Serb Republic of Srpska. (Palmowski, 2004) The UN approach in Sarajevo was unique. A High Representative was appointed in 1995. It was determined at that time that those existing public servants in posts in the central government were considered incapable of providing a balanced approach to rebuilding as it was ethnically diverse. There was a general tone of distrust among the citizenry of those holding positions of authority. ILO was requested by UNDP to introduce targeted training programmes at the local level in both Bosnia and
Herzegovina and Srpska. I was advised to deal directly with local governors in each entity. The Serbians in Pale simply asked for the money saying they can handle their own development. This was not agreed by UNDP. The funding was then focused on locations that had been most affected by the conflict with the Serbians from the adjoining Republic of Srpska. A total of US$2 million was earmarked.

I was the senior vocational training advisor in ILO Geneva and visited to prepare the proposals for a building construction centre in Bihac in the north for the construction industry, a mechanical engineering school in Gorazde in the south east and an all-purpose technician level engineering facility in Travnic in the east. Local government officials, former technical educators and community leaders were assembled in each place and agreement was reached to identify competencies and employment needs for each location. As a result Bihac was supplied with tools and equipment to cover the construction industry. This centre was formerly supported by the Swiss Builders’ Federation as it was a valuable source of labour for their construction industry.

Travnic was shelved as the UNDP stipulation was that the senior staff at each location must offer training to both Muslim and Orthodox Christians as part of the reconciliation process. The ethnic divide was so divisive in Travnic that no consensus could be reached. I conducted an evaluation in 2000 that revealed this did not occur in the other two centres either.

Gorazde’s mechanical engineering school was also assessed and suitable equipment to match local engineering enterprises ordered. Immediately following the approval to proceed I was relocated Cambodia. A new appointee in my ILO Geneva post followed up in Sarajevo. He was advised that the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) had reached agreement with the central government to supply Japanese-made equipment to the same facility in Gorazde. They went ahead without any further discussion with the UNDP and supplied a large amount of numerically controlled equipment on a grant basis. The earlier needs assessment identified the level of sophistication needed. CNC machines were totally inappropriate.

During a subsequent evaluation carried out it was revealed that the JICA equipment from Gorazde was relocated to a polytechnic in Sarajevo. Travnic’s proposal was stalled as local officials had reached an impasse. Again the lack of a central coordination body that could provide guidance and direction based on an overall
strategy was absent. Without an agreed approach between potential sources of technical assistance from the international community each acted unilaterally resulting in considerable waste.

1.3.3 Royal Government of Cambodia

The conflict in Cambodia was a protracted affair. The Khmer Rouge, officially known as the Communist Party of Kampuchea, assumed control of the country in 1975. “In power, the Khmer Rouge carried out a radical programme that included isolating the country from foreign influence, closing schools, hospitals and factories, abolishing banking, finance and currency, outlawing all religions, confiscating all private property and relocating people from urban areas to collective farms where forced labor was widespread”. In 1979 Vietnam invaded, occupied the country and installed a puppet government until a negotiated withdrawal in 1989. The Khmer Rouge maintained bases in the north for another eight years during which time the government of struggled to introduce a reasonable level of development. During this time unemployment was endemic. There was little or no industrial activity. Business and commerce was limited to self-employment and micro enterprises. Foreign direct investment was absent hence economic development was simply not happening. In 1991 ILO was invited, along with a variety of UN specialized agencies and donors to a National Conference on Education for All, sponsored by UNESCO in Phnom Penh. Although the focus was on primary education and the plight of adults who were illiterate, the Vice Minister of Education Youth and Sport (MoEYS) asked the ILO to collaborate and prepare suitable plans for rehabilitation of what was a Soviet designed system of technical education and vocational training. I was ILO’s regional advisor at that time, based in the regional office in Bangkok and prepared a draft master plan document. This was described in the traditional UNDP format and did not include a logical framework matrix. I was transferred to Geneva and, whilst theoretically responsible for ILO’s skills development in the Asia Pacific Region, (along with some other parts of the global training network) had little influence on the actual programme being developed for Cambodia.

Over a five year period culminating in 1997 of an integrated programme containing three linked proposals was developed. This was agreed by the Government, funded as a grant by UNDP and implemented by ILO. UNDP funded the programme headed by a Chief Technical Advisor. This integrated approach was hailed as a success because

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ostensibly linked three separate projects namely; (i) Labour Based Infrastructure Rehabilitation, (ii) Small Enterprise and Informal Sector Promotion and (iii) Vocational Training for Employment Generation. The Labour Based project provided training in skills required for all sorts of road rehabilitation and associated services. The Small Enterprise and Informal Sector project became an NGO called the Association of Cambodian Local Economic Development Agencies (ACLEDA). They subsequently limited financial support to those with sufficient collateral for small loans thus reducing the impact for those being provided with employable skills within the Vocational Training for Employment (VTE) project. The need for a labour market study linked to actual income generation was not evident in any of the proposals. Nor was there any evidence of follow up on success rates of those who had aspirations of becoming self-employed.

A vocational training post in the VTE project became available and, as I felt more at ease in the field, transferred myself to the project under the CTA. During this period it was possible to observe the political maneuvering between the three project leaders, the procrastination on the part of the UNDP to fully fund the overall programme, the detachment of the ADB’s project staff and the serious interference of appointed government officials who were intent on ensuring their individual positions at the expense of the intended beneficiaries. I prepared a draft procedure manual in an attempt to integrate the various activities of the ILO’s Vocational Training for Employment Project. The manual consolidated the work of other ILO professionals in the identification of employment and income generating needs at the local level. The manual described a system to service the national network of vocational centres with trained staff, equipment control and staff development. An evaluation mission revealed that although each of the three ILO projects were proceeding as planned the integration and linked cooperation was lacking. The evaluators recommended that a logical framework be prepared to show the relationships between the three projects. This was not done. 5 Funding was also secured by the Government for a similar project on a loan basis provided by the ADB and signed by the MOEYS in 1996 to build far more sophisticated technical training centres. This was entitled the Basic Skills Project (BSP). It addressed the coordination issue and established a National Training Board and a National Training Fund. As of late 1997, these peak bodies, although now fully funded,

were still not functioning. One component would provide training for the same target group as the ILO’s outreach training centres.

This resulted in many staff trained by ILO abandoning the methods developed, including the procedure manual I drafted for the operation of a National Technical Training Institute. By maintaining contact with counterparts on completion of his ILO contract in early 1998 I was able to establish that many of the initiatives introduced by ILO for vocational training were neglected once the larger and more expensive and sophisticated ADB loan programme was established. In summary it is noted that some five years following the original request for assistance a national system of TVET coordination was still not in place. A proposal for a project to support the Ministry of Labour and Vocational Training is to be funded by the ADB entitled Strengthening Technical and Vocational Education and Training. This is being proposed for commencement in late 2009. A proposal I prepared when working for ILO to establish a national coordination mechanism was made 18 years earlier. (ADB, 2009: Project number 40555)

1.3.4 Republic of Kosovo

Civil unrest extending over a period of 15 years resulted in international intervention by NATO forces known as KFOR (Kosovo Force) in mid-1999 in what is termed the Kosovo War. As there were no Kosovar nationals employed in the government structure at that time the UN formed the United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). Appointments were managed from UN headquarters in New York. It brought together a diverse range of people from around the world, some through specialized agencies of the UN such as ILO and UNESCO and others from bilateral donors, the development banks and freelance consultants. I was appointed from the ILO’s ITC in Italy as an Employment and Training Specialist within the Department of Labour (DOL). Due to the fact that any Kosovar Albanian was excluded from government office during the previous regime, UNMIK appointed them to counterpart posts in the newly staffed departments as either counterpart heads, or deputies. Resident Albanian Serbians were also given one or other of these posts to maintain a political balance.

ILO’s regional advisor in Bucharest had prepared a set of proposals for skills development linked, it was thought, to existing Labour ministry training centres. A

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6 See the report entitled Cambodia: Skill Development for Sustainable (and Competitive) Livelihoods, 1997, written by the Chief technical Advisor of the ILO’s programme.
small number of these centres were attached to employment services, formally part of
the autonomous region’s network for many years under the Labour Department (DoL)
of the Former Yugoslavia. In reality, as I was to reveal upon appointment in 2000, all
but three of the seven facilities assessed were in fact secondary technical schools and
part of the Department of Education’s (DOE) network. All existing TVET centres
required significant amounts of rehabilitation and this was far in excess of the allocation
for the DOL. The incumbent UNMIK advisor on Technical Education to the DOE, a
German national, surrendered the responsibility for technical and vocational education
to Germany’s GTZ, an organization classified as an NGO and supported by BMZ in
Berlin. Later in 2000 it was revealed that GTZ had already planned to provide large
amounts of very sophisticated industrial equipment to DoE centres for selected
industrial occupations.

As I was responsible to assess labour market needs I was aware that the industrial sector
had not been surveyed prior to ordering this equipment. Nor was any link made
between what equipment was supplied, the capacity of the private sector to utilize the
level of skill being taught or the level of competencies required. An outmoded and
traditional curriculum was being used. There was no provision for staff development.
This equipment was delivered but when installed the MOE could not afford to pay for
enough power to run the larger items, had no teaching staff familiar with the level of
advanced technology required to operate some items and the local government had no
institutionalized budget for power, spare parts and maintenance. Prior to the conflict a
large number of Yugoslavs worked as semi-skilled workers in Germany as guest
workers. Currently there are a number of useful TVET projects in place but no legal
basis for coordination exists without which it unlikely to occur. Ten years later there
was little evidence that any nationally coordinated E&SD system was in place. In
November 2009 a project was proposed to develop two of seven specialist Centres of
Competence under the Ministry of Education, Science and Technology. The Centres
“. . .will also serve as a point of counseling and training provision for employment
related services in their respective sectors”. (Luxemburg Development, 2010)

1.3.5 Republic of Lebanon

In 1991, after almost 15 years of civil and international war there was a return to a more
peaceful period. The Lebanese Government started to rebuild its infrastructure and in
doing so realized it needed, among other things, to rebuild its skills base. The then
newly formed Ministry of Technical and Vocational Education (MOTVE) was offered part of a larger programme funded from a WB loan entitled “The National Emergency Reconstruction Programme” to accomplish this. ILO sent a regional advisor to complete a proposal within the larger programme to provide text books, teacher manuals and staff development for technician level education under MOTVE. This proposal, in French, was reviewed and UNDP in Beirut who determined that further discussion was required. UNDP did not think that the Government possessed the capacity to implement such a proposal. A further delay by ILO’s regional advisor in Beirut in responding and the subsequent delay resulted in UNDP withdrawing its request to ILO as the specialized agency to provide technical assistance.\footnote{ILO can provide grant funding when governments request by providing funds for staff and associated costs whilst the WB funds major rehabilitation, construction, equipment and other costs.}

ILO Beirut requested a visit of a headquarters bases adviser see what could be done to salvage the ILO’s possible participation in this proposal which contained a number of components funded by various donors. The French were offering teacher education, the Germans and the WB offered skill worker and degree level studies, the IBRD funded emergency training for construction, and the Italians offered unspecified assistance direct to the Lebanese Government to conduct courses not covered elsewhere. These activities overlapped in some areas, especially in teacher education and equipment provision. A review of secondary source documents and a discussion with an ILO National Project Coordinator (NPC) with MOTVE unsurprisingly revealed that there was competition for resources between MOTVE and the Ministry of Labour (MOL).

The NPC advised that a Council for Reconstruction and Development (CRD) set up by the IBRD had instructed that no funds should be allocated to assist MoL. This information was confirmed when I held discussions with the special advisor to the MOTVE. The requirement for the ILO to be involved at the national level, not just in the areas previously mentioned, was agreed by UNDP. However ILO Geneva declined to go further. ILO did not want to continue with the request fearing that this would jeopardize the ongoing project with MOTVE. ILO also wanted to avoid any suggestion that the ILO as promoting a struggle between ministries. (Mission Report, Lebanon, May 1994)
A report 10 years later suggested that “…considering the lack of clear government policy for job creation, the strategy emphasized the need for a partnership between the Government and civil society”. (UNDESA, 2004:13) From this it can be concluded that a decade later adequate E&SD policies were still not in place. Additionally the situation, some eighteen years later, is that UN agencies have missed an opportunity to build upon earlier experiences. In recent times the ETF of the EU that has become very active in this area. They have reviewed the situation and reached the same conclusions in 2008; i.e. that “Although different proposals for the reform of primary, secondary and vocational education have been prepared through the support of different donors, these strategies are lacking overall coherence and links with the socio-economic development of Lebanon, particularly given the specificities of its labour market”.

1.3.6 Republic of Liberia

The country has been traumatized by internal civil wars over a generation. In 1989 war broke out as a result of policies set in place by President Doe that banned peaceful political dissent. This lead to a military coup by a master sergeant named Samuel Doe. Doe was head of state for almost 10 years. He appointed close associates to senior positions but did little to promote stability. Doe was responsible for escalating the country’s foreign debt whilst at the same time increasing public salaries.

Charles Taylor, a former government official in the Doe regime who had criminal charges against him laid by Doe fled to Sierra Leone. He formed a militia, attacked and took control of Nimba County, one of the most populous in the country. Taylor’s faction was known as the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL). In 1990 a rebellious faction split from Taylor headed by Price Johnson and succeeded in killing Doe that same year. They were known as the Independent NPFL. In the following year, during the political vacuum created by Doe’s death, four war lords were found to be seeking the Presidency. In 1992 Taylor’s faction attacked the UN -sanctioned Economic Community of West African Group (ECOMOG), who were charged with monitoring the cease fire. This resulted in an increase in the number of rebel and fighting continued.

In 1993 a peace agreement was signed known as the Cotonou Accord. This was agreed by each of the various warring factions in the country. ECOMOG intended to disarm the various factions and institute democratic elections. In 1996 the war that had raged
on in the counties had reached Monrovia before a cease fire was negotiated with an interim government. As a war-lord Taylor continued to intimidate the country with brutal acts of terror. Elections followed in 1997 with Charles Taylor achieving an overwhelming 70 percent vote for his national Patriotic Party in parliament. ECOMOG withdrew in 1998 having established a fragile peace.

In 2003 a faction known as Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy [LURD] assembled troops in Sierra Leone and invaded Lofa County in the north of Liberia. Taylor declared a state of emergency as many thousands of citizens fled Monrovia. At that time LURD controlled eighty percent of the country using torture and rape as a means of suppressing the population. A second faction known as the Movement for Democracy in Liberia [MODEL] who had attacked from the Ivory Coast joined in and a cease fire was negotiated in 2003. Taylor fled to Nigeria seeking asylum there. The rebel factions agreed to a comprehensive peace agreement known as the Accra Accord, culminating in elections in November 2005 in which Ms. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf was elected President.

Although seven years have passed since the civil war ended the issue of E&SD is still being handled in an ad-hoc manner in 2010. There are three ministries with a role to play within the E&SD area. The Ministry of Education (MOE) has its technical education mandate. The Ministry of Youth and Sport (MOYS) has the post school youth responsibility and the Ministry of Labour, though relatively weak, is the link to the labour market.

There are a number of projects in place within the MoYS and, at the time of my appointment, none had made contact with each other to see where there may be areas of commonality.

- The Danish Government has funded a Youth Empowerment and Employment Project (YEEP) with implementing partners including ILO, UNDP, UNFPA and UNICEF, each with a role in providing capacity building activities to youth.

- ILO is implementing a project for the Ministry of Youth and Sport entitled Training for Rural Economic Empowerment (TREE) focused on youth in both urban and rural communities in several counties close to Monrovia.

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8 Retrieved from www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/para/model.htm
The World Bank has funded a Youth Employment Skills (YES) project for the Ministry of Education that has two phases. The first focuses on community-based public works within communities. The second “…will support small businesses and stimulate demand for skills…” A national TVET national Qualification Framework is to be established. (World Bank, 2010)

The YES project’s conceptualization was developed by the WB in collaboration with the MOYS. I was asked to contribute by offering comments. While reviewing I noticed that the emphasis was on providing skills to youth without any linkage being stressed on the needs of the labour market. In addition the project considered the establishment of a national TVET qualification Framework as a sub-set of the YES project rather than a stand-alone project with a set of macro level activities that will impact a broad spectrum of technical education and vocational training programmes. Comments by ILO were forwarded after the bid process was completed but there was little likelihood they would have been considered. (World Bank, 2010)

As a private consultant the author was contracted by World ORT; a US based Non-Government Organization, 9 to provide technical assistance to MOYS. The beneficiaries were either those internally displaced or actual fighters/supporters for one political faction or another. The Training for Employment Project (TEP) objective was to place 1000 graduates of an Advanced Learning Programme funded by USAid. However it was not until the funding agency, USAid, the Government and donors realized that these adults, once they graduated, needed an income, however meager, if the education they had received was to be useful to them and the communities they lived in. An international donor was identified, an NGO appointed, a poorly conceived project formulated and raw data gathered by ALP field staff on possible occupational attachments. The target group, aged between 18 and 35, were predominantly those who had not had a formal primary education due in most part to the civil war. I challenged the data conclusions, conducted an in-depth evaluation of a sample of proposed attachments and determined that the attachment report was of little use. Little community involvement was undertaken and the report submitted and the data provided could only be considered as anecdotal. The likelihood that the training would lead to sustainable income generation was tenuous, the system of attachments to local master

9 ORT International was founded in Tsarist Russia in 1880. The name ‘ORT’ was coined from the acronym in Russian Obshestvo Remeslenofo zemledelcheskofo Truda, which translates to The Society for Trades and Agricultural Labour.
trainers flawed, the need for the additional skills not well-grounded and the influence of leading senior community leaders was not sought. In some cases former combatants held significant power at community level this threw doubt as to the accuracy of the collection process.

Of interest to this thesis is the fact that as recent as October 2010, for the first time, there is a proposal, albeit as a sub-set of the numbers-driven YES project, on the table to address TVET coordination. The submissions made by interested parties, consultants, NGOs etc. was based on the framework provided by the WB. The terms of reference indicated that the successful bidder would implement a number of youth skills development activities as the major objective whilst also structuring a national TVET system to coordinate inputs from all TVET providers. Given the total lack of capacity within the government structure the suggestion was that this was not conceived adequately by the WB.  

1.3.7 Federal Democratic Republic of Nepal

An independent agency called the Council for Technical Education and Vocational Training was established in 1989 and is responsible for policy implementation and coordination. (CTEVT, 1989) It has the mandate to oversee all related activities, programmes and technical assistance in Nepal. It is an autonomous body committed to the development of human resources. In particular, CTEVT is concerned with basic and middle level technical education and vocational training. It has an assembly with 24 members and a governing board of nine members. The Minister of Education chairs the Council which has a full time Vice-Chairman and a Member-Secretary. It is located at Sanothimi, Bhaktapur a suburb close to Kathmandu. At full-strength the Council has approximately 850 personnel to carry out its functions.

Whilst working for the ILO on external collaborator contracts I assisted a number of projects to strengthen TVET. These included the 1984 project entitled Training for Rural Gainful Activities, assistance to the Institute of Engineering of Tribhuvan University in 1985 to establish, staff, equip and prepare curricula for the Pokhara Technician Training Institute. In 1988 a further project was introduced for employment

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and income generation focusing on hotel, catering and tourism training. A dedicated training centre was developed.

A civil war commenced in 1994, the Maoist led Communist Party of Nepal (CPN) embarked on a slowly escalating series of attacks on government installations. After a series of negotiations the CPN extended its attacks to other private sector holdings that they considered were exploitive. During this time the E&SD activities of the Government, supported in part by ILO continued. In 2001 a request was received from the Government through the ILO office in Kathmandu for assistance to prepare a Youth Employment Project. At that time I had been retired from full-time employment of the ILO, and undertook the mission as a sub-contractor. The proposal I developed with the assistance of the Council for Technical Education and Vocational Training (CTEVT) was submitted for funding late in 2001. Due to the ongoing civil conflict the Government diverted all funds to sustain its efforts to subdue the CPN. The proposal was never implemented.

King Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah Dev stepped aside in 2007 and the royal government has been replaced by a federal democratic republic structure. However the CPN continues to this day to disagree with many of the decisions taken by the newly installed government. The civil war has also abated to a large extent although occasionally the CPN engage in attacks on individuals. During the last 15 years the CTEVT has continued to function but at a much less visible pace, due in part to the security situation and also because of insufficient funding. However it was recognized that such a Council is essential in any attempt to make the best use of available expertise and international technical assistance. In this case, and in spite of the conflict, the importance of a national coordinating body in the opinion of the Government has not diminished.

1.3.8 Conclusions.

Each of the above post-conflict countries presented a different set of circumstances for those international organizations with the mandate to assist host governments with policy and strategy to improve E&SD matters. The lack of a coordinating structure for TVET, with the exception of Nepal, was the result of a lack of a common understanding of the situation by those charged with the responsibility, especially within the UN, both prior to and immediately following the conflict. This contributed to a situation where
each of the sources of technical assistance prepared proposals and received approval to proceed without the benefit of a nationally coordinated approach. This resulted in various types of duplication and considerable waste of scarce resources.

A constant theme running through the discussions in each country in relation to the certification of skilled workers was the perception that the provision of formal courses in Ministry of Education schools and the non-formal “apprenticeship” type of skills development in Ministry of Labour training centres were in some way incompatible. This perception was found to be commonly held by educators, employers, graduates of higher education, the community in general and in particular parents who wanted their siblings to be formally and professionally educated.

Each country mentioned above has/had an historic separation between formal education and non-formal vocational education which by definition includes skills development leading to income-generation with a set of entry level competencies. 11 Many were unclear of the reasons for the separation but most were adamant that there was a stigma attached to those completing skills development courses; some thought that by offering “qualifications” to skilled workers the status of those graduates from formal courses would be degraded. This appears to have been overcome in Albania and Nepal where both ministries, whilst retaining their autonomy with respect to their institutions have agreed to be coordinated by a national TVET Agency.

The typical hierarchy of qualifications and the distribution between levels generally used as a guide for labour market and educational planners was also ignored when it came to allocating places in formal education institutions. As a general rule one engineer supports three technicians who in turn have four to five skilled workers each to supervise or a ratio of 1:3:15. 12 This is an indicator for planners when apportioning government resources. A review of secondary source documents in Afghanistan I conducted in 2007, included supply data from the various government institutions. The ratio of graduates from the different levels of education department institutions in 2005 was ratio of approximately 7:1:2. (MOLSAMD, 2007: pp34-35, 37.) Understanding

11 The JICA definition of non-formal education is “…any organized and sustained educational activity with a specific purpose provided outside the formal education system”

the role of the national economy and the need for specific levels of skilled labour from higher educational institutions were also poor. (Miwa, 2005:14)

Reactions were mixed depending on who you approached, when suggesting to tripartite stakeholders that a national body, in a form compatible with the country’s legal system that coordinates E&SD and certification would be desirable. Such a body would facilitate links between training providers and to a national qualifications framework (NQF). Workers’ organizations agreed as certification would raise the status of skilled workers. Employers’ organizations agreed that NQFs would improve the employer's ability to assess the potential of those applying for jobs. However they were cautious if this had the potential to raise wages. Those being trained determined that it would improve an individual’s mobility between employers. At ministry level there was a noticeable reluctance. Government officials, at the other end of the spectrum could envisage massive changes in the way they would be required to function. This last group is also the one who had the most to lose in terms of their authority. Another reality was that those responsible for driving change were frequently appointed through politically elite connections, had a well-educated background and had the most power to “spoil”.

If necessary, as a strategy to overcome these issues, an approach that is viable would be to map out a Logical Framework model for presentation to the most influential political person/group possible. When consensus is reached, suggest an ad-hoc committee approach, with key stakeholder representation, that places a private sector chair-person under the office of the Prime Minister/President for a predetermined time. During this period the committee must prove its worth to all stakeholders or be disbanded.

The type of assistance offered in each of the countries described varied and was frequently dependent upon the perceptions of “outsiders’ who wanted to use their specific experiences in other countries rather than assess the existing structures and provide a holistic approach. Some foreigners were also unaware of the bureaucratic culture in place and some found it difficult to understand the systems that incumbent government officials were trying to perpetuate. Others were not adequately prepared with relevant documentation, research papers and materials on the subject of E&SD. Most did not receive pre-appointment training and were not professionally inducted by their respective international organization prior to embarking on their particular technical assistance activity.
The introduction of concepts and the development of a vision of the overall system of E&SD require those providing technical assistance to present governments with an overall set of strategies that will make the best use of existing research. The tripartite nature and implications for stability of E&SD in post-conflict countries makes it incumbent upon those with the mandate to assist, to develop strategies to build capacity in recipient countries. This can be achieved through the education of appropriate levels of professionals from government, workers’ and employers’ organizations. A cadre of officials who are able to assess the options available through properly grounded research into the various aspects is an essential prerequisite. This has not occurred in some of the cases cited above, and certainly not a prominent feature in Afghanistan.

1.4 Key issues for analysis

When developing the above-mentioned approaches for Afghanistan it was assumed that consensus could be reached between government, donor (a development bank or a multi-bilateral donor), the implementing agency, workers’ and employers’ organizations to proceed as early as possible with the strengthening of the existing E&SD system or, as has been the case in Albania and Lebanon, a paradigm shift resulting in development of a new one. A tripartite approach that would allow all stakeholders to have a role in the formulation of a suitable and appropriately resourced system is something often overlooked when in a conflict/post-conflict environment. In Afghanistan, the worker’s organizations were reluctantly involved preferring to conduct their own training for members and their dependents. Employer’s organizations were engaged but in a passive manner that suggested that E&SD was not considered critical. Developing a logical framework matrix (LFM) that included these organizations was seen as essential as a means to involve them in mainstream &SD activities.

As an advisor I needed to be conscious of possible tensions between key ministries created by lack of or perceived unequal resource allocation at government, donor or multilateral agency level. It was essential to listen to all parties to ensure that there was a minimum of competition and maneuvering for influence by government officials seeking institutionalized and extra-ordinary financial and human resources. Policy that influences the potential project/programme must be public and publicly proclaimed by the Government as the direction it wishes to pursue. Care was taken with (a) the
language used and (b) the use of technical jargon was limited as this may have caused confusion in the minds of those being asked to make key decisions.

A further issue was the realization that international advisors, whether consciously or not, can in fact impose their views, perceptions and solutions. A situation could well arise where a Government that lacks capacity and hence fails to both conceptualize what is being proposed and understand the overall E&SD programme strategy.

The reality was that in Afghanistan a series of capacity building activities was required as a prerequisite to any in-country review and analysis of the existing E&SD system. This was proposed through lectures, study tours or academic fellowships for key decision-makers. Finally there was a need, though not actually fulfilled, to prepare suitable documents in the national language(s) for as wide a range of senior stakeholders as possible. A desk study report of secondary sources of E&SD issues was proposed as a basis for discussion and elaboration through national seminars and workshops. This was not undertaken due to lack of financial support.

1.5 Ethical issues

Obtaining information for such research in a volatile post-conflict location from those in authority may place the security of those officials in jeopardy. As a researcher the author was aware that if the reported results of informal or even semi-structured discussions suggest that the research was critical of anyone in government, or for that matter in an international organization, the consequences could be serious. Hence an undertaking was given to those contacted that there would be no direct reference to, or criticism of, any individual or organization. This approach is in accordance with the suggestions of Salmons (2007) who stressed that confidentiality is a serious consideration when dealing with information, especially if it was gathered in person or through contact on-line.

1.6 Data collection strategies

A selection of framework questions were prepared and, as many were initially developed from “a distance” the expectation was that they would require restructuring depending on how they were to be presented. For example key government officials
may have been unable to explain questions such as “How did you see the E&SD system to evolving following the peace agreement taking into account the amount of funds pledged from the international community?” As a means of opening the discussion the intention was to prompt the participants to simply tell their interpretation of the situation. The expectation was that this would open the discussion and lead to similar questions depending on the focus of the individual and also reflect the position of the participant organization. Given the hierarchical structure within the Government of Afghanistan any formal acceptance or agreement to such decisions should theoretically only be agreed following a process of discussion at the vice-minister level supported by those responsible within the operational department.

As such it was necessary to understand the decision-making process in Afghanistan’s bureaucracy. The difference between what is in place and a genuine western model of a public service means that the formulation of such questions must be carefully considered. In Afghanistan public service appointments are made and “unmade” by politicians and policy and staff changes are common based on social status, political affiliations and ethnic and tribal roots (Suhrke, 2006:8). I was cognizant of the strength of ethnic ties, having been to three of the major population centres in 2002 as part of a group on a fact-finding mission. The group, made up of the US Military Attaché, two UK DFID officials, Japanese from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a USAid official, an International Office of Migration officer and the author, was forced into a village at gunpoint to explain the purpose of a foreign delegation in the province. The suspicion was that this was instigated by Ismail Khan, the local war lord as a means of influencing any future decisions by donors. It had the opposite effect. At a plenary I attended I offered to run a Community-Based Project in a number of communities in that province. However each of the donors refused to offer assistance to the province in general.

At a personal level during this mission when meeting the key informants, who in the main were war lords, it revealed the diversity of ethic, language and religious groups in control of different parts of the country. As an outsider preparing a project proposal I realized that any innovation could easily be thwarted by any of these factors once project implementation activities commenced.

At a programme/project level the situation was found to be very dynamic with continuous and new technical education projects being offered to the Government.
Additional interventions were being introduced by bilateral and multi-lateral donors and NGOs, many of which are based on signed bilateral protocols with individual ministries. I surveyed the list of potential training providers in 2007 and found 60 purporting to deliver employable skills to a variety of different recipients. Of that number seven were government ministries. Registration is required through the Ministry of Planning and the ministry most likely to be aligned with the NGOs area of focus. See Appendix A.

These random arrangements, whilst well-intended were, in many instances, a serious impediment to effective and efficient coordination and delivery of technical assistance. Due also to parochial and often outdated visions, the impact of such interventions was difficult to assess. Coordination under such arrangements was therefore major challenge. A summary of international institutions professing to be able to facilitate coordination is seen at Appendix B. In my experience these organizations were absent in Afghanistan.

1.7 Labour market information

In this particular post-conflict situation I found that the linkage between skills development and the demands of the labour market was tenuous. Labour market information (LMI) being gathered was sporadic, ad-hoc, usually economic sector specific, or based on specific locations, i.e. urban informal. These studies had been conducted by international agencies and/or NGOs and/or donors. Each had specific interests; for example in a local economic or geographic area. This makes any attempt at coordination difficult.

A labour market study was conducted in 2003 by the International Rescue Committee (IRC) covering eight “safe” provinces and all in urban locations. (MOLSAMD, 2007: Annex B: 54) Another was carried out by the MOLSAMD’s Labour Market Information and Analysis Unit (LMIAU) in 2008 that covered thirty-two of the thirty-four provinces but again was restricted to urban informal sector locations. Each study covered locations where there was a concentration of micro and small enterprises. No major private sector national or multi-national enterprises were included. The data was

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13 There are 34 Provinces. The report covered urban areas in eight provinces, namely Gazni, Heart, Kabul, Kunar, Lagman, Logar, Nangarhar and Wardak.
useful as a means of matching local skills development training to informal employment opportunities but of limited value as a national labour market planning tool.

On the supply side each participating organization and institution was found to have its own interpretation of the utility of their contribution based on the political analysis/economic position of their particular funding agency. Additionally there was little evidence that any key ministry staff could describe degrees of internal and external efficiency of the E&SD system. When reviewing documentation on evaluation it was found that they were often conducted internally, i.e. conducted by staff connected to the implementing agency. This compromises the results and is not a professional procedure. Furthermore such reports were often conducted post-project and the results rarely useful in comparing indicators of success such as rates of employment, capacity building of national staff, or post training performance of the beneficiaries. MOLSAMD and GTZ had a protocol agreed in relation to the provision of technical assistance to build and staff a technical instructor training facility and several skills development centres. The Deputy Director, Labour Affairs determined that as no counterpart training and capacity building was being provided to his staff this protocol was cancelled. In addition JICA and KOICA had provided a similar instructor training facility.

In addition programme/project evaluations, whilst meeting donor expectations may not reflect government policy resulting in conclusions that may be inconsistent with government projections. Whilst data was available to me to determine the effectiveness, efficiency and relevance of the vast number of organizations/institutions delivering skills development was not used in the case study as this was an activity beyond my resources.

1.8 Employment & Skills Development problem(s):

My experience has shown that in post-conflict countries the Government was always faced with more important immediate and critical problems than those related to E&SD. Hence this issue of a coordinated E&SD system tended to be relegated to obscurity when initial international technical assistance is offered. I also found that recent up-to-date research material that would provide a basis for earlier discussion and decision-making on E&SD was rarely available to those in government that could benefit from it. If material was available it was unlikely that any such documents were provided.
proactively by international agencies to the intended beneficiaries or given directly to key national public servants in the first language of the recipient.

Whilst well-intentioned, international agencies were found to tend toward prescribing solutions within a time-frame rather than addressing the root causes, consulting local key informants and determining what can realistically achieved and over what time-frame. Without having access to a full range of research materials, texts and publications that described lessons learned these solutions/interventions frequently fail as they do not always seek the views of governments who may be better placed to decide on the need for, and the benefits of an early and coordinated approach in the formation of policy and strategy for E&SD. (Carbonnier, 1999: 300) I would argue also that language difficulties can prevent some innovations being fully comprehended.

ILO’s Senior Coordinator in Kabul in 2006 and 2007 was advised by the Deputy Minister of MOLSA that his Ministry had not been given any labour related or skills development publications from the ILO. These general documents were sent to Kabul for distribution from ILO’s office in Geneva. The reasons for this oversight were not explained. Several sets of documents central to ILO’s mandate were forwarded to the DM of Labour Affairs. The realization that senior decision-makers may be unaware of developments in the South Asia region in field of E&SD was not considered sufficiently important by ILO to distribute focused materials or to fund a translation of key documents. This is one of a number of observations that further complicates the delivery of international technical assistance for E&SD. With all the best of intentions by visiting experts such advisory missions are frequently conducted in a vacuum.

During 2006 and 2007 ILO made repeated requests for background data as a basis for E&SD related project preparation. There was little or no research documentation, few contemporary papers, text books or other documentation available in English, Dari or Pashto. When this situation is coupled with a low level of English the need for documents translated in the local language(s) is critical. The ILO Senior Coordinator in Kabul was asked by the Deputy Minister (DM) of Labour Affairs for documentation specific to issues relevant TVET and E&SD. ILO has a vast collection but only in languages of the UN, namely English, French, Spanish and more recently Russian and Mandarin Chinese. These were provided to the Ministry in English but remained in a locked cupboard in the DM’s office.
It must be recognized that countries emerging from conflict require international technical assistance and that priorities invariably focus initially on a range of important first level issues including demobilization, decommissioning of weapons of various military factions and groups. (Jalali cited in Rothberg, 2007:32) This was the case in Afghanistan. The priority was to resettle the displaced, repatriate refugees, settle land and property tenure disputes, provide basic public services and restore essential public utilities. These are basic elements in the transition from a conflict environment to that strengthening civil society and promoting sustainable peace.

In addition the author realized that these important issues were almost always addressed in a linear fashion during the transitional period, i.e. the time when peace is discussed following the agreement to cease hostilities by both governments and international agencies. (World Bank, 1999:1.4) However my suggestion was that “on the ground” technical assistance in a post-conflict situation for the establishment of an E&SD system was thought best conceptualized discussed and developed during the transition period and given equal importance with other issues such as disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. (Carbonnier, 1998:10) In a paper describing the achievements of the UN’s Integrated DDR Standards (IDDRSs) the formation of coordination bodies at national and local level is described. Membership included representatives of UN agencies, government, the military, non-signatory militia, civil society and the media. The IDDRS’s promoted the idea that DDR must be linked to other transitional authorities such as ceasefire, reintegration and truth and reconciliation commissions, the national economic recovery strategy. Of interest to this thesis is the diagram showing the five phases “… of planning for UN mission and post-conflict peace-building support.” My position is that if the UN can establish the activities in Figure 1 below during the conflict the issue of E&SD can also be a component in that process. (IDDRS, 2007:10)

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<th>Five phases of post-conflict peace-building support</th>
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<td>1. Pre-planning/Preparatory assistance</td>
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<td>2. Initial technical assessment/concept of operations</td>
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<td>3. Development of strategic/policy</td>
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There is no evidence that this has happened in relation to E&SD to date even though the ILO was a member of the Inter Agency Working Group (IAWG) who formulated the IDDRS. Intervention in E&SD is traditionally undertaken by specific UN organizations with an international mandate. UN agencies are expected to have a medium to long-term perspective. The World Bank along with UNHCR “…favor more cooperative working arrangements, including cross-secondments, joint training, and a working agreement to share information…” (World Bank, 1999:8.8) With regard to education this is the role of the United Nations Educational and Scientific Organization (UNESCO, 2005:2). The International Labour Organization (ILO) focuses on employment, skill development and training in the workplace as part of its core mandate. Regardless of the fact that there is a protocol between the two agencies UNESCO in a post-conflict environment there “…is often scope for skilled employment in construction and other sectors. A combination of institution-based training and workplace training is desirable”. This is further supported by stating that these types of interventions “… should include crisis-affected communities in innovative development programmes and recommend similar measures to multilateral, bilateral and non-government agencies…” Under the previously mentioned protocol this is the role of the ILO. The relationship between the two UN agencies was further developed and explained in a paper outlining the role of UNESCO’s International Centre for Technical and Vocational Education and Training in which it is stated that “A natural partner for the UNESCO-UNIVOC International Centre is the International Labour Organization…” (UNESCO, 2005:21) However any such collaboration, cooperation or coordination between ILO and UNESCO is rarely designed into project documents and, although meetings I attended in 2007 were held at the country level, each UN agency

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<th>framework</th>
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<td>4. Development/implementation of programme/operational framework</td>
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<tr>
<td>4. Continuation/transition planning</td>
<td>Conflict stage</td>
<td>Immediate post-conflict stage</td>
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<td>Peace negotiation stage</td>
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was seen to operate separately. Furthermore I was able to read about and observe that there were differences in emphasis between bilateral donors when discussing TVET needs at the country level. (McGrath, 1996:21)

Research carried out in relation to this thesis concerning the formal relationship between ILO, UNIDO and UNESCO was of interest. An initial UNESCO and ILO collaboration agreement was signed on the 15th, December, 1947. A second agreement, though not as prominent was with the United Nations Industrial development Organization (UNIDO/ILO signed on the 14th, September, 1987. (ILO, 1995:114) Although these specialized agencies are understood to have discrete responsibilities, it was noted that they do in fact overlap especially when it comes to the pre-employment preparation of workers, whether through formal education, non-formal vocational training and in-plant work experience. Recognizing this each agency agreed to bipartisan memorandums of understanding to clarify their specific roles and to highlight where collaboration was mutually beneficial. However there was little evidence in documents reviewed that there is consultation or direct collaboration at the implementation level between them. In 25 years of personal involvement with the UN the author can only personally recall one occasion where discussions at the field/implementation level were held between ILO and UNESCO. This was in relation to a project in Thailand involving the Department of Vocational Education and a request to advise on the implications when introducing competency-based curricula. UNESCO’s regional office in Bangkok was unable to assist. (See Terminal report of THA/80/01)

Furthermore from a review of project documentation it appeared to me that some multilateral and bilateral donors were often unwilling or unable to comprehend, support and sustain such programmes/projects over the time-span required. NGOs, often because of their sharper focus and increased flexibility do make an impact at the local level. The role of this type of technical assistance by NGOs is considered by government s with whom they have a protocol as a means of direct support, with the expectation by the donor that the technical assistance will impact the policies of the Government. Although both national and international NGOs have attempted to impact policy they rarely have sufficient influence or status to do so. (McDonald, 2005: xii)

1.9 Employment & skills development as a key component in reconstruction
This thesis examined the need for earlier action in conflict affected countries to (re)introduce a sound, appropriate, relevant and coordinated E&SD system. Personal experience in a number of post-conflict countries suggested that coordination of the activities of key stakeholders at the national level and those offering international technical assistance in the area of E&SD was difficult to accomplish, especially when the country in question was emerging from a crisis. Where attempts had been made to bring the major stakeholders together the results varied from poor to inadequate. Additional complications included a wide range of opinions concerning the efficiency, effectiveness and relevance of international agency technical assistance in these countries. Conclusions on the impact of such interventions were formed and frequently based on unsubstantiated and anecdotal information. Those delivering the technical assistance were frequently unable to achieve what they set out to do. Over-ambitious expectations on the part of donors, inadequate research and local knowledge of the situation by those executing the technical assistance and insufficient capacity of the recipient government were common. Success was frequently measured by those financing the technical assistance based on quantitative achievement data, i.e. the numbers who passed through a training course or the number of job placements made etc.. This frequently ignores qualitative indicators that measure the effectiveness, efficiency, relevance and sustainability of the intervention.

The question that repeatedly could not be answered was how to measure these three items from available data when designing, developing and implementing a national E&SD system using a wide range of implementing partners. The use a Logical Framework Approach preceded by a sound project development strategy that provides both qualitative and quantitative indicators is one solution worthy of development.

1.10 Outcomes expected:

This thesis will be useful to countries emerging from conflict, whether at the national or international level. The initial review of the literature combined with personal knowledge of the experiences of international agencies and NGOs indicates that there were problems of E&SD coordination. This research contributes to the development of a model that would improve future interventions and better coordination in the area of E&SD. As a result post-conflict country governments will be better informed on timing, options and professional capacities essential for the formulation of realistic E&SD policies and practical implementation strategies.
Systematic approaches to the development of a sound and appropriate E&SD network in a post-conflict setting were found in Afghanistan to be difficult to design given that there are a wide range of contributors, participants and stakeholders, all with the best intentions and each one striving to assist in difficult circumstances. However I feel these difficulties should not deter governments from constructing suitable mechanisms to ensure that all of these interventions are linked to the Government’s expectations and not influenced by to those of external international contributor organizations. In the case of Afghanistan there was no E&SD project in place until January 2008 to formally link related technical assistance to any national E&SD strategy.

This NSD&MLP commenced on 2008 and is managed by the Committee on Education and Skills Policy (CESP) chaired by the Vice President. Membership is at minister level from the MOES, MOHE and MOLSAMD. It also includes a representative of the MOF, two members of the private sector (the basis for the inclusion of these two members is not specified), plus two representing the donor community on a revolving basis. (World Bank, 2008:30) The membership is skewed with the majority coming from government. A more equitable membership was recommended that would provide a voice for employers and allow for more private sector involvement. However the Deputy Minister of MOLSAMD was reluctant to suggest changes. The NSD&MLP (currently located within the Labour Department of the ministry), provides the secretariat. It has the responsibility to administer and manage the technical aspects of the decisions of the CESP which is seen as an interim body. The CESP has, as its primary function, the responsibility to legally form the Afghan National Qualifications Authority (ANQA) and when this body is established and has the capacity, the CESP will be disbanded.

The ANQA is to be supported by legislation to develop a set of regulatory requirements to institute a system of national qualifications. Statutory boards for (i) secondary, education, (ii) Islamic education, (iii) higher education and (iv) technical and vocational education and training will provide the vehicle to integrate qualifications across ministries. ANQF will be responsible for the”…recognition, development and award of qualifications based on standards, skills, and competencies to be achieved by student(s) and trainees””. (World Bank, 2008:31) In particular the aforementioned National Technical and Vocational Education and Training Board, (NTVETB) as one of six
boards to be included in the earlier mentioned legislation, is an outcome of the various ministerial submissions in 2007 in support of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS). “The boards “…will be primarily responsible for facilitating and applying the policies of the ANQA” (World Bank, 2008:32)

The functions of the proposed NTVETB, which was of particular interest to this thesis, included provision of curricula and training materials. It did not indicate how an institutionalized budget would be determined, who would manage the Board or whether it would be autonomous or have a Ministry based secretariat. Missing in the document were a range of other essential elements such as technical teacher education, skill testing of trainers, equipment and facility maintenance or linkage with the public, private enterprises and community leaders who can facilitate local job placement. Additionally there was no established connection to nor did there appear to be any protocols in place to ensure that there are links between employers’ and workers’ organizations. There was no mention of the linkage with the National Employment Service. In 2008 senior MOLSAMD vacancies were placed with a leading NGO and not, as would have been expected, through its network of national Employment Service Offices, a project under the Labour Department of MOLSAMD that was implemented by the ILO. At the conclusion of the project in 2010 there was no institutionalized government budget, the staff where dispersed and the institutional memory lost.

These dysfunctional situations only strengthen the argument that unless there was an all-inclusive approach for E&SD, [albeit seven years since the signing of a peace accord in Afghanistan], the end result will be less than expected. Unless a Government’s strategy is framed in a manner that makes it clear internally and to international agencies how their intervention, supported by the technical assistance compliments the national E&SD strategy, the expectations as described by the ANQA will not be realized.

Cross-cutting aspects such as the need and provision of skills development for disadvantaged, ex-combatants and other special groups being catered for in various NGO projects should be integrated into mainstream skills development programmes. This is the preferred option. Training delivered in isolation for these groups has the potential to create a stigma when these special-needs beneficiaries seek to earn an income through wage or self-employment.
1.11 Assumptions and limitations:

The research activity was constrained by a number of factors, both from a research perspective and due to the current security situation, in terms of actually being able to gather and analyze data from key individuals and organizations in-country. To ensure a minimum level of personal safety it was essential that any further in-country research be carried out within the UN ambit. The level of security imposed by the United Nations Security Coordination (UNSECORD) unit prohibited the visits of all but essential UN personnel and movement outside the prescribed areas in the Kabul metropolitan area was to be the exception requiring official clearance. The security level deteriorated in the period 2008 to 2010 and as a result in-country data collection has been limited to meetings outside the country, by telephone and through Email contact. Assistance was requested by the author to visit for the purposes of data collection but as security was difficult that guarantee was not forthcoming from either UNHCR or ILO.

1.11.1 Assumptions:

The major assumption was that agreement to conduct the research would be forthcoming from the appropriate Afghan government ministry, i.e. Foreign Affairs, Labour Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled and Education and Science, and the United Nations specialized agencies, the International Bank for Rehabilitation and Development (IBRD) the ADB and other key international bilateral agencies having a focus on ES&D.

Additionally it was assumed that the Government wished to introduce a coordinated national system of E&SD using the capacities of these agencies to deliver technical assistance. It also assumed that sufficient staff with the capacity, or the potential to be trained, that time was available and that senior government officials were willing to discuss their perceptions, their motives and their concerns. A further assumption was that the purpose of the research would be embraced by the government officials with a direct responsibility for E&SD and the outcomes seen to be of use to them in moving forward.

Given that scenario the research was to be limited to key ministry officials having a direct impact on government policy and strategy related to the formal TVE and the non-formal skills development programme of the Government. It was not intended to cover the development of courses in technical education, vocational training and skills
development being delivered by other ministries, NGOs or workers’ and employers’ organizations.

The decision as to who would be included in the data collection was made based on the premise that those who would ultimately be responsible for any such a national E&SD system should be the key informants. If there was the will to accept, design, develop, and implement an appropriate system then their inputs would be essential. Secondary sources of data were sought from those providing technical assistance and funding.

It also assumed that there would be sufficient time and a willingness on the part of senior government and international agency officials to provide a clear and unambiguous statement of their perceptions, their motives and their concerns. International officials who were present when many of the critical decisions on E&SD were taken are appointed on fixed term contracts resulting in a relatively high turnover. This exacerbates the problem of institutional memory loss.  

1.11.2 Limitations:

Agreement to conduct the data collection component of the research in-country was difficult to accomplish. Those ministries with an impact on E&SD included Foreign Affairs, operational ministries and departments within MOLSAMD, MOE and MOHE had busy agendas and were reluctant to become involved in detailed analysis of their policies. This was also the position taken by specialized agencies within the UN including the FAO, ILO, UNESCO, and UNIDO. NGOs such as the Association of Experts in the Fields of Migration and Development Cooperation (AGEF), the IRC and CARE and the key bilateral donors such as the Federal Republic of Germany through GTZ, the USA’s Agency for International Development (USAid) were more amenable but in fact when asked by Email for data did not comply. Development banks including the World Bank and ADB did not respond to requests for assistance. The data collection activity required the full support of these bodies. However there was a general reluctance to agree to more than a few cursory conversations. During the author’s in-country attendance at a number of meetings constructive criticisms were

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14 The author undertook a total of five contracts in Afghanistan. They varied from two weeks in 2002 to four months in 2006 and several two month periods in 2007. During the periods between contracts it was difficult to keep abreast of developments.
offered based on personal; observations and experience. These may have been unacceptable to those who brought with them preconceived ideas as to what is best for the country.

Those having a direct impact on government policy and strategy related to employment linked to the formal technical and vocational education and the non-formal skills development programme of the Government were reluctant to participate. It was considered essential that the relevant officials within these bodies embrace the concept, have a clear vision of the future and assume ownership at the earliest possible time. The research was then restricted to data collection from all forms of documentation and a limited number of key informants from both the public and private sector. Skills development being delivered by other ministries providing public utilities and services or skills development to promote income support for members of workers’ and employers’ organizations was excluded.

1.12 Personal security developments:

The security situation deteriorated further in 2008 and 2009 to the point where it was extremely difficult to obtain official and necessary security clearances and an appropriate type of visa to remain in the country. I terminated my contract with the MOLSAAM as I did not consider it viable to act in a freelance situation which would have been the only way to undertake sufficient multiple in-country interviews and travel around the country to meet with key personnel.

1.13 Research issues

The key question was whether there was sufficient capacity within the Government to conduct appropriate levels of research and apply the findings to improve earlier coordination of matters related to E&SD. Specific research questions where drafted and prompts written to establish what the expectations were of the responsible government officials in relation to the timing, development and implementation of policies, and practices that impact E&SD. This assumed there would be an adequate number of sufficiently senior government officials willing to engage in discussions. This would also indicate the extent of capacity building required within the various levels of the public service. (World Bank, 2000:173)
By using a discussion format the intention was to determine the Government’s views on the efficacy of immediate policy assistance for E&SD, possibly and preferably before the cessation of the conflict. The expectation was that this approach would provide sufficient data to determine if there was a lack of recognition, or acceptance of the proposition supporting early implementation of a structured E&SD system. If the concept of an integrated and coordinated E&SD system was accepted it would then also be possible to outline a timetable to design and develop it at minimal cost to the Government. The introduction and implementation of a holistic E&SD system could then be ready when the inevitable flood of international technical assistance started to flow.

A key issue would have been the level of authority of the officials within the group. If authority was vested in the officials to make binding decisions the success of the process would have been more likely. Seeking the views of the responsible government officials was expected to bring to light to preferences, perceptions and prejudices of different ministries when the subject of technical assistance for (i) technical education, (ii) vocational training and (iii) employment focused skills development is raised. This approach would use suitably framed questions in an attempt to reach consensus on an overall framework that demonstrates the relationships between these three, often overlapping sub-sets and the influence each has at the different levels of employment.

Reference was made to the Afghan National Standard Classification of Occupations (ANSCO) document as a guide to linking all three. Standard classifications of occupations (SCOs) provide a general description of an occupation and is classified according to broad skill/qualifications and levels. It is also used to identify an individual’s occupation when conducting a census, data useful in making decisions at the macro level on the supply of different levels of the economically active available in the labour market.

The preparation of the Afghanistan version in 2007 in draft format was carried out by the Labour Market Information and Analysis Unit (LMIAU) of the MOLSAMD. This document, an update on one prepared in the 1970s focused on semi-skilled and skilled level occupations and was not supported by the NSD&MLP. As a result it was never completed. The Central Statistics Bureau (CSU), having completed the collection instruments for their proposed census in 2007 which was delayed a further year. This
lack of an agreed set of occupational classifications was pointed out as the CSO had not included questions that would have distinguished between various levels with clusters of similar occupations. ILO considered it unlikely that any census data that describes skill levels would be sufficiently robust to identify with any certainty the stock and levels of skilled personnel existing or required within the country. The next census was planned for 2008 but is now delayed and scheduled for 2010. 15

1.13.1 Technical Assistance

Any planned UN technical assistance programme is usually determined by the senior ministers within a Government in agreement with the United Nations Development Agency (UNDP) who collaborate to undertake a Common Country Assessment (CCA) based on the expressed needs as seen by the Government. From this UNDP develops a country cooperation framework. When E&SD issues are included, and in the case of Afghanistan they are found under the heading Economic Development and Growth. (UNDP, 2004a:39-42) Once the needs are agreed the relevant ministry has the option to contact the appropriate specialized UN agency, a donor and/or an NGO with matching policy targeted areas. Typically technical assistance that equates to a programme/project in the ministry responsible results in that ministry expecting that the programme is owned by them. Assistance that supports a typical non-formal skill-specific programme usually stems from the ministry responsible for labour issues. 16

Given that over the last 20 years these conclusions are consistently recurring the decision as to where the responsibility for the overall coordination of a national E&SD body should be located within the Government requires considerable diplomacy. Where this responsibility should be located and the implications for earlier coordination must be introduced to the various stakeholders in a non-threatening manner. It is important to explain that coordination did not necessarily imply that particular ministries would lose control of their traditional E&SD related programmes/projects. It does however suggest that ministries that impact employment, whether it is through the formal education system, the non-formal vocational stream or those training to support the

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15 Reuters, Afghan Census Postponed for 2 years, Kabul June 10th 2008, retrieved from www.reuters.com/article/idUSISL267420080608

16 There is no hard and fast rule however as I was appointed by ILO as Chief Technical Advisor to a World Bank project in Thailand for the MOE’s Department of Vocational Education in 1980. (See DOVE Thailand, 1980-82)
informal sector cannot remain isolated from the realities of the labour market. Coordination between them is therefore essential to provide the linkage. Establishing a means to undertake coordination is the key. Questions must be carefully framed and critically discussed and the data analyzed and presented in such a neutral and non-threatening form to ensure that those responsible understood and can present it to those expected to make decisions. The draft developed in this document suits Afghanistan taking account of the existing components, projects and (future) programmes in place in 2008.

1.13.2. Funding

The source and conditionality of funding, whether it is from a development bank, a bilateral donor, an international or national NGOs or a specialized UN agency requires clarification, especially when discussing with Government officials and frequently to NGOs who are not constrained by multiple layers of bureaucracy. Questions on the preference for sourcing technical assistance varies by country, with some governments having preferences based on previous donor or loan experience. An additional concern frequently expressed was the degree of willingness of the funding agency to provide sufficient data to ensure there are mechanisms in place for earlier coordination within a national E&SD system. Such data needs to be expressed in a format that allows it to be compared with other similar exercises. Esoteric information is an anathema when dealing with officials in Governments. What was found in these instances was that any data should be clearly presented in a simple format that describes the various issues facing all parties to the technical assistance programme/project.

The logical framework approach (LFA) is such a format. It allows the Government and the funding sources to clearly see the way forward. It alerts the partners to the issues to be faced during implementation. During the initial discussions on the submission to a potential funding source questions should be asked and answers provided by both parties to ensure transparency. Regardless of the form of an E&SD coordinating body it is expected to have authority to integrate individual projects from a variety of sources and hence maximize the benefit of their technical assistance contributions toward achieving national goals and expectations.

1.14 Conclusions:
Various strategies to conduct the research were considered. A series of key questions were developed and contact made with those with whom I had had previous contact though meetings and discussions whilst working with various stakeholders. Letters were forwarded to ninety-one organizations seeking approval to visit their representative in-country to discuss the issue of earlier coordination. The result was not encouraging with less than ten percent agreeing to allocate sufficient time to complete the sequence proposed. This is due in part to the security situation, the parochial attitudes of donors and it is suspected the potential for such research to alter or vary the methods currently in use. As a result of a year attempting to gain face to face contact in-country a different approach was deployed. These difficulties were presented to the supervisor so that he was aware of and supported the following approach. This included the use personal diary entries, primary data from earlier visits, personal research on labour market documentation, personally prepared reports and project proposals for donor funding, secondary data sources from the Internet, UN agencies, information gleaned from project personnel contacted electronically. Several visits were made to libraries in the UN’s Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, the Open University, at Heerlen in The Netherlands and the International Labour Organization in Geneva, Switzerland.
2.1 Introduction

Traditional theories on development are suspect when expounded in post-conflict situations. Those that have been applied in post-conflict environments, with few exceptions, have not to date resulted in sound and equitable progress. Development theorists such as Lewis and Rostow became prominent when they placed their faith over a half century ago on strengthening the state as a means of fostering economic growth and social and institutional development. Lewis, a professor of economics, made determinations based on the assumption that the mechanics of good government were in place and functional in the developing world of the post war period (Goldthorpe, 1996: 110). The application of his theory was then based on a simple two stage approach. It presumes firstly that there is a functioning public service capable and able to support an active urban modern sector and secondly that there are unemployed people in rural areas that can be mobilized to work in these urban areas. Critics of the theory point out that (i) the migration of workers from the rural to urban areas may not be feasible or desirable, (ii) that wage differentials may not be in balance and (iii) employers in urban locations may exploit this group of workers. Quartey criticized Lewis’ model explaining that it would most likely increase urban squalor, mass unemployment and exploitation of workers. Quartey also suggested that the capitalists would benefit from the oversupply of workers and this would drive wages down. The author also suggested that the Lewis model failed to take account of the effects of political instability, technological change and other variables (Quartey, 2003:46).

Rostow, another prominent development theorist claimed that there were five stages of economic modernization and that each can take varying amounts of time to reach fruition. First is the assumption that traditional society is functioning adequately to sustain the population, followed by (ii) the conditions for take-off that resulted in a shift from agriculture to commerce, increased savings to invest and a move away from local to regional and international markets, (iii) a rise in net investment of around ten percent of net national income and increased use of technology in a limited number of key economic sectors, (iv) the drive to maturity and the expansion of the number of economic sectors and steady investment, and finally (v) the age of high mass-consumption where some countries would seek to increase their influence.
internationally, some would redistribute the wealth through increased social services and others would become consumers on a previously unattainable scale. (Goldthorpe, 1996:111)

Each of these stages assumes that a number of conditions exist. In an ideal world they may. However the application of this model is difficult to imagine in a post-conflict country such as Afghanistan with a food deficit caused by war, drought, massive unemployment, a failed education system, a government incapable of maintaining stability and agriculture that is skewed toward the production of illegal drugs. In the case of Afghanistan food and almost every essential commodity is imported. Hence the first condition cannot be met, i.e. the traditional society estimated to be eighty-three percent of the population and characterized by subsistence economic activity or the growing of illicit drugs. This situation is likely to continue for some years until alternatives can be found that will provide sufficient money to provide a sustainable living standard. The Rostovian model is also challenged in that exogenous factors, especially those found following conflict such as the reintegration of ex-combatants and refugees, absorbing internally displaced people who gravitate to urban areas, providing services to nomadic tribes, establishing land ownership and land rights, human rights, education and primary health care, are not taken account of by Rostow’s theory. Preparing conditions for take-off, stage two, according to Rostow “…bases of coalitions touched with a new nationalism, in opposition to the traditional landed regional interests.” Whilst this is a desirable condition in reality it rarely exists. The political situation in post-conflict countries is usually in flux. The remaining stages are dependent upon the earlier ones being achieved and in this case a linear approach that relegates E&SD is not considered efficient. Where the application of the Rostovian model has been moderately successful occurs in cases where governments have established stable structures, sufficient capacity and a willingness on the part of civil society to adapt to the changes. 17

However more recently, and especially in post-conflict countries, there has been a reappraisal of this approach as public services and staff are increasingly incapable of sustaining the infrastructure needed to be effective.

The contributions of Myrdal (Goldthorpe, 1996:124) who was development economist in the 1960s and part of the third school of thought “…conceived of the situation in each South Asian country- as in any country- as a social system consisting of causally interrelated conditions in six broad categories: output and incomes; conditions of production; levels of living; attitudes toward work and life; institutions; and politics”. He considered the situation in post-colonial India and concluded that if a country has a viable public service, as was the case when the British left, it had the basic components upon which to grow its economy. Myrdal then qualifies this by suggesting that this is not the case in some other South Asian countries. At the time, the 1960s, Afghanistan was one of the poorest in the world. Coupled with this is the fact that in 1990 the United Nations Development Programme’s human development index stated that an Afghan’s had a life-expectancy is on average only 41.8 years. More recently, and in some aspects in the manner proposed by Myrdal, technical assistance for post-conflict countries from major international organizations is being seen in a more holistic manner. Projects are known to consider the impact of civil society, local cultural factors, equity, living standards, the environment, the provision of essential public services and utilities, social services, in addition to the more obvious need for reintegration of refugees, resettlement of the internally displaced, disabled and ethnic minorities. By including these groups at the planning stage ensures equitable distribution of aid. It also allows planners access to and understanding of the dynamics of local, regional and international markets to facilitate the formulation of an achievable macro-economic policy. (van Gennip 2005, para.13-15).

In a paper discussing contemporary approaches to development and conflict theory Barbanti (2004:1) contended that the concept of development should to address three interwoven levels, namely the macro or national level, the meso - or internal sector level and the micro – addressing those problems that are found at community level or are local in impact. The author points out that in a post- conflict setting development aid is clearly necessary when the “…the physical and social landscape has been damaged”. Efficient, effective and relevant technical assistance requires those who wish to expound development theories to couch them in a framework that identifies the unique aspects of, and difference between, non-conflict and conflict environments.

In the case of post-conflict Afghanistan this model is simply not realistic as the public service lacks capacity, the modern sector is very weak and currently they lack capable people to develop sufficient a critical mass of suitably skilled people. Current technical
Education programmes at all levels in Afghanistan are producing graduates but the competence level is not known. Skills development programmes, currently managed by the NSD&MLP and delivered by a wide and varying range of training providers from NGOs, bilateral donors and UN agencies are focused on short courses using instructors drawn, in significant numbers, from the local informal sector where the majority of business and potential employment opportunities are likely to be found.

Foreign direct investment is only trickling in and the modern, mining, commercial, business, financial, agricultural and banking sectors are all heavily supported by international finance and foreign technical assistance. (ANDS, 2008:73) Without a sound and dynamic E&SD system that is understood by investors growth will be limited with increased numbers of workers being imported to ensure profitability.

The need to be realistic in what can be achieved is paramount in deciding which method to use. In an analysis of methods Barakat, (2004:192) suggested that the experimental method has several shortcomings in a conflict-affected society. Sampling and adequate access for many of the key participants may be irregular and language may make accurate interpretation difficult. When access is possible the pressures on individuals to be objective in responses is often tainted by trauma, conflicting loyalties, fear and intimidation by powerful people in the community. This is often reflected in a lack of confidence or understanding of the purposes and end use of the information. It was determined that the survey method was not an option as an extended period of time in-country was available.

The “grounded theory” approach allows researchers to generate theory from “…context-dependent observations and perceptions…” This assumes there is direct access to the people involved whilst continually reflecting and comparing earlier primary and secondary sourced data with that evolving within the contemporary setting. This was considered appropriate as, by analyzing the circumstances, both past and present it should be possible to understand and critically interpret a range of institutional, governmental and international actions “…based on and connected to the context-dependent observations and perceptions of the social scene”. (Crabtree & Miller, 1999:29) In the current rapidly changing political and economic climate in Afghanistan the grounded theory approach was considered the most suitable approach to adopt for those who have the opportunity to participant observers has merit.
2.2 Origins of International Aid

The idea of international aid as a means of improving the economic performance of countries affected by conflict gained its impetus immediately following the Second World War. (Global & Autonomy Compendium, 2007) At a meeting in 1945 at Dumbarton Oaks in Washington DC in the USA it was agreed to establish “...central political and diplomatic organizations of the United Nations, its General Assembly and the Security Council”. The Bretton Woods meeting in New Hampshire in the United States of America resulted in the establishment of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). (Goldthorpe, 1996:226) These institutions would be world bodies and assume specialized development responsibilities by linking their activities to relevant national government institutions. Although a major contributor to the above global institutions the USA unilaterally undertook to provide aid and development for rebuilding Western Europe and Japan commencing in the late 1940's. The Soviet Union would not agree to its Satellite countries being recipients. They formed an alternative institution in 1949 to ensure that Stalin would be able to dominate and to appease some small Eastern European countries interested in benefiting from the Marshall Plan. Curtis (1992) explains that this was known as the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance sometimes referred to as Comecon, CMEA, CEMA, or “The Council”.

The founding of The Council dates from a 1949 communiqué agreed upon by the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, and Romania. The precise reasons for Comecon's formation in the aftermath of World War II are quite complex, given the political and economic turmoil of that time. However, Joseph Stalin's desire to enforce Soviet domination of the small states of Eastern Europe and to mollify some states that had expressed interest in the Marshall Plan were the primary factors in Comecon's formation. In 1957 the Treaty of Rome was signed by the Benelux countries plus France, Germany and Italy, resulting in the formation of the Organization of European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) for Western Europe. In 1961, as a result of the inclusion of the USA and Canada the OEEC was reconstituted and became the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). During this period individual western nations were forming units to dispense international aid bi-laterally. Beneficiaries were usually former colonies and further development required direct intervention of former colonists, whether it is in the form of aid or technical assistance. Typically among them at that time was the USA's Agency for International Development (now commonly known as USAid), The British Overseas Development
Ministry (ODM), now managed through the Department for International Development known as DFID) and the German ministry providing international assistance, the Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (BMZ).

Approximately twenty years after the initial incursion by the World Bank (WB) and UN Agencies into the provision of aid and development to developing countries the WB established the Pearson Commission in 1968 to assess, evaluate and “...propose the politics which will work better in the future”. The commission endorsed the one percent target specified by the General Assembly and recommended that seven-tenths of one percent be earmarked for official development assistance.  

The linking of aid to the promotion of economic development and the welfare of the beneficiaries was seen as a moral imperative, i.e. that “…it was only right that those who have should share with those who have not”. (Goldthorpe, 1996:231). It is at this time that bilateral aid for ex-colonial countries far exceeded that of the multi-laterals. Bilateral aid, where a country provides assistance to another, was frequently criticized when it was required that recipients of that aid would purchase donor country’s goods and services. (Schnabel & Ehrhart, 2005:10) A further criticism was the lack of coordination between international donors and the government when implementing projects. This is supported by McKechnie (WB, 2008: b) in a press release who stressed in a Joint Staff Advisory Note that “…better management and coordination of foreign technical assistance are urgent priorities…” and that the “Lack of coordination among donors has been a challenge for Afghanistan, and two-thirds of aid spending still happens outside the Government’s budget and thus outside its control and ownership”.

Sigsgaard (2009:28) when discussing the problems of the technical education system within the MOE in Afghanistan foreshadowed the need for the Government to be responsible for coordination, but not necessarily implementation, of all education efforts. This was also referred to by Burch (2009) who observed that a large proportion of TA funds are not channeled through the treasury and spending was not declared. This compounds the problems for a government struggling to develop a sound system of budget and control. This situation has finally been recognized as critical to the success of any development programme. The WB has strongly advocated that “To build a state

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18 This is the definition of ODA as described by the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of OECD.
and be accountable to its people, the government needs to have a say over resource allocation. As a result the World Bank channels all its funds through the government budget,” (World Bank, 2008c:1) The President of the World Bank acknowledges in the case of Afghanistan that “…Currently two thirds of aid….flows outside the government because donors lack confidence in its competence and transparency”. (World Bank, 2009) The UK government’s DFID, whilst purporting to support the capacity of the Government reports ironically that it allocates “…at least 50 percent of its funding through Afghan government systems”. (DFID, 2010) In a press release in January 2010, during the London Conference on Afghanistan, donors discussed the success of Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF). The WB had pledged contributions from 31 countries for this programme and channels the money through the Ministry of Finance. The Afghan Minister endorsed this methodology stating that “…it’s the Afghan government which has to be trusted with the resources”. (BBC, 2010)

UNDP is a multilateral source of funding and has offices in 166 countries. UNDP is “…primarily a funding, programming, monitoring and coordinating organization. The bulk of the field work it has supported has been carried out by UN agencies, regional commissions, and by regional development banks and funds”. (UNDP, 2004: b) Allocations for technical assistance utilizing UNDP funds are usually agreed based on the Country Cooperation Framework (CCF). This is in the form of grants for international experts, purchase of minor equipment and procurement of specialized services. When major capital expenditure for a project is required this is usually provided by development banks and results in the need for collaboration with one or other organization with the expertise to ensure service delivery.

Also as a result of the Pearson Commission's work the question as to who were the actual beneficiaries and the degree of corruption involved was flagged. Aid was frequently criticized and seen as benefiting the rich of poor countries. Individuals within government ministries were seen to have accumulated excessive amounts of money that could not have been accumulated based on the prevailing government salaries. The WB in its paper on the subject acknowledges that “…there is new empirical evidence that provides insights into the puzzle of what is effective aid and what is ineffective aid”. (WB, 1998:81) This was also pointed out by Sigsgaard (2009:280) when explaining that lessons learned stated that “Foreign aid needs to be reformed. … The state needs it but when spent ineffectively it fuels fragility in multiple ways. The current disbursement
system privileges foreign military forces, and gives big profits to corporations.” There was also the situation in Afghanistan where most aid and development was occurring in towns and major population centres rather than extending to the rural areas. This is abundantly clear as most of the UN and NGO activities are conducted in the “relatively safe” areas to the north east and around Kabul. Reasons for this included the reluctance of donors to take risks with their country's international aid money. In some instances it was related to the reluctance of the appointed experts to venture into the rural areas. Often host government officials would limit the scope to the areas where they had political constituents or tribal allegiances. Further observations that could be construed as inappropriate practices included the insistence of donors of unrealistic time lines. Quoting the need to complete projects based on fiscal requirements of the donor is also common, especially within UN agency projects.

Against this background the IBRD established the Brandt Commission in 1977 to “... review aid and development in the widest possible setting of the world economic system” (Goldthorpe, 1996:236, Brandt Commission, 1980). As a result of the oil price increases of 1973-74 and again in the late 1970s the effects of a deregulated monetary system impacted countries throughout the world, both rich and poor. Brandt's recommendations were not heeded. Aid for development work was reduced and global recession loomed as a real possibility.

The resulting Brandt Commission report entitled “North South: A Programme for Survival”, published in 1980 was far reaching. The report’s findings and recommendations to overcome the problems identified were summarized by Sneyd, (2005:1). The over-arching tenet was that to make progress it was essential that the reduction of poverty in the less-developed economies be a cross-cutting theme. More specifically this included, (a) a more concerted effort by industrialized countries to transfer funds equivalent to 0.7 per cent of GDP to the developing world (as did the Pearson Commission report ten years earlier), (b) the elimination of problems associated with the operation of transnational corporations, (c) improved food and agricultural

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19 For further reading see:
production and distribution, (d) agreed terms of trade for primary commodity exporters and reduced protectionism, (e) reducing energy costs, (f) stabilizing population growth and encouraging workforce mobility, (g) improving the international financial and monetary system, (h) eliminating unsustainable foreign debt loads, (i) increasing levels of development assistance and (j) reducing the cost of the arms race.

At the time of publication the Soviet Union had invaded Afghanistan. Economic issues in the developed economies took precedence and the 1980s saw developed countries facing varying degrees of recession. A second Brandt Commission report was prepared in 1983. It too suffered due to the prevailing economic conditions of the times. Recovery was occurring in the developed world after a period of considerable uncertainty. However by 1985 both Brandt reports had been relegated to obscurity.

The stock market crash of 1987 alerted many pundits to the possibility of economic chaos if such stock market fluctuation were to have coincided with significant third world debt default. During the 1980's the world's currencies were affected by deregulatory policies that allowed capital to move internationally in search of the high interest rates. Developing nations saw increased investment and growth based on inflows of capital resulting in employment and increased wages. Aid flows were also fluctuating. The proposal by the Brandt Commission report to institute a World Development Fund to be financed from untapped “universal” revenue sources was also ignored. The proposed sources of revenue were expected through fees from international corporations, international airline tickets, maritime transport, ocean fishing, satellite parking spaces, electromagnetic spectrum use, arms trafficking, environmental pollution, currency trades, hedge funds, and derivatives. (Quilligan, 2002:30 & 33).

Inflationary pressures in Asia led to devaluation of some currencies and the crisis of 1997-98 saw the IMF called in to provide support. The Brandt Report was reviewed by Quilligan (2002:33) who explained that “...aid to developing nations is simply as an extension of credits that developed countries use to promote the export and purchase of their capital goods”.

Regardless of the type of assistance the situation facing post-conflict countries is usually so severe, as was the case in particular in Afghanistan, that they would have benefited greatly had the various proposals mentioned above been implemented in a manner appropriate to their needs. This may have reduced the likelihood and number of many
of the serious civil and international conflicts that have occurred from the time of the report’s publication.

2.3 Background to the Afghanistan conflict:

2.3.1 Historical setting:

When collaborating with the people of a country, and especially as an international advisor, it is essential that those offering advice and assistance have a sound understanding of the background of those they are working with. Ethnic tensions, religious beliefs and social mores must be respected. To put this in context the following short summary is provided.

Afghanistan is currently recovering from almost 30 years of conflict. However the country has had a turbulent history stretching back several thousand years. The late 19th and early 20th Century saw a number of leaders including Abdur Rahman (1880 – 1901), his son Habibullah (1901-1919) and Amanullah (1919 – 1929). Amanullah was a reformist who lost popular support and was replaced by a Tajik who in turn was replaced by a cousin of Amanullah, one Nadir Shah who then ruled until 1973. Upheavals following the Second World War resulted in a change in the relationships on the eastern border when Pakistan became independent of Britain. Renewed nationalism arose concerning the placement of this border known as the Durand Line as it divided the Pashtun ethnic group. The issue of the legitimacy of the border has not been satisfactorily resolved to date. There are conflicting statements and claims from those affected by the border on this subject. This has considerable influence on the relationship between Pakistan and Afghanistan. (Farahi, 2004:231, Khan, 2000:241). Soviet intervention in Afghanistan’s internal politics was again evident in 1973 when Mohammed Daoud Khan overthrew the Shah dynasty having ruled in a relatively peaceful manner for almost a half century. Khan introduced far reaching changes, many of which were unpopular. This in turn contributed to the physical intervention of the USSR in 1979 which extended over a 10 year period (Saikal, 2004:29). In the 1980’s the US government’s CIA provided technical and military equipment and advice to the Mujahidin who were resisting the Soviets in Afghanistan. By using the Pakistan government as a proxy through the connections of the Inter-services Intelligence (ISI) agency, the USA, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia were hoping to influence an embarrassing

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20 The spelling of this tribe varies. Pashtun or Pashtoon or Phatan is used by different authors.
defeat of the USSR. This strategy contributed in part to bring about the withdrawal of the Soviets in 1989. However the aid provided through the ISI left some Afghans, mainly those labeled as warlords, very well provisioned with military intelligence gathering information and sophisticated military equipment. The early 1990’s internal fighting between ethnic groups erupted. (AREU & WB, 2004:6) This resulted in the destruction of large parts of Kabul, disillusionment of the population and the rise of the Taliban, a group supported by graduates of madrasas in both Afghanistan and Pakistan where many of the young men were indoctrinated by Pakistani mullahs with religious ideologies. The general definition of a madrasa or madrasah under the Ottoman Empire was that of a place of learning similar to a university. The contemporary description in South Asia is that of a school that provides students with general subjects and a radical form of Islamic instruction. The Taliban succeeded in taking power and were seen as a better alternative as they reduced the crime and violence that citizens had been subjected to over many years. Initially they also significantly reduced poppy cultivation. However in more recent times they have resorted to using this crop as a means of raising significant amounts of revenue.

The intervention of the USA following the events of September 2001 was predicated on the need to eliminate the terrorist infrastructure in the Eastern mountains of Afghanistan supported by the Taliban. Although political and diplomatic pressure was exerted they refused to dismantle the freedom-fighter cum jihadist/terrorist training camps or to surrender key personnel manipulating the tribal leaders. (Rashid, 2001:139) Additionally technical assistance interventions of non-government and bilateral and multi-lateral organizations was limited during the 20 years between 1979 and 2000 to ad-hoc interventions being mainly concentrated on humanitarian issues with a minimal amount of informal sector skills development.

During the early 1990s ILO’s E&SD project was implemented with a Chief Technical Advisor (CTA) based in Quetta in Baluchistan Province of Pakistan. (See Project Document Pak/90/01/OCA) This was during the period of Soviet occupation. The project team operated using mobile training facilities that travelled across the border from Quetta into the south of Afghanistan. This project was seriously constrained when the CTA and team members were threatened by the Taliban who claimed the project was supporting people not supportive of their regime. A subsequent evaluation conducted in 1995 described the coordination and networking that this project had
developed. This project, had it been extended, would have been the basis for coordination at the community level for reconstruction and rehabilitation in Afghanistan (See Pakistan, 1995: pp13-17) A similar project was drafted for Afghan refugees in Iran with the intention of preparing the various agencies, NGOs and community level administrators “…with administrative, organizational and vocational skills… prior to returning to Afghanistan”. (See Iran 1994: 4) This was not funded as the Iranian government could not agree on a modality within the action plan proposed by the United Nations Operations Research /Systems Analysis (UNORSA).  

2.3.2 Culture and ethnicity

Afghanistan is a country made up of peoples from various ethnic groups, some of whom originate from neighboring countries. International borders have been drawn and redrawn for centuries, often without due consultation with those who reside in each of the various locations. This has caused many civil and cross-border conflicts over a number of years, the latest being the civil wars of the mid 1990’s. It is critical to have an historical understanding of the culture of the major ethnic groups, and to be aware of the recent power shifts that have occurred over time that have brought the current elected government to power. Those international agencies wishing to provide technical assistance must also have sufficient understanding of the culture of different ethnic groups (language differences), religious variations, and the impact of geography on the delivery of goods and services. This prior knowledge must be balanced with, and take account of the capacity and comprehension of those in executive posts within the contemporary government structure.

2.3.3 Religion

The 1964 constitution proclaims Islam the "sacred religion of Afghanistan". (Afghanistan Government, 2004a) It states that religious rites of the state shall be performed according to Hanafi doctrine. Afghan Muslims make up ninety-nine percent of the population. Islam was the official religion of Afghanistan when the USSR invaded. In an effort to win over religious leaders, the USSR Marxist regime set up a Department of Islamic Affairs in 1981 and began providing funds for new mosques and for the maintenance of old ones. Following the departure of the USSR in 1989 an

21 See www.fao.org/nr/water/aquastat/countries/afghanistan/index.stm
Islamic State was again proclaimed. In 1994 militants known as the Taliban, a term used at that time to describe religious students - began to impose their strict form of Islam observance across the majority of the country. (Crews, 2008:27) Women were ordered to dress in strict Islamic garb, were banned from schools, barred from working and not allowed to leave their houses unless accompanied by a male relative. Males were forced to pray five times a day and grow full beards as a condition of employment in the government. The Taliban were driven by religious dogma and, as they had little idea how to administer and manage a nation, resorted to a strict religious code to maintain control using draconian interpretations of Sharia law. Under the Taliban, repression of the minority Hazara ethnic group, who were predominantly Shi‘is, was severe. This was not in accordance with the 2004 Afghan Constitution which has reaffirmed the definition of religious freedom and practices laid out some forty-five years earlier.

2.3.4 Demographics

Afghanistan covers some 650,000 square kilometers with a majority of its people living in rural communities, some of which have not impacted by any external influence for centuries. The country is landlocked and has borders with six neighboring countries. Iran is to the west and following in a clockwise direction there is Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, China and Pakistan. Until the partition of India that created Pakistan it too had a common border. Each neighbour has and continues to impact development. Some are attributed as being responsible in part for the current lack of adequate economic, social and political conditions within the country. (BBC, 7/2007) Approximately eighty percent of the population is Sunni; nineteen percent is Shi‘is; with the balance made up of Christians, Hindus. In terms of ethnicity the breakdown is estimated to be Pashtuns (42 percent), Tajiks (27 percent), Hazara (9 percent), Uzbeks (9 percent), Aimak (4 percent), Turkmen (3 percent), plus other minorities such as Nuristanis. This diversity has contributed to what Shah, (1978: 35) called “village states” where ancient values, superstitions and myths still dominate the thinking of the people. Estimates of the total population vary. The CIA estimates there are 28,395,716 (July 2009). 22 There are many disputes concerning the actual population numbers within each ethnic group. This has created an atmosphere of distrust when claims are made about the accuracy of the major ethnic groups’ representation within the fledgling “democratic” system. This problem has plagued successive technical assistance attempts

to clarify the actual demographic make-up and hence identify and plan to raise the skills base of the country. (Ollapally, 2003:6).

2.3.5 Sociological factors

In a paper prepared for the WB it was posited by Collier et.al. (2001b:3), “…that empirical correlates of the initiation of civil war, …can be grouped into economic, social, geographic and historical”. The suggestion made is that the most critical of these is the level of the economy and its impact on the people. This is further explained by pointing out that without adequate growth in the economy the potential for initial, continuing or renewed conflict increases. Social composition also affects risk. A country in which the largest ethnic group constitutes between forty-five and ninety percent of the population has a much higher the risk of internal conflict. However, apart than this ‘ethnic dominance’ effect, ethnic and religious diversity actually reduces conflict risk. Conversely they have determined that diverse societies are safer than homogenous societies. They add that, “…countries with low per capita income, slow growth, and a high share of primary commodity exports in GDP face considerably higher risks”.

2.3.6 Geographic influences

In a post-conflict environment the geography of the country is a significant factor. Countries with dispersed populations, and those which are mountainous, face somewhat higher risks of lapsing back into a conflict situation. (Collier, Hoeffler & Soderbom, 2001a) Applying this to the situation in Afghanistan there is a higher than normal likelihood of more conflict given that the average altitude is about 1,200 meters and the Hindu Kush mountain range rises to more than 6,100 meters in the northern corner dividing the Northern provinces from the rest of the country. Central Afghanistan, a plateau with an average elevation of 1,800 meters, contains many small fertile valleys and provides excellent grazing for sheep, goats, and camels. To the north of the Hindu Kush and the central mountain range, the altitude drops to about 460 meters, permitting the growth of cotton, fruits, grains, ground nuts, and other crops. Southwestern Afghanistan is a desert, hot in summer and cold in winter. The four major river systems are the Amu Darya (Oxus) in the north, flowing into the Aral Sea; the Harirud and Morghab in the west; the Helmand in the southwest; and the Kabul in the east, flowing into the Indus. There are few lakes. (Encyclopedia of Nations, 2006)
2.3.7 Social identity influences

In an attempt to explain the complex interconnections between social identities and conflict Korostelina (2007) has undertaken extensive research and has applied the findings to the situation found in Tajikistan which shares a border with Afghanistan. The author contends that earlier research has not given due consideration to the need for analysis of social identity when anticipating possible escalation of conflict. The contention is that there are five major groups of factors that need to be considered if early warning systems based on social identity are to be used in conflict prevention strategies. These are represented and explained in the following model. See Figure 2.

![Figure 2: Social identity & Conflict](image)

The explanation of each of the five factors has many similarities to the situation in Afghanistan. Korostelina (2007:20) suggests that “…persons with salient ethnic identity are more prejudiced and show more readiness for conflict behavior toward other groups”. The term “in-group primacy” is used to describe the feeling those with salient ethnic identity accede to and accept the supremacy of group goals over individual goals and values.
Given the turbulent history of Afghanistan and the fact that there are such a diverse number of significant ethnic groups it is not surprising that there are few positive characteristics in society in general or within the different ethnic groups and individuals that would promote a sense of Afghan nationalism. Ethnic Hazaris, Pashtuns, Tajiks and Uzbek make up the majority of the population and will, if national sovereignty is threatened, come together to ensure there is no outside interference. However when that threat is sufficiently contained some of these groups have been known to resort to internal squabbling, the most recent being during the post USSR period of the mid-1990s leading to a devastating civil war. Pakistan was able during this period to manipulate and effectively separate the various factions as a means of promoting their own agenda. The Pakistan policy attempted to marginalize any consolidation of the Pashtun tribes who lived each side of the border. It was well-known at that time that the tribes wanted to be part of a greater Pashtunistan. The Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) organization of the Pakistan government put as many obstacles in the way as possible in an attempt to forestall any nationalistic aspirations. (Jalali, 2007:27)

This ethnic diversity, a product of centuries of conflict, invasion, counter invasion, international interference in the politics of the country and most importantly loyalty to an individual ethnic group and its leader, invariably outweighs any call for a national identity. When threats to individual security are real, or for that matter imagined, the myths, sacred icons and normative orders upon which the history of each of the ethnic groups are based takes precedence over any call for national solidarity.

The system of Loya Jurgas in Afghanistan, a national forum of respected tribal leaders from all the various factions is a tradition that fosters nationalistic pride. In the current contemporary setting, where there is strong representation from the major ethnic groups. The nomination of warlords as representatives of some geographic areas of the country is a *de-facto* representation of the ethnic groups. Thus they are seen by others to dominate some sectors of government thus fostering a strengthened sense of collective axiology. This tends to further alienate those minorities who are under pressure from the dominant groups. Mistrust is endemic among and between some ethnic groups. Some war lords change allegiances with different ethnic groups for political or economic gain which builds further mistrust, instability and economic hardship for the common people.
CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY & RESEARCH APPROACH

3.1 Introduction

The approach taken was to explore, describe and propose a model that would facilitate earlier intervention to improve the processes and timing of those interventions by those delivering technical assistance for E&SD, especially as it applies to a post-conflict country. This case study of post-war Afghanistan in an attempt to describe the factors that impact implementation of technical assistance for E&SD. The expectation was that I would review the inputs of as many key informants as possible would be interviewed to determine why the inputs took such a long time to be in place after the conflict. This would cover government, UN Agencies, national and international NGOs, bilateral and multi-lateral donors, the private sector, communities and other international agencies. The intention was to have discussions concerning their perceptions of the best way to approach E&SD in similar circumstances in the future.

The expectation was that an earlier and more integrated and acceptable system would evolve. This topic emanates from work previously undertaken by the author in post-conflict countries over the last ten years. The contributions of the major multi-lateral, bilateral, donors and NGOs and government ministries with a direct responsibility for post-conflict issues related to E&SD in Afghanistan was reviewed in this context.

In 2006 formal and informal discussions were held to establish whether there has been an acknowledgement by those responsible of the need to introduce, as early as possible, a body to coordinate national and international financial and technical assistance inputs to support the E&SD system. At that time this type of intervention was considered essential to maximize the benefits and to economically utilize those inputs. The above activities, now spanning seven years, suggest that there was full agreement with the concept and the importance of coordination and that this has been extensively addressed by researchers at an international level. However the transmission of this experience to the ultimate beneficiaries through those in positions of authority in government ministries was difficult to measure.

This lack of communication has occurred for a variety of reasons. In the first instance related project documentation, reports and technical articles do not appear to have been available to those implementing in country programmes and projects. Translations in the two major languages of Dari and Pashto were not in evidence. Secondly
coordination suffers when key international donors have a vested interest in ensuring that projects they implement meet specific donor rather than nationally agreed requirements. Thirdly coordination is an anathema to many NGOs who again are reacting to a specific need in accordance with their principle’s individual “mission”, without being aware of, acknowledging or agreeing with the Government’s position. Fourthly the research has revealed that little evidence of the application of the wisdom the reviewed documents espoused by national or international staff directly involved, even when the scholarly documents originated from the research arm of the parent organization. Those managing programmes/projects appear to have ignored, or have been unaware of the principles espoused by the research arms of their specialized agency, preferring to adapt international strategies that that they were personally familiar with and which may be inappropriate to Afghanistan’s needs at the current stage of development. Finally a most telling observation is that most organizations implementing projects related to, or directly impacting E&SD, are not willing to accept some degree of risk or compromise to their predetermined expectations when faced with the inevitable changes that occur in a post-conflict environment.

In 2007 discussions were held with UNDP’s newly appointed programme officer. When asked why NGOs were implementing UNDP funded projects instead of the ILO he suggested that the development of adequate systems would take decades. As the ILO was not adequately represented in-country it was preferable to engage NGOs as they had established infrastructure to deliver skills training during the immediate post conflict period. This sort of reasoning ignores the fact that a long-term approach to the establishment of a sound and sustainable system of E&SD will also be left “for decades” resulting in a huge waste of resources.

This research contends that the development of an E&SD system model for post-conflict countries that incorporates and guides policy-makers to form a body to coordinate E&SD policies of the Government, and by association the international community, is the key issue. If the formation of an interim body could be agreed, preferably during the conflict period, and the various components of an E&SD system prioritised, support for immediate reconstruction in post-conflict countries could move ahead more efficiently. The research intends to discover, describe and analyse the motivations of the major key informants.
3.2 Choosing the case study approach

Texts by Creswell, (1994), Merriam (1998) & Yin (2003) outlining the various forms of research were reviewed to determine which paradigm to favour and what particular study design would best suit the circumstances. Merriam (1994:3) explains that a design choice should be one that a researcher feels comfortable with. It is further pointed out that the researcher’s “…orientation to basic tenets about the nature of reality, the purpose of doing the research and the type of knowledge to be produced” must be examined carefully before commencing any detailed study. This author also claims that “… qualitative researchers build toward theory from observations and intuitive understandings gained in the field” (Merriam, 1994:7). Creswell (1998:11-12) describes four main types of design; namely ethnographic, grounded theory, the case study and phenomenology.

The ideas of Argyris et.al., (1974: xix) matches the perceptions the author has of the role of the training and development practitioner in the field. Argyris contends that part of the professional education process “… was to formulate “what we already know”; that is, to capture in explicit form the insights, values, and strategies of action that competent practitioners bring to situations they encounter in practice”. This was further explained by suggesting that a blending of applied science and knowing and reflective action was the challenge for professional educators to overcome. Argyris points out that reflective action is essential in the technical assistance field if a practitioner is to provide both balanced and appropriate advice. The case study approach was considered the most appropriate as it provides an opportunity to describe the patterns and processes employed by each of the contributors in relation to the central issue of E&SD in a post-conflict setting. This research strategy “… comprises an all-encompassing method – covering the logic of design, data collection techniques, and specific approaches to data analysis”. (Yin, 2003:14)

The choice of a case study was also influenced by the description used by Burns (2000:460) who explained that this approach “…is the preferred strategy when “how”, “who”, “why” or “what” questions are being asked, or when the investigator has little or no control over events, or when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within a real life context.”. Each of these conditions has a parallel when describing the conditions surrounding E&SD in a post-conflict environment. As a result the use of a qualitative paradigm linked to a case study design was considered the most appropriate
approach. The theory was that by researching the situation as it unfolded in Afghanistan it would be possible to make recommendations on E&SD policy, strategy and implementation at an earlier stage in future conflict affected countries and by doing so reduce the lead time to establish a sound basis for E&SD whilst also contributing to the reduction of waste resources.

3.3 The design components

The case study design was also influenced by Burns who suggested that initially the researcher should cast as wide a net as possible to ensure that all possible sources of data are accessed. Burns claimed that unless this approach is taken it is likely that potential sources will be ignored. It also provides a means of determining whether the study was feasible. The decision was made to continue given that there were a number of serious limitations on time and resources. The assumption was that whilst access was limited a reasonable amount of data could be collected within a secure environment.

Four major components being addressed when undertaking case studies (Burns: 2000: 464-5).

3.3.1 Initial case study question(s).

The selection of the “Grand Tour” question (Brenner, 2006:358) was considered as a sound approach when opening any dialog. The intention was, assuming that access to sufficient and suitable personnel was possible to commence any conversations with a broad question that would allow the participants to give their impressions on the topic of E&SD from their perspective. It was also acknowledged that this may well create difficulties once the in-country activities commenced as the situation can be dynamic with continuous and new TVET and E&SD interventions being introduced frequently and by a variety of different actors.

Examples of this in Afghanistan include projects being implemented concurrently by the WB funded and government implemented National Skills Development and Market Linkages Programme (NSD&MLP), the ILO pilot project funded by UNDP to develop an employment strategy for the Government, the UNDP funded ILO implemented project to expand the employment services network and the Government sponsored project (using WB loan funding) to provide a labour market information unit. Each project is linked to the Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs and Martyrs and Disabled
These project documents were reviewed and it was obvious that although each project was linked by content there was little actual collaboration at the implementation level. Each participating project had its own interpretation of the efficiency, effectiveness and relevance of their contribution based on the political/economic position of the source of funding. Additionally the Government’s understanding of the internal and external efficiency of an E&SD system was not always consistent with contemporary procedures. The specific questions that should be asked following a general discussion with key informants are seen at Appendix C. This provides more detail on possible questions and prompts that could be used to garner information needed to analyze the reasons for this absence of genuine and early coordination and collaboration within any national skills development system.

### 3.3.2 Study Propositions

The proposition was that there is a need to have a system of employment and skills develop coordination in place earlier than has been the case in post-conflict countries in the past. This would require that the Government be assisted to establish an appropriate national coordination system that would determine priorities and link any skills development by any training provider, whether in training centres or in the local community, to direct income earning opportunities. This should create equitable employment opportunities across all sectors of the economy and in an environment where existing skills can be put to work while those without employable skills could be offered relevant skills development based on local studies of the labour needs.

This does not align with the proposition that an extensive network of publicly funded training facilities is a post-conflict priority. The inevitable suggestion by those providing technical assistance is that donors assisting conflict-affected countries should immediately embark on a programme to build large and expensive technical education and skills development centres/networks. This approach, in a post-conflict setting, must be challenged. This situation is frequently driven by donors who want to see “bricks and mortar” to justify expenditure of large amounts of money. (Rasanayagam, 2003:260) A more realistic proposition would be for the international community to prepare suitable policies leading to affordable strategies including the provision of ‘front-end’ funding to sensitize the key decision-makers to enable them to comprehend the implications for the future of a sound E&SD system. This would include but not be limited to recognizing the need to establish a national coordination system in an
environment where existing skills can be put to work and those without employable skills are trained to meet local income-earning requirements.

3.3.3 Unit of analysis.

A sample of key informants based on technical and replicable criteria was not defined. The intention was to explore, describe and, if access was possible, explain the situations encountered (Crabtree & Miller, 1999: 258). The data collection exercise intended to include as many key decision-makers in the above institutions as could be accessed. The purpose of the research was fully explained by letter and potential participants asked to agree that they were willing and legitimately able to collaborate. Confidentiality was guaranteed. Ethics approval was sought from the Ethics in Human Research Committee and granted in 2007 for a year. I advised CSU that the amount of actual face-to-face contact would be limited as the security situation had deteriorated to the point where it was not advisable to travel within the country without a UN contract. The remainder of the research involving individuals would be carried out by contact with key personnel in-country and with individuals in organizations having offices outside

3.3.4 The population

The functionaries contacted by Email were limited to:

- Senior government and international officials, technical advisors employed by or supporting the Ministries of Finance, Education, Higher Education, Industry, and Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs and Disabled.

- In-country desk officers from multilateral development banks having a direct impact include the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, also known as the WB, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and other and multilateral financing institutions such as the European Commission (EC).

- Officials responsible for programmes for bilateral donor governments active in the E&SD field include the United States Agency for International Development (USAid), the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), the Department for International Development (DFID) from the United Kingdom, Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Korean International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), the Australian Government Overseas Aid Program (AusAID), and the Dutch Directorate-General for International Co-operation (DIDG).
Various UN agency representatives from ILO, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO and UNICEF.

The Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR) having a coordinating function. Other prominent organizations involved include the British Agencies Afghanistan Group (BAAG), Care International Afghanistan (CARE), OXFAM-International (Afghanistan Programme), the International Crisis Group (ICG/WB), the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) Afghan German Technical Training Programme (AGTTP), the German Workers Group for Development and Skilled Workers).

The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) involved in stabilizing various communities through Provincial Development Committees and the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).

The intention was to obtain as review as many documents as possible, collect and analyze as many individual views, opinions, suggestions and/or criticisms on the subject of E&SD coordination to determine how each participant perceives the need from each person’s individual perspective. This approach was considered more appropriate as the validity and availability of reliable quantitative data in the current political and economic environment was not considered reliable. (Burns, 2000:47 & Patton, 1990:100).

3.3.5 Linking data to the proposition & criteria for interpreting findings

The propositions, in relation to E&SD issues are, (i) how to establish such a national system (ii) who should take responsibility for coordination, (iii) why there needs to be a system of coordination in place, i.e. how much earlier and (iv) what benefits improved coordination of the E&SD system would provide. The collection of data can be achieved through open-ended discussions, specific questions and other information sources such as documents, participant observation and other artifacts. By using multiple sources it was possible to ensure triangulation and hence increase reliability. (Burns, 2000:468-9) The interpretation of the findings was based on the following criteria: (i) evidence of existing coordination activities (ii) determining who currently
has the responsibility for coordination, (iii) why national coordination was needed and (iv) what needs to be done to improve or introduce such a system.

3.4 Logical Framework Approach principles

The LFA methodology was developed by USAid in the 1970s (AusAID, 2000: sec 1) when it was realized that earlier systematic approaches to project identification and implementation were not providing adequate indications as to the success of technical assistance. Prior to this most projects were implemented based on an analysis of the problem(s) to be solved using a structure based on objectives, outputs and supporting activities. This approach dominated UN and bilateral agency project development until the mid-1980’s. Project documents, or modifications based on in-country assessments/reviews, frequently failed to measure the impact, efficiency, effectiveness, relevance and sustainability of the project. Programmes and their projects were evaluated based on outputs and timing of the results rather than indicators of success. Whether the beneficiary, whether a government or an individual actually benefited in the medium to long term from the activity within project did not receive close attention.

The LFA methodology has some detractors however. The matrix format takes no account of the political setting, the social environment in which the project is set or the linkages to the project cycle management process that preceded it. It is seen by many as a static tool in many respects. In its initial development it records the thinking of the stakeholders at the time of writing, much the same as the processes used in earlier project preparation. Unless the logframe matrix is continually monitored and updated to reflect changes in the environment in which it is located it can, like previous project documents, become redundant. The success of an operational project using this tool is dependent upon the participation of all stakeholders at each stage of the project life. (Sartorius, 139-146)

3.5 Logical Framework Approach application

Project cycle management includes the development of a model for E&SD using the logical framework to produce a logical framework matrix. The LFA is an analytical, presentational and management tool that can help planners and managers to analyze the existing situation during project preparation. This establishes a logical hierarchy of
means by which objectives will be reached. It allows planners to identify the risks to achieving the objectives, and to sustainable outcomes. Provision is also made for ongoing monitoring and formative and summative evaluation based on outputs and the outcomes resulting from the outputs. The LFA is now commonly used by international aid agencies offering technical assistance as a means of engaging the beneficiaries in the decision making process. However if this strategy is not developed prior to a conflict it can be used reactively, i.e. after the event, and hence may not address the issues of employment and skills development early enough. This reactive approach is therefore prone to criticisms from some quarters because it is developed in a period when a number of other more humanitarian critical issues are considered more immediate by those offering to assist. The summative evaluations are provided in a standard format that is readily available for any of the stakeholders and can be used as a basis for future project implementation and research. (AusAID, 2005:1) The LFA uses a matrix to describe a summary of the project design. The Australian Government prefers the following structure.

Table One

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Logical Framework Matrix</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activity Description</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goal or Impact</strong> – The long term development impact (policy goal) that the activity contributes at a national or sectoral level</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Purpose or Outcome</strong> – The medium term result(s) that the activity aims to achieve – in terms of benefits to target groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Component Objectives or Intermediate Results</strong> – This level in the objectives or results hierarchy can be used to provide a clear link between outputs &amp; outcomes (particularly for larger multi-component activities)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Outputs</strong> – The tangible products or services that the activity will deliver</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: AusAID guidelines 3.3, figure 1, 2005:3
In order to avoid common problems associated with the use of a LFM, AusAID suggests that managers should ensure that participants have a common understanding of the key analytical principles and terminology used. They must also emphasize the importance of the LFA process as much as the matrix product. By doing so managers can ensure it is used as a tool to promote stakeholder participation, dialogue and agreement on activity scope, rather than as imposing external concepts and priorities.

3.6 Logical Framework Approach in reality

The process to follow when developing a LFM, whilst advocating the involvement of stakeholders from the outset is often carried out as follows. A technical advisor, a bilateral or multilateral agency, an NGO or a donor may draft the basic tenets in isolation as a way of conceptualizing ideas and framing thoughts based on their own perceptions of the problem to be solved. The resulting draft is then discussed with a counterpart, usually an official responsible within a government ministry with a vested interest. This is to ensure that the initial premise(s) hold true in the field. The involvement of a truly representative group identified with full government involvement can be called to finalize the project and the resulting LFM. However this last step may be delayed due to a number of factors, some of which include continued insecurity during and/or following the conflict, lack of foreign direct investment, donor reluctance, the tardy approach of UN agencies, lack of local capacity and an often risk adverse attitude of key government personnel. Such delays should not be seen as reluctance to proceed but an opportunity to build capacity, discuss the draft and refine its content so that it is available as a planning tool when the opportunity presents itself. (Bond, 2007: 3) The situation in Afghanistan in relation to a national education plan was discussed by Sigsgaard (2009:28) who pointed out that “Even if the first plan is not entirely accurate, or its targets unrealistic, it is, nevertheless, desirable to have a tangible document which can later be edited and revised.” As the LFM is preceded by a project design exercise impacted by multiple stakeholders the circumstances are likely to change, especially if there is a time lag. Those involved must continue to contribute throughout the process if the project is to succeed. Once a draft has been agreed and the project funded practitioners should avoid using the matrix as a blueprint through which to exert external control over the project. The matrix should not be considered the only means of planning and monitoring a project but rather a means to an end not an end in itself. (Bond, 2007:1) The intention must be to treat the matrix as a presentational
summary that is kept it clear and concise. In this way it is possible to refine and revise the matrix as new information comes to light. (AusAID, 2005:4). The matrix provides a means of evaluating the output of a project and hence its impact by specifying the means of verification. As an example success could be verified by records showing that legislation is promulgated with attendant regulations and is introduced and accepted by the stakeholders and beneficiaries within a specified period. The LFM can provide such data at the micro level also. An indicator of a project’s success could be determined when a person trained in an employable skill earned a living wage within a specified period following course completion.

3.7 Conclusions

Within the context of this thesis the use of the LFA is considered appropriate as a vehicle to involve all the stakeholders in identifying and setting a suitable timetable for earlier introduction of a coordinated national E&SD system. At the policy level such a framework would make it clear to donors where technical assistance is needed. The priority projects should build capacity at the national level to assist governments in the area of policy development. By including the Government in the process of developing a programme within which a number of projects are identified to address these issues the Government would be aware of the futility of simply declaring its intention by issuing a political statement. Such statements require that any policy is in fact legislated and supported with regulations and that these regulations are supported further with adequate financial means to accomplish the goals of the policy.

This in turn requires that there be a means to measure the impact of the projects based on the original goal and project purpose. A checklist should be prepared that seeks to clarify and explain the process each institution/individual would follow to identify the area in which each contributed, or continues to contribute, to the formulation and implementation of the national E&SD system. The LFM model and checklist would provide a transparent and dynamic tool to assess the extent of use and understanding of existing research and related publications. The content, when owned by the participants, would assist in determining the manner in which the post-conflict E&SD system evolves. By following the processes described would be possible to develop the model based on grounded experience.
CHAPTER FOUR

DOCUMENTARY, POLICY & SITUATION ANALYSIS

4.1 Documentation scope

The various forms of literature covered with some degree of depth in this research in relation to Afghanistan linked to E&SD issues spans the period from 1987 to 2010. However the majority of the data has been generated by various international and several local sources commencing in 1998. This is due in part to the fact that little information in written form of an E&SD nature survived the extended period of conflict. It was either burned as fuel in the winters or the purged during the Taliban regime. Many senior officials have either left the country or have retired during the last 30 years. Several requests were made in mid-2003 by ILO for a written summary of the E&SD system covering the previous 25 years from senior officials of the MOLSAMD. This resulted in less than adequate information, due in part to the difficulties of working in a second language and the inherent lack of a professional capacity within the ministry to prepare even the most basic technical documentation.

4.2 Afghanistan Employment and Skills Development system

The characteristics of any E&SD system, the institutionalized labour market structures and the type of training programmes delivered, are all related to the dominant forms of production and services found within a country’s economy (Ashton, Sung & Turbin, 2000). In Afghanistan a loosely formed system was operating in the modern sector of the economy prior to 1979. It was managed centrally and provided training for low-level value-added forms of production and for workers in industrial and service occupations at skilled and sub-professional levels. In a paper obtained from a senior Afghan academic residing in the UK it was indicated that the network of MoES technical institutions prior to 1979 included several agricultural training centers functioning in rural locations to assist that sector to improve the quality of crops, livestock, fisheries, forestry and poultry. (Baha,2003:6). However this paper also explained that labour supply was linked, but very loosely to the immediate needs of selected urban modern sector employers and the public service. The system was not targeted directly to other economic sectors and hence did not need to respond to
widespread unemployment or to wider implications of “employability” of the Afghan labour force.

Some six months after the Bonn Agreement of December 2001 a general consensus among participants from the Government concerning the need for a concerted and coordinated approach to the issue of E&SD was reached. At that time the UN agencies were requested to reaffirm, strengthen and implement their commitment to assist with the rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction of Afghanistan. However, almost seven years later the concept of an integrated E&SD programme appears to have been ignored. The existing programme did not extend in a national sense to provide any significant training for other important economic sectors. There were employment service offices in place but these were seen as a means of registering unemployed and recording vacancies within the public service plus managing the benefits programme for public servants and state-owned enterprises. This was not considered as part of a broader framework of labour market information (LMI) and analysis (LMA) or linked as a component of any national effort to match supply with demand. Until 2007 with the advent of the IANDS the idea of integrated and hence coordinated post-conflict E&SD system would also appear to have been alien to the Government.

The delay in addressing these interlinked E&SD issues has significant economic and social ramifications. The NSD&MLP, originally conceived as a stand-alone intervention was included as a component of the WB’s far more comprehensive Afghanistan Skills Development Project (ASDP). (WB, 2008) This has contributed further to refining of the roles of each of the major ministries, namely MOE and MOLSAMD, who have now agreed on a common approach to TVET and skills development provision. The MOE has a Technical and Vocational Education and Training Department (TVET) responsible for post-grade nine level vocational education in 45 centres throughout the country (WB, 2008:2) The delay of seven years in reaching a publicly agreed consensus on responsibility for a discrete part of a national E&SD system by each ministry could well be attributed in part to the absence at a much earlier stage of an agreed E&SD system model that could be comprehended by decision makers. Given the documentation reviewed the conclusion reached was that E&SD was not considered early enough nor was it considered as sufficiently important as a
pathway to increasing income generating opportunities or as an essential element to promote stability and peace.

ILO’s guidelines (ILO, 1998:para.64-67) and those of others (ADB, 2004:25, Anderlini & El Bushra, 2004:1, UNHCR, 1998:2, WB, 2004:2) who have in-house units publishing documents addressing post-conflict issues, appear to have largely been ignored by government organizations. Nor do they appear to have influenced the actions of those international practitioners given the responsibility to implement technical assistance on their behalf. Each of these documents, prepared by the relevant organizations, make the point that the distinction between a conflict and post-conflict situation is always unclear and recommends early intervention, even whilst hostilities continue if feasible, to gather information on the labour market, the skills gap and the training needs of special groups to match potential demand.

4.3 Relevant definitions

The descriptions and definitions provided in the literature reviewed and used in discussions with key personnel often creates confusion in the minds of those conducting research in the area of E&SD (de Moura Castro, 2000:16). There are also various and different philosophical positions as to what these definitions mean in the minds of those interpreting legislation, policies and regulations in different ministries of the Afghanistan Government. The literature that provides definitions in the field of skills development is tailored to particular national circumstances (NCVER 2000, TESDA Act 1994: sect. 4). In Afghanistan such definitions require further clarification. Reference to key documents reviewed shows a number of variations in interpretation. (Afghanistan Government, 2004a, 2004b, 2004c) The differing perceptions of various key staff in these ministries, i.e. MOE, MOHE and MOLSAMD also highlight this fact.

4.4 Contemporary documentation

An initial review of materials that refer to policies and contributions of international agencies including development banks, international bilateral donors and non-government organizations revealed that most contemporary reports, whilst useful as data may not be classified as genuine research, more as position papers. Those that meet the criteria as scientific papers are empirically oriented. Of the number of significant papers
available that could be classified as scientific research, focus is on the analysis of the reasons for the conflict. Some react seriously to economic issues but do not extend the discourse to solving urgent and immediate E&SD problems (Carbonnier, 1998, Fujimura: 2004a, ILO, 2002).

According to Zeeuw (2001:12) there is no doubt that any macro-level issue, including the treatment of the labour market, is critical in a post-conflict context but addressing this in a linear fashion, i.e. as part of a continuum has been discredited. By doing so planners frequently ignore the plight of the general population. A number of solutions need to be available simultaneously and in the short term to directly assist them as they lack knowledge of and access to income generating opportunities (ADB, 2005: 12). The post-conflict period, especially in Afghanistan is far from a chronological series of events. Peace has been followed by recurring violence within and between communities. 23 “War modifies the behavior of private agents, both firms and households, due to the increased uncertainty and survival strategies developed during the conflict.” The rebuilding of national infrastructure requires trained skilled personnel to be available locally throughout the country. Carbonnier (2004, 302-303) lists a number of common features found in such situations and key among them is “a dramatic lack of skilled manpower”. Whilst employees may not be available with the levels of skill expected by the international community, there are sufficiently skilled people available on the labour market that are seeking work and can contribute immediately. The questions that those offering technical assistance within the international community should ask is: “Where did the skilled work force come from to build the original infrastructure”? Were there a sufficient number of skilled workers originally? If not why not, and if so, what was a living wage? If their skills were sufficient to earn a living wage then what is the difference in level of skill needed now to earn of living wage? Inappropriate or insufficient levels of employable skills and a lack of access to income following the peace accord can contribute to instability. Criminal activity is likely to increase due in part to lack of income-earning opportunities coupled with the uncertain security climate (ILO: 1998:6).

Employers can access labour in the construction sector in urban areas. Locally trained skilled workers gather at various collection points in and around major towns and cities at mosques and other well-known locations. They are daily paid, have basic tools and

are available for work with contractors. In addition there is an informal network of patronage among ethnic groups who pass on work to their kin. A series of employment centres supported with technical assistance from ILO are operational in major towns but at the time of writing were still developing linkages with employers and training providers. Some projects conducted by NGOs and financially supported by the NSD&MLP are required, as a contract obligation, to offer job placement assistance as a part of their programme. This service, as a contract obligation, was not linked to the MOLSAMD’s Employment Service Centre project.

4.5 General documentation

The literature review was undertaken in an attempt to identify and analyze what has been documented in the area of E&SD in post-conflict Afghanistan and other countries affected by civil and international war. The aim was to determine whether there is support for, and if it is feasible to intervene earlier, using a generic model of an E&SD system. The assumption was that if an E&SD system is designed to react quickly to the needs of the conflict-affected and at the same time take account of the wider social, economic and political context, that this would accelerate social cohesion, and promote a more stable environment upon which to build a sustainable peace.

The review provided a means of assessing the extent to which the available data addressed the need for rapid action in post-conflict countries to (re) introduce a sound, appropriate and relevant E&SD system. A system of vocational and technical schools under the MoES was in place prior to 1979. Training focused on industrial, commercial and some agricultural areas. This was continued during the Russian occupation and the centrally controlled administration assured most graduates of positions in the public service. MOLSAMD provided short skills development courses, usually in temporary facilities at district and provincial level to meet local demand. Neither ministry coordinated with each other. There was, and still as of 2009, no unified system of certification for students/trainees entering the workforce from any training provider.

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24 This section is an extension of the earlier literature review undertaken in 2005. The content of the documents cited have been added to, reviewed, and, the observations made based on experiences in similar conflict-affected countries.
A number of bilateral and international institutions have published on issues related to improving the delivery of humanitarian and development assistance. Within the UN system humanitarian assistance is usually carried out by UNHCR and the International Office of Migration (IOM). They address repatriation and reintegration issues as a core concern. This is carried out by a range of institutions including the UN, bilateral donors and NGOs. The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD/WB) has a large number of documents related to the post-conflict situation. Many of them are reports that focus on a particular aspect such as international responses to civil war, development economics, disarmament, demobilization, reconstruction strategies with the community development aspects such as civil dispute settlement, land tenure and basic health with education and E&SD having relatively low priority.

In a document on the effects of conflict on a community, Collier et. al. (2003:161) described the situation of returning ex-combatants to their home districts. It was explained that a return to crime and violence was highly likely “…because some soldiers had lost their skills for other activities, or indeed, if they were recruited as child soldiers they may never have had any other skills. Of particular concern is the danger …that demobilised soldiers will turn to violent crime”. Furthermore “Their time in the military may have provided them with skills and equipment for violence and desensitized them to its use”. Where there were concentrations of this group they “…significant and substantially increased local crime rates”. It is at this point that there are gaps in the literature as the E&SD aspect is frequently relegated to a sub-set of the education system or even ignored as a separate entity. A search of this document did not locate any reference to the key words of this research topic.

An excellent paper, well researched and providing an excellent bibliography by Rubin, Hamay & Stoddard (2005, pp 44-49) focuses on Afghanistan. It describes some of the macro level issues the country faces and, according to the conclusions drawn; the country will continue to face for a number of years. It was concluded that there is lack of capacity of the Government level to sustain the institutions currently being built with foreign capital. The paper outlines the situation where these institutions will require funding, staffing and on-going capacity-building, including the period after the Bonn Agreement was signed. Legislation and strategies for implementation have to be
developed and, as existing institution building to date has not been participatory, some initiatives may fail. The paper further points out that analysis of the lack of capacity of the civil service in Afghanistan was not undertaken in a professional manner in Afghanistan and hence the results of the analysis were inconclusive. Appointments in some instances are known to be based on tribal affiliation rather than technical or political experience and qualifications. The impact of poorly prepared public servants seriously affects the management and operation of any public service. Again it is noted that there was no direct reference to the provision of an E&SD system or network.

A third work by ILO, (1998:37) provides a very practical outline containing a section on TVET that includes the post-conflict situation as it impacts E&SD. It is described in clear and unambiguous terms. The recommendation is to train for demand using local community resources rather than in locations where established training facilities exist. Furthermore the text includes a draft policy for ILO’s consideration and application in post-conflict countries. However the extent to which this can be implemented, given the tardiness of donors, the in-fighting for resources between ministries and the lack of experience and vision of those delivering technical assistance requires further analysis (ILO, 1998:51).

4.7 National documentation

With respect to the provision of a national E&SD system, with or without a national coordination body, the absence of substantial and comparable literature and data especially that generated by the Government on this topic, suggests that there are still major impediments to realizing E&SD coordination. Whether this lack of national data and research was, until now due to the timid, parochial and somewhat risk-averse attitudes of the international donor and development bank community, or the lack of capacity of the Government to conduct research into matters related to E&SD is unclear from the research. However it is evident that there is reluctance on the part of the government to move forward until they are comfortable with the technical and financial implications of a national E&SD approach. This could have been due to the lack of clarity and flexibility, the entrenched attitudes and resultant policies and practices of the international agencies and NGOs offering technical assistance.
4.8 Coordinating international aid

Initially assistance for post-conflict countries concentrates on the areas of humanitarian aid, providing security for those who remain in or have returned to their communities, those who are internally displaced and those who are refugees from another country. This is linked then to development aid providing technical assistance across various economic sectors. At this point the organization and introduction of any post-conflict intervention by international agencies and NGOs requires an intimate knowledge of the country’s social structure, its culture, geo-political aspects, and religious fervour. This is especially relevant in the case of Afghanistan, with additional complications caused by the internal multi-cultural/linguistics and demographic of the population, the different sects within the Muslim religion, the affinities of some border tribes with international neighbours and the traditional trading practices and markets that ignore internationally determined state borders. Furthermore some technical assistance providers do not have their activities linked to the government’s policies nor do they have budgets linked to the central budget (Sinno, 2008:254).

Added to this is the situation where it is difficult for the beneficiary government ministry to understand the conflicting political interests of donors (van Gennip, 2005: para.62). Collier & Hoeffler (2002:1) in an analysis of the efficacy of development aid point out that the money for post-conflict countries is from the overall development budget of donors. It is unusual to see additional funds for relief and as a result it is more likely existing donors reschedule existing allocations. Any additional funds entering the country are therefore unlikely in the short term. An exception could be where there is a large Diaspora community who remit funds to assist. That is to say that the pool of international resources is finite – that when there are multiple conflicts occurring internationally donors may simply divert development funds from one area to another. Because of this countries emerging from conflict suffer a double jeopardy, i.e. the intended for earlier and planned technical assistance money is used in a relatively short period to recover or regain the level of security in place prior to the conflict and as this takes time the original purpose of the technical assistance is excessively delayed.
4.9 Impact of international aid

In Afghanistan little of the above sequence of events had any direct affect. The Soviet occupation of 1979 was continuing and having devastating consequences for the general population. Originally a net exporter of food the Government had to import vast quantities to feed the population. The costs of importing essential food items had also risen considerably due to fuel prices. The country was being occupied by Soviet forces intent of securing the borders and ensuring that the national government was pro-USSR. Western powers however were concerned with stabilizing their economies. Aid to Afghanistan was minimal during this period, especially from the international community and with the exception of several international NGOs gallant efforts little was done to assist the Afghan people. The “cold war” had arrived in South Asia and the influence of the USA on the war was being felt by the Soviet forces when the CIA provided funds for more sophisticated weapons to Mujahidin forces. 25 This was accomplished through the Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence. (Rasanayagam, 2003:104, Saikal, 2004:223) The turning point in the Soviet occupation was the USA's supply of Stinger missiles capable of destroying the Hind helicopter-gunship. By 1989 the Soviets had agreed on an exit strategy, one that was surreptitiously negotiated with the USA, and left Afghanistan in a complete shambles. (Tanner, 2002: 270)

4.10 Sources of technical assistance

The following summarizes the major sources of technical assistance offered to the Government of Afghanistan. There are a huge number of programmes/projects in place. Finding specific details of those related to the focus of this thesis, i.e. employment and skills development is fraught with problems as agencies have unique formats making searches and comparisons of data difficult to source, code and present. As a means of describing the sources the following groupings are described. Details of selected programmes and projects can be reviewed in Appendix D.

4.10.1 Development Banks

The ADB is a key source of technical assistance with a portfolio of US$1,297 million for the period 2008 to 2013 and is directing its resources toward energy, national resource management, governance and finance.

The International Development Association (IDA) focus is on skills development, education, microfinance, transport and public sector accounting and auditing plus of public sector projects to assist in building capacity. The IDA considers this situation as critical when rebuilding the public service. The single most important programme from their portfolio from the E&SD perspective is their support of through the ASDP which amounts to US$ 20 million.

4.10.2 The European Commission.

The Commission has pledged US$1.210 million over a 6 year period commencing in 2008 to support the EU Country Strategy Paper[1]. The EU has proposed three focal and three non-focal support areas. Primarily they intend to focus on rural development, governance and health, whilst social protection, mine action and regional cooperation will form the second group. 26

4.10.3 Bilateral agencies. 27

The USA as a bilateral is the largest donor providing two thirds of all total aid assistance. This assistance commenced in 2002 and has disbursed US$ 3.4 billion to 2008. In fiscal year 2008/2009 this planned to increase to US$ 5.1 billion with a further US$12.338 billion being committed until 2013. A large number of USAid programmes and projects are currently being implemented across all sectors of the economy. 28

27 Official development assistance that takes place between a donor country and a recipient country. Retrieved from www.bized.co.uk/virtual/dc/resource/glos1.htm
28 Retrieved from www.usaid.gov/press/factsheets/2008/fs080327.html. The complexity of the USAid programme makes it difficult to precisely determine the individual projects that directly impact E&SD. However most have a skills development component. Whether those skills lead to sustained employment is not known.
4.10.4 Other major bilateral donors

An Aide-Memoire was prepared for a conference in 2004 that outlined the various bilateral models used by a number of additional donors supporting countries in transition. The paper explained the various approaches taken under several headings.

First were those who have earmarked “transition funds”. Denmark provides funds “…to developing countries undergoing a period of adaptation or reconstruction”. The Netherlands has a Dutch Stability Fund for “…rapid, flexible support activities at the interface between peace, security and development” and Norway’s Transition Budget Line “…is intended to address gaps in transition situations in which neither humanitarian assistance not long-term development co-operation measures are in place”.

A second group who broaden the approach to aid and technical assistance include Australia who “…support the concept …that transition planning should commence concurrently with emergency/humanitarian assistance”. Belgium too directs aid “…towards preventative, emergency and short-term rehabilitation aid”. Finland offers humanitarian assistance funds for a maximum of one year. Finland is not involved in conflict environments. The Federal Foreign Office of the German Government launched a Crisis Prevention and Conflict Transformation Program together with its technical co-operation agency, the GTZ to”…raise awareness about the interrelation between development co-operation and conflict and to enhance the potential for development co-operation…””. The Italian government’s approach is that it “…humanitarian assistance should never be confined to the mere provision of relief to victims of a catastrophe or humanitarian crisis”. It operates in collaboration with the UN to provide transition funds. The Swedish approach seeks to “…minimize the risk of gaps between relief and development in two ways”. First it supports the UN and NGOs with funds to “…easily bridge their activities in a given transition setting”. Secondly through a system of flexible budget lines “…both humanitarian and development budgets can fund transition activities”. The Swiss approach to transition is to “…consolidate(s) short-term assistance and long-term development by jointly planning and coordinating its use of development resources”. There are also Swiss programming instruments developed by the Federal Directorate of Political Affairs “…in order to contribute to the prevention of violence, the settlement of conflicts and the consolidation of peace”.
The final cluster of countries is categorized as hybrid in that they have various earmarked funds within their national budget that can impact transitional programming. Canada’s approach is through three separate sources. The Canadian International Development Agency and the Human Security Program from Foreign Affairs and International Trade have budgets to assist in transition. There is also a Land Mines Initiative plus individual country level funding available for post-conflict countries. In 1999 Japan established a Trust Fund for Human Security. The objective “…is to support projects implemented by UN agencies that address threats to human lives, livelihoods and dignity”. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs provides (i) Emergency Grant Aid, (ii) Grant assistance for Grassroots Human Security Projects and (iii) Grant Aid for Conflict Prevention and Peace Building. The Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) provides in-country technical assistance. The United Kingdom established a Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department within the Department for International Development (DFID). To facilitate and coordinate the UK’s contribution to transitional issues Conflict Prevention Pools were established. They are “…jointly administered by the Ministry of Defense, the Department for International development the Foreign and Commonwealth Office”. The intention was to provide joint analysis, financing and coordination. The United States of America approached these issues through the Office of Transition Initiatives located within USAid. The Office “…is designed to assist peaceful and democratic change in countries recently initiated, or are expected to soon be initiating, a transition. The Office provides “… support for conflict prevention as well as increasingly sustainable post-conflict reconstruction assistance”. 29 The following Table 2 summarizes the amounts involved to 2008.

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### Table Two

**Overseas Development Assistance pledges for the ANDS 2008 - 2013**  
(in US$ million)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Fiscal Year</th>
<th>08/09</th>
<th>09/10</th>
<th>10/11</th>
<th>11/12</th>
<th>12/13</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>2,500</td>
<td>1,840</td>
<td>1,895</td>
<td>1,971</td>
<td>2,049</td>
<td>10,255</td>
<td>39.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAid</td>
<td>1,586</td>
<td>1,509</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>1,037</td>
<td>1,037</td>
<td>6,169</td>
<td>23.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>1,512</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADB</td>
<td>227</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1,297</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>229</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1,120</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WB</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>291</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>1,207</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>218</td>
<td>1,092</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>881</td>
<td>3.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>2.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>675</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>128</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sth. Korea</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total US$</td>
<td>6,555</td>
<td>5,549</td>
<td>4,945</td>
<td>4,557</td>
<td>4,603</td>
<td>26,209</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


### 4.10.5 Non-Government Organizations

These can be classified as national or international. The total number varies depending on the source. However it is known to be in excess of 1500. Within that number 20 International and 150 national organizations have had their licenses revoked by the President because they did not report six-monthly on their activities as required by law. (UNOCA: 2010) The impact of this decision on E&SD has yet to be measured.

(a) **National:** These NGOs provide a valuable, though not always measurable service to communities. They are funded by a wide range of sources, frequently operate in locations that are considered too difficult for the UN or the bigger bilateral donors and because of their longer-term commitment usually have the advantage of language proficiency.
(b) **International:** The significance of the contribution of this group requires careful evaluation, especially with regard to the subject of this thesis. They are frequently seen as surrogates of the ministry they are attached to. They have often been in a country for a number of years, have weathered political and civil unrest and devoted huge amounts of time and energy to provide their target groups goods and services they would otherwise have gone without. In some cases they have national networks of facilities and close connections to the communities in which they are located.

### 4.10.6 United Nations agencies

There are 19 UN agencies established in Afghanistan. They are currently being overseen by the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) whose mandate expires in early 2011. Those with the potential to significantly contribute to the development and implementation of an E&SD system are ILO, UNESCO, UNHCR, UNIDO and UNICEF. In most cases these agencies traditionally rely on funds from other sources for major programmes/projects and are frequently criticized as being unable to respond rapidly to the needs in a post-conflict environment.

### 4.11 Regional perspective.

There are a number of regional bodies formed by governments and the international community that focus on the general area of skills development. A review of the literature revealed that there are no specific activities focused on post-conflict employment and training issues. Some suggested that training should be geared to employment opportunities but the linking of ministries and the eventual coordination between them to integrate E&SD is not obvious. Each of the following delivers training in some form or other to countries in the region.

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4.11.1 The Colombo Plan Staff College for Technician Education (CPSC) activities include training, research & development and consultancy in the areas of management of TVE systems, research, etc. and other emerging thrusts in TVE. A review of their website did not however reveal any information related specifically to E&SD in a post-conflict environment. 31

4.11.2. The Asia Pacific Skills Development Programme (APSDEP) was hosted by ILO’s Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific (ROAP) in Bangkok. This programme had not taken the lead on the issue of E&SD in any of the conflict-affected countries in the region, preferring to wait until there is a more stable security and political situation for them to provide projects having providing more traditional solutions. It has been replaced by the Regional Skills and Employability Programme in Asia Pacific. This new programme has not addressed post-conflict as a theme. 32

4.11.3. The Korean Research Institute for Vocational Education and Training (KRIVET). A review of the programme did not identify any reference to research or activities that would contribute to a better understanding of E&SD issues in post-conflict situations. 33 The Korean Human Resource Development Service facility has no programmes offering E&SD activities to countries emerging from war. 34

4.11.4. The Southeast Asian Ministers for Education Organization (SEAMEO) Regional Centre for Vocational and Technical Education (VOCTECH) located in Brunei has an extensive programme in support of vocational training but nothing was found that would contribute to the debate on E&SD in post-conflict countries. 35

4.11.5. The United Nations University Japan (UNU) conducts courses related to post-conflict issues. In a review of the programme between 1999 and 2009 five six week sessions have been offered as follows:

- 2005 Armed conflict: Prevention management and resolution
- 2007 Armed conflict and peace keeping

33 Retrieved from http://eng.krivet.re.kr/eng/ec/prg_euCAADs.jsp
34 Retrieved from www.sivat.or.kr
The course outline mentions the need for DDR but does not include direct reference to the issues discussed in this thesis.  


It is incumbent upon those offering technical assistance to acknowledge the existence of legal instruments that are in place both nationally and enforceable through international conventions. To ignore these instruments is likely to create unnecessary problems with the bureaucracy. As it is difficult to analyze legislation and any regulations related to E&SD without this sound theoretical underpinning, this section is intended to describe what is currently in place in Afghanistan that needs to form the basis for the introduction of a responsive, flexible and appropriate national E&SD system. The legal framework existing in Afghanistan that forms the basis for any existing government policy on E&SD is explained, albeit in general terms, in the following documents.

4.12.1 The Afghan Constitution (2004). This contains references to employment and training. Article 46 requires the state to establish and operate higher, general and vocational education. The citizens of Afghanistan also can establish higher, general, and vocational private educational institutions and literacy courses with the permission of the state. The state can also permit foreign persons to set up higher, general and vocational educational private institutes in accordance with the law. The conditions for admission to state higher education institutions and other related matters are regulated by the law. See Ch. 2, Art. 24. Article 48 states that employment is the right of every Afghan. Law regulates working hours, paid holidays, right of employment and employee, and other related affairs. See Article Ch. 2, Art. 26.

4.12.2 The Afghan Labour Code (ALC). The 1987 version reflected a western and traditional approach in the articles it contained in respect of the employment and training of workers. This version of the ALC has been at the centre of recent discussions (2003 - 2005) between the ILO and the Government and is due to be reviewed by a tripartite committee, following national general elections (Fujimura, 2004b: 3). An offer by the ILO to assist in preparing a new draft ALC was also resisted by the MOLSAMD in 2004, due in part to the confusion concerning the funding of other ILO activities related to skills development. In 2006 the Government did prepare an

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36 Retrieved from http://isp.unu.edu/capacity/ic/
ALC draft with ILO assistance which was tabled at the International Labour Conference of the ILO in Geneva held in June 2007. The version available on-line is an English translation and, if accurate, requires some editing, structural changes and technical adaptation. 37

Chapter Six of the draft 2006 ALC refers to vocational training and skills development of in-service employees. It then provides articles covering employer in-service training and in-plant training centres, the establishment of government and non-government training centres by the MOLSAMD, training conditions, wages and linkages to the national employment services network. The order and wording of the 2006 text is not logical and is certainly in need of editing and further clarification. In respect to the chapters in both texts, i.e. the 1987 and 2006 versions, on vocational training and skills development there were few changes. The latest version has varied the wording of some definitions, e.g. “the Office” in 1987 has been changed to “the Organization” in the 2006 version when describing “All state and mixed enterprises, administrations and institutes, social organizations, co-operatives as well as private enterprises …”. The inclusion of Article 80 requiring those workers who avail themselves of Organization-sponsored further higher education may be contentious. It explains that an employee who receives paid further education paid by the employer is obliged to “…work for the same organization after the completion of his/her studies based on a contract, or …. he/she will have to pay more than the amount spent for his/her education by the organization”. It is also vague as it mentions that the amount to be reimbursed in “more” than that expended by “the Organization”. The Government requires technical assistance to prepare the regulations that are needed to implement such a stipulation.

The need for LMI, the basis for determining where the jobs are and the training gap, has been highlighted by a number of articles (Fujimura, 2004a: pp25—26 & Date-Bar, 2003:62, 2005: p5 & p23). The absence of capacity within the Government to conduct a regular and systematic national LM survey and analyze the data for planning purposes is also a concern (Fujimura, 2004a: 25). Attempts in late 2007 by the LMIA Unit of MOLSAMD to conduct a labour market study were constrained by the lack of reliable

37 It has not been possible to establish whether the ALC draft has been approved by ILO or agreed by the Government at the time of preparing this document. See also www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex_browse.details?p_lang=en&p_country=AFG&p_classification=0 1.02&p_origin=COUNTRY&p_sortby=SORTBY_COUNTRY
The narrow focus of skills development offered through the NSD&LM project had a built in mechanism that required those receiving contracts to provide skills development to generate LM data as a precondition for funding. Other donors, development banks, government agencies and enterprises may require more specialized and focused data. The LMI unit within the MOLSAMD should have been adequately staffed and trained to manage that process to ensure that data was collected, analyzed and presented in a common format to ensure that it could be fed into a national data base. This would also allow the data to be linked to the census data of the Central Statistics Office (CSO). The services of the ILO to provide technical assistance to conduct a fully-fledged labour market survey was offered but rejected by the MOLSAMD as being too expensive.

### 4.12.3 International Labour Organization Conventions

Afghanistan is a signatory to fifteen ILO conventions, some of which have relevance to the E&SD activity. The Human Resources Development Recommendation 150 and its attendant Convention 142 of 1975 has been updated by Recommendation 195 in 2004 to take account of contemporary developments in the human resource development field. The content of each document is intended to guide signatories in the formulation of their policies and practices. In the case of Afghanistan there was no evidence that the...
Government was aware of this ILO Recommendation or that it had been referred to as a source for policy development or in relation to formulating projects.  

4.12.4 **The Bonn Agreement.** This document was an agreement to provide a temporary government structure during the transition period whilst a new constitution was being developed. It was signed in Germany in December 2001. The mention in annexes of the role of the United Nations during this period urged them, along with the international community, donors and multilateral organizations to reaffirm, strengthen and implement their commitment to assist in the rehabilitation, recovery and reconstruction of Afghanistan in coordination with the Interim Authority (paragraph. 2, Annex III). This Agreement was superseded with the finalization of the Constitution in 2004. Elections for the President was followed by lower house elections in September 2005.  

4.12.5 **Afghanistan Compact**

In a meeting held in January 2006 the Compact was formulated. It “…is the result of consultations between the Government of Afghanistan and the United Nations and the international community and establishes a mechanism for the coordination of Afghan and international efforts over the next five years”. A Joint Monitoring and Coordination Board (JCMB) was also established made up of key institutions to monitor the benchmarks in both the Compact and the ANDS. (Afghanistan Compact 2006, 5, ACBAR, 2007:5).

4.12.6 **Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS)**

The ANDS is described in a comprehensive document and has evolved over a number of years. It consists of three pillars. The interim version was issued in 2006 [1385] and was used by various ministries to guide then in the development of strategies to implement various programmes and projects.

The final version of ANDS issued in 2008 [1387] covers five years to 2013 [1391] and was presented by President Hamid Karzai as “…an Afghan-owned blueprint for the development of Afghanistan in all spheres of human endeavor… will help us in achieving the Afghanistan Compact benchmarks in the Millennium Development

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Goals”. (ANDS, 2008: v). ANDS was developed with the participation of provincial governments. Provincial Development Plans have been integrated as a means of ensuring development that meets local needs. ANDS is structured in pillars with Security being the primary concern followed by, Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights and lastly Economic and Social Development. The order of the key sectors within the pillars, in terms of priorities is explained in some detail with security being predominant followed by Infrastructure. Economic and Social Development includes Education. Skills development is subsumed within education, is ranked by third and employment fourth after agriculture and security (ANDS, 2008, 23 Table 2.4).

However these are Provincial Government-led priorities. International organizations, including UN specialized agencies, having a long-term commitment to assisting these post-conflict countries can utilize this document to develop suitable medium to long-term strategies to ensure they can provide technical assistance at the earliest possible time.

For the purposes of this study the various inputs from relevant ministries to the ANDS were coded and analyzed to establish whether there are data that demonstrate the linkages between E&SD activities and the programmes/projects put in place. The analysis also included coding to determine the source of the funding, the implementing agency, the date duration and number of persons impacted. The same codes were used to review the final document. Little significant differences were noted. The Afghan Compact mentions skills development within the Economic and Social Development pillar as a component of the Education Sector. In the case of E&SD issues, this has resulted in a disjointed and ineffective approach and responsibility for any shortcomings rests squarely with the authors and partners to the ANDS. This includes national government officials, international development banks, bilateral donors, UN agencies and national and international non-government organizations. At the time of the formulation of these National Priority Programmes the ILO did not receive any invitation or participate in formulating the benchmarks attributed to the Afghan Compact or the MOLSAMD’s contribution to ANDS. The NSD&MLP benchmarks are (i) that a human resource study would be completed by end 2006. This was completed in two stages. A secondary sources report was completed in July 2007 and a study of the labour market in urban locations was completed in October 2008 and (ii) that 150,000 would be provided with employable skills training by 2010.
In Kabul in 2006 there were nineteen UN agencies with fully-fledged representatives. The ILO, whilst not shown in this source document was in-country offering technical assistance. Again the case in point, i.e. that issues that impact E&SD, had not been adequately addressed by the ILO. As the specialized agency with the mandate for E&SD and having a number of stand-alone narrowly focused projects in place, had drafted a number of additional projects. However they were unable to attract finance from either the UNDP on a grant basis or development banks or bilateral donors to undertake this type of technical assistance.

4.13 Technical framework of E&SD.

Within the Government there are several ministries conducting skills development courses. Key among them is Education (MOE), Higher Education (MOHE) and MOLSAMD covering both the linkages to E&SD. All were competing for the same resources during the post-conflict period. This competitiveness was caused in part by previous experience where there was an overlapping of responsibilities between ministries. This was partially caused by existing and often outdated legislation and interpretations of various regulations. Definitions of the terms vocational education and vocational training were used interchangeably and in a number of countries still are. (Afghanistan Government, 2004 d: 7) In Afghanistan MOE, MOHE and MOLSAMD because of the lack of clarity on definitions, can legitimately claim to cover the complete skills development field. A further contributing reason causing delays in reaching a consensus on the way forward is that donors, who have considerable influence with the Ministry of Finance, wish to see clear and unambiguous evidence that their funds are not going to be squandered. Whilst acknowledging that in a post-conflict situation there will always be an element of risk, this type of implied conditionality is not realistic in the post-conflict situation.

4.14 E&SD integration

Conceptualizing, designing, introducing, building long-term capacity, ensuring tripartite involvement to install an appropriate E&SD system, whether it extends to public, and private or enterprise-based institutions requires commitment by all stakeholders within Afghanistan. For the MOLSAMD an estimate of US$ 20 million was been earmarked

for donor funding. However more important is the capacity of public servants in positions of authority to absorb the changes that will result when changes are introduced. Without a serious attempt by the Government through an enabling policy framework and the means to regulate such policies by the public service, the restoration of confidence and hence investment in the private sector necessary in the immediate post war environment will take much longer to establish. The ambivalence of UN agencies to appoint adequately experienced and committed staff to assist and advise on the way forward in building a sustainable E&SD sector, is also a concern. Again it is noted that NGOs are expected to fill the gap with poorly developed training courses that are not centrally coordinated. Whilst it has been highlighted in earlier documents as an urgent and immediate need (ILO, 1998:5) here has, to date, been little attention in the literature given to the problems related to the establishment of sound and integrated E&SD. The literature assumes in many cases that the intervention of the Government supported by international technical assistance will ameliorate the hardships of the population because this level of intervention brings all the experience and knowledge required (Date-Bah, 2003: 58). This needs to be reviewed in light of recent experiences in a number of post-conflict countries.

4.15  Employment & Skills Development conceptual framework

A conceptual model of a typical national E&SD system can be developed to ground the contributions of the major stakeholders. Donors would then be able to identify areas that are in line with their country or source of funding preferences. The model that follows is, based on the experience gained over the last decade in similar situations. It contains and wide range of typical components that need to be factored in when evaluating national E&SD systems. It can describe those components already in place. The format is an aid in identifying those that require strengthening plus highlights those to be introduced. It guides decision-makers in prioritizing future technical assistance. At the conceptual stage it is best drawn up in the form of a mind-map. (Hart, 1988:157: figure 6.10)

41 In the last five years the ILO’s office in Kabul has had five officers’ in charge, each from completely different technical backgrounds and with different nationalities.
UNESCO conceptualizes the non-formal education sector as being bifurcated into life skills and productive skills. It furthermore describes the responsibilities in respect of skills development between the MOE and MOLSAMD stating that “…while the Ministry of Education will continue to play a strong role in technical and vocational education, MOLSAMD will be the lead Ministry”. (Deyo, 2007: 4) Other ministries that offer technical and vocational education include the Ministry of Women’s Affairs, the Ministry of Transport and Aviation, the Ministry of Water and Power Supply, the Ministry of Telecommunication and the Ministry of Culture, Information and Tourism. Additional ministries that incorporate non-formal education initiatives into their ongoing efforts include the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock; Ministry of Commerce; the Ministry of Narcotics; the Ministry of Public Health; and the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation & Development.” (Deyo, 2007:4) This source defines and describes the roles and responsibilities of government ministries in respect of the E&SD system. However it demonstrates clearly that those preparing documents do not comprehend the differences or distinguish between education and training. Nor do they recognize that public service occupations and the majority of employees required are determined by the demographics and are relatively stable whilst the private sector is driven by market forces. As a result employees with transferable skills are more likely to be mobile. Whether this will actually be the case in reality remains to be seen.

4.16 National programme overview

The national Public Investment Programme (PIP) was supported and implemented by various international organization representatives who acted as proxies for departments in ministries. For example ILO was linked to the MOLSAMD and UNESCO to the MOE and the MOHE. Meetings were, in the case of the Committee for Education and Training, poorly attended with the host ministry MOLSAMD relying almost entirely on international advisors to conceptualize, prepare discuss and its proposals. To overcome this lethargic situation, sub-committees were formed. One was named the “Vocational Training Advisory Group”. It suffered the same fate, due in part to the fact that international advisors were frequently changed, absent or on recreational leave when the meetings were held. UN officials have a six-week rotation. This is part of the normal contract. Continuity suffers as it makes coordination of meetings and training of counterpart staff difficult and does little to ensure institutional memory when international staff was continuously replaced.
Professional disagreements frequently occurred concerning the expected pace with which the E&SD system was to be established. The degree and rate of change requested by non-technical and mainly expatriate economists advising ministries within the Government appeared unrealistic. The pressure to achieve benchmarks and deadlines within the ANDS was continually stressed by WB staff when placing emphasis on the need to clarify the “end-state” and the need for an “exit strategy”. The author, as a participant observer at these meetings was able to observe the different approaches of the members. In particular the WB was pushing for quantitative data to measure results, i.e. to reach a benchmark of 150,000 trained, including 35 percent women, by the end of 2010 through the National Skills Development and Market Forces project. UNESCO was pushing to have its Technical Schools network strengthened but could not provide any data on skill levels, skill types or staffing. The fact that there were no skills standards, no curricula that reflected contemporary skills needed in the market and no technical teacher training facility did not deter WB and UNESCO/MOE?MOHE from insisting on development an end game scenario. This quantitative approach of the WB ignored the fact that there were thousands of training places in NGO projects operating outside the ambit of the NSD&MLP that were adding to the national skills base. These were uncoordinated and ignored resulting in considerable resource waste and duplication.

4.17 National Priority Programmes (NPPs).

The introduction of the series of NPPs coinciding with the publication of the document entitled “Securing Afghanistan’s Future” was intended to break the nexus between what is doable in a normal technical assistance programme and that found in a post-conflict situation (Afghanistan Government 2004c). The strategy was to raise the level and authority of those involved in the development of priorities. The NPPs that were operational prior to 2004 included (a) The National Emergency Employment Programme (b) The National Solidarity Programme, (c) The Irrigation and Power programme, (d) The Afghanistan Stabilization Programme, (e) The Transportation Programme, (f) The Feasibility Studies programme. The NPPs introduced in 2004 were (a) The National Private Sector Programme, (b) The National Vulnerability Programme,

The above programmes were based on the premise that offers from international sources would be forthcoming but for specific E&SD areas and not for an overall programme. This approach evolved from a series of discussions chaired by the WB, as the behest of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA) who has the mandate to assist and support the government of Afghanistan in its state-building and development efforts, and coordinate and harmonize international assistance to the country. 43

The UN specialized agencies, NGOs and international bilateral aid agencies were repeatedly voicing concerns stressing that there was very weak coordination and confusion among various national and international actors in Afghanistan. Some donors also highlighted the need for improved coordination. Ms Rice, the US Secretary of State, told reporters in Kabul during a visit on 7 February, 2007 that "There are a lot of cooks in the kitchen here; we have a lot of countries that want to help Afghanistan…" adding that the international community needed to have a coherent engagement plan in Afghanistan. In response, Mr. Christopher Alexander, United Nations Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan, said that donors' coordination was best reflected in their unwavering support and commitment to the ANDS - the Afghan blueprint for long-term development - which is currently being implemented. He commented that "Coordination is not perfect, but it is wrong to say that there is no coordination at all. It is easy to dismiss the work of 25 ministries and hundreds of development experts just with a single comment… it's unfair and it diminishes what is an important reality for 25 million people in this country". 44 Also attending these discussions were representatives of the Ministry of Finance (MoF), the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), international and national advisors to the respective government ministers and key deputy ministers.

Experience suggests that some donors prefer to select specific areas from within a larger integrated framework, i.e. women, the disabled, single heads of household, youth etc.,

from within any E&SD programme (Afghanistan Government 2004:5). Those attending were requested to follow-up and to seek confirmation of offers to build/re-equip facilities for various types of skills development activities. With two exceptions, namely Korea and Iran, donors did not commit actual funding. Meanwhile NGOs and some bilateral donors were providing uncoordinated programmes throughout the secure areas in the country. The greater proportion of projects related to E&SD are being accomplished in the northern provinces by bilateral donors and both national and international NGOs. This was due to the improved security there at that time. This was considered by other provinces as unfair. The development activities of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams have the potential to improve this imbalance with projects in other parts of the country. However it was discovered that bringing each of these stand-alone projects into some form of government controlled coordination mechanism was fraught with problems. The NSD&MLP, intended to bring some order to the various uncoordinated E&SD issues. The programme was formally agreed with funding from the WB with implementation commencing in 2007. The nexus was wounded but not broken.

With the reformulation and publication of the final ANDS in 2007, and based on experience gained during the application of the interim version, it was incumbent upon those responsible for the NSD&MLP within the MOLSAMD to adjust and clarify their role in relation to the Ministries of Education (MOE) and Higher Education (MOHE). In fact the ILO, the WB, the MOLSAMD and the Chief Technical Advisor of the ILO implemented NSD&MLP could not reach consensus on the way forward. Within the Government in general and particularly within the MOLSAMD, there was little understanding of the vision and the modalities and structure devised for implementation. This resulted in a dilution of the original NSD&MLP and the projects within it. The ILO wanted to develop a national skills development system to be managed by an autonomous body.

It is at this point, when funds were finally secured, that the head office of ILO became interested. ILO/HQ made a request for over US$ 1 million to conduct a national labour market survey. They expected that this funding would come from the WB allocation. This was resisted by MOLSAMD as being (i) excessively expensive, (ii) a conflict of interest with the NSD&MLP and finally, (iii) surveys were not seen as the role of the ILO but that of the Central Statistics Office (CSO). The result of this struggle for funds
was that MOLSAMD retained control of the labour market information function and continued with a focused LM study based on the needs of priority economic sectors.

The WB had already committed to support the strategy in the ANDS, which placed the function within the education sub-sector of the Economic and Social Development Pillar. The MOE and MOHE did not surrender their role in vocation education and technical education. The ILO’s Chief Technical Advisor, a former NGO employee resigned and continued to work for the MOLSAMD as a contractor.

At a meeting in November 2007 the Deputy Minister of MOLSAMD was reluctant honour an earlier agreement to allow the newly established NSD&MLP to become the nucleus of an autonomous body responsible for an all-inclusive E&SD system. The financial support for the project from the WB being implemented within MOLSAMD played a significant part in this decision. The WB then issued a document in 2008 as a technical annex following further discussions with the key partners involved and this clarified the roles of each in turn. (World Bank, 2008)

4.18 National ownership.

The literature also glosses over, and frequently fails to recognize that the national (as opposed to ministerial) ownership of such E&SD systems is essential if it is to be sustainable, i.e. following the period when there is a reduction and eventual withdrawal of technical assistance from abroad. Independent research has suggested that any future government will be unable to sustain even a simple economic programme, because of the drain on the economy, unless there is a considerable recommitment of financial aid and international technical assistance by the international community (Barnett, Humayan & Stoddart, 2005:pp2-3, United Nations, 2005:11). The post-conflict interventions of the international community, intent on committing, acquitting and evaluating their short-term projects for their respective donors frequently overlook this salient fact. Byrd (2001:3), when providing advice based on international experiences within the IBRD advised against “…putting in place institutional arrangements which will become a problem over the long term”. He further suggested that “Genuine partnerships, both with the Afghan people and the Government and within the international assistance community, are essential”. (Byrd, 2001:4)
Afghanistan, as of this date, has a fledgling employment service but no national skills development system. In 2004 the Government and various short-term international advisors, having put all the procedures and protocols in place, were still discussing the most appropriate location, format and donor for the introduction of a coordinated and relevant programme (Afghanistan Government, 2004b). The stress in the literature on the physical rebuilding of the economy, infrastructure, civil society, food security, the government public service and the focus on a return to an economically stable condition, almost without fail, misses this most important aspect (Zeeuw, 2001:6). A functioning and flexible labour market is an essential prerequisite to any reconstruction programme within a post-conflict economy (Carbonnier, 1998:5, Date-Bah, 2001:35, USAid, 2001:3). The dearth of workers with the necessary skills suited to this post-conflict economic climate and the ambivalence found in relation to the responsibilities for a relevant and supportive E&SD system, added to the confusion during this period.

4.18 Conclusions

Documentation on the past efforts to administer and operate a skills development system is one of a number of an essential tools needed when attempting to reconstruct and advise on the way forward. Institutional memory provides a basis for framing future recommendations. Policy decisions that were made must be understood and legislation and attendant regulations for implementation require close scrutiny. In a post-conflict setting it may not always be possible to reconstruct the past but it should be possible to put together a diagram and a framework suitable for the key participants to confirm how the E&SD system operated and identify who had been responsible for each of the components. Aid and especially international aid, from whom-ever, in what-ever order and what-ever form it takes requires focus if it is to be effective, efficient and relevant to the country’s needs. The sources of technical assistance must be managed in such a way as to ensure they are contributing to national and predetermined policies, and not in fact driving the donor government’s development agenda.

International agreements following a conflict must be recognized as a means to the end of the conflict. They should not affect the longer-term impact of international conventions, national legal instruments and strategies developed to enable the population to return to a situation of stability and peace. These aspects are often sidelined, or ignored by those providing aid in the rush to implement their relatively short-
term well-meaning projects. Such omissions can cause long-term systemic problems for fledgling government structures resulting in confusion, wasted resources and frustration. Unless aid and the technical assistance that it delivers is nationally owned, not just in terms of the process, but with regard to the policies leading to the process, recovery will be longer and more torturous than necessary.
CHAPTER FIVE:

Employment priorities

5.1 Post-conflict employment in context

Employment at all levels is thrown into turmoil in a post-conflict setting as people scramble to earn an income. For the unskilled it is difficult to find any type of income-generating opportunity. Government employment, once a certain source of employment for year twelve graduates in Afghanistan has, in the post-conflict period reduced significantly due to restructuring. Returning refugees are frequently able to obtain work in international aid agencies and private enterprises and international businesses more readily than those who were internally displaced or remained behind during the conflict. This is, in part, because they were able, whilst in internationally supported refugee camps, to receive education and training in modern languages and skills that would be useful on their return in the newly developing contemporary setting. A far more serious issue is the very high levels of remuneration paid by international organizations to national staff. Legislation is in place in Afghanistan for those employed who have been trained to agreed standards to be paid accordingly (ALC, 1987: Article 41, section 2 & Article 45, section 1). However the standards are simply not known nor are those offering courses aware of the requirements. It is unfortunate that there are better opportunities for many returning refugees due to their better skills. They are disliked by those who remained behind and this can turn to violence and crimes against them.

The conditions under which people are engaged in employment, in whatever form or sector of the economy, are many and varied in the immediate post-conflict period. Invariably there is a tremendous amount of damage to private housing, enterprises and public infrastructure. Engaging people in the cleaning up of public places and the restoration of a clean environment is essential and is encouraged. This is in UN parlance classified as “food or cash for work”. It is important as a means of ensuring that as soon as possible there is money circulating in the hands of those who need it.

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45 In 2007 when I was senior coordinator for ILO in Kabul my driver, a refugee for 20 years in Pakistan, had returned with his own vehicle. He rented his vehicle to the ILO, and in addition was earning four times that of the Deputy Minister of Labour.
most; the civilian population. However this cannot be considered as sustainable employment. A medium and longer-term plan should be developed at the earliest possible opportunity.

In Afghanistan the ISAF policy for contracts promoted by the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in the provinces is entitled “Afghan First”. Afghan companies, entrepreneurs and local communities are encouraged to compete for a wide variety of contracts to support the PRTs in their provinces. The national Government has clauses in all internationally staffed contracts to ensure that local companies, and hence local workers, are given an opportunity to participate in the ISAF bidding process. If it is likely that they would be excluded due to skills deficits, the successful contractor who imports foreign labour is obligated to declare this. An act is in place in Afghanistan to both control and protect foreign workers. This law states that “The proper authorities for employment will, in principle, hire their employees only through Afghan official representatives in foreign countries.” (Afghan Government, 1935) This law protects the foreign worker and outlines the obligations of the tripartite partners.

Additionally for the unskilled and semi-skilled there are “special public works projects” that provide paid employment to restore services in urban and rural areas. This type of employment includes labour intensive secondary and tertiary road rehabilitation, small culvert and bridge repair and reconstruction and other construction activities at community level to allow access to goods and services for the rural population to access markets (WB-NEEP, 2003a:2). A further area is the reconstruction of irrigation systems destroyed by the Russian military in the 1980s in an unsuccessful attempt to subdue the Afghan rural population.

Whether these and similar types of employment are sustainable is directly proportional to the extent of the damage caused during the conflict. The potential for the worker to continue to use the skills when the economy stabilizes must also be factored into any E&SD programme. Whilst this form of employment has limited long-term sustainability for most of the workers it does provide an income for those who are unskilled and semi-skilled.

Considerable effort is given to providing training for local providers of micro-finance to encourage access to credit for those wishing to enter “self-employment and micro/small-
scale business‖. (ILO-AMEP, 2004d) However the suggestion that this form of income generation alone can alleviate unemployment is fallacious as the number of people in a general population who wish, and have the talent, to pursue self-employment and avail themselves of business opportunities is comparatively small in relation to the general economically active population. (Smith & Wise, 2002:5 & Czarzasty, 2003)

The bulk of the unemployed in a post-conflict country seek an income in the informal economy. Those that can be classified as economically active require work for wages. Very often they have limited education and minimal level skills that are not required in the modern sector and therefore not required by the labour market. This skills and knowledge gap is thought to be overcome by providing “quick impact skills training courses”. The justification for these invariably short courses is frequently based on rather tenuous data and anecdotal employment information. (IRC, 2003) Justification is frequently provided by superficial labour market studies, and often promoted by local or national level politicians based on the needs of particular pressure groups. Hence such training programmes are usually hastily and rapidly introduced, rarely culture free, well-funded but delivered without a clear understanding of the needs or capacities of the recipients or the local economy (McCawley, 2003:3). Short courses that are not part of or designed to integrate with, national skills development systems are both a disservice to the participants and a waste of donor and government funds (Afghanistan Government, 2004:280). Quick impact courses are, by their very design, not intended to be sustainable.

For employment to be sustained in the medium to longer term it is necessary to have stability within civil society. People need to be confident that the government has plans to (re) introduce measures to support local, regional and national systems with suitable enabling mechanisms that will promote internal and foreign direct investment. This requires an understanding of the different target beneficiary requirements.

5.2 By beneficiary

5.2.1 Ex-combatant
To many people living in a post-conflict environment their most recent employment has been in the military, belonging to local militia groups and/or being engaged in the supply of goods and services required for the war effort. There are frequently many
skilled people involved either directly or as contractors to the armed forces. The ravages of a drawn out, often urban-based conflict however seriously impacts labour markets within what may remain of the public service and civil society in general. Resources are diverted to supporting the war, traditional jobs are lost and the economy, especially in a civil war, deteriorates. Frequently those to whom the resources are directed divert them for personal benefit at the expense of the intended beneficiaries. The literature often stresses the need for the integration of ex-combatants (Specht, 1998: 6) when discussing disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) of military personnel and assumes that the majority are unskilled (Srivastiva, 1994:10). This could well be misleading as military operations require a variety of skilled people to gather resources and provide logistical support, some of which can be profitably used in the post-conflict labour market.

The ex-combatant is a special category when it comes to reintegration into the civilian life and subsequently the work force. As such the skills development should be based on a thorough assessment of prior knowledge, experience and skills on an individual basis if these people are to be rapidly absorbed into civilian life. Great care is needed by to ensure as smooth as possible transition for the ex-combatant. (Smith & Wise, 2002:2) It is assumed that once they demobilize they will be trained to have market-based skills enabling them to financially support themselves and family. The challenge is formulating cost effective demobilization programmes that are satisfactory to the ex-combatants themselves (WB, 1999:5.5). In addition unless the problems associated with the conflict are resolved the return to mainstream civil society for the ex-combatant will be fraught with problems.

5.2.2 Community groups

Individuals and groups in the community are also at risk because of a lack of sufficient income to support their families. During the period of conflict one major means of earning money is to provide goods and services linked to the war effort. Communities in rural areas benefit by providing food. Middlemen undertake delivery. Commercial outlets sell the goods and services. Leaving aside the extortion and corruption that exists in such wartime arrangements, the income generated provides a level of predictable, and somewhat secure local economic activity. (Brett & Specht, 2004:132) The E&SD system in a post-conflict environment can be designed to introduce an
approach that includes this level of community activity by providing improved business development services, micro-finance and agricultural extension services as a means of strengthening the capacity of local entrepreneurs and micro enterprises to prosper in an open and transparent manner.

5.2.3 School leavers

A set of data was prepared for Afghanistan in 2007 based on secondary sources from the relevant ministries of those being educated within the formal education system. The numbers in each category, given the dramatic increase in attendance has huge ramifications and should be of concern to the Government and those international agencies with a mandate to assist. General education students exceeded 6 million in 1386 (2007) with a female participation of 35.8 percent. The number of technical and vocational students in 1384 (2004) to be available to labour market in 2005 was 5388, of which 4771 were male. University attendance for 2005 - 2008 (1385, 1386 & 1387) was 159,295. (MOLSAMD, 2007:32-37)

It was difficult to analyze or compare the data due to the fact that numbers on actual enrolments and graduates were not directly comparable as they were collected for different purposes. The trend however seems obvious, i.e. that there has, to date, been too much emphasis on funding tertiary level courses and, if there was gainful employment available for graduates, that there would be an excess of applicants.

5.2.4 Unemployed Youth

The statistics on youth who are under the age of 18 years is quoted as fifty-seven percent of the population (Jalali, 2007:50) A separate source estimates that those between 0 and 14 years is estimated to be 44.6 percent and those between 15 to 64 years at 53 percent. Under- and unemployment is estimated at 40 percent within a total economically active labour force estimated to be 15 million.

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These figures demonstrate that there are approximately six million potentially economically active people unable or unwilling to engage in legally available income earning opportunities. These people will draw on the informal safety nets developed over decades of war to survive. They are resourceful however and, as they are effectively excluded from a livable income due to lack of employable skills, opportunity, or motivation may well resort to illegal means to obtain goods and services they feel entitled to.

5.2.5 Unemployed adults

Unemployment among economically-active adults is endemic. This unemployment level is not however predicated on a western style economy where the labour market is in balance, where unemployed numbers are in low single digits and matching job seekers with vacancies is a continuous process of matching skills with employer needs. The high unemployment rate in Afghanistan is due in some part to other factors related to the extended period of conflict such as destruction of agricultural livelihoods, destroyed infrastructure, exclusion of the war-disabled, displaced populations and the large number of refugees in adjoining countries. (ALTI, 2006:26) Many unemployed adults have never worked in the sense that is being discussed here. They have matured during a period where there was never anything else but war, had no opportunity to develop employable skills that would be marketable in the modern sense and are now faced with family responsibilities requiring that they earn a living within a civil society context.

5.3 By economic sector

5.3.1 Agricultural/fisheries/forestry sector

In most conflict-affected countries major destruction takes place in the rural areas. Cultivated land is left fallow due to lack of workers to tend it, lack of money to exploit it, or due to war damage, land mines and unexploded ordinance. Water sources can be polluted. Fisheries suffer the same plight from overuse and with no scheduled management or replenishment they are eventually exhausted. Forests are denuded for firewood or stripped for illegal sale to provide cash by the military. Recovery of some
timber species take a generation. Rebuilding of an economy in this sector requires skills of a particular type, in many cases unique in that they are linked to the regeneration of natural resources. In each instance it is likely that the landholder in many cases a private individual, requires limited skills enhancement, access to business development services training, extension and technical services, familiarity with changes being introduced to transportation and communication systems plus financial advice and assistance to recommence production. (ADB, 2007:12)

5.3.2 Business/Commerce/Services sector

There are a large number of service-sector employment opportunities required in urban areas. They provide access to goods produced in rural areas, may have been providing vehicle maintenance, repair services for equipment, accommodation for soldiers and providing medical treatment and rehabilitation opportunities. In a post-conflict setting additional services are required to integrate the internally displaced, returning refugees, the disabled and those ex-combatants returning to their communities. The E&SD system provides the means to train suitable people and identify efficient organizations, whether public or private, to provide access to these services as early as possible. These and other services need appropriate training programmes that reflect and incorporate appropriate access to contemporary technologies. They can be conducted in-situ where this is feasible, thus avoiding further dislocation of those participating. (ILO, 1998: 37)

A mission report of an ILO consultant (Boros, 2004) suggested that there be a coordinated effort to establish credible and competent institutions to compliment the already existing micro-finance network, also supported with ILO technical assistance. The provision of access to business development services (BDS) and training for existing providers of BDS was proposed to overcome the well-intentioned but poorly developed services being offered. The Government requested ILO to recruit a suitable person to undertake a formulation mission. This absorbed months of negotiation between ILO and the Government. The end result was that the Government undertook to recruit from the private sector rather than go through the protracted and bureaucratic processes imposed by the UN system. This sector of the labour market has been addressed by the ADB. In addition the WB has finally accepted the idea that the self-

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employed and micro enterprise in a country emerging from a conflict can be a valuable means of bringing stability, growth and eventual prosperity to those outside the modern sector of the economy. The International Development Association (IDA) offered a grant of US$ 30 million to promote employment and income generation, some eight years after the signing of a peace accord. (World Bank, 2010)

5.3.3 Entrepreneurship/micro-small business sector

Many of those entrepreneurs and owners of micro-enterprises would benefit from courses that develop business plans that are linked to small amounts of low interest credit, without which many small businesses cannot restart gainful income generating activities in a post-conflict setting. New business ventures require start-up financing. However existing financial institutions are not likely to lend at rates that can be afforded by those with little or no tangible assets. Where money is available the potential for usury and extortion must be monitored and dubious lending practices reduced to a minimum. Programmes to strengthen these local institutions within a national micro-finance network are required to ensure standard procedures are introduced to eliminate many of these problems. This is an essential component in a national E&SD system, especially at community level (Nagarajan, 1998:6). The time frame of many international technical assistance projects is frequently less than the time it takes to ensure that there is sufficient critical mass to sustain such programmes.

Moslem models of banking and forms of credit need to be understood by those providing technical assistance in Afghanistan. The paper prepared by Toutouchnian (1982) provides a clear distinction between Islamic and capitalistic systems of banking. The distinction needs to be made between interest, the rewards accruing to money, and profit which is the reward accruing to capital investment. Money is a unit and has a value of 1, or more plainly put the exchange rate of one unit is 1. The price in the model of money is the interest, i.e. its rate. Thus money made available from a capital provider, in this case a bank, to an entrepreneur that is linked to that depositor’s money, which is invested by the bank, is jointly owned. Any profit or loss is jointly shared.
5.3.4 Informal Sector

By far the largest sector for employment is the informal economy. This is the case in a post-conflict situation where family/self-employment sits alongside the micro-enterprise as a means of income-generation. Afghanistan is no exception. Governments despair as they see many small and frequently vibrant and profitable businesses operating without contributing to the country’s development by way of taxation. Owners in the informal sector are very cautious when approached about their employment and skills development needs. In surveys in which I participated many were often unwilling to discuss the details of their operation as they saw this as a means for government officials to apply regulatory measures. Most prefer to train within the family network or, as is the case in many South Asian countries, build a skills base using a traditional form of apprenticeship known as Ustad Shagird. (Hameed, 2005:198) These approaches to skills development are found in the traditional craft occupations. Parents place their children with a master; the expectation being that in some instances, by paying for the opportunity for their children to learn the craft and henceforth be able to support them later in life. In an economy where there is little educational opportunity this makes perfect sense. Whilst the level of education in the formal sense can be considered as a problem it has implications in post-conflict Asia for E&SD initiatives. Should a government attempt to control such measures? Is it possible to provide sufficient services so that this type of employment, if in fact it is genuine employment, and not as many report, exploitation of minors, can be provided. The is support for the view that this type of traditional skills development should be left as is in post-conflict countries until such public services are in place and there are ample alternatives available to parents to make informed choices. (SDC Karachi, 2002) In Afghanistan this form of E&SD provides a foundation for individual economic independence. In may surveyed communities this is the only alternative for their children. Whether and when such a system can be integrated into a national skills development network is the major concern of those seeking to provide equitable and equal opportunities within the country.

5.3.5 Information & Communication Technology (ICT) sector

The numerous numbers of courses from the private sector and NGOs offering ICT courses is also a major source of skilled labour. There are two facets to consider. First
the NGO community is divided between local and international. The latter must requester with the Government and as such is must comply with the regulations for such organizations. The proliferation of local ICT providers is not so stringent. In both cases they are not monitored in relation to the skills they impart. This is a dilemma. Any attempt at coordination is frequently resisted. Individual certificates of achievement are issued that are not within any nationally recognized framework and employers have no way of determining whether the potential employee has in fact accomplished entry-level skills. The NGO can claim that they have registered, have proposed a programme which implies a certain level of achievement and that what they teach, how it is delivered and what they charge is proprietary information. This situation could be rationalized if there was sufficient and early advice given to a government on registration requirements that stipulated course outcomes in a form that described competencies achieved. This would however commit the Government to provide suitable guidelines and to set in place a qualification framework that is agreed between the Employers’ and Workers’ organizations and the Government. To do this properly would also have a cost as regular monitoring would be essential to ensure transparency.

5.3.6 Industrial & Manufacturing sector

Inevitably much of the infrastructure is destroyed in this sector of the economy. In Afghanistan additional heavy industrial activity was introduced by the USSR with large complexes built in and around Kabul. These were eventually destroyed following their retreat in 1989 during the civil war of the early 1990s. The level of post-conflict industrial development was found to be hampered by lack of capital investment, especially foreign direct investment. Locally grown agricultural products continue to be produced. Value added products are sold and in a few instances exported. It is in this area that NGOs are a major source of inspiration. They train in a large number of locations and provide courses to groups in accordance with their particular focus. However they are usually concentrated in provinces that are relatively stable so the benefits may not accrue to the most-needy.

5.3.7 Extraction industries

Post-conflict countries need to exploit natural resources as a means of providing goods and services to improve their economies. Because the resources are predominantly
exploited by off-shore companies the extraction, processing and shipping of materials is expensive: often beyond the capacity of governments to accomplish without international funding and technical assistance. Afghanistan is well-endowed with mineral resources and has considerable amounts of minerals to be exploited. (CNN: 2010) It has long been known that the potential existed to exploit them was beyond the Government’s resources. In addition the various conflicts and wars that have ensued have created a vacuum in terms of skilled personnel to develop deposits. 49 Much of the on-going extraction is either poorly managed and in many instances is informally operated. 50 International companies are currently scrambling to conduct feasibility studies. Some have already invested in significant deposits. 51 The opportunity to provide sufficient Afghan trained skilled workers for these major deposits has been lost due in part to the lack of forward planning in the E&SD area. Again earlier E&SD coordination with and between the public and private sector would have reduced the need for what will probably result in large numbers of foreign workers being hired to fill the skills gap. Coordination in this situation would be fraught with problems. The existing legislation on foreign skilled workers requires review.

5.4 By geographic location

Afghanistan is divided into 34 provinces. Projects and programmes of bilateral and multi-lateral organizations are almost exclusively headquartered in Kabul. The main urban population centres outside the capital are in Mazāri Sharīf, Herat and Khandahah. They receive the majority of any technical assistance from international organizations. This occurs for both security and logistical reasons. Hence the rural population sees this as a further extension of the pre-conflict period where resources were also focused on the relatively small elite in the capital. Many rural people are, or have recently been, displaced due to the fighting. A number of international and national NGOs provide services to them in rural and urban areas (ILO, 2005: d). This is more likely to be at community level and focused on health care, traditional craft training and assistance to

49 The need for all levels of professional, technical and a wide variety of skilled personnel on large deposits has been well-known by the Government. ILO held initial discussions with the Ministry of Mines in 2007. Officials were aware of the need to have mining engineers and support technical staff trained. ILO then approached the various UN agencies for fellowships but was unable to secure support.

50 For more detail see http://www.bgs.ac.uk/afghanminerals

51 In a report in the New York Times the claim was that Afghanistan was “… moving quickly to tap newfound resources, retrieved from: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/18/world/asia/18afghan.html
micro enterprises, local economic development and rehabilitation, access to micro-credit and directed to target groups including those whose livelihoods have been directly affected by the conflict.

Returnees bring mixed blessings. They are usually better skilled, having been trained in a skill, as records of UNHCR revealed, whilst incarcerated in camps. They are often financially better off and more able to settle having been in a “civilian“ environment for many years. They do however create strains on the poorly maintained and funded infrastructure as they frequently resettle in urban rather than their original rural locations (UNHCR, 2002:13). It is estimated that there were as many as 3 million people in this category in Afghanistan. They are frequently also resented by those who did not flee the country as returnees receive what the local population considers disproportionate amounts of additional assistance from the international community (Soros, 1998: Ch 3:1, Cochrane, 18).

5.5 Employment classification

Prior to 1978 skills development courses offered by the MOLSAMD were confined to the typical craft level occupations in such activities as carpet weaving, traditional artifacts, and some basic building, domestic electrical and basic mechanical repair areas. In the industrial occupations the level of technology was limited. A similar programme was conducted in several technical ministries. Technical education and professional degree level programmes were offered at the Kabul Polytechnic and University of Kabul respectively. These institutions were not well supported during the Soviet period. Skills development was also available in five regionally located technical institutes and seven agricultural schools (Baha, 2003:4-5).

During the 1980’s, based on the Soviet model, skills development expanded with the introduction of state-run industrial complexes where factories were required to provide sufficient training for their immediate needs. These facilities are now dormant in the Kabul area and also where there are commercial amounts of minerals to be extracted. These resources are not currently being efficiently exploited. Commercial viability of the various ore bodies is being evaluated. Worker’s organizations also provided basic levels of training to both men and women in major population centres in traditional crafts and income substitution activities. Worker’s organizations are active in
Afghanistan but due to lack of support from the international community they are not effective. Whilst a number of national NGOs assist worker’s organizations with limited funds they are unlikely to receive significant amounts of funding from international sources. Interventions of the international community in the area of E&SD have raised the expectations of the major ministries, namely MOE, MOHE and MOLSAMD. Three donors commissioned TVET instructor training centres. In 2004 here were seven donors offering to build vocational training centres for MOLSAMD. The ADB supported the request from the MOE the more technical schools.

The ILO prepared a submission to establish a national skills development programme which would include the establishment of a national coordination body. A total of twenty-one vocational training centres have been mentioned in discussions with donors including the Governments of Iran, Korea, Germany, Japan and the WB to expand the capacity of MOLSAMD. Of that number only two were actually commenced as of late 2004. MOE, MOLSAMD and MOHE had requested additional parallel funding within the NPP structure. Support was sought for MoHE’s re-equipping of 41 vocational education schools/colleges. MOLSAMD wished to build six (6) vocational training centres in key locations throughout the country (ILO: 2004e: 7). These requests were embedded in the overall NPP programme document. This programme was still being discussed in 2010.

The multi-ministry network proposed resulted in a broader interpretation of the role of skills development. The announcement in 2007 supporting the introduction of the NSDP&ML (Afghan Govt.: 2004b) was the means by which this broader multi-sector programme was eventually to be realized. The priority economic sectors to be covered were industrial, commercial, agriculture, fisheries, forestry, minerals and services. Information and communications technology was classified as crosscutting. Both the MOE and MOHE conduct relevant courses depending on the qualification level. The role of the MOLSAMD was not as clear but certainly it was expected to provide for skills development opportunities in both urban, peri-urban and rural areas for adults, the under and unemployed, demobilized military personnel, returning refugees, heads of single-member families, the disabled and minority ethnic groups.
However, again, it was noted that no mention was made, and hence no recognition acknowledged, of the existing ALC nor was any conscious effort made to integrate the expectations of the NSD&MLP into discussions on a labour code revision.

5.6 Sources of technical assistance

A broad range of skills development programmes are provided by NGOs, bilateral donors, philanthropic foundations and development banks such as ADB and the WB. The estimated number of NGOs varies. However it is estimated that within a total of over 1500 some 120 international and 280 national NGOs are involved in some form of humanitarian assistance. Of that number it was estimated that approximately 80 are providing employable skills though training as a service. It was recognized 2004 that there needed to be coordination of the skills development being offered by specific NGOs. This was established at an information meeting hosted by the German NGO AGF, and convened by the MOLSAMD. During the plenary session the participants requested that a national association of NGO training providers be formed so that resources could be shared, skill levels set and certification standardized. A submission was prepared on behalf of the MOLSAMD through ILO, for funding to establish such an organization. This was justified on the grounds that it would advise a national NGO forum in whatever form met with existing legislative norms. It would initially be ad-hoc until it proved its usefulness. A questionnaire was distributed to NGOs. (See Appendix E) The response was less than five percent. As a result the request was unsuccessful in obtaining support from any bilateral or multi-lateral donor.

Collectively the amount of aid funding available through NGOs at that time was approximately US$ 200 million in 2003 (ADB, 2003). Whilst it is recognized that these NGOs do valuable work in all the areas covered above the difficulty with many of these programmes, where substantial amounts of training is involved, is the lack of accountability, the unknown degree of professionalism and the difficulty involved in measuring levels of skill standards achieved. It is also apparent that the logic applied for prioritization of target groups may not be in accord with the Government’s policy priorities. Many NGOs may well be inefficient with huge ranges of unit cost, be

The acronym for AGF in German is: Arbeitsgruppe Entwicklung und Fachkräfte im Bereich der Migration und der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit.

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training on inadequate and often inappropriate equipment and supporting training materials and have relatively short periods of focus. (CCTS, 2001:5)

Most NGO’s are rarely committed to the long-term development of the country, tending to move on to the next conflict-affected country. The tendency to shift their focus based on the profile of their respective volunteers or in accordance with the sponsor’s wishes has also been noted, especially with national NGOs. This was noted by Suhrke (2006:19) when discussing the issue of sustainability; the position being that stable government is a product of stable international support. Supporting the Government is important but the problem is that there is a need for the Government to assume a coordinating role as early as possible to avert waste and to ensure a balanced approach that does not re-kindled local intra and inter-community animosities. (ILO, 2003: 13)

5.7 Employment services

The introduction of an appropriately sophisticated, E&SD system that can be expanded and improved as required should be preceded by analysis of what components are available and a description of the additional components needed in a post-conflict context to complete the overall framework. The establishment of a post-conflict emergency public employment service has been introduced by the ILO as a means of rapidly “…building essential bridges between job seekers and employment opportunities” (Wheelahan, 2003: iii). Traditional employment services that record vacancies that are not linked to jobs are considered to be of little value. It is well known there are many unemployed. Registering them without a link to immediately available jobs raises false expectations. The matching of registrants to available jobs in a post-conflict setting is virtually impossible. Four years after the cessation of hostilities there were still only five MOLSAMD employment service offices in the country (ILO, 2005c:1).

In the post-conflict environment it is unlikely that western models of an employment service or conditions for efficient delivery of E&SD are in place, or, if they are, whether they are functioning in manner that reflects the pre or post-conflict situation. Traditional E&SD related policies that require stringent pre-requisites for entry to training courses ignore the fact that many people have completely been excluded from the opportunity to gain even a basic formal education due to the conflict. Very often the
courses offered by the more traditional government training facilities are not in tune with the labour market. The provision of offices that register those seeking work does not assure that those registered will be offered employment. It should also be remembered that being registered does create expectations on the part of those coming to register but on its own it does not create jobs. Skills development that is not linked to the relevant sectors of an active labour market reflects negatively on both the trainee and the training provider. Such programmes raise false hopes on the part of the trainee, or the parents, who would have; in the case of fee for service courses expended a relatively large amount of money. They want results. The donor too expects that by expending resources the training provider must demonstrate the efficiency, effectiveness and relevance of the skills development to the labour market when evaluated.

These ideas are sometimes difficult to convey to public servants who have a narrow area of their responsibility, are hampered by outmoded bureaucratic regulations, nepotism and various forms of corrupt practices. There is also confusion when the technical assistance proposed is frequently crosscutting. NGOs frequently offer skills development training for particular target groups based on social criteria, sometimes based of available volunteer expertise and often without any form of coordination with government ministries. NGOs frequently operate in a vacuum and can be ignorant of government policies, in this case in respect of E&SD.

5.8 National Skills Development and Market Linkages Project

This project is one of six National Priority Projects (NPPs) announced by President Karzai in Berlin in April 2004. The overall goal was to contribute to the socio-economic recovery of Afghanistan through the provision of a national skills development and vocational education and training system that is responsive to labour market needs and one that provides Afghans with the knowledge and skills for decent work. It was envisaged that the national system would ultimately be managed by a National Technical and Vocational Education and Training Board (NTVETB) operating through seven regional offices strategically located throughout the country. The NSD&MLP was hampered by a number of factors in providing a “national” system of skills development as it was predominantly focused on industrial skills and related urban-based occupations which further constrains its implementation. Funding was not agreed at that time due in part to squabbling between MOE and MOLSAMD. The WB also
showed reluctance as it had equity concerns and uncertainties as to the continuity of funding. Furthermore the skills being offered through a variety of training providers was predominantly in urban and informal sector occupations with no standards, skills tests or certification. The focus ignored the plight of those in the rural areas where the majority of the population is located.

However the expectation on the part of those formulating this strategy, i.e. that the NTVETB would be autonomous, was not formally accepted between international agencies, donors and the Government until 2007. Funding was finally agreed through the WB. This provided for the introduction of a team to coordinate selected aspects of skills development and provide linkages, but not having direct influence over employment policy in Afghanistan. The LMIA sub-project, although funded by the WB and attached to the NSD&MLP, was to be absorbed into the MOLSAMD within its traditional structure whilst the programme was to assume a broader role to include overall system responsibility along with legal autonomy in the future. This set the stage for continued confrontation between the MOLSAMD and MOE as each has differing views on the funding as well as technical assistance implementation priorities.

The main objectives of the NSD&MLP were to:

(a) strengthen the institutional capacity of the Project Implementation Unit (PIU) such that it evolves into a National Vocational Education and Training Authority (NTVETA).  
(b) ensure national standards both in the delivery of skills development and in course outcomes.
(c) provide Afghan women and men from across the country with increased waged and self-employment opportunities through the provision of market oriented skills training and linkages to micro-credit and business development support services.
(d) establish a NTVETB that will have overall responsibility for policy and planning in regard to the nature and quantum of vocational education and training, and the standards of delivery, accreditation and certification of that training throughout the country.

53 This was the basis for the proposed national priority programme (NPP) now entitled the NSD&MLP that ILO submitted to the USAid advisor to the Afghan President in 2004.
The NSD&MLP has two strategic components:
A funding component allows training providers and implementing partners who sub-contract training providers to be engaged through a competitive bidding process. This gives the project to capacity-build the providers through contractually obliging them to use good TVET practice and also to ensure that training is market driven and leads to employment. This has been further enhanced using formative monitoring procedures during the process of trainee selection, training and placement in either self- or waged employment.

5.8.1 A TVET system building component

This is designed to develop curriculum, coordinate TVET activity across all training providers (public, private and NGO), establish a training provider mapping and registration system which will develop into an accreditation system, develop TVET standards and a certification system and support the development of training-of-trainers provision.

5.8.2 Labour Market Information & Analysis component

As part of the capacity building strategy, the NSD&MLP commissioned an urgent activity entitled the Labour Market Information and Analysis (LMIA) sub-project. It was acknowledged when designing the NSD&MLP that there would be an urgent need to provide two key studies supporting the ANDS. These are referred to as Human Resource Studies. The first study was completed at the end of July 2007, based on secondary labour market information. The second was based on primary data to be collected throughout the country. This primary data collection activity was carried out in conjunction with the Central Statistics Office (CSO) and involved MOLSAMD’s LMIA Unit staff in direct collection activities. (The exact methodology and collection process was decided in collaboration with the CSO, the legal body responsible for all national surveys). The primary data collected in each province by trained national data collection staff was analyzed by the LMI unit within MOLSAMD.

The sub-project had earlier determined that the census being prepared for and due in 2009 would provide the data on current levels of employment based on questionnaires developed with assistance of the ADB. However as it was discovered that there was no
national Standard Classification of Occupations (SCO) document in use it was difficult to see how such data could be considered reliable without a standard system of describing jobs. Furthermore the determination of skill levels within and between the various levels of any SCO is not possible without a commonly known system of occupational classification and reliable census data. The second report, based on the data collected, was released in late 2008. The accuracy of the descriptions used to define occupations and levels is not obvious in the report and therefore caution should be used when reviewing the results. (MOLSAMD, 2008)

5.9 Coordination between Government and Aid Agencies

Effective and efficient responses to E&SD depend on coordination between international agencies and national governments and their departments. UN agencies have world-wide networks and direct counterparts within national governments. In times of peace, governments request technical assistance when capacities and/or finances are inadequate to meet national policy objectives, or in the case of disasters or conflict, to aid in recovery.

The specialized UN agency responsible globally for E&SD is the ILO based in Geneva. The ILO is required to be in tandem with its counterpart ministry, usually the ministry responsible for labour on issues such as E&SD. There are ILO regional advisors responsible for the support of E&SD in member countries. These posts are known to operate reactively in their approach to the issue of E&SD; and the ‘ILO toolbox’, to coin a phrase to describe the products available to members, does not include a model for national E&SD, although it does have a set of international conventions and recommendations to guide countries to develop such systems. In the case of Afghanistan these appear to have been ignored and, as the experiences below will indicate, connections between these components were, and currently remain, extremely weak.

During the early 1990’s the ILO Regional Office in Bangkok had overall responsibility for regional E&SD projects, one of which was to provide mobile skills training facilities inside Afghanistan. This project was implemented during the Taliban period. The project was based in Quetta in the south west province of Baluchistan. Technical assistance in specific areas including matters related to employment and skills
development in Afghanistan was provided by a specialist from the sub-regional office in New Delhi. ILO established an office in Kabul headed by a Senior Coordinator. The author undertook a number of short-term consultancies including one in 2002 for the ILO’s New Delhi office. This was to draft a “Training for Peace” project proposal on behalf of the UN Special Representative in Kabul. This proposal was completed and, as convention decrees, submitted to the Government who in turn approached UNDP for funding. The expectation was that ILO would implement the project. However UNDP appointed the Association of Experts in the Fields of Migration and Development Cooperation (AGEF), an international NGO from Germany who had established a substantial number of training facilities throughout the country. A further proposal was then prepared by a separate ILO consultant entitled Employment Creation through Skills Development for War Affected Afghans (EDSWA). This second proposal was also ignored by a number of bilateral donors, the WB and UNDP.

The probable reason(s) for the inability of the ILO to fulfill its mission in Afghanistan relates in part to the ILO’s relatively late arrival in the country, its inadequate levels of long-term technical advisory services and the lack of available and experienced professional staff familiar with a post-conflict environment. These were issues had been successfully addressed by a number of NGOs over a decade earlier thus putting them in a stronger position to react more quickly to government ministry requests.

In July 2003 the UNHCR prepared a discussion paper to provide a fresh appraisal of the refugee situation. (UNHCR: 2003: 4) Being aware of the fact that the Bonn agreement was to lapse in 2004 following elections, UNHCR anticipated that there would be a change in their focus group from genuine refugee status to one of migration and development. In response, it proposed that there be “…effective partnerships between governments and technical cooperation agencies with the required competencies, expertise, and resources.” In August 2003 a written request was sent from the Special Representative in Kabul to the Director General of UNHCR in Geneva for an inter-agency approach between ILO and UNHCR on refugee matters. This request was based on the belief “…that the causes of this protracted and complex situation have evolved in ways that go beyond UNHCR’s mandate and expertise and require new approaches to address them.” (United Nations, 2003). In October 2003 UNHCR’s Reintegration Unit

54 AGEF was recently investigated on fraud charges. See http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,14779304,00.html
in Kabul prepared a paper outlining the need for cooperation with various UN agencies. (UNHCR:2003: b) Its three pronged approach included (i) shelter assistance, (ii) drinking water and sanitation and (iii) income generation. The last mentioned also included a proposal for micro-finance with the assistance of the ILO who arranged an introductory training course for those currently involved.

In 2004 an approach was made from UNHCR to have the ILO conduct a survey of refugee women who had relocated in metropolitan Kabul having been trained in a variety of income earning activities in refugee camps in Pakistan. In the case of Afghans in Pakistan many have been out of the country for more than a generation, speak several languages and in some cases have undergraduate qualifications.

ILO’s proposal specified several prerequisite conditions, key among them a request for the type(s) of training completed the name and location of the training providers and where the beneficiaries were currently located. When assessing refugee profiles it is common to note that the economically active group may have attended as many as ten different training courses. Often they have been out of the country for more than a generation, speak several languages and in some cases have undergraduate qualifications. The data provided to ILO was incomplete and although UNHCR has records of their beneficiaries they had not been able to track them once they returned. The UNHCR proposal was not pursued further.

The National Emergency Employment Program (NEEP) was launched in 2002, aiming to increase access to rural infrastructure for local communities and to provide employment opportunities for rural labors. As a result of a joint assessment of NEEP conducted by the World Bank, ILO and the government of Afghanistan in early 2005, the program was reviewed and restructured to make a smooth transition to more development-centered assistance in Afghanistan. To mark the beginning of a new phase, NEEP was renamed the “National Rural Access Program NRAP” with a more strategic focus on the provision of a rural road access network that will connect households and communities to essential services and markets.55

In 2003, with USAid support, the Government initiated a Microfinance Investment Support Facility for Afghanistan Project (MISFA). The project was intended to monitor

and monitor micro finance institution performance and to develop their capacity through loans and grants, a role that later expanded to include small and medium enterprise (SME) lending. In March 2006, MISFA was registered as a limited liability non-profit company wholly owned by the government. The ILO provided an expert to strengthen local micro finance institution capacity through direct technical assistance. Coordinated donor support to MISFA through the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund has lent coherence to MISFA’s service delivery standards. (World Bank, 2006: 245) Donors such as the UK’s Department for International Development (DFID) and the Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) were more confident that their funding was being efficiently utilized having witnessed the levels of fiduciary management which in turn attracted additional financial support. As of August 2009, MISFA became the primary funder to 16 partner MFIs.

In March 2004 the author was drafted in for several months on a short-term contract to replace the outgoing coordinator of ILO’s country programme. During this period I initiated a series of meetings, workshops and discussions with various stakeholders in an attempt to establish a coordinated approach to the issue of E&SD. The initial development work was handed to a permanent ILO appointee who had no technical background in the E&SD field. At that time ILO also hired an advisor to the MOLSAMD in an attempt to promote coordination and collaboration within the ministry and between ILO and other partners. This initiative was to last a few months. Disagreements on priorities arose resulting in the ILO advisor transferring to another UN agency in a different role. ILO, after four more years, prepared the NSD&MLP. This was funded by the World Bank. ILO appointed a Chief technical Advisor in 2008. The NSD&MLP was a stand-alone project with a separate development strategy. The other key ministries involved in E&SD, i.e MOE and MOHE had already prepared their independent delivery strategies. Attempts to improve coordination have not been successful to date.

The main reason for these ILO proposals failed to attract early support can be attributed to the long delays between formulation, gaining support from funding sources and, assuming they are funded, identifying staff and commencing actual implementation. Donors and UNDP have other choices. The increased use of NGOs, [some of whom are

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surrogate organizations of bilateral donors] is justified when they already have well-established in-country facilities and staff delivering projects in the country. The German Government openly supports AGEF and GTZ, both classified as international NGOs who have been in the country for a decade. Each have excellent facilities in various locations in the country and were able to attract sufficient funds to implement projects for UNDP because of their extensive and well-respected network of offices, training centres and publications in local languages. (AGEF: 2004a & 2004b, & 2007). They also collaborated with other projects including those of the ILO. This coordination was the result of bilateral discussions between ILO and the AGEF/GTZ directors in 2004 and was an initial attempt to coordinate E&SD activities. (ILO, 2003)

When discussing assistance to infrastructure most donors and UN agencies immediately focus on industry and commerce as it applies to the modern sector of the economy. In 2004 there were a number of significant initiatives offered by bilateral donors. Activities abound in this sector. Facilities, fellowships and courses for instructors to support modern sector skills development was offered to MOLSAMD by three separate bilateral donors, namely GTZ, JICA and KOICA, the latter in addition built the Central Vocational Training Institute in Kabul. GTZ “… has established a model for skills development based on a flexible, modularized, competency based approach…” through a network of reliable NGOs. JICA has developed nine skills development centres throughout the country. Iran has also provided courses in four provinces with an offer as of 2005 to do so in four additional locations in the future. India has a similar protocol with MOLSAMD and at that time was being discussed to refine the details. Finally at that time the WB focused on youth as a target group in four provinces. In the documents sourced it was noted that the courses were in predominantly industrial and suited to the modern sector of the economy. Details of the levels, target groups or specific locations were not provided in the source document nor was there any quantitative data on the linkage between skills development provision and labour market needs (Stewart, 2005).

However these major donors were not focused on other sectors of the economy such as agriculture, fisheries, forestry, energy, transportation, mineral/resources extraction, or the skills and services required to link the informal sector to the needs of communities. Nor were they extending their programme to other ministries, preferring to limit the majority of their training to non-formal modern sector employment. One observation is
that bilateral donors always have difficulty in “showcasing” results when resources are devoted to the informal sector as there is often a lack of “bricks and motor” to advertise the donor country’s benevolence. Supporting the Government is important but the problem is that there is a need for government to assume a coordinating role as early as possible to avert waste and to ensure a balanced approach that does not re-kindle local intra- and inter-community animosities.

International technical assistance from UN agencies must have a medium to long-term perspective. The literature available highlights the rural population’s need for income-generating activities. A major proportion of the population is predominately classified as agrarian. However the majority of the job opportunities, i.e. daily or weekly paid work, are in the urban areas. The majority of the rehabilitation of damaged infrastructure is being carried out to link the various urban centres. Secondary and tertiary road rehabilitation is being addressed partially by NEEP, funded by the WB and initially implemented by the ILO. Further phases of this project were implemented by the UN’s Office of Project Services. (UNOPS). However the majority of these roads, and the infrastructure in communities that are serviced by them, will be rehabilitated “in the future”. When the finance is withdrawn these roads, and the public utilities that traditionally follow this network such as transportation, electrical services and water, will be delayed. Once the current international technical assistance concludes, it is highly likely that only those roads that are “politically sensitive” will be rebuilt.

Whilst all this is going on the majority of the economically active population are starved of skills development that would assist in improving all economic sectors, but in particular, in the agricultural forestry, fisheries, services, business, commercial, transportation, communications, electrical distribution, and other public utilities such as power and health care areas. Until mapping of the E&SD needs based on a national census that provides data from the household survey this uncoordinated technical assistance will continue to waste some of its resources, cause internal friction and be assessed by donors in general as inefficient, ineffective and in some cases irrelevant. The national census proposed in 2008 was delayed due to security concerned and planned for 2010. The most recent information on the population is gleaned from estimates published by the US Census Bureau who estimate the total size of the
population at 29,785.  However this data is not disaggregated sufficiently to indicate the total number of those who are economically active. The basis for planning medium to long-term E&SD strategies is therefore still unavailable.

Reviewing the ILO role throughout this period it was apparent that whilst the ILO Kabul office conducted regular progress reporting meetings by calling together those Chief Technical Advisors (CTAs) assisting each project, coordination and firm linkages were not evident. The UN system places responsibilities for projects squarely with the respective CTAs. They are imbued with the belief that they are the experts in their field and all decisions on the way they operate is theirs alone and, as they have direct links to an ILO technical unit at sub-regional, regional and headquarters level any such coordination should be written into their respective projects. The role of the ILO Office in Kabul is limited to administration and management of the ILO’s activities in the host country. The lack of focus on E&SD in Kabul has been due, in part, to the fact that the ILO person in charge cannot be technical professionals in every field. This is the responsibility of the ILO’s dedicated professionals in New Delhi and Bangkok. They must accept responsibility for the present unacceptable situation.

5.10 Conclusions:

The adage that “training does not guarantee employment” has never been more dramatically demonstrated than in post-conflict countries. The infrastructure damaged by twenty-five years of war and the enormity of the E&SD challenge facing the Afghan Government is daunting. It is obvious that the international community did not coordinate their efforts early enough. The only conclusion that can be reached is that governments must receive adequate UN assistance earlier, possibly even while the conflict is continuing to ensure there be a more balanced and coordinated approach be taken in collaboration with the Government of the day by international organizations of all types.

The conclusion reached from personal experience as the senior professional for ILO in Kabul in 2006 and 2007 and after reviewing the data from several countries is that the ILO, having the mandate for the provision of assistance in matters of E&SD to conflict affected countries, should have a proactive approach. A strategy that is long-term, well

http://www.census.gov/population/international/data/idb/country.php
thought out, and based on empirical evidence from research by competent professionals would make it possible to intervene at an earlier stage with a much higher degree of success.
CHAPTER SIX

JUSTIFICATION FOR AN
EMPLOYMENT & SKILLS DEVELOPMENT MODEL

6.1 Introduction

Early attention to macro-level policy level issues, including the treatment of the labour market, is critical in a post-conflict context. However the development of policies for a comprehensive E&SD approach that promotes implementation in a linear fashion has been discredited (Zeeuw, 2001:12). This linear approach is inappropriate as it does not focus sufficient resources on the plight of the general population, the majority of whom are either refugees, internally displaced and in war-affected rural or urban locations. These people require a number of solutions to be available simultaneously, and in the short term, to increase income-generating opportunities (ADB, 2005:12). These policies, developed with the intention of providing early and rapid solutions, include counseling on potential job opportunities, and linked skills development with paid employment in low-tech labour-based intensive public works programmes for infrastructure (re)construction, rehabilitation and maintenance. (Gleeson, 2004) Policies are required for community-based interventions including training and financial support for self-employment and income generation programmes and the provision of demand-driven skills training leading to wage or self-employment.

The International Rescue Committee, an NGO with an office in Kabul, having funded a labour market survey in 2003, requested another be conducted by ILO in 2007. This was proposed to ILO in Geneva as they are the agency with that mandate. ILO expected this would be funded with WB funds allocated for the NDP programme. The Government considered this to be a conflict of interest, being that the ILO was managing the NSd&MLP. This was never funded. The next study was conducted in 2008 by MOLSAMD, under the auspices of the NSD&MLP. It focused entirely on the needs of communities in urban and peri-urban areas of each province. 58 This later

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58 Peri-urban areas form belts of non-urban land fringing metropolitan centres. They are often neither fully urban nor rural but form a mosaic of often incompatible and unplanned uses. They usually contain important natural resources, remnant biodiversity and significant landscapes, often remain important for agriculture and recreation, and attract diverse populations of people. Retrieved from www.periurban.org.au
study is considered a valuable capacity building activity but from a national E&SD system perspective has limited medium to long-term planning value.

The post-conflict period, especially in Afghanistan, is far from a chronological series of events. Localized violence, some seven years after a peace agreement, is frequent, and acceptable levels of stability are, in the opinion of those offering technical assistance is currently difficult to sustain outside the metropolitan areas. “The international community now tends to recognize that institutional rebuilding is at least as important as the more obvious reconstruction of physical infrastructure” (Carbonnier:2004:312). The rebuilding of this infrastructure requires skilled personnel. However the focus emphasised training local skilled workers to an international standard. In some instances this approach is intended to ensure that international contractors would have a skilled labour supply in Afghanistan. Whilst such workers may not be available with the levels of skill expected by the international community, there are sufficiently skilled people available on the labour market that are seeking work and can contribute immediately. In a country where it is estimated that over eighty three percent of the economically active labour force is engaged in agricultural activities, employment that is local, meets local standards and provides a liveable income is essential if peace is to be sustained. The objective should be to allow economically active people to enter the cash economy and not, as some would assert, to provide skilled employees to facilitate rapid completion of internationally funded technical assistance projects.

The question those offering to provide skills development should ask is: “Where did the skilled work force come from to build and maintain the original and predominantly adequate infrastructure?” An approach taken by some major donors is to provide scholarships to the semi-skilled and skilled and train them overseas in alien environments on different technologies in foreign languages. This is then justified by claiming they require people who can work to international standard. These workers are then hired locally as employees for the foreign companies whose government is a donor!

Western skill standards are simply unnecessary in the early stages of the reconstruction process for several reasons including (i) the lack of training facilities and trainers to train to that level and (ii) the capacity of the market to pay for a regional or international level of performance. The suggestion that resources, from both government and donors,
should focus on skills at this level for the modern sector of the economy should also be assessed in this light. Modern sector skills are defined as those occupations that are impacted by market forces in industrial, commercial, service and information & communication technology occupations. This directs a disproportionate amount of resources on a minority of beneficiaries. Without the means to earn a living, through self-employment or various forms of wage employment, it is extremely difficult for the majority of those affected by the conflict to support their families.

This research is predicated on information gleaned from an earlier literature review conducted in 2005 focusing on the identification, or lack, of policies and strategies for the implementation of a national system of E&SD in post-conflict countries. In this respect the international community did little better. The Government’s national priority programme for skills development and labour market linkages, which evolved as a result of actions taken by the President following political lobbying. The author, whilst engaged as ILO Senior Coordinator in collaboration with American Embassy advisors, specified as a preliminary requirement, an analysis of the existing capacity for the existing national technical education and skills development network. Progress on this aspect, a key component in the development of a national system of E&SD coordination has not been carried out to date.

There was scant information on this subject available as a basis for policy guidance and realistic decisions due in part to the lack of capacity of the Government to collect and analyse data on labour market and skills development issues before, during and after the “official cessation” of the conflict (ADB: 2004/1:25). The reality is that the E&SD system devised jointly by the Government with inputs from a number of international advisors lacked vision and depth and it is only in the last several years that international agencies have provided assistance relevant to E&SD. It is still however uncoordinated with other bilateral and NGO providers.

In 2007 over sixty organizations were contacted who claimed to have capacity to provide technical assistance in the E&SD area and provided each one with information in Appendix F & G. Of that number less than a dozen responded and of that number only three were positive. This reluctance is due in the main to their concerns over security although some felt that involvement of staff and such close scrutiny of their programme would be a drain on their meager resources, time and professional staff.
The opportunity therefore to conduct extensive interviews was thwarted by these concerns, many of which are outside the author’s control. However a number of personal contacts were made between 2005 and 2010. These individuals were contacted, where possible, to gather views and opinions on the research topic. Further elaboration on major issues was also possible with several UN personnel via Email and phone contact.

6.2 Level of intervention

In the immediate post-conflict environment there is inevitably a serious lack of capacity in government ministries responsible for the operation of existing and frequently uncoordinated and isolated components that make up the existing E&SD network. This has been the case in the past, and will continue to be a major bottleneck in the future, where attempts are made to strengthen coordination and make the best use of foreign funding. Where there have been competent nationals they have, in many cases, been attracted to the private sector, migrated or accepted academic scholarships. Some who are competent in a second language, usually that of a donor, are paid outside the official salary framework to ensure the integrity and implementation of internationally funded projects and programmes. Others join international organizations in mediocre positions, essentially because the remuneration is far better. The lack of technically experienced government staff familiar with the process and procedures required to contribute to the development of programmes of technical assistance also hampers the reconstruction effort (Barnett, Humayan & Stoddart, and 2005:44). National ownership of proposals must be encouraged but the delays often caused by misunderstandings, language problems, cultural differences and parochial attitudes can frustrate international advisors placed in functional ministries to assist them.

6.3 National Government Policy

The Government must be approached and carefully prepared to recognize that they are required to make a number of important decisions with regard to the future of any post-conflict E&SD system. It is also prudent to be aware that in providing policies that encourage rapid entry of entry level workers into the labour market as a means of promoting stability requires acceptance of the fact that there is certain degree of risk. These policies need to take account of future development and structural changes and
whilst they are expected to have an immediate impact on the economy and hence the jobs available after the initial surge, the policies must be built into future development plans (Tessaring cited in CEDEFOP, 1997:29-30, USAid, 2001:17). The attendant risk for the donor is always there too. In some cases the donor is reluctant to commit. This has led to a “lack of transparency” claim, due in part to donor reluctance, lack of security and differences in the donor and recipient government’s priorities.

The key ministries must be able to reach agreement on the responsibilities each has to ensure that those provided with any type of training are in fact included a future national E&SD system. There may be over-lapping areas of responsibility. This is not important initially as there is an obvious need to find jobs for the economically active as soon as possible. International technical assistance can assist in this endeavor by providing a regional perspective to senior government decision makers. The various options open to the Government could cover the assessment of prior learning, recognition of current skills and the integration of demonstrated competencies developed in the informal sector into a national qualification framework for skilled and sub-professional level workers. This would greatly assist government officials in promoting equity in the work force as a contribution to the peace-building process.

Of real concern is the capacity to sustain sophisticated systems, whether they are for the E&SD system or others, once international technical assistance and the funding that underpins it is expended. International technical assistance programme expenditure is frequently administered outside the Government’s purview and each agency has an independent financial system, accounting and reporting procedure, few of which are comparable. The reality of the situation as described coupled with the likelihood that the Government will be unable to institutionalize sufficient budget in the annual accounts in the future, is a genuine concern of many donors. Current indications are that there will be insufficient resources allocated to E&SD within the overall package offered to Afghanistan at the Berlin Conference in March 2004 to implement the programme entitled “Securing Afghanistan’s Future” (UNDP:2004c)

6.4 Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS)

A review of several individual ministry strategy documents within the Interim-ANDS 2005 and ANDS 2008 with respect to HRD plans provides clear examples of the
different approaches each is taking to ensure there is sufficient capacity within their individual structures to provide the various public services.  

The strategy document of the Ministry of Women's Affairs, explains that sustaining mechanisms and support systems "... will largely draw support from non-state entities, such as the international community, NGOs and other sectors of civil society". This document quotes the I-ANDS political vision that "the Government of Afghanistan continues to see Non-government Organizations (NGOs) as essential partners in our development efforts and will continue to support their work in Afghanistan". This reliance on external support is also referred to in the Afghanistan Compact of 2006 which embodies a commitment from the international community to support the Government. For example the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation's programmes, acknowledging capacity short falls, are like all government programmes, heavily reliant upon foreign technical assistance. Other Ministries are addressing their HRD needs in a similar manner.

6.6 Province/district/community level.

According to the Afghanistan Statistical Yearbook 2004, eighty-two per cent of the active population was estimated as being engaged in agriculture, less than six per cent in industry, with the remainder working in the service sector. Afghanistan faces high youth unemployment, with three million estimated to be unskilled. This figure is expected to increase by 300,000 per annum, assuming that the MOE and MOHE are able to expand as their individual ministry strategies have indicated. There was, and still is, high under-employment in rural areas and increasing unemployment in the urban areas. At the same time, however, the economy was beginning to recover, partly as a result of an increased demand for workers on major reconstruction and rehabilitation as well as a re-bounding agricultural sector following easing of a ten year drought.  

The introduction of a national network of E&SD providers must take account of the needs of the agricultural and informal sector of the population. International organizations that operate at this level require support from the central government and

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59 See Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), www.acbar.org
the local military/political and civilian population if there is to be any real improvement
in the number of people able to enter the cash economy. At the district and community
level it was considered doubtful that any programme could succeed without the local
support of these traditional leaders. As was mentioned earlier, the impact of the national
E&SD system is minimal outside the metropolitan areas. This sector of the population
has been plainly neglected for generations.

The NSD&MLP is currently hosted by the MOLSAMD. The programme has
introduced an innovative and transparent process of skills development throughout the
country that is aimed at using a variety of implementing partners, both public and non-
government providers, to deliver courses linked to local labour market needs. The
programme has faced constraints in terms of the coverage across all provinces due to the
security situation. It is further limited by the absence of quantitative data, a lack of
qualitative information and poor coordination between key stakeholders. There is
inadequate local level intelligence as to the current and proposed employment
opportunities and training potential available to NSD&MLP target groups.

The MOLSAMD strategy outlined in the ANDS indicates that training will be provided
for a range of market forces jobs found in different economic sectors. Programme
training delivery commenced in 2007. Training providers under contract were required
to identify employment opportunities prior to receiving funding. Given that there has
been little data upon which to make decisions the programme elected to conduct rapid
employment needs assessments based on local and focused employment opportunities.
Those completing these courses were expected to enter a very fluid and unpredictable
labour market.

6.7 Labour market information

The initial LMI secondary sources review conducted in 2007 within the NSD&MLP
faced similar conundrums. The following questions were posed: (1) What level of LM
review is useful and to whom is it to be directed? (2) Who needs this review and what
value has it other than recording the past attempts by very different organizations to
provide specific data for particular purposes? (3) Is the review a preliminary activity
that is intended to provide a base-line for a more comprehensive labour market survey?
In fact earlier reviews only recorded anecdotally what had happened in the past. Also
the reports and related documentation covered were prepared for somewhat different purposes. i.e. donor requirements indicating differing performance outputs, making comparisons and hence analysis difficult.

The approach used by MOLSAM to provide a baseline of LMI, whilst espousing the need for capacity building of the LMIA Unit of the NSD&LMP, was considered flawed. The strategy was to use temporary staff for data entry and as enumerators at the field level. If there was to be any sustainability this approach needed rethinking. More importantly the focus and direction to MOLSAM’s LMIA Unit lacked any policy concerning the role of MOLSAM in any future HRD plan for the Government.

The following question was posed: What is the responsibility and scope of the MOLSAM with respect to LMI in the broader context? A labour market survey document, framed within the MOLSAM’s response to the I-ANDS, was to be undertaken in 2007 but abandoned in favour of a study of urban centres in 31 of the 34 provinces the following year. (MOLSAM, 2008). This study was hailed as a success. It revealed some interesting facts. Key among them was that as few as five percent of the total population sampled in urban areas had been trained in vocational centres. Most others were in some form of traditional apprenticeship/skills development situation in the informal sector.

6.7 Conclusions

Existing papers in English that address the area of humanitarian and development assistance are both sufficient and broad enough to provide future policy formulation on the coordination of E&SD. Information has been written by many international organizations on the subject of E&SD policies, strategies and priorities to assist conflict affected countries and communities to reconstruct their lives. What is not so evident is whether the copious amount of material, some of which could be legitimately called academic research, covering everything imaginable, is being used to inform those who actually have the responsibility to implement any type of E&SD programmes on the ground.

With respect to the provision of a national E&SD system, with or without a national coordination body, the minimal amount of literature in Afghanistan in any of the three
national languages on this topic suggests that this is a major impediment to realizing true E&SD coordination. Whether this is due to (i) the timid, parochial and somewhat risk averse attitudes of the international donor and development bank community (ii) the reluctance of the Government to move forward until they are comfortable with the impact of such a national approach or (iii) the entrenched policies and practices of the international agencies and NGOs offering technical assistance, requires further research.

Added to the mix is the manner in which the description of the pre-conflict TVET network has been portrayed by the Government. Not wanting to seem inept the description provided was frequently couched in glowing terms, i.e. the number of institutions, staff levels, pass-out/graduate throughput and rates of job placement exaggerated to the programme/project developer who may in turn be the potential provider of technical assistance. The numbers of Training Centres purported to be in place by staff in MOLSAMD in the 1970’s was cross checked with an expatriate Afghan in London. They did not match. (Baha, 2003:5) Upon further investigation it was determined that the numbers quoted were found to include those of NGOs and donors with whom the MOLSAMD had an affiliation. Many did not belong to the ministry; the Ministry simply facilitated their establishment.

The reluctance and suspicion on the part of those previously responsible in the MOLSAMD for the many components that made up the pre-conflict E&SD system is understandable. It may well have been that they did not know, or more likely, were not capable of preparing such a report, especially in English. Their position may well have been that in their view their stewardship was considered adequate prior to the period of conflict and given that they frequently continued to deliver services during the conflict, the system is satisfactory. The hesitancy is understandable as to concede that the system must make a paradigm shift to survive is a major challenge. The seemingly massive changes being proposed as a result of technology changes, globalization and regional power shifts must be a daunting prospect, especially for older and more entrenched bureaucrats. These national incumbents are also aware that the various international change agents/advisors/ experts are not likely to be in the country for the duration that is necessary to implement these changes. Hence some international appointees may be unable to fully comprehend the political, economic and social impact on the entrenched public servant.
Seasoned Afghani public servants have been exposed to a series of shifts in the way government has been conducted over the last quarter century so may well fail to take most major proposed changes very seriously. These same people are also well aware of the posturing that goes on between international agencies, donors and NGOs. Their skepticism is no doubt also coloured when they observe the maneuvering that goes on at meetings between the international experts and advisors who are there ostensibly to assist them. This is also evident in documentation being used to influence outcomes according to particular international agencies and donor agency platforms. There is a desperate shortage of capable national scholars in-country with sufficient vision and support to conduct the sorts of research needed to improve the flow of information to those responsible for major policy decisions. There is the reluctance of some public servants to think laterally (out of the box) as by participating in such exercises threatens their immediate and short term stability. Their decision to passively but reluctantly participate, even in exploratory discussions, suggests that they have their own agenda and ideas.

The international community must support a process to let these ideas germinate, and become “locally owned”. Government officials and the employers’ and workers’ organizations have intimate knowledge of the pre-conflict E&SD system. Their suspicion, whether changes are reasonable or radical, is a legitimate concern. Sustainability is not always assured especially when the funds are coming from donors. National incumbents are also aware that the change agents are not likely to be there for the duration of these interventions, and therefore may lack the vision to fully comprehend the medium to long-term impact. Any future research on the need for an integrated and immediate E&SD system must focus on those practical aspects to determine ways and means of applying the existing previous research at the delivery level. Hilhorst (cited in Zeeuw, 2001:25) when discussing the problems of external technical assistance suggested that an understanding of what had been in place prior to the conflict would go part way to reducing the fragmentation that occurs when those providing technical assistance do so in relative isolation from the Government.

The number of UN agencies, international and local NGOs plus bilateral donors providing humanitarian and development technical assistance in post-conflict countries can often overwhelm the Government. The competition for, and appointment of, competent national staff to assist with internationally funded projects, especially after a
protracted period of conflict can create a vacuum in some Government ministries when inflated salaries are offered by foreign agencies/enterprises. The level of remuneration offered by international organizations, whilst well-meaning is often considered excessive by local standards and creates an imbalance in the local economy. The cost of rent, food and services is driven up to the point where the original residents can no longer afford to live in their own city. The additional cash that is circulating in the economy is also concentrated in urban areas thus also contributing to discontent between the urban and rural population. The maxim “Do No Harm” is often ignored. This is certainly the position of Anderson (2000:99) who concluded that, “Aid’s negative effects on conflict seem more obvious and more profound than its positive effects. The manipulation of aid to worsen conflict seems more widespread than the use of aid to achieve harmonious and just relations.” Anderson’s thesis is that whilst aid saves lives and reduced suffering in the short term it has not, until recently, been used as a means of promoting peace following conflict. The conclusion is that aid in this context does not cause or contribute to the cessation of conflict. It should be seen as support to local institutions, managed by local communities that encourage those communities to formulate appropriate strategies that will promote sustainable development. This also the position of the Director of the World Bank’s Fragile and Conflict-Affected Countries Group and former Country Director in Afghanistan who reiterates that the World Bank is “…very concerned to be “conflict sensitive”, i.e. not to do anything that makes conflict worse – the “do no harm” principle” He further points out in an interview that, “This is done by social analysis of the situation on the ground and the social implications of interventions such as investments we finance, and by ensuring that some of the underlying grievances that fuel conflict, such as poverty are addressed. We also support activities such as community driven development where there is evidence that mobilizing communities to solve their problems can reduce tensions within a community”. (World Bank:2008a:2) What the WB did not promote in its dealings with the Afghan Government and the promotion of the ANDS was an employment strategy within which a structured skills development component was included.
CHAPTER SEVEN

PROJECT DESIGN & LOGICAL FRAMEWORK

7.1 Project Cycle Management

The research coupled with the experience of the author when developing a number of these projects, and accepting that there are a large number of common elements in post-conflict E&SD systems it is a given that there are logistical issues involved. The drafting of a model based on the use of the logical framework approach as a draft based on past experiences is considered appropriate. The LFA is however best considered as a team effort, if that is possible. Detractors would argue that it is of little use to construct one without the deliberations and inputs from those who will eventually be responsible for its implementation and monitoring.

The problem is one of timing and thus a pre-prepared LFM model is essential if governments and donors are to be introduced quickly and efficiently to the issues associated with ES&D in a post-conflict setting. By exposing the key informants to the various components that make up an E&SD system it may be possible to prompt decision-makers to investigate the reasons why E&SD is frequently relegated to levels of almost obscurity following a conflict? The analysis of stakeholder interest was investigated during by the author in Afghanistan between 2002 and 2007. An objective analysis has been conducted over a number of years that is the topic of the thesis. The risks have been identified and acknowledged within the earlier chapters. The decision has been taken to develop a model LFM based on the analysis that puts the related issues clearly in front of the intended beneficiaries, those in government with the authority to adapt the model to suit local conditions.

7.1.1 The visionary aspect

A vision can be developed based on that model that involves contributions from those who will be impacted at each level of government, the aid sector, the private sector and the public. Formation of an ad-hoc committee is one method. Members can be drawn from key private sector enterprises, the public sector ministries having responsibility for labour market issues, plus international aid agencies and NGOs having a mandate to
assist in specific areas with technical and financial resources. Sub-committees can look at specific issues, for example the certification and skills testing of trainees, and develop reports to be consolidated into a green paper for submission to the Government of the day. The final form of any and all project proposals within the overall programme would be a matter for extensive discussion and debate with these major stakeholders. Technical assistance can then be sought from international sources for the preparation of a white paper. This would be followed by submission to the government of the day with the expectation that it would lead to the development of policy, subsequent legislation and regulations and the provision of an executive body to implement the law. This step is critical to the success of any strategy for the implementation of any national level project or programme being proposed.

7.1.2 The project design process

First among many activities to be carried out when proposing solutions to problems is to identify where the impetus is coming from to introduce or change current E&SD arrangements. This could be from the Government, the private sector, a pressure group, an association of professionals, an outside agency such as the UN, a significant donor or a combination of local stakeholders. If the prime mover(s) can be identified early in the process this improves the clarity of direction for future discussions. If the aim is to remove barriers to development or promote foreign direct investment it must be tied back to policy statements. The determination of just what or who makes a policy varies enormously. One view is “because the Minister said so”. Another is based on what was written in an election speech or found in media reports. Some are accepted as policy because the issue was justified and included in Green and/or White papers prepared as a basis for possible changes to legislation. Finally there are policies issued in writing and these are probably endorsed by the key partners.

In the case in Afghanistan international UN and bilateral agency advisors were driving the need for change with minimal impact from relevant ministry personnel. Whilst not ideal this environment assisted those in government responsible for the change process to determine whether it is necessary to review specific economic sectors or the economy in general and provided a means of prioritizing sectors based on government policy. It was assumed that this proposal was aimed at the programme level. In this case the
strategy needed to include a process whereby a systematic and logical approach to the
development of an equitable national skills development programme would evolve.

7.1.3 Coordination

A second issue is the need for E&SD programme coordination. An E&SD system can be managed in a variety of ways. A multi-ministry and legally constituted tripartite body such as is established in Albania brings the key informants together. The proposal for Kosovo was also to establish a coordinating body. Another was the arrangement is Nepal where a para-statal body has a legislated mandate to manage the technical education and vocational training being provided. In Afghanistan the National Skills Development and Labour Market project was in place as of 2007, and had the potential to also provide overall administration, coordination and to a limited degree, the implementation and delivery of a comprehensive set of services. This has not been realized to date.

To achieve the desired impact the executive must be supported by promulgated and flexible legislation and have adequate and appropriate regulations if it is to be able to manage this system (ILO, 2005a: II, 5). Regardless of what this body may be called, and assuming that the staff have sufficient capacity, such a body is then in a position to adequately provide overall monitoring, coordination and evaluation of the various contributors to the E&SD system. The body, with a tripartite structure, would be capable of advising on matters of resource allocation, the need for additional facilities, staff development and research to assist in identifying target groups based on needs of the labour market. The body’s capabilities can extend to investigating issues that are contemporary, contentious and require further discussion and elaboration if the human and financial resources allocated from a government or donor are to be efficiently and effectively utilized.

When a general consensus is reached between the major contributors to the E&SD system it may be necessary to conduct an independent and objective evaluation of the various components that are in place, regardless of their professed effectiveness, efficiency and relevance before proceeding to enshrine the proposal in law. This process ensures that these existing physical and human resources in place are not
ignored or duplicated by other ministries or non-government and international organizations.

More importantly once a set of regulations are in place the various international sources of financial and technical assistance can be directed and advised on exactly how they are to be integrated into the overall national E&SD framework as required by this analysis. It is often the case that UN agencies and bilateral and multilateral organizations bring packages of preconceived strategies that fail to acknowledge existing infrastructure and policy.

7.1.4 Tripartite affiliation

Third is the tripartite aspect of a national E&SD system that must be central to any policies, legislation, regulations and strategies. Employers’ and workers’ organizations must join the government and take an active part in the formulation at each level in refining an appropriate system. In post-conflict countries engaging such bodies is often difficult. Conditions of work, wage parity, occupational safety and health and other traditional components of a tripartite nature are not high on the agenda. However ignoring this aspect does present a level of risk. Employers may simply avoid situations where they see any contentious legislation. Classifications of foreign workers can be altered to avoid limits on the types of workers that can be externally hired. Training levies can be avoided by splitting tasks and responsibilities into semi-skilled occupations. Conditions of work may be an issue with unions and if these organizations are not involved at the formulation stage there is potential for industrial unrest.

7.1.5 Linking supply with demand

A fourth priority is the evaluation of the existing components to take account of the linkages that exist between the graduates of technical education and skills development programmes and the realities of the labour market. It is incumbent on government to make clear its programme policy priorities as envisaged by them for the country’s economic development. The relationship between the various types of workers and the levels of skill required must be clearly indicated. Planners must know where to place the resources flowing into the system from the various sources of technical assistance to
compliment, rather than replace the Government budget. Employment services, whether public or private can also focus their activities based on these same policies. Employers need to be able to assess the stock of skills [to be] available as a means of determining where, and what type of capital expenditure, it is prudent to invest in.

### 7.1.6 Skills testing and Certification

When discussing the skills testing and certification issues that will eventually make up a national qualifications framework (NQF), Afghanistan will need some form of verification mechanism in place to ensure that employers can and will trust NQF levels. As mentioned earlier there are a multitude of different training providers offering skills development. Employers are faced with a dilemma when it comes to recruiting skill labour. There are frequent claims when recruiting that those exiting formal programmes lack key skills such as adequate communication, number skills, information technology basics, team working self-learning strategies and problem analysis and designing solutions. (ILO, 2009b:42) Graduates do however have a certificate that says they have entry level employable skills based on a formal qualification provided by the Government and they expect that this would be sufficient to obtain employment. Those who did not complete a formal award and seeking work may lack the entry-level skills needed by employers engaging in reconstruction using modern technologies.

Unless there is some form of agreed certification in place that is understood by those responsible for resource planning, the training provider, the employment service counselor and the employer this mismatch will persist. Little coordination is possible without some form of certification based on competencies. The question as to how these competencies are established, who sets the levels, who assesses the competencies and who provides the quality assurance are of critical importance.

### 7.1.7 In-plant skills development

The major concern for government and employers is that the skills that new employees bring to the workplace are often not in harmony with the needs of the enterprise. Responsible enterprise managers take responsibility for the training of employees. A nationally supported E&SD programme must harness this contribution to the skills base
by providing certification to those trained in the non-formal sector. Apprenticeships and other forms of traineeship must be recognized as agreed alternatives within any national qualifications framework.

Another aspect is the role of employers’ and workers’ organizations in developing workers’ skills on-the-job. The serious employer builds employee development into the enterprise’s policies and makes adequate budget allocations to put an accession plan into place. Such decisions ensure that operational departments have the human resources with which develop and sustain an adequate level of skilled labour. This approach has evolved in situations where (i) the enterprise is a specialized one that cannot expect its formally-trained recruits to be fully skilled on entry (ii) the skilled labour available is not capable of working efficiently without some form of in-plant training, and/or (iii) there has been a technology shift creating redundant employees who must be retrained.

7.1.8 Capacity to implement

Finally the acceptance of and by all stakeholders of the need to build government staff capacity at a realistic rate to implement an E&SD system that covers the components is essential. This would ensure that those to be trained for the labour market are referred to the most effective courses of study based on individual capabilities linked to known demand. Skills developed would then better match the requirements of the labour market in both the public and private sectors of the country. Personnel, whether from the public or private sector, charged with the responsibility to provide skills development would be adequately prepared administratively, professionally and technically, to undertake the maintenance and development a more efficient E&SD delivery system.

7.1.9 A Proposed LMI structure

A suggested structure within the MOLSAMD that follows was prepared and offered in 2007 when it was found that there was no provision for the collection of data. This was to institutionalize the labour market information unit (LMIAU) within the Labour Department of the Ministry. The recommendation was that a tripartite labour market policy board be established and in a position to influence policy and direct the labour market information unit. It would study particular aspects of the E&SD system to reflect the policies of the Government. This would require additional resources, both
financial and physical and considerable capacity-building. It was recommended that it be accomplished as soon as possible. As of October 2008 no action had been taken. A proposal prepared during the preparation of the Secondary Sources Report on Labour Market Information to integrate the LMIA Unit project into the existing structure of the MOLSAMD’s Department of Labour is seen at Appendix H.

### 7.2 The logical framework

It is important at the outset to distinguish between the term *Logical Framework Approach* (LFA) which is a design methodology and the *logical framework matrix* (LFM) or Logframe (LF) which is a document. 62 A further term used is “logical framework analysis” and is best ignored as it is subsumed in the overall activities that result in the LFA. A project planning mechanism that utilizes this approach can be developed as a means of preparing a model for the initial conceptualization, design, development and, when adapted to local conditions used to implement a systematic and coordinated E&SD system.

There are a number of well-regarded organizations using project cycle management and logical framework approach as one of their tools to develop projects. 63 By utilizing the logic espoused in these texts to develop a model LFM it is possible to present those being asked to fund as well as officials responsible within government, academics, the direct beneficiaries and stakeholders in the community at large, with a tool that not only allows those involved to manage the proposed programme but provides a visual presentation for any others who may be indirectly impacted by the proposed programme. (SIDA, 6)

The results of the analysis activity, presented here in the form of a document is called an LFM, is supported by lessons learned from other post-conflict situations. It is considered as a useful adjunct to demonstrate the outcome of the analysis with the matrix framework to “lay” people who are impacted by the state of the labour market and makes them aware of the government’s approach to ensure a responsive and relevant national E&SD system. Most importantly the LFM clarifies many questions when

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63 Various sources and guidelines are available.
national and international investors have discussions with government, employers’ and workers’ organizations, community leaders and donors.

A LFM model such as the one developed in this chapter is based on the author’s experiences, most of which are outlined in previous chapters. The macro-level LFM programme model is considered an excellent means to promote a structured and logical approach to E&SD in post-conflict countries where capacity is usually weak and the Government initially has a wide range of more critical issues to solve.

7.2.1 The initial approach

The ILO is the UN specialized agency responsible for E&SD issues. It has designated advisors for E&SD. Each member country has a focal point ministry that can compile a complete record of existing E&SD programmes plus related technical assistance offered or in the pipeline. Such interventions can be at policy, strategy or implementation level, each having its own logical framework. Linking governments to the ILO is the role of UNDP in the host country. Problem analysis and needs can be anticipated as a basis for the development of technical assistance projects.

7.2.2 Macro level approach

This thesis advocates the development of a macro-level technical assistance programme of E&SD coordination that uses the logical framework approach as a means of documenting, consolidating and clarifying the issues at the earliest time possible. The term “technical assistance project or programme” is a generic term used to describe interventions by those outside the Government of a country and includes UN, development banks, bilateral donors, foundations and non-government organizations. Such interventions can be at policy, strategy or implementation level.

7.2.3 Policy Development

An E&SD programme at the policy level that ensures that there will be coordination at the earliest possible time can be developed, drafted and expressed in the form of a LFM that is effective, efficient, realistic, relevant, and at an appropriate level for serious deliberation of the Government of any post-conflict country.
As a precursor to drawing together all stakeholders, and assuming that there are suitably experienced experts available, a draft LFM can be prepared based on a desk study by professional staff from donor agencies, UN specialized organizations or incumbent government officials can access relevant data from documents, surveys, research texts, project documents and related prior technical assistance. It should be noted that the purist would insist on full participation of all key stakeholders when drawing together the information needed for this exercise. (AusGUIDElines, 2000:5) The author’s perspective is that the opportunity may not be available to collaborate with some key stakeholders, and failure to use what information is available as a draft, i.e. to wait for ideal conditions is not in the best interests of the beneficiaries in a post-conflict country. This approach, with its inherent risks, takes account of existing documents, international experience and the reality that unless a structured document that is based on actual data and international experience is available there may be more time lost, especially if there is a limited number of capable national stakeholders.

7.2.4 The Logical Framework Model

It is described as a model, a starting point that can be modified once the stakeholders are assembled. If there is no initial research such as that advocated above then the risk is that services will be duplicated or even more serious; provided to the wrong target groups.

By grounding the existing system for stakeholders in the form of an LFM it draws together the various components that make up the current E&SD system. In reality it is likely that during and immediately after the period of stabilization of the conflict some stakeholders will emphasize some aspects of the LFM that may have been overlooked or given less importance. Some components may be well established though projects whilst others are absent. The components that do exist can be identified within the draft LFM using Figure 3 that follows. This process is a means of prompting ideas, identifying different approaches and reaching consensus as to what components should constitute any nationally coordinated E&SD system.
Linkages for planning a national E&SD system

7.3 Entry points for the development of technical assistance coordination

Post-conflict countries are almost always faced with a multitude of sources of technical assistance. Armed with the best of intentions many international institutions offer assistance that is well-meant, well-funded and well-placed within the country. The projects in respect of E&SD are usually based on an identified need, are local in coverage and vary significantly from one another in terms of unit cost, duration, skill level and relevance. See Figure 4 for an overview of the international technical assistance framework.

Source: Generated by the author
International Technical Assistance Framework.

Figure 4

7.4 National Employment & Skills Development system development

The drawing together of the individuals who impact the national E&SD system to confirm the results of any previous research is essential. Given that the description in the programme framework is accurate, i.e. it reflects the situation clearly at that point in time, it can be used as a baseline for further projects to overcome inadequacies within it. Projects within the E&SD system can be developed using the same approach and logic. As a means of developing the capacity of those with responsibility at the policy level those providing technical assistance can draw up a diagram similar to Figure 5 that follows. This can be developed using inputs from employers’ and workers’ organizations in collaboration with government officials as one means of describing the National E&SD system.

Source: Generated by the author
7.5 Projects within a National Programme.

Some projects are conceived based on a very narrow premise, e.g. the disabled or those who are single heads of household, and as a result have in some instances been found to be unrealistic in terms of ensuring access to income. Whether self-employed or working for wages, the beneficiary needs some assurances that the effort and expense/opportunity cost of attending skills development courses is likely to result in work. As such courses must be based on an adequate analysis of the labour market in the catchment area where the training is offered. Some trainees must move to other population centres to find work. This situation, if not planned at the outset can cause other social problems and infrastructure issues. If this is not recognized some projects are assessed by international consultants and are often linked to a particular ministry, i.e. agriculture, or health or education each aiming to support the short, medium or long-term policy of the government. Some training provider organizations operate autonomously and their finances are not controlled by any government agency.
The above set of conditions makes mapping the various sources difficult with some NGOs/donors frequently operating in parallel to, rather than in collaboration with, the responsible government ministry. The ANDS stresses the need to have all such programmes channeled through the Government’s budgetary system so that the valuable contributions that are offered are in line with government policy. Hence an agreed methodology at the policy level is required to map out the existing training system and to develop a future national framework within which all components are integrated.

7.5.1 Process model for coordination

The refinement of the LFM model should then be prepared in collaboration with key informants and the objectives, verifiable indicators, means of verification and assumptions confirmed. From this a checklist will seek to clarify and explain the process each institution/individual followed to identify the area in which each contributed, or continues to contribute, to the formulation and implementation of the national E&SD system. The adapted LFM and the checklist will be one means of triangulating the data. The checklist will also assess the extent of individuals’ use and understanding of existing research and related publications that impact E&SD in post-conflict countries.

7.5.2 Goal definition

A technical assistance programme supports a goal that is linked to policy in the longer term. It is assumed that the policy is the result of a series of prior consultations and/or deliberations leading to a clearly defined policy and that the proposed programme is part of an agreed strategy. In this case the strategy needs to include a process whereby a systematic and logical approach to the development of an equitable national skills development programme evolves. The policy statements of the Afghan Government are enshrined in the Afghan Compact of 2006. With respect to E&SD the most relevant among many statements is found under the heading Principles of Cooperation in item two. “As the Afghan Government and the international community embark on the implementation of this compact, they will: “Work on the basis of partnership between the Afghan Government … and the international community, with a central and impartial coordinating role for the United Nations”. As a result the Afghan Government established a Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB).
programme of the type envisaged in this thesis contributes in part only to that goal and/or policy. Other programmes may be considered equally as important in achieving this goal at national level. Technical assistance programmes are usually focused on specific sectors of the economy. In the case of nationally coordinated E&SD there are a number of overlapping sectors that benefit directly or indirectly. Employment is cross cutting. It impacts a number of the Government’s operational ministries. Income earning, with or without skills development is found in the public or private sector. Skills development could be for entrepreneurial activities, self-employment, waged employment, contracted work or international placement. Skills development may also be offered as a result of changes in technology resulting in redundant skills of previously trained workers. Ex-combatants, especially youth, require employable skills as a means of returning civilian life and contributing to the community. Income earners displaced by conflict may also have a skills deficit through no fault of their own. Specific skills development for placement overseas based on contract workers is also a potential source of income earning. All have policy implications that must be addressed nationally and within the region as early as is feasible to do so if inter-country tensions related to imported labour are to be reduced.

7.5.3 Purpose or Outcome

The purpose of the proposed programme is carefully fashioned and the outcome(s) clarified. By indicating that this programme will provide an E&SD framework that will integrate the formal, non-formal and informally skilled into a common skills hierarchy support for international technical assistance and subsequent intervention at the national level is possible. The outcome is an appropriate, nationally conceived and consensus-driven national E&SD system based on a model developed through research and lessons learned in other similar post-conflict situations

7.5.4 Objectives

These can be aimed at several levels.

- The development objective is usually a macro level statement that indicates the major area that the activities of the programme/project will contribute to. The inference is that there are a number of other contributions from different sources needed to achieve the overall objective. A typical DO could be:
To promote foreign direct investment opportunities through improved coordination of publicly funded technical education and vocational training delivery for Afghan labour.

Programme/project objectives are those that directly address a component within the DO. In this instance the following is appropriate

To provide a programme outline and a model LFM at the earliest possible stage suitable for consideration of post-conflict governments to develop a nationally coordinated technical assistance programme to promote E&SD.

The programme as described would have projects within it that could be funded from a variety of sources. Each would develop an individual LFM that would be tied back to the overall programme objective as described in the programme LFM. Typical examples are shown in Appendix I. Each project can be coordinated by the Programme level project that is established to coordinate E&SD across the nation. See Figure 6 for a range of possible projects at various levels within the system.

7.6 Levels of coordination

The Afghan National Development Strategy (ANDS, 2008) document consists of three volumes. It has the dual function of also serving as the country’s Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper. ANDS describes the policies and subsequent priorities and programs/projects required to enable the Government to achieve its development objectives. (ANDS, 2008:5). There are three pillars within Volume I, namely Security, (ii) Governance, Rule of Law and Human Rights and (iii) Economic and Social Development. Volume I contains eleven chapters describing the processes to be followed to achieve national goals and policy directions. Chapter Seven explains the content of the third pillar. A review of pillar three, suggests that the authors did not appreciate the significance of E&SD within the national development strategy. The issue of ownership within the Government and responsibility between ministries and within departments, for E&SD, is unclear. This is evident in the sector strategy for Social Protection contains benchmarks for vulnerable groups (ANDS, Vol. I, Chapter 7, pp 114-116). This describes the Education Sector in Afghanistan as having three sub-sectors: (i) primary and secondary, (ii) tertiary and (iii) skills development. The MOLSAMD is hosting a NSD&MLP that has pretensions of being autonomous, i.e. having its own Act. The term “skills Development “was not been used by the MOE until it was coined by the ILO when seeking the approval of the President to include the
NSD&MLP as a National Priority Project (NPP). This vague and confusing situation may result in more duplication and demarcation issues between ministries at the expense of the intended beneficiaries.

A separate and distinct section within the ANDS devoted to the issues related to E&SD, instead of what appears to be a dysfunctional approach by subsuming it under education, would have the added benefit of focusing in a holistic manner on sustainability issues and make the best use of the human capital available across all ministries. The fact that the ANDS Volume I document has determined that the function of skills development and labour market information and analysis, both of which are components of any established a national employment and training system, are relegated to a sub-level within Pillar three of ANDS is also disconcerting. By doing so it is viewed as a subset of "education” and the ministries with that responsibility, namely the MOE) and MOHE, would not traditionally wish to assume this overall responsibility. Afghanistan will be no exception. The structure described below in Figure 6 is provided as a guide to the type of approach to integrating both formal and non-formal education and skills development under a common structure.

Figure 6

Source: Generated by the author
The above structure is a model. It can be adapted to reflect the needs of the country and use the existing certification titles in place. It can also be understood by employment services when matching jobs to vacancies, by workers’ and employers’ organizations when supporting equitable job opportunities, by parents paying for post school training and by potential employers and lastly the trainees themselves as a means of developing a life-long learning framework.

7.7 Programme coordination body

To support such a model it is expected that there would be a coordinating body established to administer, manage and implement the programme. It would have a Programme Management Department with Project Implementation Units for each project area. The projects would be supported by the various Technical Units. A model structure for a National E&SD Institute is seen at Figure 7 below.

Source: Generated by the author
CHAPTER EIGHT
CONCLUSIONS FROM THE RESEARCH.

8.1 Conclusions

The development of an E&SD system programme model for post-conflict countries requires more grounded research by international institutions offering technical assistance. This must be accomplished on a country-by-country basis. The results could guide policy-makers within governments to form an ad-hoc body to coordinate the inputs of the host government and, by association, the international community and to learn from the experiences of other countries. If the formation of an interim body at the national level could be agreed, even during the conflict period the various components within the logical framework matrix could be prioritized. Hopefully the resulting data and inputs would improve access to skills development that results in gainful employment, identify the needed capacities of those charged to manage it and identify and put in place the resources and infrastructure necessary to accelerate reconstruction to ensure more efficient, effective and relevant use of international and government funds.

International agencies and the Government must address the issue of coordination and have an agreed mechanism in place earlier, preferably during the negotiations for peace. If possible such mechanisms could be established prior to any negotiations leading to peace agreements rather than waiting for cessation of hostilities. Without any form of income generation mechanism in place for those who are demobilized as well as for the general civilian population, social stability is doubtful, criminal activity is likely to increase due in part to the uncertain security climate and the return to conditions that caused the conflict environment is a distinct possibility. (ILO:1998:6) The evidence from agencies providing aid is not conclusive at this time. The conclusion reached having reflected on the past is that research that encourages agencies, whether they are local or international, to consider side the effect(s) of any form of aid is needed by those providing it in a conflict-prone environment.
8.2 Employment & Skills Development policy development

During a conflict or immediately after, national personnel must prepared by those providing TA to be capable of undertaking E&SD policy design, drafting, development and implementation activities. Capacity building is essential. Judgments can be made based on a comparative analysis of policy developed in other countries, especially those emerging from or recovering from similar types of conflict to ensure that lessons learned are noted when making future plans. By analyzing existing decisions of the Government, or any other public domain policy sources, a national E&SD system will emerge in whatever form as the national system. Whether it is flawed or not it is.

Preparing a programme and placing it into a logical framework matrix is the first step in building a programme that genuinely reflects the needs of the labour market at that point in time. The extent to which it involves stakeholders at every level, i.e. those directly impacted in the system’s construction, will be directly proportional to the success it achieves and thus the long-term sustainability of the overall system.

To achieve this it is necessary to conduct a series of national, provincial and district-level information sessions, workshops and seminars to reach consensus with as wide a range of stakeholders as is possible. Once consensus is reached a draft policy statement would be forwarded to the national responsible body for ratification. Assuming there are no objections, legally binding regulations would be determined to implement agreed policies. The sharing of responsibility with non-government actors must be seen as a short-term expediency. It must be remembered that the withdrawal of international expertise is inevitable. International experience suggests that NGOs should not be expected to assume responsibility for, or be considered alternatives to Government.

In a paper discussing the implications of development in a post-conflict environment Barbanti (2004:2) points out that when governments are vulnerable, i.e. have inadequate capacity to administer needed programmes, often as a result of poor financing, this results in “…the transference of responsibilities from the central state to NGOs, local governments, and the private sector”. This conclusion, whilst considered to be an unfair criticism of NGOs is in fact the fault of governments who surrender responsibility to NGOs without insisting on a timeline for capacity building of national staff, especially for strategic activities that should always be managed by Government. This is
especially relevant to the development of the LMIA unit within the MOLSAMD in Afghanistan where capacity is being developed, albeit slowly.

Any HRD programme, whether at national or ministry level must be prepared for such contingencies. By planning at the earliest stage it should be possible to have a system in place that would reduce, if not eliminate the loss of institutional memory and ensure a transfer of knowledge from the non-government actor as well as responsibility to the appropriate government authority.

8.3 Employment & skills development technical assistance sources.

Within the international technical assistance component of E&SD are sub-components that seek to identify sources of assistance leading to donors, loans, grants, governments etc. It is necessary to explain the reasons for requesting assistance to political, social and economic stakeholders. The mechanisms and procedures for governments to receive assistance from development banks, bilateral agencies, UN agencies, NGOs needs to be understood as do procedures for identifying the types of assistance leading to technical assistance and advisory services. Research is required to analyze and measure the utility of the work that has been and is currently being carried out. It is essential to draw out the experiences of the beneficiaries and determine the effectiveness of the various programmes (UNHCR 2002: 13).

There are certain protocols and formalities to be followed to access national and international grants, loans and the processes for tender procedures, formats and obligations. It is essential that the different processes for monitoring of international grants and loans through interim, final and independent post-evaluation are understood by recipient ministries. Suitable data on expenditures, physical outputs of personnel, capital and administrative expenditure allocations require accurate recording during implementation to assess the impact of the technical assistance. Sustainability of the project requires adequate indicators to be set as agreed baselines so that subsequent evaluations can be measured to establish success rates.
8.4 Employment & skills development system co-ordination

Coordination must extend to identifying, prioritizing and requesting approval for international organizations to prepare proposals for technical assistance on behalf of the Government. A coordinating body would assume the responsibility for advising on the scope, type, level and apportionment of resources from bilateral donors, UN organizations, NGOs and the Government to support the Government E&SD programme. The coordinating body would undertake or contract external sources to monitor the activities of all institutions (whether public, semi-government or private) providing skills for the labour market and ensure the economic utilization of financial allocations. Activities involving employment projections and training needs assessment that recognize these identified needs leading to resource allocation for curricula development and subsequent equipment identification would flow directly from and be managed by the body. Staffing levels, prerequisite qualifications for administrators, managers, principals and trainers can be planned based on reliable data as can the needs of existing staff to meet the newly identified course needs.

8.5 Post-conflict employment and skills development requirements

The need to develop a well-educated and trained work force as soon as possible is highlighted in a number of key documents. (Date-Bar 2001, ILO 1997a, ILO 1998, ILO 2001, McCawley 2003, WB 2003b). However the same literature then emphasizes that the formal sector, namely the vocational education, higher education and university sectors require strengthening for this to happen. What seems to have escaped the pundits is that in the post-conflict environment the need is for real jobs that pay a living wage in a much shorter time-frame than these traditional supply-driven education systems can deliver. Strengthening the capacity of the systems that provide formal and non-formal TVET is a medium to long-term goal. International technical assistance is traditionally a relatively short-term activity and according to Zeeuw (2001:26), unless a reasonable degree of sustainability can be built into programmes in the short term the value of such interventions is doubtful.

Part of the E&SD matrix that does not receive any immediate attention is plight of the unskilled and semi-skilled. In a post-conflict country these people are the majority of
those seeking employment yet they are often ignored or worse, excluded. The provision of a project component that develops an employment service system with the responsibility to place people in real jobs, not simply register them as unemployed, is required. It therefore requires linkages to employers in all major economic sectors and sufficient government enabling edicts, Acts, regulations or directives required to implement them at the community, district and provincial level.

Foreign direct investment (FDI) for major development is constrained by a lack of sufficient skilled personnel in-country. FDI from multinational, international or the Diaspora is not likely to be high in the immediate post-conflict period (CPCR, 2003:16). However the Government must be prepared with adequate legislation when the FDI does start to flow to manage the use by contractors of foreign workers. The draft ALC alludes to “…a separate regulation…” for this type of worker. (ALC 2006: Article 6).

The disabled are a major group estimated by ILO in 1998 to have peaked at one million (Afghan Government: 2004c: 20). This group must be mainstreamed, where their disabilities allow, and join training programmes that will encourage them to re-enter to the work force. Without the restoration of a basic means of acquiring a livable income there is a likelihood of a return to the war, (Zeeuw 2001:27). This situation also leads to increased anti-social behavior and criminal activity.

The role of international technical assistance with regard to the E&SD system is to know what is, or has been, in place and to use that ad-hoc system, regardless of its faults and flaws as an immediate conduit to fill the skills gaps, the data gaps and to strengthen the existing networks, however informal or inadequate it may be, to get people working as soon as possible. Attempts to undertake revision of the E&SD components at the outset is simply not necessary and major changes are not advisable. The approach using medium to long-term objectives that can be designed as early as possible is considered a valid approach however. The process of assessing the performance of current E&SD systems, with a view to formulating and implementing corrective measures, if these are needed, is often misunderstood, or for other reasons not applied to greater advantage. These issues can be addressed as part of the medium to longer-term programme (JBIC 2003: S-11).
In the post-conflict environment the E&SD system must innovate. It must evaluate existing systems and, where this is found wanting, introduce new and appropriate changes as a means of ensuring that people who are expected to contribute to the economy possess the necessary knowledge, skills and attitudes. By seizing the opportunities implied by globalization and technological progress, governments and those providing technical assistance, are more likely to reduce uncertainty in the minds of those unemployed and hopefully reduce the potential for unwanted consequences.

8.6 Conditions for an employment & skills development system

Once even a modicum of security has been established a large number of people need income. The majority of those affected by such conflicts rely on a steady, albeit moderate, amount of money to enable them to maintain a basic standard of living. The absence of employment or self-employment opportunities is often chronic. There are a number of means at the disposal of those previously “employed” to be able to generate income to provide for their individual needs or those of their families. One option for ex-combatants is to continue as a member of the national government’s military. This has obvious advantages if the military has been absorbed into the emerging and stabilized government. This may not always be the case however. Another is to turn to anti-social or criminal activities as a means of “earning” a living (Brett & Specht 2004:133, Srivastiva 2000:11). The third, if the conflict was relatively short and the skills previously learned are still required, is for the ex-combatant to be employed in a job similar to that was held pre-war. It is unlikely that after decades of war in Afghanistan that ex-combatants engaged in a technical occupation would still be considered competent. This also assumes that the original skill is still marketable and such jobs still exists. This may require retraining for those with redundant skills whilst younger ex-combatants may need basic formal education before entering the work force.

Finally, at the conclusion of hostilities, and if the conditions are there, ex-combatants from various factions and those under or un-employed in civil society can be offered the opportunity to be trained in an occupational area required in the current labour market. The literature reviewed does not stress the need for E&SD coordination and labour market information adequately, preferring to focus on one or the other with token recognition of the need for direct linkage.
Whether a civil or international action, such wars virtually freeze technological advancement within many of a nation’s vital industrial, commercial, agricultural and other economic sectors. Large tracts of the industrial sector may have been operational and hence provided technical support to the war effort. However they are frequently found to be using redundant technologies. The impact of changing technology is frequently devastating for those with limited skills to offer. Conversely there may have been a great deal of damage due to fighting to the infrastructure and work to rehabilitate this requires careful analysis before committing resources to technologies that may be out of date. Skills development may be required prior to considering facility rehabilitation and/or equipment placement through carefully thought out working arrangements with individual employers. The longer the conflict the more likely it is that development and application of appropriate imported and endogenous technologies will lag behind.

The destruction of training facilities, the lack of trained administrators and teachers and a lack of sufficient and predictable institutionalized government budget makes it difficult to provide even short skills development courses required by the post-conflict labour market. Added to this is insufficient access to even small amounts of bank credit, a lack of local private sector and foreign direct investment and little or no market-based information upon which entrepreneurs, capital investors and enterprise owners can reasonably make decisions to confidently restart or enter into viable business activities in the near future.

For skills development programmes to be sustainable a clear and unambiguous set of criteria for the design, development and assessment of the courses must be agreed that is part of the national qualification system. The number of short courses that are terminal, i.e. do not lead to any acceptable partial or complete qualification, is a continual problem for all concerned; especially those trained who subsequently discover that the course may not have any national recognition. The impact on the confidence of those (re) adapting to civilian live, i.e. ex-combatants, the internally displaced and returning refugees, of training that has no recognition, either by the Government, employers or those offering credit can create undue and unnecessary tensions.

The international community must acknowledge the existence of, and publicly recognize existing national legislation and the relevant regulations. Training courses
delivered that do not comply with these regulatory instruments may well be in contravention of the ALC. Training providers must develop and deliver skills development that measures the level of knowledge, skills and attitudes transferred. This in turn can be assessed against valid criteria set by the appropriate government authority or nationally recognized professional association.

8.7 Impact of Foreign Workers

There are a large number of foreign workers engaged in contract work in Afghanistan, mainly from Iran and Pakistan. It is claimed that there are insufficient number of Afghans with the pre-requisite skills to do this type of work. Without a sensible and appropriately designed skills development programme that is well coordinated, foreign workers will continue to deny Afghans their right to an income (Jalali, 2007:50). There is dearth of literature on the short, medium and long-term impact of these various forms of “emergency employment programmes” suggesting that the situation requires detailed further research and analysis to justify the large financial allocations for E&SD being used in Afghanistan as a pretext for promoting stability.

It is important to get those completing short-term skills development course into some form of income generating activity. The development of policies must be conceived, developed, debated, legislated, publicized and provided with appropriate enabling regulations as soon as possible. Clear E&SD policies will guide those responsible for labour market information analysis, determine its application and inform those undertaking labour market studies. Steps were taken by NSD&MLP management in 2010 but formalizing this will be some years before the skills and levels are integrated within any national skills development framework.

8.8 Further research

Governments must be pro-active in providing an enabling environment if immediate inroads are to be achieved with unemployment. Existing legislation must be clearly and transparently applied or publicly discarded and interim measures introduced. For the E&SD system to operate there must be maximum cooperation within and between various government instrumentalities. International technical assistance during this

\[64\] The ALC is also in need of review and requires technical assistance to have it upgraded to recognize contemporary developments in the region.
period should ensure full participation of the Government to ensure ownership of the process.

Existing E&SD components, i.e. employment services, public, private and NGO training providers, employers’ and workers’ organizations and local community groups must not feel threatened by any attempts to change them to conform to some foreign concept of coordination. These groups must also be involved in the process, preferably during the conceptual phase. In a post-conflict context this broad involvement is essential. The reasons for this are obvious but the way in which this can be accomplished is difficult to determine. Local buy-in is essential if the E&SD system is to have any sustainable impact.

The types of further research that would assist governments, national stakeholders and those offering technical assistance to make sound and appropriate decisions to strengthen the E&SD system can be divided into two main categories. First is the need for a proactive permanent cell within the UN system, possibly the ILO, to assume responsibility for E&SD issues in individual countries at risk of conflict, whether it is civil or international in nature. Second is the need to support a twinning arrangement with the ministry within the country responsible for E&SD to build capacity over an extended period. In Afghanistan this is the MOLSAMD. As a means of bundling the topics and areas recommended these are grouped in accordance with the sections in 8.1 above.

8.8.1. Policy development
Research resulting in technical papers that analyze the need for a more integrated approach by UN and bilateral agencies could highlight the problems post-conflict countries face in the area of E&SD. These could be commissioned by these institutions and presented and discussed at regional forums such as workshops, meetings and seminars. Having been discussed and accepted these papers could then be promoted as a vehicle to sensitize governments, aid agencies and international donors to the realities faced in a range of different post-conflict locations.

Research is required to analyze and measure the utility of the work, that has been and is still today being carried out. It is essential to draw out the experiences of the beneficiaries and determine the effectiveness of the various programmes (UNHCR
There is dearth of literature on the short, medium and long-term impact of the various forms of “emergency employment programmes” suggesting that the situation requires detailed further detailed analysis to justify the large allocations being used, especially in Afghanistan where it was expected that this would promote internal stability.

Research is required to confirm the veracity, impact and cost of establishing a network of sophisticated emergency employment service offices in the immediate post-conflict environment and especially the value of such interventions with regards to an integrated post-conflict E&SD system.

Research and analysis of the skills and expectations of those displaced and returning should be a prerequisite to any in-country training activity. Labour market and informal business opportunities at community level must be assessed and facilitated as early as possible. Policies must be developed at Government level to address these informal skills development and income-generating needs. Research into what works based on studies in similar situations in other post-conflict countries is essential and should be undertaken on a continuous basis.

Research papers by the regional institutions within the Asia Pacific Region cited in Chapter Four into the magnitude and utility of a more integrated approach by the specialized UN agencies with a mandate to assist in E&SD could highlight the problems post-conflict countries face. These could be commissioned by the above institutions through a process of tenders to universities, research institutes and private consulting consortia. The results would then be presented and discussed at regional forums such as workshops, meetings and seminars. Having been discussed and accepted the papers could then be promoted as a vehicle to sensitize governments, aid agencies and international donors to the realities faced by their own post-conflict countries.

8.8.2. Sources of technical assistance

- Research that covers the strategies of the plethora of additional well-intentioned but uncoordinated international agencies offering assistance in field of E&SD.
- Research into the needs of national E&SD systems is a preliminary and essential activity requiring donor support. It is necessary to map the key economic areas in both
the rural and urban areas where immediate employment can be offered. The research would focus on the needs both immediate and medium to longer term.

- Research by the institutions having a direct responsibility for post-conflict issues may well be advised to look more carefully into this neglected area in post-conflict countries. A detailed ethnographic study of these situations may be a means of determining the best way to assist in equitable distribution of international aid and technical assistance.

- Research into the physical and financial resources required to develop, introduce and sustain a research unit to design a national E&SD system is a preliminary and essential activity that requires donor support. It is necessary to map the key economic areas in both the rural and urban areas where immediate employment can be offered. This research would focus on immediate needs and at the same time be concerned with the development of a sustainable system in the medium to longer term. The introduction of an appropriate E&SD system that can be expanded and improved as required should be preceded by analysis of what is available and a description of the components that make it up in a post-conflict context to complete the framework.

- Research using an ethnographic study of a set of selected villages, communities, townships and cities impacted by a selection of these situations may be a means of determining the best way to assist in equitable distribution of future international aid and development assistance.

- Research is required that would contribute to clarifying the roles of not just the ILO and UNESCO but the plethora of additional international and bilateral agencies offering assistance in field of E&SD.

8.8.3. Coordination of technical assistance

- Research is required that assists the Government to select the most appropriate form of coordination by providing options for future legislation based on labour codes from other countries, some of which are endowed with similar demographic, economic and social features. Analysis, both quantitative and qualitative, into the labour market in a post-conflict environment is essential and should commence as soon as it is physically possible.

- Research is required to assist the Government to select the most appropriate form of coordination by providing options for future legislation based on an agreed national labour code.
Research is required that would contribute to clarifying and/or coordinating the roles of various UN agencies to ensure that there is synergy in the field of technical education and vocational training.

8.8.4. System needs

- Research into the impact of micro-credit programmes that extends beyond the duration of international technical assistance would be a valuable contribution when formulating policies to support a nation-wide E&SD system.
- Research into the impact of micro-credit programmes in Muslim countries, especially those intended to be sustainable beyond the duration of international technical assistance, would be a valuable contribution when formulating policies to support a nation-wide micro-finance network when linked to the E&SD system.

8.8.5. System conditions

- Research into E&SD building design, aids for disabled trainees, opportunities for work and business development opportunities for communities of disabled requires immediate attention.
- Research is also needed to determine the impact of eventual certification of those who have entered the work force without the formal education and technical training traditionally found pre-conflict as the basis for establishing wage and salary levels.
- Research is also needed to determine the impact of eventual certification of those who have entered the work force without the formal education and technical training traditionally found pre-conflict as the basis for establishing wage and salary levels.
- Research into the definitions of job classifications most suited to the country in question would promote discussion and hopefully lead to a high degree of national consensus with all stakeholders. This would ensure that there is no confusion prior to the introduction of any legislation proposing the formation of a national E&SD coordinating body that will seek to become a statutory body in the future.
- Further research into the implications of such a programme that acknowledges the expectations of the direct beneficiaries, those trained, the donors who pay for the training and the impact on Government ministries involved should be undertaken as a matter of urgency.
8.9 Summary

Technical assistance provided to post-conflict countries in whatever form is needed that takes account of ethical issues and demonstrates ethically responsible behavior on the part of the international community. Reacting positively and pro-actively to the security and safety needs of the population is also essential. Interventions by well-meaning non-government organizations is a major benefit that is always welcome. Activities to support demobilization, disarmament and reconstruction at various levels are justified also from a social and economic perspective.

For the purposes of this thesis the issue of coordination employment and skills development (E&SD) has been researched and the conclusion reached is that considerable benefit can be achieved if policies are in place at the earliest possible time to ensure that employment needs are identified and skills development structures identified. Having such a framework in place, even during the conflict and with the agreement of the relevant government agencies is one essential component to promote future peace and stability.

What is not so evident is whether such E&SD structures are being developed as a result of the conflict, i.e. reactively or, whether this was in place prior to the outset of the conflict. Given that the UN system is charged with providing assistance to countries with the intention of ensuring long term social and economic sustainability it is incumbent upon the UN’s specialized agencies to have such long-term strategies in place as a matter of policy.

This research has concluded that the UN has been marginalized, especially in the case of Afghanistan, by a variety of donors, the development banks, bilateral agencies and non-government organizations who, because intervene earlier, can react more efficiently to the immediate needs of the population. The UN specialized agencies are constrained by bureaucratic structures and are frequently unable to react in a proactive manner in a conflict environment.

In respect of E&SD this involves the International Labour Organization (ILO), the specialized agency with a major role to play in promoting tripartite structures that will enshrine the need for a system of sustainable employment and skills development and
imbed these structures within all sectors of an economy. To achieve this it is necessary for ILO to assist governments to design and develop an holistic approach to E&SD that is continuously reviewed and adapted to suit the economy of each of the countries concerned. This research provides a model that will contribute to that objective.

8.10 Conclusions

The research undertaken demonstrates that the institutions and mechanisms to assist post-conflict countries are not sufficiently developed nor do they have a framework in place that address employment and the attendant issue of skills development. In many cases the TVET and Employment Services networks in each country were being written down for the first time. Because there was no attempt to develop an institutional memory in UN organizations the inputs of the key agencies lag behind the more proactive bilateral and NGO organizations. The ILO in particular lacked credible presence and hence was unable to advise this government or any of the previously mentioned post-conflict governments on employment and skills development issues. The coordination, design, development and implementation of policies in countries emerging from conflict require a more proactive approach. It is clear that in the post-conflict situation the ILO should conduct long-term and on-going research on issues related to E&SD, especially with its constituents at the country level, and should ground that experience though it’s regional advisor network. Technical assistance is required that provides a framework for the continued evolution of an E&SD system that is both relevant to the needs of the labour market and sustainable within the Government’s institutionalized budget.

The product of this thesis is such a planning tool and if applied based on agreed government policies and priorities, would provide for the efficient identification and delivery of the various sources of technical assistance.

The logical framework model at Appendix I provides a structure that can be used for planning when, where, at which level and for whom any form of existing or additional E&SD technical assistance can be integrated into the national system. The model links supply and demand structures and will improve efficient delivery of adequately prepared entry level skilled people for the labour market whilst providing the tools needed to conduct monitoring and evaluation at each of four levels including policy formulation, regulatory measures, application and delivery.
REFERENCES
The following work cited is arranged under a number of headings. Items in section 1 are held by the author. These are ILO documents written by various authors based on the Government’s needs at the time of writing.

1. Personal mission reports & Project documents

Mission reports. ILO Advisors are required to prepare a report on missions undertaken to assess particular issues related to E&SD. This could be initiated by the ILO or at the request of governments, bilateral or multilateral donors, development banks or workers’ and employers’ organizations. The resulting report is sent to the Government ministry directly impacted and discussed by the relevant technical personnel within the ILO. The report states the reasons for the mission, provides the background, summarizes the work undertaken, follow-up action to be taken and by whom. Lists of contacts made and documents collected are to be attached.

Project documents. In some cases a project is formulated to assist governments to clarify their thoughts as to how their particular requirements can be strengthened by utilizing international technical assistance. The ILO can undertake to source a donor and implement on behalf of the Government. The project can be undertaken directly by the Government on a cost sharing basis by offering an in-kind contribution or directly with a bilateral or multilateral donor, a philanthropic foundation or on a grant/loan basis with a development bank. It is also possible to have joint collaboration between any of the aforementioned sources.

2. General References


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- Association of Experts in the Fields of Migration & Development Coordination, (AGEF).
- International Rescue Committee (IRC)
- Ministry of Education & Science(MoES)
- Ministry of Labour Social Affairs Martyrs and Disabled (MOLSAMD)
- Sanayee Development Organization (SDO)
- Solidarite Afghanistan Belgique (SAB)


Pakistan, (1995), *Umbrella project for occupational skills training of Afghans, Project findings and recommendations, PAK/90/01/OCA & PAK/91/01/OCA*, International Labour Office, Geneva. (Declassified)


United Nations, (2003). Letter dated August 23rd from the Office of the Special Representative, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, of the Secretary-General for Afghanistan, Kabul to the Director-General, Mr. Juan Somavia, of the International Labour Organization, Geneva.


WB, (2008a). Interview with Alastair McKechnie on Helping Fragile States, retrieved from http://discuss.worldbank.org/content/interview/detail/5856/


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2. **Personal mission reports**

3. **Project documents.**
   Project Document Pak/90/01/OCA)
APPENDICES

A  NSD&MLP implementing partners
B  International & national institutions having a coordination mandate
C  Data items for semi-structured interviews
D  Significant projects/programmes impacting employment & skills development
E  Data collection form from NGOs
F  CSU requests to undertake data collection for the research
G  The ILO’s Human Resources Development Convention 142 of 1975
H  Strategic plan for sustaining the labour market information & analysis unit
I  Logframe model
NSD&MLP
Implementing partners

The following table attempts to capture the essential data of a selection of short-listed implementing partners (IPs). Many of them are NGOs who had been involved in relief and more recently have focused on humanitarian activities covering selected provinces/districts and in selected skill clusters. In addition the MOE and the MOLSAMD submitted proposals that would utilize their in-house training facilities.

Individual IPs provided this summary information to the senior staff of the NSD&MLP following a call for expressions of interest to undertake skills development courses. A short list was then drawn up and potential IPs were asked to supply further information on training that could be offered based on localized identification of demand in the labour market. The short listed training providers are shaded.

The huge potential for improvement in the delivery of skills development is evident. What is not so obvious to measure is the quality of the training being delivered by those within, and who are operating outside, the ambit of the NSD&MLP. The duration, skill level and unit cost and means of proficiency measurement is also unclear. Additional skills development training providers have been included where the information was available from other sources.

It is evident from the course titles used that there has been little attempt to standardize the nomenclature. The MOLSAMD did not provide standard terminology. There was no format/layout for course titles or descriptions based on a Standard Classifications of Occupations. Therefore it was difficult to determine course content and titles for those training providers bidding for financial support.

Non-Government Organizations offering skill development within the National Skills Development & Market Linkages Programme

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NO</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Address</th>
<th>Registration Status</th>
<th>Operational Provinces</th>
<th>Skills development courses offered</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Agency for Technical Cooperation &amp; Development (ACTED)</td>
<td>Head Office House 403 Daqiqi Watt Taimani-Dist 4 Kabul M: 070282539 Email: <a href="mailto:mkabul@acted.org">mkabul@acted.org</a></td>
<td>MoEc</td>
<td>Faryab Balkh Kunduz Baghlan Takhar Parwan</td>
<td>● Agriculture? ● Business &amp; commerce? ● Manufacturing ? ● services including: ● Carpentry ● Masonry ● Mechanics? Lacks clear information on courses &amp; titles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Adventist</td>
<td>House 11, Street 2</td>
<td>MoP/</td>
<td>Jawzjan,</td>
<td>● Animal husbandry</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

65 The list is indicative only. Time to verify data was not available. However the sources were in the public domain and the data derived from these sources varied in accuracy and detail. This is not a criticism as it should be noted that they were prepared for reasons other than for this particular research.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Organization</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Ministry</th>
<th>Province(s)</th>
<th>Courses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Development &amp; Relief Agency (ADRA)</td>
<td>Kolola Pushtra Street Shar-e-Naw, Kabul</td>
<td>MoEc</td>
<td>Samangan</td>
<td>Carpenter, Embroidery, Literacy &amp; life skills, Mechanics, Tailoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Aid (AAD)</td>
<td>MoEc</td>
<td>Badakhshan Ghor Samangan</td>
<td>Agriculture, Basic literacy &amp; numeracy, Basic veterinary, Bee keeping, Building/construction, Carpentry, Carpet weaving, Carpet Weaving, Embroidery, English, Food processing &amp; BDS, Fruit &amp; veg. prod. &amp; BDS, Health education, Knitting, Manufacturing/services, Small enterprise development/credit, Tailoring</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghan Relief</td>
<td>Katawas building opposite Cinema</td>
<td>Badakhshan Baglan</td>
<td>Black smithing, Carpenter</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>Afghan Carpet Exporters Guild</td>
<td>Not noted</td>
<td>Parwan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>Afghan Institute of Learning (AIT)</td>
<td>Not noted</td>
<td>Parwan</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>Agency of Consultancy for Training (ACT)</td>
<td>MoC</td>
<td>Ghazni, Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar, Kunar, Laghman, Logar, Noristan, Paktia, Paktika, Wardak, Zabul</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>Ahmed Shah Naba Training Association for Development of Educator’s Capacity (ATADEC)</td>
<td>Not noted</td>
<td>Badghis, Herat.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>Association of Experts in the Field of</td>
<td>MoP, MoEc</td>
<td>Herat.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Computer
- Embroidery
- English
- Masonry
- Metal work
- Radio
- Tailoring
- Tin Smithing
- Welding
- Carpet weaving
- Sewing
- Carpet weaving
- Building renovation
- Building construction
- Basic skills
- Silk worm production
- Tailoring
- Fishery
- Bag making
- Auto body repair
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migration &amp; Development Cooperation (AGEF)</th>
<th>Kunduz Mazar-e-Shariff Paktia</th>
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</table>
| | ● Auto mechanics  
| | ● Auto painting  
| | ● Carpentry  
| | ● Embroidery  
| | ● Masonry  
| | ● Metal/sheet work  
| | ● Motor cycle repair  
| | ● Painting & decorating  
| | ● Plumbing  
| | ● Radio/TV electric  
| | ● Stationary engine servicing  
| | ● Tailoring  
| | ● Tin Smithing  
| | Women’s courses:  
| | ● Business & administration  
| | ● Computer  
| | ● Cosmetician & hairdressing  
| | ● English  
| | ● Gardening  
| | ● Industrial tailoring  
| | ● Kindergarten teaching  
| | ● Tailoring  
| | ● Wood carving  
| | ● Business development services |

<table>
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<tr>
<th>11 Afghanistan Technical Vocational Institute (ATVI)</th>
<th>Attached to the Faculty of Engineering, Old Science Centre, Kabul University</th>
<th>Not noted</th>
<th>Kabul</th>
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| | ● Construction  
| | ● Horticulture  
| | ● Information & communication technology  
| | ● Vehicle maintenance |

| 12 Ayez Engineering Company (ECO) | 3rd part of Khair Khana Danish Bus stop Street 19 Left side, second house Kabul  
M: 0799182385  
Email: feco_org@hotmail.com | MoEc |
|----------------------------------|---------------------------------|------|
| | ● Animal husbandry  
| | ● Fishery  
| | ● Nursery  
| | ● Silk worm  
| | Commerce:  
| | ● Import of materials??  
| | Construction:  
| | ● Masonry  
| | ● Carpentry  
| | ● Plumbing  
| | ● Electrical works  
| | ● Metal works  
<p>| | ● Painting |</p>
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<th>Contact Information</th>
<th>Notes</th>
<th>Services</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>13</td>
<td>Afghanistan Reconstruction &amp; Planning Department (ARPD)</td>
<td>MoEc</td>
<td>Helmond, Kandahar, Nimroz, Urozgan, Zabul</td>
<td>Mosaic &amp; stone work, Tile &amp; ceramics work, Steel fixing, Production &amp; services, Show making, Leather work, Silk work, Woven carpet work, Bakery, Tailor, Confectionery, Prefabricated construction pipe &amp; concrete blocks, Jacket weaving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>Afghan Literacy Organization</td>
<td>MoP</td>
<td>Helmond Kandahar Nimroze Urozgan Zabul</td>
<td>Building construction, Canal rehabilitation, &amp; construction, Bore hole construction, Road rehabilitations &amp; construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>Afghan Pooshtesh (ICT) Ltd</td>
<td>M; 07992117671 Email <a href="mailto:info@afghanPooshesh.com">info@afghanPooshesh.com</a></td>
<td>Not noted</td>
<td>Kabul Telecommunications company</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>Afghanistan Reconstruction &amp; Development Services (ARDS)</td>
<td>Baban, Lab-e-Jar Station Hesa-e-Se Mustaqim Khair Khana M; 0799848019 Email <a href="mailto:barab.org@gmail.com">barab.org@gmail.com</a></td>
<td>Not noted</td>
<td>Kabul Dikundi Bamiyan Vocational training</td>
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<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>Afghan Social Services (ASS)</td>
<td>Note: Conducted survey in NE provinces but proposal out of date</td>
<td>Not noted</td>
<td>Badakhshan Kunduz Takhar Caterpentry, Masonry, Tin Smithing, Tailoring</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>Co-operation for Rehabilitation of Afghanistan (CRA)</td>
<td>M: 0799302397 <a href="mailto:Engakram_salam@yahoo.com">Engakram_salam@yahoo.com</a></td>
<td>Not noted</td>
<td>Kabul Ghazni Carpentry, Electrical motor winding, Masonry, Metal work, Motor cycle repair, Plumbing, Steel fixing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Location(s)</td>
<td>Industry(s)</td>
<td>Skills or Services</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>--------------------</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>De Nangahar De Sarmano Aw Colmo Fabrica</td>
<td>Not noted</td>
<td>Tin Smithing, Vehicle electrical, Vehicle engine repair, Vehicle engine repair, Vehicle panel beating, Welding (which type?)</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Fur garments, Leather processing, Micro credit</td>
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<td>Kabul</td>
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<td>Agriculture (what kind?), Literacy</td>
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<td>Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance</td>
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<td>Kapisa Balkh Faryab Herat.</td>
<td>Electrical Embroidery Masonry Tailoring Tin Smithing</td>
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<td>Danish Committee for Aid to Afghan Refugees (DACAAR)</td>
<td>Not noted Badghis Ghazni Herat. Laghmania Paktia Parwan</td>
<td>Agriculture Auto Mechanics Blacksmithing Carpentry Embroidery Literacy Masonry Tailoring</td>
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<td>Education &amp; Aid Center (EAC)</td>
<td><strong>Note: Labour market research!!</strong></td>
<td>MoEc Bamiyan Daikindi Ghazni Kabul Pawan Sari Pul Wardak</td>
<td>Adult education, Agriculture, Animal husbandry, Bag Making, Bee Keeping, Building construction, Building rehabilitation, Carpentry, Carpet weaving, Embroidery, Electrical equip. repair, Handicrafts, Literacy, Mobile Phone repair, Plumbing, Poultry raising, Stationary engine repair, Tailoring, Vehicle driving, Tin Smithing</td>
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<td>Educational &amp; Training Centre for poor women &amp; girls of Afghanistan (ECW)</td>
<td>Not noted</td>
<td>Kunduz Kabul Baghlan Badakhstan Takhar</td>
<td>Computer skills, Income generation??, Management skills??, Tailoring, Vocational Training??</td>
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<td>Health &amp; Development Centre for Afghan Women (HDCAW)</td>
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<td>International Alliance for Nation Development in Afghanistan (IANDA)</td>
<td>Taimani Watt, Haji Mohamad Dad Mosque, Street 4 House 8</td>
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<td>International Rescue Committee (IRC)</td>
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<td>Badghis Balkh Farah Gardez Ghanzni Herat. Jalalabad</td>
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<td>Just for Afghan Capacity and Knowledge (JACK)</td>
<td>Note: Market research/assessment MoP Takhat Kunduz Badakhstan</td>
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<td>● Painting  ● Metal working for construction  ● Plumbing  ● Electrical installation  ● Furniture making  ● Masonry  ● Carpentry  ● Smith craft?</td>
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<td>Ministry of Education (MOE)</td>
<td>Balkh Kabul Kapisa Parwan</td>
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<td>● Full range of formal courses to year twelve plus short courses in:  ● Agronomy  ● Car repair  ● Carpentry  ● Computer??  ● Electrical wiring  ● Machine??  ● Masonry  ● Plumbing  ● Radio TV repair  ● Refrigeration  ● Tailoring  ● Tin Smithing  ● Welding</td>
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<td>Ministry of Higher Education (MOHE)</td>
<td>● Full range of academic bachelor level degrees</td>
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<td>● Computer  ● Management  ● Gardening</td>
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<td>Ministry of Water &amp; Energy</td>
<td>● Electrical?  ● Hydrology  ● Security</td>
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<td>Tech. Courses?</td>
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<td>39</td>
<td>Ministry of Interior (MOI)</td>
<td>● Agricultural blacksmithing</td>
<td>● Tailoring</td>
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<td>41</td>
<td>KOICA</td>
<td>Kabul</td>
<td>● Automotive ● Carpentry ● Computer ● Dress making &amp; design ● Electrical wiring ● Plumbing ● Welding</td>
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<td>42</td>
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<td>Balkh</td>
<td>● Computer ● Electrical ● Welding/sheet metal</td>
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<td>Location</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>Bamiyan</td>
<td>Computer, Electrical, Tailoring, Welding/sheet metal</td>
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<td>44</td>
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<td>Kabul</td>
<td>Computer, Electrical, Welding/sheet metal</td>
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<td>45</td>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>AJVT Centres with NGOs 1. Herat (CC A)</td>
<td>Radio TV repair, Tailoring, Welding</td>
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<td>46</td>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>2. Jawzjan (ADRS)</td>
<td>Carpet weaving, Masonry, Welding</td>
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<td>3. Kunduz (KNF)</td>
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<td>4. Nangarhar (ACRU)</td>
<td>Computer operation, Plumbing, Tailoring</td>
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<td>49</td>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>5. Paktya (ADVTP)</td>
<td>Carpentry, Welding, Tailoring</td>
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Proposed National Skills development and Market linkages courses:

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<td>52</td>
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<td>Jawzjan</td>
<td>Carpet weaving, Masonry, Plumbing, Welding/sheet metal</td>
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<td>53</td>
<td>JICA</td>
<td>Kandahah</td>
<td>Auto body repair, Auto engine repair, Electrical wiring, Tailoring</td>
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<td>54</td>
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<td>Nangarhar</td>
<td>Carpet weaving, Computer, Plumbing, Tailoring</td>
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<td>Parwan</td>
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<td>Kapisa</td>
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<td>Bamiyan</td>
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<td><strong>Provinces</strong></td>
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<td>Kabul</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bamiyan</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

- Automotive
- Auto Engine repair
- Rickshaw repair
- Tractor repair
- Motor cycle repair
- Automotive panel beating
- Automotive painting
- Automotive wiring
- Vehicle blacksmithing?
- Vulcanizing
- Textiles
- Machine embroidery
- Tailoring group sitting?
- Tailoring individual
- Electrical
- Computer repairing
- Engineering works?
- Generator repair
- Mobile phone repair
- Radio/TV repair
- House wiring
- Handicrafts
- Carpet weaving
- Shoe making
- Knitting
- Hand embroidery
- Reed furniture making
- Reed screen making
- Ornamental planting
- Leather working
- Building/construction
- Carpentry
- Plumbing
- Steel fixing
- Mechanical
- Bicycle repair
- Machining
- Tin Smithing
- Welding
- General
- Bakery
- Beauty parlor
- Home management
- Photography
- Pottery
- Watch repairing
- Agriculture
- Nursery
- Vegetables
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<th>Province(s)</th>
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<tr>
<td>66</td>
<td>Save the Environment Afghanistan (SEA)</td>
<td>Kunduz, Takhar</td>
<td>Fish farming, Marketing, Mushroom production, Poultry raising</td>
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- Cereals
- Potato
- Orchard
- Poultry
- Fruit/vegetable/value added processing production
- Dairy
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<th>Organization</th>
<th>Location</th>
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<tr>
<td>67</td>
<td>Southern Afghanistan Development Association (SADA)</td>
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<td>Not noted</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>Not noted</td>
<td>Badakhshan Logar Samangan Takhar</td>
<td>Building construction, Carpentry, Lace making, Rug weaving, Stringer??, Tailoring, Welding</td>
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<td>70</td>
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<td>Nooristan</td>
<td>Building construction, Carpentry, Lace making, Shawl weaving, Tailoring, Welding</td>
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<td>71</td>
<td>Welfare &amp; Development Society for Social Services (WDSSS)</td>
<td>Not noted Gardez Kabul Khost Kunar Laghman Logar Nangrah Haar Nooristan Parwan</td>
<td>Patoo weaving, Chajaki weaving, Carpentry, Carpet weaving, Charma dozy, Electrical installation, Goat rearing, Masonry, Mechanical, Plumbing, Shoe making, Tailoring, Welding</td>
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<td>72</td>
<td>Sheladia</td>
<td>Not</td>
<td>Building construction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Associates Inc. (SAI)</td>
<td>noted</td>
<td>Carpenter/joinery, Electrical wiring, Metal fabrication, Painting/decorating, Plumbing</td>
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<tr>
<td>73</td>
<td>Not noted</td>
<td>Services, Auto repair, Beauty palour, Computer installation &amp; repair, Cooking, Domestic services, Electrical appliance repair, Hairdressing, Mobile phone repair, Motor cycle repair, Tire fitting</td>
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<td>74</td>
<td>Not noted</td>
<td>Agriculture, Bee keeping, Dairy farming, Goat &amp; sheep rearing, Greenhouse vegetable production, Poultry farming</td>
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<td>75</td>
<td>Not noted</td>
<td>7 region coverage??, Business &amp; commerce, Baking/confectionary, Carpet weaving, Lace work, Leather goods, Patoo weaving, Shoe/sandal-making, Silk production, Tailoring</td>
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<td>76</td>
<td>Not noted</td>
<td>Kandahar, Computer installation and operation</td>
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<td>77</td>
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<td>Information &amp; Communication Technology</td>
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<td>78</td>
<td>Not noted</td>
<td>Computer installation and operation, Building form work, Electrical installation, English, Furniture making, Literacy, Pipe fitting, Sanitation</td>
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<tr>
<td>213</td>
<td>Steel fixing</td>
<td>Tailoring</td>
<td>Bridal dress making</td>
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<td>214</td>
<td>Embroidery</td>
<td>Carpet weaving</td>
<td>Netting/cap making</td>
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<td>215</td>
<td>Business marketing</td>
<td>Blue print reading</td>
<td>Building operation &amp; maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>216</td>
<td>Carpentry</td>
<td>Drywall finishing</td>
<td>Electrical</td>
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<tr>
<td>217</td>
<td>Masonry</td>
<td>Painting</td>
<td>Plumbing</td>
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<tr>
<td>218</td>
<td>Safety training</td>
<td>Steel fixing</td>
<td>Welding</td>
</tr>
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</table>

**79**  
Contrack International Inc. (CII)  
Not noted  
- Blue print reading  
- Building operation & maintenance  
- Carpentry  
- Drywall finishing  
- Electrical  
- Masonry  
- Painting  
- Plumbing  
- Safety training  
- Steel fixing  
- Welding  

**80**  
Basic Education & employable Skill training (BEST)  
Note: Job Placement service  
Not noted  
- Auto mechanics  
- Bakery  
- Business development services  
- Carpentry  
- Carpet weaving  
- Computing  
- Embroidery  
- English  
- Motor cycle repair  
- Masonry  
- Panel beating  
- Plumbing  
- Tailoring  
- Vulcanizing  
- Welding  
- Radio repair  
- Lathe Machining  

**81**  
Training Human Rights Association for Afghan Women (THRA)  
Flat 1, Block 103, 2nd Macroyan, Kabul  
M: 070286774  
Email: roshan_sirran@yahoo.com  
Not noted  
- Nanagarhar  
- Kabul  
- Laghman  
- Nooristan  
- Kunarha  
- Mazar-e-Sharef  
- Human rights awareness  
- English  
- Sewing  
- Handicraft  
- Literacy  
- Computer skills  
- Management Skills  
- Tailoring  

**82**  
Afghan Corporation for Development (ACD)  
MoEc  
Not relevant to NSD&MLP  
- Income generation  

**83**  
Afghan  
MoJ  
- Income generation  

Note: Job Placement service  
Not noted  
- Bamiyan  
- Gardez  
- Ghazni  
- Kabul  
- Kandahar  
- Khost  
- Kinduz  
- Kunar  
- Laghman  
- Nangahar  
- Nuristan  
- Nooristan  
- Nangahar  
- Kabul  
- Laghman  
- Nooristan  
- Kunarha  
- Mazar  
- Mazar-e-Sharef
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<th>Women Business Council (AWBC)</th>
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<th>• Entrepreneurship • Business Development Services</th>
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<tr>
<td>84 Church World Service (CWS)</td>
<td>Not noted</td>
<td>No data</td>
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</table>
International and national organizations with a coordination mandate

The roles and positions of the various bodies purporting to facilitate coordination in Afghanistan see the summaries below.  

**Agency Coordinating Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR)**
ACBAR commenced its operations in 1988 “…by NGOs working with refugees in Pakistan”. Membership is made up of national and international NGOs and non-profit organizations. It produces a database of NGO activity throughout Afghanistan.

**Afghan Civil Society Forum (ACSF)**
The ACSF was formed in 2001 to provide a platform for dialogue and to develop the role of civil society in political decision making. It has revised its strategy in 2008 “…to focus on coordination, capacity building, advocacy, civic education and research”.

**Afghan NGO Coordination Bureau (ANCB)**
The ANCB was formed in 1991 to “…coordinate the activities of Afghan NGOs with the Afghan Government, The UN, International organizations and donor agencies”.

**Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF)**
ARTF was established in 2002 as the conduit for international donor funds to ensure that the national core budget was strengthened rather than NGOs and other actors. The ARTF also sees this as a means of coordinating technical assistance in support of government priorities. In 2008 ARTF was transformed “… into a programmatic, sector-oriented funding mechanism to drive the implementation of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) priorities”.

**Consultative Group(s) (CG)**
These CGs were formed in 2004 in eight areas, one of which was entitled Education. Their role was to “…resolve sector-specific issues and challenges, and maximize the coordination of development in Afghanistan”. When ANDS was finalized in 2008 CGs ceased to exist and the function was assumed by the JCMB.

**Joint Coordination and Monitoring Board (JCMB)**
Formed in 2006 following the endorsement of the Afghanistan Compact and the Interim ANDS the JCMB is currently the peak body responsible for overall coordination of the ANDS. Its membership includes all major stakeholders from the public and private sector, regional governments, international donors, development banks, the European Union and military personnel. It has three standing committees, one for each pillar of the ANDS. Of direct concern is the Economic and Social Development pillar within which education is a component.

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66 For additional details of the various coordinating roles see AREU, (2009). The A to Z Guide to Afghanistan assistance.
67 I requested information in 2004 of NGOs offering skills development but the data was not available. However ACBAR was advertising vacancies it received from its members and was offering this service to the MoLSAMD for staff posts. The MoLSAMD was benefiting at the same time from an ILO implemented Employment Service project.
National Area-Based Development Programme (NABDP)
Launched in 2002 by UNDP the project is linked to the Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD). NABDP is a National Priority Programme defined in the NDF. NABDP’s first phase promoted “…urgent recovery and longer-term development in priority areas of rural development while building government capacity …” Its second phase in 2006 was intended to serve as a key coordination mechanism for government and UN-supported rural development programmes. The five components include (i) Community Empowerment, (ii) Economic regeneration, (iii) Institutional development, (iv) Implementation support and (v) Rural energy.

National Development Framework (NDF)
The NDF “…was drawn up by the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA) in early 2002 as a road map for the development and reconstruction process in Afghanistan,” It identified the 16 National Development Programmes and six cross-cutting issues under three pillars human capital and social protection, physical infrastructure and an enabling environment for development. Consultative groups for each of the NDPs provided varied degrees of support and plans were formulated through Public Investment Programme proposals. The NDF was under the Ministry of Finance and was replaced when the Interim ANDS was introduced.

National Priority Programme(s) (NPP)
Six NPPs were established prior to 2004, the next six being agreed following a series of assessments and reflection by those responsible for the Government’s policies. A key sub-committee of the Cabinet, the NPP Budget Committee oversees the financial aspects of each NPP. An oversight committee provides overall general and operational guidance. During the first phase it was found that “Existing NPPs have also provided an important mechanism for the relevant ministries to come together with a range of donors to devise strategies and solutions to (sic) help confront some of Afghanistan’s most serious challenges in a genuine spirit of partnership”. Each NPP has (i) a steering committee (SC) made up of government ministers “…to ensure that there is government ownership and continuity, where policy decisions can be taken and oversight of the programme maintained” and (ii) a “time-limited” Joint Planning team to facilitate the rapid implementation of the programme. Funding would initially come from the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF), with the expectation that other budgetary support would eventually be institutionalized through the government budgetary mechanisms. A line ministry would assume executive powers. Each SC has a programme implementation unit (PMU) to manage the NPP and build local capacity ensure sustainability.

The NPP of interest is the Skills Development and Market Linkages Programme located physically within the MOLSAMD. This NPP is chaired by the Minister of Higher Education. Ministry membership of the SC includes representatives from Commerce, Communications, Education, Haj, Higher Education, Labour Social Affairs, Martyrs & Disabled, Light Industries, Mines and Industry and Transport.

Donor support is from multiple sources and includes the Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) Trust Fund, the West German Bundesministerium für Wirtschaftliche Zusammenarbeit (BMZ), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the

69 The development of each NPP was predicated on an existing policy in order for it to be funded. The steering committee would more likely be concerned with delivery strategies and possible changes if policy shifts are expected.
Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA), the Korean International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United States Aid (USAid), and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD).

National Solidarity Programme (NSP)
Public Administration Reform (PAR)
The PAR is one of the priorities within the Afghanistan Compact and the ANDS. It “….seeks to create an efficient, effective and transparent civil service in Afghanistan”. Its aims include addressing problems of fragmented government structures, improving coordination among agencies, improving linkages with the provincial governments, increasing accountability, building civil service staff capacity, providing robust recruitment, remuneration and promotional procedures. The NSP delivery strategy had its critics, due in part to the lack of capacity to implement projects. This also a reason for some donors to delay moving funds from international NGOs and UN agencies to the Government. (Suhrke 2006: 20)

Provincial Reconstruction Team(s) (PRT)
PRTs are small units made up of civilian and military personnel located in military bases. From its inception in 2002 by US forces. Other countries providing military assistance have embraced this concept and it has expanded to 28 locations. The objective is to “…assist the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to extend its authority, in order to facilitate the development of a stable and secure environment in the identified areas of operations, and enable Security Sector Reform (SSR) and reconstruction efforts”. Monitoring and guidance is through the Ministry of Interior (MOI) who chairs an Executive Steering Committee. PRTs have no common mandate. Activities are dependent upon the location, the philosophies and caveats of the troop-contributing countries and the work being carried out by other agencies providing technical assistance.

United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)
UNAMA absorbed two other agencies that preceded it, namely the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance to Afghanistan (UNOCHA) formed in 1993 and the UN Special Mission Afghanistan (UNSMA) formed in 1996. UNOCHA was “…charged with promoting and coordinating humanitarian assistance in a complex emergency.” In a lessons learned report in 1996 entitled “Coordination in a fragmented state” the authors recommended, among others, a unitary approach to coordination, suggesting that there is an artificial distinction between humanitarian and development assistance and this mitigates against the “…urgent need to rationalize, if not unify, the current double coordination tracks of UNOCHA and UNDP”. (UNOCHA, 1996:3) The UN Security Council established UNAMA in 2002 as a means of fulfilling the UN’s obligations outlined in the Bonn Agreement of 2001. Since that time the mandate has been extended five times, the last being in 2009. “UNAMA, the main point of contact for the entire UN system in Afghanistan, is the only agency authorized to speak on behalf of the UN regarding political insecurity in the country”. UNAMA provides guidance to the 20 UN agencies through the UN Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF), an operational framework based on a Common Country Assessment (CCA). The CCA has four critical areas of support, including Health and Education, latter being of direct importance to this thesis.

United Nations – Civil Military Coordination (UN-CMCord)
This body has oversight responsibilities for coordination of UN activities. In a compilation of organizations, institutions, non government organizations and donors the
now defunct Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance (OCHA) listed 191 entities in the country. Not all of the entries in UN-CMCoord list have a direct impact of E&SD. However the list is an indicator of the complexity of coordination when there are multiple contributors, especially in a post-conflict situation.

**United Nations Development Programme, (UNDP).**
The formulation of a Common Country Assessment is undertaken with the participation of all major stakeholders and UN specialized agencies as a precursor to a future United Nations Development Assistance Framework (UNDAF). The stated intention of the Afghanistan UN country team is that the UNDAF “…will prove a useful source of information for better coordination and programming of United Nations support in the country”. The sector of the UNDAF that directly concerns this thesis is the third chapter entitled Economic Development and Growth where it discusses employment and chapter four entitled Social Wellbeing which includes education. A fifth chapter headed Areas of Cooperation describes the support that the UN system can provide to “…allow people to lead long, healthy and creative lives, to enjoy decent living standards and freedoms, to possess dignity, self-respect and respect for others” UNDP:2004a:70)
APPENDIX C

DISCUSSION PROMPTS
Data items – semi structured interviews with key stakeholders

Introduction:
The intention in asking the framework questions posed in Chapter Three was to firstly establish the extent of the individual’s knowledge and experience in the area of E&SD and build confidence and trust with the participant(s). The main questions are supported by prompts to guide in-depth one-on-one interviews, where these interviews are possible. Some framework questions are repeated in each group and may provide some level of triangulation of information. This will be carried out with five main contributors, namely government, non-government, bi-lateral and multilateral donors, the International Security Assistance Force and UN agencies. A cross-section of key informants from public sector ministries, the international aid community, international security forces, provincial reconstruction teams, provincial development committees, non-government and private sector organizations, employers’ and workers’ organizations and community leaders were included. An opening discussion prompt would be to ask each of the participants to discuss their professional background and their experience in relation to E&SD in the country and the region.

All stakeholders

Q.1. What are your views on the ability of Afghan government ministries to undergo a paradigm shift or major change in their approach to improving employment through skills development? [For all participants]
Prompts
Q1 Can you explain the current situation with respect to the coordination of E&SD? If so please provide a diagram of the E&SD system as you understand it and a short description of the key components.
Q.2 If you are not familiar with the E&SD system, when do you consider it necessary to plan for the introduction of a national system of coordination for employment and related skills development?
Q3. What would you do to plan, introduce, improve and coordinate E&SD?
Q.4 Who do you think should be responsible for the administration, management and implementation of a national E&SD system?
Q.5 What are your views on the ability of Afghan government ministries approach to improving employment opportunities through skills development?
  ● Are you aware of the Government’s policy for an E&SD system?
  ● If so where did you obtain this information?
  ● Who prepared the documentation?
  ● Is it in English/Pashto or Dari?
  ● Does the policy radically change the exiting E&SD system?
  ● Do you think there is a need to make any changes to the current E&SD system?

70 The idea of posting/distributing a letter followed by a set of questions to be returned was not considered feasible, due in part to language difficulties and the lack of a reliable post.

71 The questions also apply in non conflict-affected countries. However they are a major issue in post-conflict countries where resources are limited. The competition for international and extra-budgetary government funds is aggressively pursued by direct and intended beneficiaries, frequently based on misinformation, always considered as urgently needed. As a result funds are often committed without proper needs analysis to the detriment of the overall technical assistance programme.
If so what would you change?
How would you go about introducing these changes?
What problems do you foresee in making changes?
How would it impact those entrenched in government posts?
How long do you think it would take to ensure sustainability?
How much money do you think it would require to institutionalize these changes?
Who would be the people most benefiting from these changes?
Who would need to be directly involved in implementing any significant changes?
Do you think it appropriate for international agencies to suggest radical solutions?
Are you confident that there is sufficient capacity within existing government ministries to implement any necessary radical changes?
What were your expectations from technical assistance from international agencies, NGOs and others?
What is your general opinion of the delivery of that or any future technical assistance?
What would you do differently in the future, if needed, that is different?

Government Ministries

Q.1. What do you think the Government expectations are concerning the role of internationally supported technical assistance for E&SD? [For any ministry official(s)]

Prompts
- Do you think technical assistance is needed to improve the linkages between E&SD?
- Are protocols in place defining the role of the international agencies in relation to the Government?
- What do these protocols signify?
- Is there an agreed and widely understood Afghan national E&SD policy, strategy and implementation plan in place?
- What legal framework is in place within which an international agency and the host ministry can operate?
- What is the mandate of an international agency and does it compliment E&SD policy?
- How was this arranged between the technical assistance provider, the immediate beneficiaries and the Government?
- Is there competition/maneuvering by government officials for institutionalized and extra-ordinary financial and human resources?
- Is there tension between key ministries created by lack of or perceived unequal resource allocation at government/donor/multilateral bank level?
- If so is this a function of past policies and experience and/or new policies?
- Has any proposal been prepared by your ministry to strengthen E&SD?
- Who provided any earlier technical assistance for E&SD?
- How was this requested?
- Who prepared the request?
Q.2. When do you think is appropriate to intervene to provide technical assistance to develop a national \( \text{E&SD} \) policy, strategy and implementation plan in post-conflict countries? \( ^{72} \) [For a specific ministry]

**Prompts**

- When do you think it is appropriate to receive external technical assistance for \( \text{E&SD} \)? i.e. lack of capacity at govt. level, technology change, economic shifts, natural disasters such as drought etc., prolonged civil war, and impact of globalization.
- What do you think is the best way to use the resources associated with technical assistance from international agencies? i.e. have a joint programme/project with international and/or only national staff, give the funds directly to the Government, etc.
- What are your experiences with the delivery of international technical assistance? i.e. scope and focus of the programme/project, staffing, delivery, budget, accountability, performance assessment, evaluation etc.
- What would you do to improve the process of programme/project preparation and delivery of technical assistance from international agencies?
- When was this programme/project experience gained?
- Who did what? i.e. which ministry, NGO donor etc,
- Where was it done? i.e. city/town/village.
- How well was it done? i.e. follow up to link the skills development with job performance and/or placement.
- Which economic sub-sector did it focus on? i.e. industry, commerce, agriculture, mining, military etc.
- Why do you think the Government selected that/those sub-sectors? i.e. key areas from a national economic and social development plan, donor influence, proximity to urban populations, support for provincial development, support for community development etc.
- When did you last receive an opportunity to discuss the national \( \text{E&SD} \) system with other colleagues in-country, regionally and internationally?

Q.3. Are there differences in philosophy as to the purpose of the education system amongst those supporting the need for skills development programmes that provide competencies that enable graduates to enter the labour market? [For a specific ministry]

**Prompts**

- How does your ministry contribute \( \text{E&SD} \) within the ministry’s ANDS document?
- What other actions should the Government take to coordinate the delivery of \( \text{E&SD} \) activities?
- How are decisions taken to support \( \text{E&SD} \) at ministry level?
- What form does this contribution take?
- Who is responsible to prepare this submission?
- Who reviews, approves and submits this contribution?
- How is it funded?
- What do you consider is the scope or the role of your ministry in the delivery of \( \text{E&SD} \) leading to employment?
- How many other ministries are delivering \( \text{E&SD} \) programmes for jobs subject to market forces? \( ^{73} \)

\( ^{72} \) Taken from the earlier CSU research proposal text.
Do you consider that there is any duplication in the delivery of E&SD courses? 
How can this be improved? 
Do you believe there can be culture free humanitarian/development/technical assistance? 
Is language an issue in interpretation of meanings by all involved in the decision-making process? 
Do international agency advisors providing technical assistance come with a preconceived idea of what should make up an E&SD system? 
What documentation is available to your staff to explain global and/or regional experiences in post-conflict countries? 
Is knowledge of the country/language a prerequisite for appointment? 
What is the ratio of expatriate to national staff?

Q.4. Which projects and programmes are being offered by external sources at this time to your ministry? [For particular ministries]

Prompts
• At what stage, in relation to the time of the peace agreement, were these proposals put before the Government? 
• Who are the international agencies offering technical assistance to the Government for E&SD? 
• How were their proposals formulated? 
• Were you involved and at what stage of the proposal’s development were you involved? 
• What documentation is available to you to explain global and/or regional experiences in post-conflict countries? 
• Who are the international agencies offering technical assistance to your ministry for E&SD? 
• Given your experience to date would you have gone about the formulation in a different way? 
• Has the project produced the outputs and met the indicators of success stated in the project document? 
• Have the assumptions and the risks associated with the project’s formulation been overcome?

Q.5. In which way does your ministry/organization contribute to the national economic and social development plan as described by the Afghan National Development Strategy? [For a specific ministry]

Prompts
• How were decisions taken to support E&SD in the ministry’s strategy document? 
• What form does this contribution take? 
• Who was responsible to prepare this submission? 
• Who reviewed, approved and submitted this contribution? 
• Who was it forwarded it to? 
• What do you consider is the scope or the role of your ministry/organization in the delivery of E&SD that has a direct connection to income generation?

73 A national E&SD coordination system, whilst catering for all those requiring training that leads to certification focuses on market forces jobs impacted by shifts in the economy. Jobs that are influenced by demographic data are usually excluded. This latter group includes personnel for the military, police, firemen, nurses, public utility staff, school teachers etc., whose numbers are relatively static.
• How many other ministries are delivering E&SD programmes for jobs subject to market forces?
• What documentation is available to you to explain global and/or regional experiences in post-conflict countries?
• Do you consider that there is any duplication in the delivery of skills development courses?
• How can this duplication be reduced?
• What other actions should the Government take to coordinate the delivery of E&SD activities?

Q.6. What are the Government’s expectations as to the role of technical assistance from international agencies in developing E&SD in your country?

Prompts
• Do you think this technical assistance from international agencies is needed for E&SD?
• Has this been requested?
• Do you know who prepared the request?
• Are you aware of any previous technical assistance for E&SD?
• How was this arranged between the technical assistance provider and the Government?
• What are/were your expectations from technical assistance from international agencies?
• What is your general opinion of the delivery of that or any future technical assistance?
• What would you do, if needed, that is different?

UN agencies, development banks and bilateral donors.

Q.1. How does your international agency collaborate with a Government in deciding what will be undertaken in E&T field for your country?

Prompts
• Are protocols in place defining the role of the international agencies in relation to the Government?
• What do these protocols signify?
• Who should take the lead in developing/strengthening/ an E&SD policy/strategy/implementation plan?
• Is there an agreed national skills development policy, strategy and implementation plan in place?
• What is the mandate of the international agency and does it compliment the policy?
• What legal framework is in place within which the international agency and the host ministry can operate?
• Is there any legislation in place related to employment and skills training that addresses:
  • National Technical and Vocational Education (TVE) and E&SD coordination?
  • Levy/grant systems?
  • Apprenticeship systems?
  • Access to government skills development budget?
  • Prohibited and/or restricted occupations for foreigners?
  • What is the breadth of the Employment Service?
What systems are in place to provide vocational guidance, job placement?
- Unemployment/vacancy register
- Labor market data
- Labor market analysis
- Statistical analysis/prediction.
- Is the E&T system functioning efficiently?
- Is there a clear division of responsibility for skills development within/between government ministries?
- What is Government policy regarding the private sector’s role in skills development?
- Is there a system of certification in place?
- Who is authorized to assess competency/issue certificates?
- Who administers/manages/monitors the certification system?
- Who is responsible for the provision/coordination of skills development?
- Is skills development provided by the Government?
- Is skills development provided by private proprietary training providers?
- Is skills development provided by Non Government Organizations (NGOs)?

Q.2. Does your agency offer direct technical assistance related to the E&SD system? [For a specific international agency]

Prompts
- Who did what? i.e. which ministry, NGO, donor etc,
- Where was it done? i.e. city, town, village.
- How well was it done? i.e. numbers trained, impact on the community, follow up to link the skills development with job performance/placement.
- Which economic sub-sector did it focus on? i.e. industry, commerce, agriculture, mining, military or multi-sector etc.
- Who determined which sector to focus skills development on?
- Why do you think the NGO, international agency or the Government selected that/those sub-sector(s)? i.e. key areas from the ANDS, donor influence, political pressure.
- When do you think it is appropriate to receive external technical assistance for E&SD? i.e. lack of capacity at govt. level, technology change, economic shifts, natural disasters such as drought etc., prolonged civil war, and globalization.
- What do you think is the best way to use the resources associated with technical assistance from international agencies? i.e. have a joint programme/project with international and/or only national staff, give the funds directly to the Government and have international monitoring etc.
- What are your experiences with the delivery of international technical assistance? i.e. scope and focus of the programme/project, staffing, delivery, budget, accountability, performance assessment, evaluation etc.
- What documentation was available to you to explain global and/or regional experiences in post-conflict countries?
- What would you do to improve the process of programme/project preparation and delivery of technical assistance from international agencies?
- When was this programme/project experience gained?
- When did you last receive an opportunity to discuss E&SD systems with other colleagues in-country, regionally and internationally?
How can the coordination of international agencies interventions in the E&SD field be better coordinated and managed in post-conflict countries?
How can international agencies, including development banks, bilateral donors, international and national NGOs and UN specialized agencies maximize the benefits of their technical assistance contributions in an integrated way?
What is the role of UN agencies in relation to their national counterpart ministry in a post-conflict situation?
How can improved efficiency, effectiveness and relevance of UN interventions be achieved?
Is there a difference in philosophy within and between ministries as to the purpose of education and training for youth, women and adults to gain entry level employable skills?
Is the tension between key ministries created by lack of or perceived unequal resource allocation at government/donor/multilateral bank level?
Do you think there is competition/maneuvering by government officials for institutionalized and extra-ordinary financial and human resources?
Is this competition/maneuvering a function of past policies and experience and/or new policies?
Do international agency advisors providing technical assistance come with preconceived ideas of what should make up an E&SD system?
What documentation was available to you or to your field staff prior to or during their period of appointment to explain contemporary strategies to improve the E&SD in post-conflict countries?
Is there such a thing as culture free technical assistance?
Is language an issue in interpretation of meanings by all involved in the decision-making process?

Q. 3. Are you aware of other projects or programmes offering technical assistance in the area of E&SD?

Prompts
- How can international technical assistance in the area of E&ST be better coordinated in post-conflict countries?
- How can international agencies, including development banks, bilateral donors, international and national NGOs and UN specialized agencies maximize the benefits of their technical assistance contributions in an integrated way?
- Who should take the lead to develop guidelines for international technical assistance in this area?
- How can the coordination of international agencies interventions in the E&SD field be better coordinated and managed in post-conflict countries?
- What is the role of UN agencies in relation to their national counterpart ministry in a post-conflict situation?
- How can improved efficiency, effectiveness and relevance be measured?
- Is there a difference in philosophy as to the purpose of education and those supporting the need for training youth and adults to gain entry level skills?
- Is the tension between key ministries created by lack of, or perceived unequal resource allocation at government/donor/multilateral bank level?
- Is the competition/maneuvering by government officials for institutionalized and extra-ordinary financial and human resources a function of past policies and experience and/or new policies?
- Do international agency advisors providing technical assistance come with a preconceived idea of what should make up an E&SD system?
Do bi-laterals try to impose their own systems of E&ST, frequently ignoring or seriously assessing existing national systems and procedures?

What documentation is available to national counterparts to explain global and/or regional experiences in post-conflict countries?

Do you believe there can be culture free humanitarian/development/technical assistance?

Is language an issue in interpretation of meanings by all involved in the decision-making process?

Non Government Organizations

Q1. What do you understand the role of an NGO in a post-conflict situation to be?

Prompts

- Do you provide humanitarian and/or development assistance?
- What process is followed to decide what form your assistance should take?
- What types of assistance have you been offering?
- Were you here prior to the cessation of hostilities?
- Where you able to plan for the post-conflict situation?
- Do you believe this early planning was of benefit to your programme?
- How many people/projects/programmes are you responsible for?

Q2. How can your organization contribute to the strengthening of the national E&SD system?

Prompts

- Have you been active in E&SD Afghanistan?
- If so how long has this been operational?
- What is the focus of your organization in a post-conflict situation?
- Which government ministry did you seek registration with?
- Which Government ministries do you have reporting relationships with?
- Do you have official or non-official contact with UN organizations?
- Is that contact of benefit to your programme?
- Is there any formal coordination of NGO activities related to E&SD?
- Can overall coordination of national and international agencies offering this type of technical assistance be improved?
- Are there limitations/restrictions/embargos on the type of post-conflict E&SD technical assistance you can offer?
- In a post-conflict environment does your mandate include humanitarian and/or development assistance?
- What are your priorities for humanitarian/development/technical assistance and what do you use as a determinant when deciding what should have precedence?
- What period of time does your organization normally offer post-conflict assistance?
- How do you see your organization contributing to the improvement of general living conditions of individuals and communities in the post-conflict situation?
- What documentation is available to you or your staff to explain global and/or regional experiences in post-conflict countries?
- Is language an issue in interpretation of meanings by all involved in the decision-making process?
- Do you believe there can be culture free humanitarian/development/technical assistance?
• Is skills development through entrepreneurship, self-employment, or wage employment acknowledged by your NGO as a viable means of self-reliance?

Q.3. Does your organization have a strategy to promote entry level training for ex-combatants, unemployed youth, women and adults?

Prompts

**Ex-combatants**
• Are you aware of any measure to integrate ex-combatants into the work force?
• If so what is your experience?
• Do you think that ex-combatants are willing to be integrated?
• Do you know of any ex-combatants who have been involved in reintegration projects?
• How were they integrated?
• Have they succeeded in civil society as contributors to the economy?

**Youth**
• Are you aware of the numbers of people between school-leaving age and the mid twenties who are without work?
• Do you know the numbers who exit each formal education level each year?
• Do you know the number of non formal course graduated who are entering the labour market each year?
• Do you know the number of short course graduates who enter the labour market each year?

**Women**
• How can women contribute to the economy?
• What suggestions would you make to ensure that women are able to contribute?
• Have you any experience with working with women in this or previous employment?
• Do you consider they were able to contribute?

**Adults**
• Has the Government been able to provide adequate skills development for adults leading to income generation?

**Key issues for analysis**
• Is there tension between key ministries created by lack of or perceived unequal resource allocation at government/donor/multilateral bank level?
• Is there competition/maneuvering by government officials for institutionalized and extra-ordinary financial and human resources?
• If so is this a function of past policies and experience and/or new policies?
• Is language an issue in interpretation of meanings by all involved in the decision-making process?
• Do international agency advisors providing technical assistance come with a preconceived idea of what should make up an E&SD system?
• What documentation is available to explain global and/or regional experiences in post-conflict countries?
• Is there such a thing as culture free technical assistance?
Significant projects impacting E&SD

The sample items below were taken from a variety of sources including personal copies of programme/project documents, texts provided by colleagues and the Internet. Each project/programme is annotated. The list is provided as a sample of those I have reviewed in a desk study as having a significant E&SD component.

Humanitarian assistance:

UN Development assistance:
   IOM works closely with the Ministries of Public Health and Education in order to construct hospitals, midwifery training schools and provincial teacher training colleges, which will benefit millions of people throughout the country. This project builds on a successful IOM programme which has built a total of 502 schools and clinics.

2. Return of Expatriate Qualified Afghans project. (2001). (US$ 5 million)
   The International Organization for Migration’s intention was to seek the assistance of expatriate Afghans to assist in the reconstruction effort by supporting incumbent public servants to implement policy and build institutional capacities within the public sector. As of 2003 493 highly qualified expatriate Afghans nationals where in key positions in 21 ministries and 41 NGOs and

   Implementing Partners / Responsible parties: FAO, ILO, UNDP, UNICEF, UN-HABITAT, UNESCO, UNV, UNFPA, and UNAMA.
   The project had a large number of outputs including improved access to livelihood opportunities, through increased awareness, education and skills development.

Development Banks

Asian Development Bank

The ADB is a significant contributor to the redevelopment effort in Afghanistan. As of 2008 the total was US$ 1.77 billion. As the fourth largest donor the Bank has pledged an additional US$ 1.5 billion to 2013.

The ADB programmes/projects that impact E&SD as Loans and Grants include:

   The project was supported by three donors namely the Japanese Fund for Poverty Reduction and the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development and the Canadian International Development Agency. It provided education for children and adults, skills development in road rehabilitation, basic health care and micro credit for returning refugees and the displaced.

The project was to rebuild the education system by constructing new buildings and providing equipment and materials.

The Project focused on three components in the north of the country namely rehabilitation and construction of primary national roads, repair and rebuilding power transmission lines rehabilitation of damaged gas production, transmission and distribution facilities and rehabilitation of irrigation infrastructure.

The project provided funds to rehabilitate a stretch of road leading to the border with Uzbekistan.

The project was to provide communities with the opportunity to participate in processes that impact their livelihoods, develop infrastructure, promote natural resource management, provide access to credit and provide business development services to create micro enterprises.

The project rehabilitated traditional irrigation systems and provided short-term employment for farmers.

The project reconstructed an unpaved section that is part of the national ring road.

The project rehabilitated this section of road and established a toll facility and weigh bridge.

The project loan constructed a transmission network and the grant covered construction and rehabilitation of substations and the low voltage distribution system for 11 rural towns.

The project included integrated water resources management, water resources and irrigation development, agriculture and livelihood services and capacity development and project management through rehabilitation and upgrading of 65,000 hectares of traditional irrigation systems.

The project will rehabilitate a section of road to link to the national ring road.
The project developed four business support centres to assist farmers, agri-
processors and traders to profitably produce, process and market products. An 
agri-processing plant was established, credit made available and training and 
development support provided.

The project will connect power from Tajikistan to the national grid and finance 
the construction of transmission lines to connect to Kabul.

The project has four components including construction, ancillary and 
emergency works, road maintenance and business process development on the 
national ring road.

The project is to develop the agricultural sector’s market infrastructure, build 
facilities to establish standards in livestock and horticulture and build 
laboratories to certify product quality.

World Bank.

By far the largest source of funds the WB has a number of relevant programmes/projects 
impacting E&SD in its portfolio. As of 2008 the Bank had 21 active projects with 
commitments of US$ one billion. 75 Earlier three programmes known as budget support 
operations covered emergency public works, infrastructure reconstruction and education 
rehabilitation.

The WB projects that impact E&SD include:

1. Afghanistan Reconstruction Fund. (ARTF) 002. US$3.7 billion, of which US$ 2.3 
billion has been received [as of 2008]. 
The Fund is one of the major instruments for financing the country’s recurrent 
budget deficit and was set to evolve into a major source of technical assistance 
and investment support. It is jointly managed by the World Bank, the United 
Nations Development Programme, the Asian Development Bank and the Islamic 
Development Bank.

Prepared to support small-scale reconstruction and development activities 
identified by local Community Development Councils. The project has funds 
provided by the Japanese Social Development Fund and the Afghanistan 
Reconstruction Fund which is supported by 28 donors. Within that portfolio ten 
percent was identified to “…improve livelihoods and generation of income…” 
and a further “…10 percent for education infrastructure”.

3. National Emergency Employment Programme (NEEP) 2003. This programme 
had a number of projects.

3.1 The NEEP project for Rural Access was to assist the Government in 
providing targeted social protection and improving livelihoods of the rural poor.

The objective was to be realized through labour-based rural access infrastructure projects. US$ 22 million.

3.2 The NEEP project for Demobilization, Disarmament and Re-integration and Rural Livelihood Support was to create employment opportunities for ex-combatants in order to facilitate their re-integration into society. US$ 19.6 million.

3.3 The NEEP project prepared “… to assist the Government to enable the rural population to benefit from round year-round access to basic services and facilities… [and] creating jobs where feasible”. US$ 39.2 million. [An extension entitled the National Emergency Rural Access Project (NERAP) was approved and further US$ 112 million allocated].

3.4 The Creation (of) Future Potential Entrepreneurs: Targeting Youth project. This was to improve the economic and social status of youth by preparing them for careers and assisting them to generate income on a sustained basis. US$ 2.98 million.

The two project components were linked through a system of block grants at village level for approved sub-projects. These projects could focus on any of the following; (i) public infrastructure, (ii) community assets and revolving funds, social services and training. The grants could also cover the cost of labour, materials, tools, transportation and rental of equipment. Technical assistance was provided.

To pilot the provision of teacher training, direct grants to communities, to rehabilitate school buildings and teaching materials in four provinces. A mid-term review suggested this be extended to all 34 provinces.

To progressively restore basic operational performance at six core universities. This included partnerships with international universities and the procurement of books for libraries.

This was to remove bottlenecks in the transport network on an emergency basis, and support government efforts to rehabilitate highways and civil aviation programmes. The project was extended with US$ 45 million for major highway rehabilitation.

This was to expand the communications network to government employees throughout the country and set up linkages between Kabul and the provinces.

This was to provide reliable and equitable distribution of water to farms in the project areas.

This supported reconstruction and rehabilitation for the urban poor and to ensure access to basic services.
10. Emergency Power Rehabilitation Project. US$ 105 million. This was to improve the supply and distribution of electric services to Kabul through rehabilitation of the supply network and connection to the North East Transmission system.

11. Improvement of Power Supply to Kabul Project. US$ 7.4 million. This was to improve the availability and reliability of power supply in Kabul. It had three components. Partial rehabilitation of the Mahipar Hydropower Station, the rehabilitation of the 110 KV transmission lines and the supply and installation of street lighting.

12. Emergency Horticulture and Livestock Project. US$ 20 million. The project has a number of international donors. There were a number of objectives. Key among them was the expectation that it will improve and provide an incentive framework for private investment and contribute to the Government’s counter-narcotics agenda. The UN’s Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) assisted with integrated pest control management. The project also sought to assist some 25,000 women enhance their income from rural small holder production activities.

13. Private Sector Development Support Project (PSD). (2007) US$ 25 million. The project was to provide services and facilities, including electricity, water and telecommunications and capacity-building of government agencies to promote Afghanistan as an investment destination. An industrial park was also envisaged.

14. ARTF Microfinance Support for Poverty Reduction Project. US$ 119.3 million. The project assisted the Government to develop a sustainable micro-finance sector that was flexible, convenient and affordable for poor people.

15. Urban Water Supply and Sanitation Project. (2005). US$ 41 Million. This was to support the project in the short-term to cover five components namely the Kabul water supply, Kabul sanitation, Provincial town water supply and sanitation, engineering support and technical assistance and finally financial support to the Central authority.

16. Rural Water Supply Project. (2006). US$ 5 million. The intention was to provide water and sanitation services to eight provinces and in doing so to strengthen the capacity of central and provincial government, the private sector, non-government organizations and community services.

17. National Skills Development and Market Linkages Project. (2008). US$ 35 million. The project was intended to increase the number of skilled Afghans and create a high-quality TVET system that is equitable, market responsive and cost effective. The project is expected to provide this training to 150,000 individuals by 2010. See benchmarks in the ANDS. The project also intends to establish a coordinated national skills development system and lead to the formation of an autonomous national policy body.

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Statement for the WB economist and Project Team Leader, Mr. V. Sundararaman.
DATA COLLECTION FORM

SKILLS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMMES

AFGHANISTAN

- The International Labour Organization (ILO) has been asked by a number of Government and Non Government Organizations to collect data on training for skills development and related activities.
- The purpose of the data collection exercise is to promote the exchange of information and services related to skills development.
- By providing this information your organization will improve linkages with others who can help trainees.
- These services include the availability of:
  - Labour market information from various sources
  - Employment services including counseling and guidance, and job placement
  - Follow up services for trained people requiring additional support
  - Credit facilities through micro finance service providers
  - Additional or alternative skills development providers
  - Business Development Services for Micro and Small enterprises
  - Assistance for the disabled to re-enter the workforce
  - Assistance to women to re-enter the workforce

Your participation in this data collection exercise will greatly improve access to the range of services available to those wishing to benefit from income earning activities.

The result of this data collection exercise will be a document freely distributed throughout the country to schools, communities, employment service offices, non government organizations and government instrumentalities.
NAME OF ORGANIZATION:
ADDRESS:
    City:
    District:
    Province:
    Phone:
    Fax:
    Email:
TYPE OF ORGANIZATION:
    Public:
    NGO:
    Private:
    Enterprise based:
    UN Agency:
    Donor:
    Other: 77
SUMMARY OF ACTIVITIES: i.e. training for employable skills, returnee training, the disabled, adult literacy, income generation, business development services,

ACCESS BY ROAD: Y/N (Please circle)
Seasonal: Y/N (Please circle)
Annual: Y/N (Please circle)
Distance from provincial capital in Kilometers. ___Kms
Nearest commercial airport. Name: ____________________
                                      Distance from organization. ___Kms
SOURCES OF FUNDING: 78
Name(s):

TRAINING DELIVERY:
When did you commence this work in this location? __________ dd/mm/yy
Does your organization offer similar training in other locations?
    If so where? _______________________________
Does your organization intend to increase these activities in the future? Y/N (please circle)

77 Please specify:
78 No further details are required on this form
Please list the types of training you provide: e.g. industrial, commercial, services such as beautician, hairdresser, food preparation, domestic appliance repair, information technology, business development services, off-farm, income generation, health care, child care, elderly care, etc.

1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

TARGET GROUPS:

Please describe the target groups who directly benefit from your training, e.g. returnees, the internally displaced, female/male single heads of household, unemployed adults, ex-combatants, out of school youth, illiterate children-adults, the disabled, etc.

DATA ON TRAINED PEOPLE:

Do you have data on individuals trained showing any of the following information:

Name:
Age:
Sex:
Ethnic group:
How was the trainee selected?

Type of training received:

Duration of training in days/weeks:
Date of training -- from/to:
Hours per day:
Location of training:
Current post training location:
  ● residential address
  ● employment address (if different)

TRAINING STAFF:

Do you have your own trainers? Y/N (please circle)

How are they sourced? Y/N (please circle)
  ● By internal transfer
  ● By external advertisement

What are the main criteria for appointment?

Who makes the final decision to appoint?

Do you train your own trainers to teach? Y/N (please circle)

Do you send staff to be trained as trainers? Y/N (please circle)

If yes, where do you send them? (Please be specific)

---

How many fulltime trainers do you have? Male ____________
  Female ____________

How many external trainers to you hire? Male ____________
  Female ____________
**TRAINING FACILITIES;**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Answer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Do you have your own training premises?</td>
<td>Y/N (please circle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If not, who owns your premises?</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do the buildings suit the needs of the disabled?</td>
<td>Y/N (please circle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Are women able to use the building utilities?</td>
<td>Y/N (please circle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How many teaching areas do you have?</td>
<td>________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How many trainees per class?</td>
<td>________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How many shifts per day?</td>
<td>________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How many days per week?</td>
<td>________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>How many weeks per year?</td>
<td>________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who pays for the maintenance of your facilities?</td>
<td>________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Does the Government tax you for the building?</td>
<td>________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do trainees pay for tuition?</td>
<td>Y/N (please circle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If so, what is the amount in US$ per week?</td>
<td>________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>If not, how are these costs covered?</td>
<td>________</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Do you have figures on trainee unit costs per week?</td>
<td>Y/N (please circle)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Would you be prepared to discuss these confidentially with ILO?</td>
<td>Y/N (please circle)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TRAINING CLASSES

What is your maximum trainee class size? __________________

Are classes made up of both females and males? Y/N (please circle)

If not why are they segregated?

________________________________________________________________________

What approximate percentage is from an urban location? _____%

Is child care for the children of trainees provided? Y/N (please circle)
Do you provide follow up services? Y/N (please circle)
Do you provide post training grants? Y/N (please circle)
Do you provide tools or equipment? Y/N (please circle)

Please return this form by Email or provide an address and ILO will collect or send you a self addressed stamped envelope.

Thank you for assisting us.

To: Mr. Bob Duffy
Senior Coordinator
Phone: (93) 070 277 868
ILO, UNDP Compound
Email: bob.ilokabul@undp.org
Shah Mahmood Ghazi
Watt, Shar-e-Naw, Kabul
Organization details here

Request for assistance to undertake a Research Project on E&SD systems for post-conflict countries

Dear Sir/Madam,

I am writing to you to ask if individuals in your organization would be permitted and willing to participate in my research activity related to E&SD issues in Afghanistan. The research is being conducted as a case study covering the sequence of events in relation to E&SD in Afghanistan covering the last 30 years, but with emphasis on the last five (5) year period.

Background

Stage 1. Literature review. This commenced in 2005, involved a desk study of literature, documents and materials from a wide variety of sources including international agencies, non-government organizations both national and international, donors and, in a limited number of cases, academic research papers. Literature available was critically reviewed. It found that there are a considerable number of references available concerning different strategic approaches taken to stabilize countries at the political level, ensure security and to develop and implement programmes that will contribute to the rapid restoration of peace within the general population. This review was conducted a year ago. There are no doubt other more recent sources that could be useful. I would be happy to forward a copy of this work should you request it. I would be grateful if you could refer me to any relevant documentation or potential sources.

Stage 2. Contact key institutions. This letter is intended to ensure that there is agreement in principle from your organization to allow your staff to participate in the research. Assuming there is agreement I will then make contact by Electronic mail, telephone or facsimile with whomever you nominate as a key informant to discuss with those actually implementing your project/programme activities related to E&SD. The intention is to seek the advice of practitioners to determine the reason(s) for the programmes/projects, the processes that were followed, the problems that arose and the activities/projects/programmes introduced/ongoing/completed and the lessons learned. Other organizations being contacted include; (i) NGOs, (ii) Development Banks, (iii) Government Ministries, (iv) the International Security Assistance Force, and other UN agencies active in this field. The conversations would be with these key individuals. From this I will develop a framework of issues considered to be critical by them to improving the delivery of development assistance related to E&SD. The information will be analyzed and reformulated to reflect the overall views and opinions of the same key informants from a number of different organizations with a stake in the strengthening of E&SD. This focus group would be asked comment on a modified logical framework matrix leading to the development of a model for post-conflict E&SD.

Stage 3. Analysis of data. This would be carried out so that the conclusions drawn can be checked with participants to ensure that their views and opinions are accurately interpreted.

Stage 4. Key informant follow up. This would involve clarifying and confirming the results of the analysis of the group work with the key informants.

Stage 5. Preparation of the research paper. The final consolidation of the research would be completed within 6 months. The report would contain, as an annex, the model developed during the field work and would be available for general use and adaptation in future post-conflict situations.
I believe that this research will contribute to the development of more effective and practical strategies and procedures leading to the improvement of the quality of life of those communities affected by civil and international conflicts.

The key issues that I would like to discuss during key informant discussions would cover policy and strategy implications from both the perspective of those providing development assistance and the Government.

General discussions

These would cover a wide range of areas and include how your organization:

- anticipates and responds to Government’s expectations of donors.
- establishes the level and capacity in the Government to conduct research into matters related to E&SD.
- assists with developing E&SD policy, strategy and implementation.
- identifies the appropriate intervention point and time to provide development assistance to develop E&SD policy, strategy and implementation.
- coordinates with other each key stakeholder in the E&SD field.

Any information disclosed by your participation would be held in strict confidence. No details which might identify your staff or your organization would be released as due to the sensitive nature of the content the University has agreed that the research report is to be classified confidential.

I look forward to talking with you or members of your staff during the spring of 2009. If your organization agrees to participate and have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me at the coordinates below.

Yours sincerely

R W Duffy
Grupellostraat 25
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The Netherlands
Phone: +31 45545 2394
Fax: +32 45454 1724
Email: bobduf@gmail.com
E&SD Systems for post-conflict countries: The case for earlier coordination. A case study of Afghanistan

This research is part of a Doctor of Education (Ed D) program undertaken by Mr. Robert Duffy who is a doctoral student at Charles Sturt University, Australia. Charles Sturt University conducts one of the largest teacher and education research programs in Australia.

The aim of the research:
The research will investigate the experience of post-conflict Afghanistan to identify factors that may influence the efficiency and effectiveness of E&SD interventions by governments and international agencies that offer technical assistance in post-conflict countries.

Methods
The research will first collect and analyze relevant literature and data to develop questions for semi-structured interviews with key informants. This information will be used to develop a draft logical framework matrix model for E&SD intervention which will then be discussed with key informants nominated by a range of stakeholders. An iterative process with the stakeholder groups will be used to refine the model.
The key informants will be drawn from in-country government ministries, development banks, the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), international agencies and non-government organizations (NGOs). All personal information and details will be kept confidential. No individual will be identified in any public document and no audio records will be taken or kept.

Outcomes
The findings will contribute to the development of a model which will identify the most appropriate intervention points and strategies for effective E&SD implementation. The research will develop recommendations to improve the coordination of E&SD interventions.

NOTE:
Charles Sturt University's Ethics in Human Research Committee has approved this research activity. If you have any complaints or reservations about the ethical conduct of this research, you may contact the Committee through the Executive Officer:

The Executive Officer
Ethics in Human Research Committee
Academic Secretariat
Charles Sturt University
Private Mail Bag 29
Bathurst NSW 2795
Tel: (02) 6338 4628
Fax: (02) 6338 4194
Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated fully and you will be informed of the outcome.
Locked Bag 588,
Wagga Wagga,
Boorooma Street,
North Wagga
NSW 2678
Australia
Telephone: +61(02) 6933 2000
Facsimile: +61(02) 6933 2639

Dear <<insert name>>

Research Project: Employment and skills development systems for Post-Conflict Countries: The Case for earlier Coordination. A Case Study of Afghanistan

Thank you for your positive response to my letter of the dd/mm/2009 requesting permission to involve your organization in my research project. The project is being conducted as part of a Doctor of Education degree at Charles Sturt University, New South Wales, Australia.

This research has received considerable support from government, United Nations agencies and Non Government Organizations. The contributions of key organizations such as <<insert name of the organization>> will be valuable in developing a better understanding of the policies and strategies adopted by key organizations in restoring prosperity to post-conflict countries. I appreciate the opportunity to discuss the issues and to be able to incorporate your experience into the overall research findings.

It is an ethical and legal requirement of Australian university research that the informed consent of participants is obtained. I would be grateful if you would read the attached Information Sheet which outlines the research aims and methods and to indicate the willingness of your staff to participate by signing the attached Consent Form.

Thank you again for your assistance in this important work
Yours sincerely

R W Duffy
Grupellostraat 25
6461ET, Kerkrade
The Netherlands
Ph: 31 652 093 052
Fax: 31 45 545 4037
Email: bobduf@gmail.com
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN A RESEARCH PROJECT
Key Informant Organization contact information

Project Title: Employment and skills development Systems for Post-Conflict Countries: the case for earlier coordination. A case study of Afghanistan

This research is undertaken by Mr. Robert Duffy as part of a Doctor of Education degree at Charles Sturt University, Australia. The research process has been explained to me and I have read and understood the Information Sheet provided. I have been assured that there will be ample opportunity to ask questions about the research.

The model generated by this research will be made available to relevant international organizations and NGOs but all research papers and the final Dissertation will be secured from public access. No audio records will be kept.

I understand that any information or personal details gathered in the course of this research about me or my firm/organization/institution will be considered by the researcher and research supervisors as confidential and that neither my name nor any other identifying information will be used or published without my written permission. I further understand that I am free to withdraw my participation in the research at any time.

Staff nominated to collaborate from my organization will be advised of all details of this project and will also be asked if required, to provide written consent before any direct involvement in the research.

It is an ethical a requirement of Australian university research that the informed consent of participants is obtained. Charles Sturt University’s Ethics in Human Research Committee has approved this research and I understand that if I have any complaints or concerns I can contact:

The Executive Officer
Ethics in Human Research Committee
The Grange
Charles Sturt University
Bathurst, NSW, 2795
Australia
Phone: +61 (02) 6338 4628
Fax: +61 (02) 6338 4194

Any issues you raise will be treated in confidence and investigated fully and you will be informed of the outcome.

Name ___________________________ Signature ___________________________
Title and Organization ________________________________________________
Date ___________________________ Location ___________________________
The ILO’s Human Resources Development Convention 142 of 1975

This document has been revised in recommendation number 195 of 2004 where it stresses the need for tripartite involvement in the design, development, regulation and implementation of appropriate policies for E&SD.

The 2008 International Labour Conference when discussing the revised recommendation concluded that “…effective skills development policies must be integral components of national and sector development strategies rather than be pursued separately”.

Recommendation 195 can be used to review and assess the host country’s E&SD system. This mapping of the existing framework is useful in building capacity of the Government’s staff. Such reviews can be used to identify where areas need to be strengthened and where an essential component is not in place, to develop it based on sound and researched international experience. A programme or series of coordinated projects can be then prepared for donor, development bank, bilateral or multi lateral funding. The linkages to a government’s policies can be identified with and aligned to the potential funding source’s preferences for offering international technical assistance. Coordination within and between the different international agencies providing technical assistance is assured when linked to nationally declared policies.

The ILO, in supporting countries seeking to improve their E&SD capacity has developed packages to assist.
1. The Training for Rural Economic Empowerment package assists beneficiaries to identify and develop economic opportunities leading to income generation in the peri-urban and rural areas of the country.
2. Guidelines to identify, manage and improve self-employment, micro and small businesses are available.
3. Manuals and texts on the management of vocational education and training institutions have been prepared.
4. Products from research into the impact on countries emerging from conflict are also available.

Research into issues related to post-conflict countries has been conducted and papers published outlining the results. These are widely distributed and in several UN languages. However they are rarely published in the languages of those countries most in need of them.

Five years after initial attempts to set up an E&SD system whilst I was conducting research into the availability of labour market information there were few documents written in anything but English in 2007. Under the NSD&MLP the secondary sources report related to the labour market was published in Dari and Pashto, the predominant local languages. The Afghanistan National Development Strategy document was also provided in multiple national languages.

Technical assistance projects were developed in collaboration with a specific ministry within a Government. It was noted that other ministries with potential to collaborate and coordinate were rarely involved. In most cases research conducted by the ILO did not reach down to the level of the beneficiaries of projects, being forwarded to senior
management of ministries who rarely read the results, often passed them down the line to technical people who lack the capacity to comprehend the implications of the research. These technocrats can be intimidated by reports of this nature unless (i) they can read them in a first language and (ii) they were intimately involved in the formulation.
Strategic plan for sustaining the Labour Market Information & Analysis Unit

Background summary:
The Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs, Martyrs & Disabled (MOLSAMD) enters a period of post-conflict peace having never had to conduct any type of national labour supply and demand activity. As a result of this vacuum people in search of an income have developed a number of traditional coping mechanisms have evolved and a large proportion of unskilled and semi-skilled labour is sourced through linkages with family, through word of mouth and by other forms of informal contact. People have multiple ways to cope and earn a livelihood in such an environment. (UNAMA: 2002) Employment Service Centers (ESCs), established as a means of finding work or sourcing labour is, as yet, relatively new as a concept in Afghanistan. It is noted that it is not incumbent upon private employers to register vacancies nor is mandatory for the unemployed to register. This aspect of MOLSAMD’s work focuses on a very small sector of the population, mainly in urban locations, and is therefore of questionable value at this stage of the country’s development. With such a large proportion of the economy being informal in nature, it is questionable as to whether an ESC approach is equitable at this stage.

Labour market information and analysis unit (LMIAU)
The organization of the Ministry did not include an LMIA Unit prior to 2008. The NSD&MLP funded the LMIA Unit as a sub-project. The duration was 16 calendar months and was due to complete in July 2008. It was, at the outset considered doubtful that this Unit would be sustainable without more time, considerable staff training and overall capacity building.

The structure of the LMIA Unit consisted of a manager, an assistant manager and seventeen staff. None had any background in labour market information structures, terminology, procedures for data collection statistical frames or analysis. It was recommended that additional staff with suitable experience and educational profiles be recruited.

The expectation was that the LMIA Unit would be able to define the scope and purpose of any LMI by ensuring that potential future users would have access to reliable data and analysis. The Unit was to provide a service that could inform decisions that positively impact individual, corporate and government ministries in a form that would have a positive impact on E&SD to assist in promoting growth in various sectors of the economy. This would contribute to earlier coordination of any skills development activates.

For the LMI to be useful to as many beneficiaries as is practical it was necessary to identify who required the information, in what form they required it when it was needed and how often this information was to be updated. The following components were required and assumed there was a set of user's criteria clearly defined as a prerequisite to the submission for the LMIU to engage in negotiations:

- Clearly identified sources of reliable LM signals, indicators and intelligence,

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79 I was contracted to undertake a Secondary Sources Report on LMI
80 Sector specific occupational needs, numbers of occupations covered, or target group specifics.
Supply and demand data in a form that can be manipulated to respond to a variety of queries and questions,
Procedures resulting in LM data that, when collected and analyzed can, if necessary can be replicated,
Linkages to the Central Statistics Office to ensure compatibility with surveys they conduct on a regular basis,
Suitable ICT hardware and software.  

Typically this would require the MOLSAMD to assure that there was:
Sufficient and suitable financial allocations to maintain a network of staff and offices,
Suitably located offices and associated staff positions to sustain a critical mass within the DOL network of offices
Adequate transportation and ancillary office equipment,
Appropriate financial allocations to promote and publicize the role and expanded of the LM office network
Capacity building of staff through targeted staff development and accession planning for all key posts in the DOL’s LM network.

Existing capacity
Assuming there was no significant increase in resources, both human and financial, and having assessed the existing capacity of staff allocated to the LMIA Unit within the MOL SA it was considered unlikely that the present incumbents would be able to provide adequate data, information and analysis leading to future and substantive policy formulation.

The initial LM study, as described by the I-ANDS benchmark was undertaken in two phases. The first phase will provide a review of available information on the supply and demand for skilled labour. This was followed by a supply and demand study of the modern and the informal sectors in each Province’s capital city.
There is a need for support at the highest level to form a national LM coordination mechanism to overcome the situation. To form such a body requires further elaboration, especially in terms of how such a mechanism would best operate. The formation, title and level of authority of such a body will require considerable discussion between the users and the providers of LM data. The authority of such a body requires definition in the form of legislation and regulations and the distribution of responsibility must be clearly described.

A Labour Market Policy Board (LMPB) would be the peak body for determining LM policy supported with a secretariat located in the MOLSAMD to execute the decisions of the Board. Sufficient resources would be provided by MOLSAMD to sustain the Secretariat. The Secretariat would draw on the resources, both financial and in terms of staff, of the Research and Development Unit within the LMIA Unit and the DME as well as research and planning units in other ministries based on LMPB directives.

81 The extent of the ICT will be determined by the Government in accordance with the priorities given to the needs as decided by the I-ANDS.
The LMPB would ensure that there was a minimum of duplication between the key actors, that scarce resources are not wasted and most importantly all the key actors would be aware of each other’s needs and capabilities. The MOL SA, being the ministry responsible, would be meeting its obligations by facilitating the Secretariat. MOL SA would also be staffed with professional analysts in its LMIAU who could prepare supporting materials to support nationally determined Labour Market policy. A further devolution of responsibility for specific data and simple analysis would be the responsibility of personnel at the Provincial Department of Labour Office level.

**Restructure of the DME**

The Department of Manpower and Employment (DME) within which the LMIA Unit is suggested to be located, needs to address areas that are traditionally the responsibility of a Labour Ministry that require a variety of technical assistance activities. The structure of the DME within MOLSAMD and the divisions of responsibility with each of the key Departments require review as part of the preparation for the LMIA Unit’s integration into the overall structure. The functions and responsibilities of other Departments as it relates to LMI must also be further clarified. A suggested structure is seen below.

Source: Generated by the author

Individual LMIA Unit staff profiles would need to be prepared including the description of skill and qualification gaps of existing staff. Staff development plans need to be
agreed. Job descriptions for key personnel must be developed in close cooperation with the incumbents. This will take account of personal aspirations, background experience and include broad duties and responsibilities, the actions to be taken to achieve them and the means by which the results of those actions can be measured. Staff unable to adapt to the activities of the project will be counseled and offered alternative posts if necessary.

The DME would assume responsibility to establish a national Labour Market Policy Board (LMPB). DME would identify and establish a task force, convene a workshop, invite members, decide on TORs and establish as an advisory body supported by the Government. The LMPB will also include representatives of the donor community, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other UN agencies. This DME of MOLSAM&D would act as the Secretariat for the LMPB would guide the work and determine priorities of those involved in the collection and analysis of LMI and data. Capacity, in terms of numbers and qualifications and experience must be critically examined within DME to ensure that there is sufficient critical mass within DME to properly undertake the duties and responsibilities. Those appointed to the posts will be given in-service and regional and international exposure in relation to job functions. A central LMIS unit within the DME would assume responsibility for any MOLSAM&D data collection and analysis and develop staff to conduct systematic, articulated and focused national labour market requirements. The unit would be adequately resourced for sufficient time to allow the institutionalization of their operations into the government budget.

These staff will design, articulate and monitor surveys by other agencies and determine whether MOLSAM&D should conduct such activities to suit its plans and policies. The staff will also study all survey data to establish how it can contribute to satisfying the demand of specific sub-sectors of the labour market. Assessment of existing survey material and evaluation of the potential of those currently responsible for existing surveys would reduce, if not eliminate, any obvious duplication of resources. The DME, through its LMIA Unit, would assume responsibility for the conduct of national, provincial and district level surveys and a general analysis based on the needs articulated when the activity was originally justified. Field based DOL Department officials and Employment Service Center officers would be trained by the LMIA Unit to use survey instruments, in collaboration with the CSO and approved by the LMPB. The DME will also collaborate with provincial and district level VT training centers, NGO implementing partners and NSD&MLP plus the MOE schools to ensure there is no duplication of effort. The LMIA Unit will examine ways and means of collaboration between the programme by bring all the stakeholders together at the national and local level, including training providers, employers' and workers' organizations, community groups, donors and NGOs to create synergies, eliminate duplication and promote collaboration with and within the expanding E&SD system.

**Strengthen the Employment and Training function.**

The DME would be given responsibility to undertake the design, development, implementation and monitoring of a comprehensive employment and training service. This would build the capacity at the central and provincial level labour offices to provide adequate employment and training services. This would include counseling and vocational guidance, job placement vacancy registration, linkages with enterprises and the building of capacity to undertake focused and sector specific analysis of employment needs. In addition the strengthening of advisory services through informal linkages with employers and community level associations would be a priority. The
establishment of closer liaison mechanisms with public and private training providers is essential. Staff needs to be pro-active in identifying problems, including training and skilled worker needs as a result of technology change.

**Intended beneficiaries**

The staff of the DME would be given extensive in-service and on-the-job training to enhance their capacity to operate an effective, efficient and responsive employment service to its clients. Other beneficiaries include: (i) researchers and planners who use LMI to determine policies and plans of action as it affects their particular target groups. (ii) staff of the various training providers organizations who will receive better information on local demand for various levels of competence, (iii) a wide range of people who will be able to receive assistance in a full range of improved employment services. This includes students, unemployed and underemployed, enterprise managers and the local education community. This improved service will be coordinated at national level but information and data collection would be decentralized to the local level to reflect needs in the immediate catchment area.

**LMIA network**

There needs to be considerable time and effort invested by the MOLSAMD to establish a network of individuals and institutions to participate in a continuous process of gathering LMI. The key sources and locations of individuals are already in place in each province. The following table indicates the number and location of those could be part of the network.

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Potential network of contacts for the LMIA Unit

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82 Taken from the AGEF brochure on Employment Service Centres
83 Tabulated from the organization table provided by MOLSA
84 Taken from Tables provide by MOE’s MIS Unit. This includes TTC and VTC schools
85 Taken from the CSO Afghanistan Statistical Year Book, 2006.
86 The totals are those that showed an interest in contracting with NSD&MLP. Some additional NGOs are included who are self-funding.
87 Taken from data provided by the Vocational Training Department of MOLSA.
88 Taken from an ISAF document entitled Provincial Reconstruction Team Handbook, 2007.
Potential network of contacts for LMIA Unit

Employment Service Centres (ESCs) are currently located in 10 provinces. The personnel in these ESCs are a valuable source of LMI. They are also in touch with the local labour market through the registration of vacancies. The recently introduced ILO project to assist with the reintegration of ex-combatants and their families through a strengthened set of ESC’s will also extend the amount of data that will be available. The ESC network and local employers must be strengthened to ensure placement rates are improved.

Department of Labour Offices (DLOs) in 32 Provinces have a minimum of three staff, one of whom is responsible for vocational training. These officers offer ad-hoc courses for the work force and are also in a position to contribute with local LMI. DOL staff responsible for labour rights and the labour inspection function can contribute LMI as a result of their visits to enterprises in the catchment area.

Ministry of Education vocational schools are located in 16 provinces technical schools. Some are sector specific, i.e. agricultural schools, and would have sound linkages established as part of their overall programme. The staff of the Vocational Education Schools is also a source of local LMI and should be assisted to establish linkages with DOL’s ESCs.

Ministry of Higher Education prepares degree level graduates from 15 public universities. The network of contacts developed to place them during courses with potential employers for placement and feedback after they graduate would allow the faculty staff to keep abreast of local and, in some cases, national needs for their graduates.

Non Government Organizations are known to be more pro-active than Government institutions. Most have a much better understanding of local conditions and frequently gather LMI as part of their overall approach to providing both humanitarian and development aid. As major implementing agencies throughout the country this group can provide LMI that is current. As they are traditionally separate from the requirements of certification of their training programme this aspect requires careful attention when they are engaged to do the work of a national government.

Key informants at the provincial, district and local level are an important source of local intelligence. A network of such people needs to be nurtured so that the local population is involved and will contribute with data when necessary.

Employers from the informal sector and the modern sector where this is applicable, should also be encouraged to advise on the trends as they see them in the local economy.

Community leaders are an additional source of information regarding local needs, especially as they refer to the informal sector of the economy. The Provincial Development Committee structure should be included where they have skills development issues to contend with.

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89 The ILO has a project being implemented that will extend to all 34 provinces.
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are active in the provision of training and the employment of local workers. Where it is feasible the LMIA staff must be linked to the responsible ISAF representative to gather information on labour.

The LMIA Unit's role will be to integrate all of these potential sources of LMI into an advisory group to provide primary information for direct application at the local level. Some could be compiled centrally and analyzed as a means of informing national policy.

Recommendations

Labour market policy board
- That a labour market policy board is formed consisting of all major stakeholders including government, the employers’ and workers’ organizations. The LMPB would provide guidance and oversight to the MOLSAMD and other agencies undertaking LMI related activities.
- That a network of advisory committees be formed at provincial level on an ad-hoc basis to support the gathering of local intelligence and data for the LMIA Unit as well as others seeking to assist with E&T system strengthening.  

Labour market information and analysis Unit
- That the scope and limitations of the LMIA Unit within MOLSAMD be discussed with an ad-hoc group of public and private stakeholders at the national level as soon as possible to develop an agreed realistic work plan to achieve sustainability.
- That the existing incomplete Dari version of the Afghan Standard Classification of Occupations (ASCO) be updated and developed as a guide describing the outline of a job/occupation.
- That the NSD&MLP develop a procedure manual for contractors with a standardized format for the reporting of labour market supply demand.
- That the titles of courses being offered through the NSD&MLP are standardized and a description of the various jobs, taken from ASCO, related to the course, is appended to all curricula documents as a means of (i) counseling trainees and (ii) distinguishing which ASCO codes are related to the course.

Labour market survey
- That the LMIA Unit is given the responsibility and authority for labour market surveys regardless of whether they conduct them from within their own resources or externally if resources, both human and financial are not available.
- That a strategy to have the labour market survey function privatized be developed, especially for selected labour specific sectors.

Staffing policy
- That the DME advertise, select, and hire staff with the necessary education background to fill posts within the LMIA Unit. The type of person required at each level should be described and a profile drawn up in consultation with CSO and AIMS.

\[90\] See Table Nine for potential membership.
\[91\] The requirement for this is urgent if it is to be of benefit to CSO in the forthcoming census exercise. The existing version has large sections missing and needs to be redone. A small team of 5 could accomplish this in six months. An English version would also be useful to researchers and analysts.
\[92\] Those seeking specialized workers, seasonal labour, overseas placement etc,
Staff development
- That as a precursor to entry to the LMIA Unit, a short-list of candidates should be assessed by LMIA Unit and AIMS. Those who qualify should be sent to AIMS for the data base assistant course. Those passing should be given tenured posts.

Staff career planning
- That a personal career development plan be drawn up for the staff of the DME and LMIA Unit that will provide in-service and training and external exposure to suitable meetings, conferences and workshops to enhance capacity.

Accession planning system
- That as promotion within the LMIA unit will be limited there must be assured and alternative promotional opportunities at the senior level identified and made available within the public service. E.g., between CSO, MOE and other ministries with similar job functions. Transfers across ministries must be agreed if this level of staff is to be retained within the public service.

Capacity building across MOLSAMD
- That an incremental approach to the strengthening of MOLSAMD that matches the existing capacity be implemented based on an agreed strategy over a five year period. 93

93 The expectation that wholesale restructuring of the ministry was appropriate at this stage was simply unrealistic. The natural resistance to change must be overcome with a sensitive and carefully managed programme.
APPENDIX I

MODEL LOGFRAME MATRIX
Introduction to the Logframe Matrix

The purpose of the information that follows is to draft a logframe matrix, which could be used as a basis for the design of further support by the international donor community for E&SD reform.

This interim logframe matrix that has been developed based on the inputs from a variety of sources and provides a total programme of E&SD reform at all levels of the system. The information used as a source for the matrix should therefore be further developed as the Government accomplishes certain activities and when and if donors or development agencies are prepared to assist.

The basic objectives, outputs and activities are sufficient it is felt at this stage, to indicate the needs but stop short of any specific quantifiable outputs for several reasons.

Firstly there are a number of agencies willing to assist and some may already providing technical assistance to address some of these issues. Secondly the Government may already be devoting some of its resources to analyzing and developing policy, legal and strategic E&SD issues. To omit them from the matrix however would suggest that these items have already been accomplished. They are included to show the relationships between the various levels of intervention, and because they may also be seriously under-resourced.

The matrix is structured at four levels. This is shown on the next page in simple overview format (see **Figure One A**).

**Level one**

1.1 Firstly it is considered necessary to establish the role of E&SD from the perspective of the Government and the social partners.

1.2 This is followed by the development and publication of a consolidated E&SD policy document, something that to date is available but in a fragmented and indirect way through various reports, meetings and seminars, proclamations by political and government leaders.

1.3 Next is the acknowledgement that the authority to implement such policies must be supported by laws and regulations.

1.4 Finally, given that the development of such documents has been transparent and tripartite, a national strategy to implement the E&SD reform process should be developed that explains the role of the Government and the social partners at each subsequent level.
Figure One

MODEL EMPLOYMENT & SKILLS DEVELOPMENT SEQUENCE OF EVENTS

1.1 SOCIAL PARTNERS PROVIDE A GREEN POSITION PAPER ON E&SD

1.2 E&SD POLICY WHITE PAPER ISSUED

1.3 EA SD LEGISLATION DRAFTED, DISCUSSED, PROMULGATED

1.4 E&SD STRATEGY DEVELOPED TO IMPLEMENT REGULATIONS

2.1 E&SD INSTITUTE TO DEVELOP REGULATIONS

2.2 E&SD BODY TO DEVELOP REGULATIONS

2.3 E&SD PROGRAMME DELIVERY AND COORDINATION

3.1 PUBLIC TRAINING PROVIDERS

3.2 SEMI-GOVERNMENT INSTITUTES FOUNDATIONS

3.3 NON-GOVERNMENT TRAINING PROVIDERS

3.4 PRIVATE PROPRIETARY TRAINING PROVIDERS

3.5 ENTERPRISE TRAINING PROVIDERS

PEAK INSTITUTION(S) LEVEL ONE

IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL TWO

TRAINING PROVIDER LEVEL THREE

INSTITUTIONAL NEEDS LEVEL FOUR

SD DELIVERY THROUGH VARIOUS TRAINING PROVIDERS

LEVEL ONE

LEVEL TWO

LEVEL THREE

LEVEL FOUR

EMPLOYMENT & SKILLS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME
2.1 The establishment of a tripartite National E&SD Coordinating body is essential if adequate coordination is to be achieved. The body when convened will provide a tripartite forum that would advise the Government on policy, strategy, and resource allocation. It would promote E&SD across the economic and social spectrum and ensure that the wishes of the social partners are acknowledged, and where possible acceded to.

Duplication and fragmentation of current national and international agencies, donors and the public sector could be reviewed and monitored through the body as they would have the mandate to recommend on rationalizing the E&SD system. Another of its roles would be to commission studies in accordance with the terms of reference within its mandate through the National E&SD Institute. (see Figure Two A).
2.2 The establishment of a National E&SD Institute is considered necessary to support variety of people in both government and the donor community. There is a need to have an integrated capacity to centralize certain E&SD related activities as described under this heading. Ministries such as those responsible for education and labour issues must be involved in a non-partisan manner to ensure that the skills developed are in line with market needs. Foundations involved in delivery of training to target groups may also have loose affiliations with the Institute. Research into E&SD issues, at the request of the Government or through the tripartite National E&SD body would be undertaken through the E&SD Institute. (See items 2.1.1 to 2.1.12). The current capacity of the Government to address most of the issues on the list must be assessed. (see Figure Three A).

Level three

3.0 The main providers of TVET are described under this level. The Government has realized that they must make optimal use of the available TVET capacity throughout the country. At this level the following contributors are listed.

3.1 Public training providers. These are mainly found in a Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Labour. Other Ministries provide training but are usually for those employed within their establishments. They are not mentioned here although they do contribute.

Figure Three A
3.2 Quasi-Government Institutes and Foundations. These are usually targeted toward specific groups in the community and as such have an important role to play in providing the target group with skills and knowledge. Many require assistance from the Government both directly and indirectly to provide adequate training services.

3.3 Non Government Organization training providers. NGOs are a most important contributor to the E&SD system. The scope and variety of NGO programmes is vast. There may be opportunities for the Government, through the Council, government Ministries or informal channels, to assist them with a wide range of technical assistance when programmes are in accordance with government priorities.

3.4 Private proprietary training providers. There are companies/entrepreneurs that have identified niche markets for profit. They too play an important role in the provision of short-courses that are currently responsive to labour market needs.

3.5 Enterprise training providers. There are companies/entrepreneurs that sell training in niche markets for profit. They too play an important role in the provision of short-courses that are currently responsive to labour market needs. Enterprise managers introducing training, whether off the job in a vestibule-type facility, a dedicated training centre or in-plant, provide the bulk of skills development to workers. The responsibility for this must be addressed and the Government must encourage training of this type. Governments can assist with advice and technical assistance to employers who wish to undertake training of employees at a variety of levels.

**Level four**

4.1 This level is addressed to the public sector training provider. It is expected that the appropriate government training provider, i.e. the Director of an institution, take the lead in the catchment area and promote the government’s policies, legislation and strategies for E&SD at the local level. This bottom-up approach is considered a practical method of achieving improved an immediate response to SD delivery. It does however assume that the Government will provide support through enabling legislation that will allow flexibility in the methods by which SD can be delivered. The issues are divided between those that can be accomplished externally, i.e. at the community level and internally to promote professional integrity and the short, medium and long-term development of graduates. **Figure Four** A shows a typical structure for the industrial cluster.
Conclusions
In most instances in a post-conflict situation the E&SD system is fragmented, uncoordinated and under-resourced. The impact of any intervention must be studied carefully and suitable policies and regulations in place before any decisions are taken to allocate financial and human resources. The temptation to move as quickly as possible without suitable analysis may be wasteful.

Many traditional E&SD systems are found to be biased towards providing skills for jobs that are available in limited numbers and mainly in the modern sector of the economy. More focus needs to be placed on the opportunities for Small and Medium Enterprises, the rural off-farm population and employment at the community level. To overcome the lack of inertia public institutions at the community level must be allowed the flexibility and provided with training on how to implement a more flexible and client oriented approach to E&SD delivery. Government for its part must eliminate the bureaucratic barriers that stifle initiative at training institution level by creating an environment that encourages innovation and flexibility. The services must be made available to a wider range of people including the rural and informal sectors of the economy.
Rationalization may be needed in the two major ministries delivering training. The departments in each ministry may be merged into a single department. Structured induction, in-service and technology up-grading must be planned for teachers and administrators. The Government must provide clear guidelines to schools/centres and the teaching staff to implement their directives. Resource and capacity problems must be solved. Where this is seen to be a bottleneck NGOs can be delegated to provide courses in line with government needs. Access to pedagogic training for and NGO personnel should be provided. The staff development function should be merged into one single facility within the proposed National E&SD institute.

Employment and training needs assessment should extend to the community level and a series of training programmes developed and delivered to staff that identify employment potential at all levels of the labour market, not just those for which there are courses already available. This should be carried out jointly by the National Employment Service (NES) and the public training provider. Public and private provision should be researched with the view to eventual privatization of a large segment of the system. This would leave whatever limited resources are available to concentrate on Government priorities.

The matrix that follows is a basis for future development – not a blueprint. Resources are required for the orderly and gradual improvement of the E&SD system now. Without sufficient and timely assistance little can be achieved.

Comments on the logframe matrix:

The detail provided covers the first two levels of the matrix. Levels three and four, at the training provider level, are limited to a description of objectives, results and activities. The third and fourth levels must be developed further based on policies and with the agreement and guidance of the proposed National E&SD Council. The implementation should be carried out in collaboration with and following strengthening of staff of the National E&SD Institute. Potential donors should be asked to provide resources to establish internal mechanisms to provide support for these two key components of the E&SD system. Preparation of detailed proposals for training provision is dependent upon support for the first two levels described. Unless the two national bodies are established a fragmented and inefficient E&SD Reform programme is most likely.

Budget estimates

This set of model log-frames provides an estimated cost based on the activities proposed for levels one and two only. The figures are in European Union Euros. Where the cost is for an expert and each one is based on work months to support a fixed or short term post within the UN system. The amounts are for planning purposes only and would be negotiated with donors/multilateral agencies and the Government on a case by case basis.
Recommendations

Reform Level

- That a programme/project is designed to reflect the current and future needs of the E&SD system.
- That the E&SD system be provided with resources necessary, both human and financial, to achieve the basic mandate expected of it by the Government and the social partners.
- That a task force of leading national and international experts is convened to develop a national E&SD position paper.
- That all the existing statements of policy direction emanating from various sources, both within the political arena and at public service level, be incorporated into one source document and endorsed by the tripartite partners.
- That an E&SD policy be prepared taking into account the wishes of the Government and the social partners.
- That a review of existing legislation be conducted to analyze the implications with the view to modifying or drafting a new E&SD law.
- That a document be produced that explains the scope, needs and limits of the proposed revisions to the E&SD system.
- That the contributing ministries provide written confirmation and clarification of their respective roles and capacity to support the development of the proposed E&SD system.
- That consensus is reached among the contributing ministries as to what is required by each and that this is matched with sufficient resources for implementation.
- That national E&SD body for co-ordination of the system is given high priority by the Government to ensure that maximum benefit is realized from the contributions of training providers in the public and private sector.
- That a national E&SD Institute is supported to rationalize the existing semi-government and Government authorities involved in E&SD issues.
- That enabling legislation be designed and enacted to promote the devolution of responsibility for implementation of the Government’s policy for E&SD to the level where it can best address demand from the labour market.
- That sufficient support from the international community is provided so that the system of E&SD envisaged by the Government will be possible to achieve.
- That the linkage between the demand for skilled workers and the supply be strengthened through better understanding of all the stakeholders.
- That the National Employment Service (NES) provides labour market information and data on vacancies in collaboration with training providers.
- That representatives of employers’ and workers’ organization contribute to the development of curricula by nominating suitably professional personnel to assist with linking enterprises to the TVET institutions.
- That staff of training providers collaborate with the NES to provide job counseling and placement services as part of the process of linking the school/centre to the enterprise.
DRAFT LOGICAL FRAMEWORK
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>0.0</th>
<th>E&amp;SD Reform Programme</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NATIONAL TVET SYSTEM LEVEL</td>
<td>Indicators of achievement</td>
<td>Sources of information</td>
<td>Assumptions and risks</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Wider Objective** | • To develop a stable and economically viable national E&SD system that is supported by the government, employers’ and workers’ organizations and the community | • Improved collaboration  
• Increased flexibility to demand  
• Institutionalized budgets for each accredited E&SD instrumentality | • Economic indicators |  |
| **Overall Objective** | • To reform the E&SD system | • Improved co-ordination of Government and international financial contributions to the E&SD system | • Government budget allocations | • That there is sufficient political will  
• Stability of Government |
| **Project Objective(s)** | • To provide a E&SD system appropriate to the needs of the country | • E&SD system structure agreed | • E&SD system published | • That there are no differing perspectives on E&SD from social partners |
| **Results** | • E&SD policy  
• E&SD legislation  
• E&SD strategy | • Each item published  
• Government, employers, workers, community groups, parents willing to participate in E&SD activities at all levels | • Documents for each output  
Records of meetings  
Drafts of action plans  
Commitment in public debate | • That there is consensus of social partners  
• That there is sufficient capacity at each level of the Government  
• That there is sufficient confidence by social partners in the Government |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Resource Details at Levels 1 and 2</th>
<th>ECU 5,475,000</th>
<th>That donors are confident enough to assist in a medium to long-term financial assistance package</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| • Seek support from Government and social partners for improved E&SD co-ordination
• Convene meetings with key personnel
• Reach consensus on scope of E&SD
• Engage social partners in dialogue on E&SD issues
• Draft action plan for implementation
• Indicate level of commitment of social partners to E&SD development | • | • | • |
1.0 NATIONAL INSTITUTION LEVEL

1.1 E&SD POSITION PAPER  
ECU  
84,000

1.2 E&SD POLICY STATEMENT  
ECU  
included above

1.3 E&SD LEGAL INSTRUMENT(S)  
ECU  
32,500

1.4 E&SD IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY  
ECU  
61,500

TOTAL ECU  
178,000
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1.0 INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL</th>
<th>Indicators of achievement</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>Assumptions and risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.1 Develop a E&amp;SD position paper</td>
<td>• To reach a consensus on the development of the E&amp;SD system</td>
<td>• Agreement for all parties to the need to clarify the role and scope of the E&amp;SD system</td>
<td>• All papers having an impact on the E&amp;SD system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall Objective</strong></td>
<td>• To consolidate and publish a comprehensive document explaining the future direction of the E&amp;SD system</td>
<td>• E&amp;SD position paper published</td>
<td>• That the Government ensures that there will be a policy based on consensus and transparency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project Objective(s)</strong></td>
<td>• Agreement of the government and social partners on the scope of E&amp;SD • A position paper that reflects the views and suggests policy recommendations for E&amp;SD</td>
<td>• Public commitment by the Government to accord E&amp;SD a high priority in its economic and social planning</td>
<td>• That there is sufficient understanding in Government of the implications of the position paper over the short, medium and long-term</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Results</strong></td>
<td>• Assess existing E&amp;SD policy statements • Convene meetings with key personnel • Engage social partners in dialogue on E&amp;SD issues • Reach consensus on scope of E&amp;SD • Draft a consolidated position paper • Review position paper content • Publish national E&amp;SD position paper</td>
<td>• 1 international E&amp;SD specialist x 4 work months • 2 national E&amp;SD specialists each x 4 work months • Miscellaneous</td>
<td>• That key personnel will consider the activity worthy of input and support • That consensus is possible • That govt.-in-kind resources are available to conduct the project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1.0 INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL</td>
<td>Indicators of achievement</td>
<td>Sources of information</td>
<td>Assumptions and risks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>1.2 E&amp;SD policy statement</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall Objective</strong></td>
<td>• To develop a consolidated E&amp;SD policy statement</td>
<td>• Need for a policy acknowledged by government</td>
<td>• Existing directives on policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project Objective(s)</strong></td>
<td>• To consolidate and publish a single and comprehensive E&amp;SD policy document</td>
<td>• Policy document finalized, accepted and implementation agreed</td>
<td>• Annotated bibliography of all related documentation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Results</strong></td>
<td>• E&amp;SD Policy document published</td>
<td>• Policy document and action timetable published</td>
<td>• That there is sufficient political will to introduce a publicly debated E&amp;SD policy that has been agreed by the Government and the social partners.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Activities** | • Assess existing E&SD position paper statements  
• Convene meetings with key personnel  
• Confirm policy consensus  
• Consolidate into draft  
• Issue for comment  
• Submit to Government for ratification  
• Request written commitment from government ministries and instrumentalities indicating how they will contribute to the implementation of the policy | • This is combined with 1.1 above | • That resources are available for capacity building and to train staff  
• That employment and training in general is given sufficient priority |
|  |  |  |  |
### 1.3 Develop TVET legal instrument(s)

**Overall Objective**
- To provide a legal basis for the future development of the TVET system
- Legal basis for the TVET structure confirmed
- Legal articles reviewed

**Project Objective(s)**
- To develop a TVET law
- TVET law promulgated
- Final TVET law and regulations

**Results**
- TVET law implemented
- Regulations developed and introduced
- TVET law and regulations published
- Legal documents scrutinised
- Changes made to existing legal documents
- Draft law and regulations approved
- Draft TVET law and supporting regulations
- Reports of changes to associated laws

- That there is sufficient priority, resources and capacity available to carry out the activity
- That social partners will react positively to increased regulation
- That the TVET law is applied equitably across all economic sectors
- That the supporting regulations are applied flexibly
- That there are sufficient capacity in the Government to implement the regulations
- That the authority necessary to implement the regulation is legally supported
### 1.0 TVET Reform Programme
#### INSTITUTIONAL LEVEL

### 1.4 Develop a TVET implementation strategy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall Objective</th>
<th>Indicators of achievement</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>Assumptions and risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To improve and integrate all programmes, projects, activities and technical assistance offered into a national strategy for TVET</td>
<td>All contributors identified that are willing to be integrated</td>
<td>Detailed review and confirmation to contribute to the National TVET system</td>
<td>That commitment of all participants is sustained</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Project Objective(s)**
- To prepare a national TVET strategy

**Results**
- TVET strategy designed to reflect the physical, political and social and financial realities of the country
- TVET strategy implemented in 2000
- Reports on implementation from the NTVET Council and the NTVET Institute

**Activities**
- Review existing legal documents in relation to agreed scope of TVET
- Recommend changes to existing legislation to comply with policy
- Develop a draft TVET Law
- Promulgate the TVET Law
- Develop regulations draft
- Discuss with the social partners
- Submit to the Government for approval
- Estimate cost to implement
- Revise and implement

- 1 international legal expert for 1.5 work months
- 2 national legal experts for 2.0 work months each
- miscellaneous costs

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Cost (ECU)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 international legal expert</td>
<td>22,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 national legal experts</td>
<td>2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>miscellaneous costs</td>
<td>8,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>32,500</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- That there is sufficient Government capacity to undertake the project
- That the legal documents on the TVET system are made available for scrutiny
- That there is no opposition from government instrumentalities to the TVET law
2.0  IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL

2.1  NATIONAL E&SD COUNCIL  ECU  1,196,500

2.2  NATIONAL E&SD INSTITUTE  ECU  3,673,000

2.0  IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL

2.1  NATIONAL E&SD COUNCIL

2.1.1  IMPROVE E&SD COORDINATION  ECU  909,500

2.1.2  LIAISE AND COLLABORATE WITH NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL DONORS  ECU  in above

2.1.3  PROMOTE EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES, & GENDER ISSUES  ECU  15,000

2.1.4  COLLABORATE WITH PRIVATE PROPRIETARY AND NGO TRAINING PROVIDERS  ECU  72,000

2.1.5  DEVELOP ACCESS TO CONTINUOUS/LIFELONG LEARNING OPPORTUNITIES  ECU  77,000

2.1.6  PROMOTE E&SD IN THE COMMUNITY  ECU  50,000

2.1.7  RATIONALIZE THE E&SD SYSTEM STRUCTURE  ECU  40,000

2.1.8  CONDUCT AUDIT OF EXISTING E&SD FACILITIES  ECU  33,000

______________________________

Total  ECU  1,196,500
## IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2.0</th>
<th><strong>Indicators of achievement</strong></th>
<th><strong>Sources of information</strong></th>
<th><strong>Assumptions and risks</strong></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.1 National E&amp;SD Council</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.1.1 Improve E&amp;SD co-ordination</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall Objective</strong></td>
<td>• To formerly establish a national E&amp;SD Council</td>
<td>• Government records on procedures for discussion</td>
<td>• That there are no objections to the Council's formation from the Government</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project Objective(s)</strong></td>
<td>• To strengthen the co-ordination of E&amp;SD provision</td>
<td>• Improved co-ordination mechanisms agreed</td>
<td>• That there is no resistance to the functions and powers ascribed to the Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Results</strong></td>
<td>• National Council Established with permanent secretariat</td>
<td>• Secretariat established and functioning by October 1999</td>
<td>• That there is sufficient funds to institutionalize operating costs</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Activities** | • Submit a proposal to the Government for agreement to proceed with the formation of an interim National E&SD Council and secretariat with financial support for a minimum of three years  
• Prepare a submission justifying the need for financial support  
• Seek decision of the Council of Ministers  
• Arrange finance through the Government  
• Prepare detailed budget for duration of project  
• Convene a meeting to identify possible “contributors”  
• Develop a detailed budget with allocations in accordance with offers for contributions from different donors  
• Identify international and national technical assistance needs  
• Establish premises | • 1 international senior E&SD expert for 10 work months over 3 years  
• 5 international specialists for 4 work months each  
• 5 national experts  
• Unspecified consultants  
• Equipment  
• Miscellaneous  
• Fellowships  
• implementation 10% | • Decision of Council of Ministers published  
• Technical assistance proposals reviewed and approved  
• Financial records available  
• ECU 140,000  
• ECU 196,000  
• ECU 56,000  
• ECU 20,000  
• ECU 80,000  
• ECU 73,000  
• ECU 260,000  
• ECU 84,500 |
|  |  |  | • That government remains committed to sustaining the council  
• That donors will support the council until government can institutionalize the secretariat and Council budget |
|  |  |  |  |
|  |  |  |  | **Total** 909,500 |

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**Notes:**
- **1** international senior E&SD expert for 10 work months over 3 years
- **5** international specialists for 4 work months each
- **5** national experts
- **Unspecified consultants**
- **Equipment**
- **Miscellaneous**
- **Fellowships**
- **implementation 10%**
<table>
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<th>2.0</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL</th>
<th>Indicators of achievement</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>Assumptions and risks</th>
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<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>National E&amp;SD Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.1.2</td>
<td>Liaise with National and international donors</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Overall Objective</td>
<td>To provide a focal point for all external technical assistance in the TVET field</td>
<td>International agencies seek NTVET Council assistance</td>
<td>Reports of TVET council</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Project Objective(s)</td>
<td>To provide support and technical advice to potential donors on the priorities to the TVET system</td>
<td>Local, regional and national Government acknowledges role of the NTVET Council</td>
<td>Reports from the NTVET secretariat of potential donor/agencies requests for advice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Procedures for the evaluation of external technical assistance established</td>
<td>Procedures published</td>
<td>Documentation on requests for technical assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>mechanisms for recommendations on technical assistance offers published</td>
<td>Guidelines published</td>
<td>Technical reports on TA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Public statements issued</td>
<td>Project evaluation and monitoring reports</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Proformas requested</td>
<td>Records of requests for information</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Procedures adhered to</td>
<td>Proformas received</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Procedures utilized</td>
<td>Technical reports received</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Monitoring reports</td>
</tr>
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<td></td>
<td>Results</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>Prepare public statements on the priorities of the Government for TVET</td>
<td>Included in 2.1.1</td>
<td>That priorities are maintained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Develop proforma’s for potential donors identifying technical assistance offered</td>
<td></td>
<td>That donors are flexible</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Prepare procedures for recommending on proposed technical assistance</td>
<td></td>
<td>That procedures are transparent</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Establish monitoring and evaluation procedures for all approved TA</td>
<td></td>
<td>That procedures for monitoring and evaluation are specified, quantified and integrated into proposals in clear and measurable terminology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.0</strong> IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL</td>
<td><strong>Indicators of achievement</strong></td>
<td><strong>Sources of information</strong></td>
<td><strong>Assumptions and risks</strong></td>
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<td><strong>2.1 National E&amp;SD Council</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2.1.3 Liaise with National and international donors</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Objective</td>
<td>• To promote EEO and gender issues</td>
<td>• EEP policy accepted</td>
<td>• EEO policy published within the TVET policy</td>
<td>• That courses are sufficiently diverse to attract non-traditional trainees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Objective(s)</td>
<td>• To improve access of all sectors in the community to TVET and employment opportunities</td>
<td>• Increased diversity of involvement</td>
<td>• Enrolment and graduate records</td>
<td>• Placement rates in employment or self employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>• Improved information of TVET opportunities</td>
<td>• Information developed</td>
<td>• That the social environment and culture accepts the role of working women, the disabled and minorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Improved physical conditions for TVET institution access</td>
<td>• Physical access provided</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Disaggregated data indicating composition of TVET trainees</td>
<td>• Data distinguishes between men and women</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Established links with the NES Labour Market Information system</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>• Prepare promotion material on EEO and gender issues</td>
<td>• NGO contract to promote TVET for target group(s) over 3 work months</td>
<td>• ECU 15,000</td>
<td>• That resources are made available to integrate women and disabled into the normal functioning of TVET training providers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Develop and implement plans for physical upgrading of facilities to accommodate on women and disabled</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• That employers are prepared to provide jobs for the target group(s)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Design data collection instruments that discriminate between sexes</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Establish links with local/regional/employment service on employment opportunities</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>Implementation Level</td>
<td>Indicators of achievement</td>
<td>Sources of information</td>
<td>Assumptions and risks</td>
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<td>2.1</td>
<td>National E&amp;SD Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.1.4</td>
<td>Collaborate with private proprietary training providers and NGOs</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Overall Objective**
- To promote the increase in PPT/NGO provision
- To increase the number of training places available to the community
- Records of PPT/NGO provider programme(s)

**Project Objective(s)**
- To provide potential PPT/NGO providers with technical assistance to promote private provision of E&SD
- Increase understanding of the government’s policies priorities and support for PPT/NGO providers
- Reports of Government assistance to PPT/NGO providers

**Results**
- Increased capacity to deliver courses
- Improved liaison with PPT/NGO providers
- Improved matching of needs to supply of trainees
- Increased trainers
- Increased Government assistance
- Reduced mismatch of training to jobs
- Course records
- Reports of collaboration
- Placement of graduate
- Records of

**Activities**
- Assist PPT/NGO providers to assess needs
- Provide training materials as required
- Develop training of trainers, needs assessment, curriculum etc.
- Promote integration and multiple use of resources
- 1 international expert for 3 work months
- 4 National experts for 6 work months
- Miscellaneous
- Fellowships for 4 national experts
- ECU 45,000
- ECU 12,000
- ECU 12,000
- ECU 15,000
- Total ECU 72,000

- That PPT/NGO providers maintain ethical considerations
- That continued vigilance is maintained with course standards
- That PPT/NGO are not over-regulated
- That Government develops enabling legislation to promote PPTs /NGOs
- That PPT/NGO providers are willing to seek and accept government involvement/assistance
- That services and resources for E&SD can be made available to PPT/NGO providers at reasonable cost
- That regulations allow multiple use of available resources
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall Objective</th>
<th>Indicators of achievement</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>Assumptions and risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To develop a culture of continuous/lifelong learning</td>
<td>Increased numbers of adults continue E&amp;SD courses</td>
<td>Programme of E&amp;SD courses</td>
<td>That adequate resources are available to provide a continuous learning environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Objective(s)</td>
<td>Procedure to allow flexible entry/exit introduced</td>
<td>Records of participants</td>
<td>That staff are trained to assess prior learning and flexible exit requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>Continuous learning structure designed and implemented in the E&amp;SD system</td>
<td>Increased participation of adults</td>
<td>That employers recognise CLL as being to their long-term advantage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guidelines published for the assessment of prior learning as a prerequisite for entry</td>
<td>Increased personnel and employer supported career planning</td>
<td>That training providers can mount diverse range of courses</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Guidelines published on flexible entry/exit for selected courses</td>
<td>E&amp;SD structure documentation</td>
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<td></td>
<td>A E&amp;SD structure published that promotes continuous learning</td>
<td>Prior learning applications</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Records of flexible entry/exit capacities</td>
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<td></td>
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<td>Modular course material</td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Progression criteria applied</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>1 international expert for 3 work months</td>
<td>ECU 45,000</td>
<td>2 national experts for 4 work months each</td>
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<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Develop a E&amp;SD structure that is agreed with the social partners</td>
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<td>- Prepare guidelines on prior learning assessment</td>
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<td>- Prepare guidelines on entry/exit possibilities</td>
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<tr>
<td>- Design structured curricula in modular format for customized training needs of employers and individuals</td>
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<td>- Design progression criteria based on demonstrated competencies as the means of assessment</td>
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<td>IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2.1 National E&amp;SD Council</strong></td>
<td><strong>2.1.6 Promote E&amp;SD in the community</strong></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall Objective</strong></td>
<td>• To raise awareness in the community to the potential of E&amp;SD</td>
<td>• Potential of E&amp;SD publicity disseminated and community awareness raised</td>
<td>• NE&amp;SD council commissions NGO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project Objective(s)</strong></td>
<td>• To promote E&amp;SD as a means of obtaining employment</td>
<td>• Increase in the number of trained people employed</td>
<td>• TORs written for contract</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Results** | • Promotional material on E&SD policy, laws and strategy published  
• Career guidance materials for priority occupations published  
• E&SD Institutional calendar published | • Promotional career guidance and TVET calendar published  
• Contracts progress reports  
• Contract final report | • Sufficient source information on priority skills, ASCO terminology, training provider data is developed |
| **Activities** | • Develop TORs to sub-contract  
• Prepare promotional materials promoting the Government’s efforts in E&SD  
• Develop career guidance manuals for TVET staff and students/trainees  
• Publish details of courses offered, location, contact details, commencement dates, and duration for all nationally accredited E&SD TVET | • Engage NGOs to develop materials on TVET as described  
• ECU 50,000 per annum over three years | • That the cost is subsidized by a donor until the activity can be absorbed into the NVEII and the NO  
• That TE&SD information is sufficiently diversified to attract broad multi-sectoral interests  
• That various forms of media are used |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL</th>
<th>Indicators of achievement</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>Assumptions and risks</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>National E&amp;SD Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.1.7</td>
<td>Rationalize the E&amp;SD system structure</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Overall Objective</td>
<td>● To provide adequate and appropriate access to TVET</td>
<td>● E&amp;SD system developed that is affordable and efficient</td>
<td>Proposal developed covering agreed scope of the system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Objective(s)</td>
<td>● To provide an appropriate affordable structure for continuous TVET access</td>
<td>● TVET components and scope clearly identified</td>
<td>That support from donors is made available</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>● An analysis published of the current TVET sector and the implications for the economy of an integrated system of skills linked to formal qualifications and work experience</td>
<td>● Each level of the TVET system integrated into one seamless system</td>
<td>That capacity is developed within the existing staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>● Establish the structure and size of existing E&amp;SD provision</td>
<td>● 1 international expert for 2 work months</td>
<td>That collaboration between ministries can be strengthened</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Conduct macro assessment of employment medium and long-term needs</td>
<td>● 1 national specialist for 2 work months</td>
<td>That senior MoES staff are trained in the management of TVET institutions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Identify existing resources to deliver training based on employment needs</td>
<td>● ECU 30,000</td>
<td>That additional resources at the senior management level are available, and sustained</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>● Assess capacity available</td>
<td>● ECU 2,000</td>
<td>That recommendations on decease/increase of facilities and staff are acted upon seriously</td>
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<td></td>
<td>● Assess and identify internal efficiency factors</td>
<td>● ECU 8,000</td>
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<td></td>
<td>● Recommend on increase/decrease number of training facilities</td>
<td>Total ECU 40,000</td>
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<td></td>
<td>● Recommend on increase staff levels/redeployment of redundant staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Section</td>
<td>Implementation Level</td>
<td>Indicators of achievement</td>
<td>Sources of information</td>
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<td>2.1</td>
<td>National E&amp;SD Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.1.8</td>
<td>Conduct audit of existing public TVET facilities</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Overall Objective**
- To establish the current status of TVET facilities
- Accurate information based on existing programme catalogued
- Overview report of the total TVET institutions within system completed
- That the cost of upgrading the TVET system can be covered initially by donors for key areas of the Government’s policy

**Project Objective(s)**
- To establish the level and condition of resources available in public TVET training institutions
- Improvements in the condition of buildings and equipment
- Report on condition of buildings equipment and services

**Results**
- Report indicating condition and availability of buildings, capital equipment, furniture, workshops, utilities and training materials
- Audit and training needs matched at macro level
- Report on capacity of the TVET systems facilities
- That existing policies of the Government and donors remain supportive of strengthening the TVET delivery system

**Activities**
- Prepare data collection instruments
- Field test on two non-pilot schools/centres
- Compare with TVET programmes offered in each
- Modify data collection instrument
- Train MoES/MOLSAMD staff to conduct national audit
- Determine scope and conduct national audit
- Consolidate information
- Translate into English
- Prepare status report based on priorities of the Government for TVET
- Estimate cost to upgrade TVET system
- Submit to TVET council
- Distribute to potential donors
- 1 international expert for 1 work months
- 3 national experts for 3 work months each
- Miscellaneous costs
- ECU 15,000
- ECU 6,000
- ECU 12,000
- Total 33,000
- That staff training is provided
- That the audit is prepared in electronic format for analysis across various fields
- That rehabilitation costs are realistic
- That donors are prepared to provide finance for priority facilities and equipment
- That procedures for bidding are transparent
- That local as well as international competitive bidding is acceptable
### 2.0 IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL

#### 2.2 ESTABLISH A NATIONAL E&SD INSTITUTE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
<th>ECU</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.2.1 DEVELOP FINANCING OPTIONS</strong></td>
<td>ECU 60,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.2.2 ESTABLISH NATIONAL STANDARD CLASSIFICATION OF OCCUPATIONS</strong></td>
<td>ECU 69,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.2.3 ESTABLISH NATIONAL SKILL STANDARDS, TESTING AND CERTIFICATION</strong></td>
<td>ECU 140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.2.4 PROMOTE LINKS WITH THE NATIONAL EMPLOYMENT SERVICE</strong></td>
<td>ECU 653,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.2.5 STRENGTHEN THE NATIONAL OBSERVATORY</strong></td>
<td>ECU 120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.2.6 IMPROVE MANAGEMENT TVET INSTITUTIONS</strong></td>
<td>ECU 413,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.2.7 PROVIDE TEACHER TRAINING</strong></td>
<td>ECU 520,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.2.8 DEVELOP FLEXIBLE CURRICULUM RESEARCH &amp; DEVELOPMENT PROCEDURES</strong></td>
<td>ECU 314,000</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2.2.9 DEVELOP LEARNING RESOURCE CENTRE</strong></td>
<td>ECU 388,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.2.10 STRENGTHEN CAPITAL EQUIPMENT AND ASSET MANAGEMENT</strong></td>
<td>ECU 392,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>2.2.11 STRENGTHEN TVET TRAINING INSTITUTION ACCREDITATION PROCEDURES</strong></td>
<td>ECU 140,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>ECU 673,000</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.0 IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2.</strong> Establish a national E&amp;SD institute</td>
<td><strong>Indicators of achievement</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>2.2.1</strong> Develop financing options</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Overall Objective**
- To improve the quality and number of courses available through various sources of finance
- Reduced reliance on government and donor funds
- Existing budget documents

**Project Objective(s)**
- To develop an acceptable multi-faceted system of TVET financing
- Options are accepted by the Government and the social partners
- National TVET finance options report
- That Government continues to fund key areas of TVET provision for priority development and vulnerable groups in the community

**Results**
- A variety of options to finance TVET available to the public and the Government
- Diversified financing options introduced
- Comparison of records of TVET expenditures
- That individuals and employers see the value in paying for training

**Activities**
- Conduct comparative analysis of TVET financing in the region
- Review existing government financing options
- Compare with needs of the rationalized TVET system
- Identify short-fall over the next five years
- Identify alternative sources of TVET finance
- Reach agreement with alternative sources to fund TVET
- Discuss options for financing with source partners
- Draft option for the consideration of the Government
- Pilot options in geographical areas where there is tripartite agreement
- Review progress
- Replicate if appropriate in other areas
- 1 international expert for 3 work months
- 2 national experts for 3 work months
- Miscellaneous

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<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>ECU 45,000</th>
<th>ECU 3,000</th>
<th>ECU 12,000</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total ECU</strong></td>
<td>60,000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

- That existing Government funding is increased in parallel to external sources of funding
- That international donors will provide short and medium term assistance for TVET financing
- That TVET administrators are given training and the tools to demonstrate the efficiency, effectiveness and relevance of training provided
## IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2.0</th>
<th>2.2 Establish a national TVET institute</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.2.2 Establish a standard classification of occupations (SCO)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Overall Objective
- To establish national standard classification of occupations

### Project Objective(s)
- To develop a standard occupational classification document
- Increased standardization of nomenclature on occupational titles, TVET courses, employment office records

### Results
- A standard occupational classification of occupations (SCO) published
- Reports from NES, MoEs & MOLSAMD
- Increased efficiency in developing statistics and TVET records of the labour market skills profile

### Activities
- Justify the need for a national standard classification of occupations
- Prepare a proposal with a budget for international technical assistance
- Submit for approval to the Cabinet of Ministers
- Identify the donor
- Request the assistance of an implementing agency
- Identify the responsible national staff to participate
- Determine priority occupations
- Develop drafts to 4 digit level
- Reach consensus with social partners on content
- Publish priority occupations ASCO
- Seek resources to extend to all levels

### Indicators of achievement
- Priority occupational classification document published (SCO)
- Report on SCO

### Sources of information
- Employment and TVET records demonstrate standard nomenclature

### Assumptions and risks
- That each level of stakeholder understands the need for standardized nomenclature
- That standardized nomenclature is accepted by all stakeholders

### Miscellaneous
- ECU 45,000
- ECU 6,000
- ECU 18,000

**Total ECU 69,000**

- That employers see this as a limited means of assisting then in matching demand with TVET
- That job classifications a tool for predicting shifts in labour trends
- That applicants for jobs do not expect that the content of a job advertisement will match the responsibilities on the job
<table>
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<tr>
<th>2.0</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL</th>
<th>Indicators of achievement</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>Assumptions and risks</th>
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<td>2.2</td>
<td>Establish a national E&amp;SD institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>2.2.3</td>
<td>Establish national skill standards, testing and certification</td>
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**Overall Objective**
- To establish a national skill standard, testing and certification system
- Improved quality of skilled workers
- Increased productivity
- Resistor of SSTC
- That standards tests and contributes are accepted by employers
- That standards are reviewed regularly

**Project Objective(s)**
- To establish national skill standard, tests and certification procedures
- Standards, tests and certification available
- Skill standards published
- Test bank utilized
- Certificates issued

**Results**
- National skill standard, tests and certification procedures
- Skill standards agreed
- Tests prepared
- Certificates available
- Skill standards published
- Test bank utilized
- Certificates issued
- That standards are reviewed regularly

**Activities**
- Propose and justify a system of standards based on employer needs
- Estimate the time and resources needed, both human and financial
- Design, develop and describe the procedures necessary to identify the knowledge, skills and attitudes required in a typical worker
- Develop national capacity to undertake analysis of occupations for the purposes of establishing skill standards
- Identify key occupational clusters in agreement with the Government
- Develop procedures to identify appropriate levels within the national framework for an occupation in each cluster
- Pilot the skills testing and review results with employers’ and workers’ representatives.
- Modify and implement
- Extrapolate to other key occupational clusters and specific occupations
- 1 international expert for 4 work months
- 2 national experts for 6 work months
- Miscellaneous
- Fellowships for 10 experts
- ECU 60,000
- ECU 6,000
- ECU 24,000
- ECU 50,000
- Total ECU 140,000
- That procedures are transparent
- That certificates are not falsified
## 2.0 IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL

### 2.2 Establish a national TVET institute

#### 2.2.4 Promote links with the National Employment Service (NES)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall Objective</th>
<th>Indicators of achievement</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>Assumptions and risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To promote linkages between NES, training providers and employers</td>
<td>Increased numbers of unemployed matched to jobs</td>
<td>Reports on collaboration</td>
<td>That sufficient resources are available to make linkages between NES and training providers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Objective(s)</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To link local NES to training providers and employers</td>
<td>Improved linkages between employers and NES</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Training providers linked to NES offices by computer</td>
<td>Closer collaboration between NES and training providers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employment Promotion Programme (EPP) implemented</td>
<td>Improved implementation of Government policy on EPP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>Cost</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct research into existing international best practices in employment services, LMI, guidance and counseling, LMA and TNA systems</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluate the existing national system of LMI, analysis and career based information being generated by the NES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Propose and justify any changes to the existing LMI/TNA system</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Submit the proposal to the Government for agreement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Determine the utility of this information with regard to setting training priorities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop alternative scenarios for matching demand with supply in collaboration with employers’ and workers’ organizations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prepare a submission to have the existing NES system strengthened to provide more relevant information to local NES offices on opportunities on a national basis</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop procedures suitable for the integration of the NES with selected training providers based on key employment areas</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pilot procedures to improve the assessment of employment needs with the content of the courses offered</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 international expert on employment and training services for 12 work months</td>
<td>ECU 160,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 international experts in ENA and TNA design and implementation for 4 working months each</td>
<td>ECU 120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 national experts in key occupational areas for 5 years</td>
<td>ECU 144,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 LM data processors for 12 working months each</td>
<td>ECU 120,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous</td>
<td>ECU 200,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total ECU</strong> 653,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- That training providers will be proactive in matching courses to needs
- That employers will be able to anticipate future needs and describe skill requirements
- That trainees will accept jobs available in the labour market once trained
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2.0 IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL</th>
<th>2.2 Establish a national E&amp;SD institute</th>
<th>2.2.5 Strengthen the National Observatory (NO)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Overall Objective</td>
<td>• To enhance the reliability of statistical and relevant E&amp;SD data available to key stakeholders</td>
<td>• Stakeholders actively support the NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Objective(s)</td>
<td>• To develop capacity to provide accurate information on a wide variety of E&amp;SD issues</td>
<td>• Reports requested from a wide range of sources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>• National expertise development in E&amp;SD data collection and analysis</td>
<td>• Fields of data required clarified</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Publication distributed on E&amp;SD issues</td>
<td>• Role of NO in relation to the Government established through the NE&amp;SDI and work carried out at the discretion of the NE&amp;SDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• National network of TVET institutions strengthened</td>
<td>• Government acceptance and support for NO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• International networking strategies for National Observatories developed</td>
<td>• Reports requested and quoted by donors, external agencies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>• Establish scope of NO activities for the role it will assume as a focal point for E&amp;SD information and distribution</td>
<td>• 2 national experts for 60 work months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Reach agreement of roles and responsibilities NO and Government</td>
<td>• That support for the NO continues</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Conduct data collection and analysis of E&amp;SD issues</td>
<td>• That the role of the NO as a data collection and reporting agency is absorbed into the NE&amp;SDI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Prepare E&amp;SD reports as requested by the NE&amp;SDC</td>
<td>• That the reporting to be accomplished is recorded and reported on independently.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Procure specific E&amp;SD data requested by donors, development agencies, bilateral donors and the Government</td>
<td>• That the future role of the NO be renegotiated with the Government following the establishment of the NE&amp;SDI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Develop the medium- and long-term strategies for self-sustainability of the NO</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## 2.0 IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2.2 Establish a national E&amp;SD institute</th>
<th>Indicators of achievement</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>Assumptions and risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.2.6 Improve management of TVET institutions</td>
<td>To raise the efficiency, effectiveness and relevance to employment needs of the TVET system</td>
<td>Agreed internal efficiency indicators accepted</td>
<td>That there will be a career development programme supported to ensure that a national system of TVET institution management is introduced</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Overall Objective
- To provide training in the management of TVET institutions
- Programme of TVET management of training institutions developed
- TVET institution institutions management course

### Project Objective(s)
- To provide training in the management of TVET institutions
- Programme of TVET management of training institutions developed
- TVET institution institutions management course

### Results
- Training provided in modern methods of management, administration and operation of a TVET institution
- National TVET programme introduced
- TVET institutions mission reflects national policy
- Scope of TVET offered agreed by all beneficiaries
- Financing secured
- Devolution of responsibilities achieved
- Pilot institutions identified as centres of excellence
- Evaluations conducted
- Report accepted and recommendations acted upon
- Courses delivered to senior staff responsible for management of the TVET system institutions
- That there is suitable level of confidence from the Government and donors to assist TVET to achieve national policy objectives
- That the training provided matches the existing administrative and standards certification and skills standards procedures where possible.

### Activities
- Identify the role of TVET in achieving national policy objectives
- Determine the capacity and scope of the TVET system to meet those objectives
- Review financial management of TVET institutions
- Prepare TVET management of training institutions programme and implementation plan
- Develop strategies for devolution of responsibility to training providers
- Select pilot institutions as centres of excellence
- Evaluate pilot phase implementation
- International expert by 6 work months per year for two years
- 1 national expert counterpart for 24 work months
- Miscellaneous national support staff
- Fellowships for three groups of 15
- ECU 180,000
- ECU 9,000
- ECU 24,000
- ECU 200,000
- ECU 413,000
- Review and report on evaluation outcomes
- Revise and implement devolution strategy
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL</th>
<th>Indicators of achievement</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>Assumptions and risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.2.7   Establish a national E&amp;SD institute</td>
<td>2.2.7 Provide teacher training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Objective</td>
<td>To develop a sustainable system of TVET teacher training</td>
<td>Reduced turnover of staff</td>
<td>Teacher attendance and personal history</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Objective(s)</td>
<td>To rationalize the conditions of teachers/instructors across all government ministries into one set of working and remuneration package</td>
<td>Increased stability and performance of teaching staff</td>
<td>Teacher training records</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>That adequate funds are available from donor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>That teacher training for TVET is given high priority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>That the system is sustained with adequate resources</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Results**
- Complete profile of all teaching staff
- Identify needs of existing staff
- Determine those to invest in short, medium and long term
- Arrange overall strategy for teacher development
- Develop teacher training model for new entrants
- Provide in-service and skill upgrading options
- Group according to needs
- Identify training locations/ministries etc.
- Deliver training as required

**Activities**
- 1 international expert in TVET teacher training for 12 work months
- 2 national experts for 12 work months each
- Miscellaneous
- Fellowships for 4 groups of 20

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECU</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECU</td>
<td>12,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECU</td>
<td>48,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECU</td>
<td>280,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total ECU</td>
<td>520,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Assumptions and risks**
- That adequate funds are available from donor
- That teacher training for TVET is given high priority
- That the system is sustained with adequate resources
- That teachers trained are retained
- That training investment is focussed on the appropriate age group
- That salaries match equivalent levels in the private sector
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2.0</th>
<th>IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL</th>
<th></th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>Assumptions and risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>Establish a national E&amp;SD institute</td>
<td>2.2.8 Develop flexible curriculum research and development (CRD) procedures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Overall objective**
- To provide a flexible system of CRD
- Curricula developed that supports employer demand
- Employers requests
- Curricula frameworks written

**Project Objective(s)**
- To develop CRD systems that can be delivered to meet a wide range of employment needs
- Flexible and appropriate courses prepared
- Tracer studies on employer and trainee’s satisfaction
- That employment opportunities exist for courses conducted

**Results**
- Courses developed of varying lengths to meet modern sector employer, SME and entrepreneurship needs
- Increased percentage of trainees find employment in various sectors of the economy
- Labour market statistics
- That trainees are given adequate practical training

**Activities**
- Develop courses for adults based on labour market needs
- Establish unit costs for each course
- Seek donor support for cost to implement as part of the approval process for selected target groups
- Design selection criteria for admission to the programme
- Provide free tuition for targeted youth and vulnerable groups
- Estimate total cost to develop courses
- Set deadlines for course development
- Develop and deliver courses
- 1 international expert for 12 work months
- 6 national experts for 12 work months each
- Miscellaneous
- Fellowships for 6 experts

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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECU</td>
<td>180,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECU</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECU</td>
<td>48,000</td>
<td>ECU 50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total ECU</strong></td>
<td><strong>314,000</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- That costs are accurately estimated
- That costs are rigidly supervised
- That target groups are carefully monitored
- That vulnerable groups are assisted
- That teachers are suitably trained to deliver courses
- That consumables cost is sufficient
# 2.0 IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2.2 Establish a national E&amp;SD institute</th>
<th>2.2.9 Develop Learning Resource Centre</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall Objective</strong></td>
<td>• To improve training programme delivery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project Objective(s)</strong></td>
<td>• To develop appropriate levels of learning resources for TVET programmes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Results</strong></td>
<td>• Learning resources (LRs) for TVET produced locally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activities</strong></td>
<td>• Review the existing availability and suitability of LRs in the TVET system</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Recommend priority needs to support the appropriate curricula</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Estimate the cost of resources required, including identification, drafting, translation, and publishing, to carry out the activities for four priority occupations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Identify staff to participate in identification and adaptation of training materials to match national requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Develop procedures to design, develop, field test and produce prototype learning resources for TVET</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Assess national capacity to design, develop, edit, publish and distribute TVET training materials</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Determine potential and benefits of privatizing TVET training materials provision</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Develop prototypes, field test and produce samples</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 2.0 IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL

#### 2.2 Establish a national TVET institute

##### 2.2.10 Strengthen capital equipment and asset management

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall Objective</th>
<th>Project Objective(s)</th>
<th>Results</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| • To improve the system of capital equipment identification for TVET programmes | • To develop efficient and economic procedures for the justification, specification and purchase and management of equipment at national and local level | • Efficient system of managing facilities and capital equipment provision installed | • Provide a justification for the establishment of a Building and Facilities Services (BFS) Unit within the National E&SD Institute responsible for asset control, maintenance and repair of all public TVET institutions.  
• Identify the scope of the BFS unit.  
• Estimate the cost to provide a location to staff, equip and operate the BFS unit.  
• Submit to the Government for agreement  
• Identify staff to join the unit and present a strategy for the implementation of a national capital equipment and asset management system  
• Develop procedures for asset control  
• Define capital, minor, non-minor items for control purposes  
• Set guidelines for preventative maintenance  
• Set guidelines for replacement of capital items | • Increased efficiency in management of assets | • Reduced downtime of equipment  
• Reduced replacement cost | • TVET facilities and equipment record system improves | • 1 international facilities and equipment expert for 6 work months  
• 2 national experts for 12 work months each  
• Miscellaneous  
• Fellowships training | | | • ECU 90,000  
• ECU 12,000  
• ECU 250,000  
• ECU 40,000 | |
| | | | Total ECU 392,000 | • That sufficient priority is given to asset management | • That asset control is feasible at training provider level | • That the need for national supervision is acknowledged | • That preference is given to local supplier with potential for service contracts | • That local decision-making is encouraged | • That devolution of responsibility is encouraged | • That maintenance is sub-contracted where possible |

#### Assumptions and risks:
- That sufficient priority is given to asset management
- That asset control is feasible at training provider level
- That the need for national supervision is acknowledged
- That preference is given to local supplier with potential for service contracts
- That local decision-making is encouraged
- That devolution of responsibility is encouraged
- That maintenance is sub-contracted where possible
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>2.0 IMPLEMENTATION LEVEL</th>
<th>Indicators of achievement</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>Assumptions and risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Establish a national E&amp;SD institute</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2.11 Strengthen TVET training institutions accreditation procedures</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Objective</td>
<td>• To establish equitable accreditation procedures that encourage all levels of E&amp;SD participation</td>
<td>• Increased awareness of the E&amp;SD system at all levels</td>
<td>• Business registration categories</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Objective(s)</td>
<td>• To encourage a wider variety of training providers to join the National, E&amp;SD system</td>
<td>• Increased numbers of training providers given accreditation at programme, course, subject and staff level</td>
<td>• Records of accreditation requests • Register of accredited training providers • Record of requests for technical assistance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>• Accreditation procedures agreed and introduced</td>
<td>• Improved quality of TVET • Increased numbers trained • Improved productivity of the work force • Parents and trainees have a minimum standard of training provider that is consistent across TVET institutions • Employers willing to hire additional staff trained in accredited training institutions • Training offered with accreditation of the Government within a national certification system • Accreditation procedures agreed and introduced on a voluntary basis</td>
<td>• Reports of accreditation inspections</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• That all providers meet minimum standards for curricula, facilities, buildings and staff • That all training procedures are accredited using identical criteria</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>1 international expert for 6 work months</td>
<td>ECU</td>
<td>90,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>--------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Review existing policy and strategy papers on accreditation issues</td>
<td>• 2 national experts for 6 work months each</td>
<td>ECU</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Determine scope and level of accreditation expected</td>
<td>• Miscellaneous</td>
<td>ECU</td>
<td>24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Discuss publicly and agree with all stakeholders</td>
<td>• Fellowships for 4 people</td>
<td>ECU</td>
<td>20,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Review and draft procedures and instruments for data collection</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Train staff to provide accreditation assessments</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Pilot procedures with public and several training providers of each type</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Discuss the results, review and revise procedures and instruments</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Implement programme of accreditation</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Provide advisory services to any training provider on accreditation requirements</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Offer accreditation timetable for interested parties</td>
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<tr>
<td>• That all training providers conduct the training offered in an ethical manner</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• That accreditation is seen as an advantage or competitive edge</td>
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<tr>
<td>• That the policies and the application of them is transparent</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
3.0 TVET TRAINING PROVIDERS
3.1 PUBLIC VET SCHOOLS/CENTRES
3.2 QUASI-GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS AND FOUNDATIONS
3.3 NON GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS
3.4 PRIVATE PROPRIETARY TRAINING COMPANIES
3.5 ENTERPRISES PROVIDING OFF AND ON JOB TRAINING
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.0 TVET TRAINING PROVIDER LEVEL</th>
<th>Indicators of achievement</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>Assumptions and risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall Objective</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To establish co-ordination of training providers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project Objective(s)</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To develop a local network of training providers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Results</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training provider local network established</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Activities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convene seminar of all local training providers</td>
<td>Establish key informants</td>
<td>Develop reporting system</td>
<td>Facilitate TVET programme development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide advisory services to all TVET providers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 3.0 TVET TRAINING PROVIDER LEVEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of achievement</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>Assumptions and risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

#### 3.1 Public Training Providers

**Overall Objective**
- To strengthen the capacity of public training providers

**Project Objective(s)**
- To improve the relevance of TVET courses to meet employment priorities

**Results**
- Courses and content linked to employment needs

**Activities**
- Conduct employment needs assessment in collaboration with regional employment office
- Conduct training needs analysis
- Determine courses needed in the catchment area
- Identify resources to conduct needed courses
- Train/recruit appropriate staff
- Conduct courses
- Link graduates to jobs
### 3.0 TVET TRAINING PROVIDER LEVEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicators of achievement</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>Assumptions and risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### 3.2 Quasi-Government Training Providers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall Objective</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To improve TVET components of Quasi-Government Institutions</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Objective(s)</th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To develop and provide training services to government sponsored Institutes and Foundations</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results</th>
<th></th>
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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Courses on training methods developed</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Courses on trainer training developed</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Assess market for training services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Determine providers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Establish costing policy</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote services</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conduct fee for service courses as required</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.0 TVET TRAINING PROVIDER LEVEL</td>
<td>Indicators of achievement</td>
<td>Sources of information</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.3 Non-Government Training Providers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Objective</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To collaborate with NGOs to reduce duplication</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Objective(s)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>To rationalize TVET course offerings</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training courses conducted to suit LM needs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved communication</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Review programmes/courses offered by NGOs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recommend on government priorities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist in course development teacher training equipment access to NGO’s</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide technical training curricula, teaching materials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Promote multi-use of government TVET facilities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Develop procedures for grant-in-aid for NGOs providing courses based on government policy</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### 3.0 TVET TRAINING PROVIDER LEVEL

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indicators of achievement</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>Assumptions and risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

#### 3.4 Private Proprietary Training Providers

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall Objective</th>
<th>To co-ordinate the TVET courses offered by PPT providers that have government priority</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Project Objective(s)</td>
<td>To provide assistance to PPT providers to assist in achieving government providers</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Results | Improved PPT provider courses  
Improved matching of trained personnel to PPT graduates |
| Activities | Assess number, level, quality of PPT courses  
Establish needs of PPT providers  
Assist in voluntary accreditation of Government priority courses  
Advise PPTs on Government policy  
Provide technical assistance if requested |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>3.0</th>
<th>TVET TRAINING PROVIDER LEVEL</th>
<th>Indicators of achievement</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>Assumptions and risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>Enterprise Training Providers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Overall Objective</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To encourage enterprise training</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Project Objective(s)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• To assess the needs of enterprise and develop training programmes</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Results</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Improved enterprise training systems</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Improved productivity</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Improved linkages with public training providers</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Assess existing enterprise training needs</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Promote government priorities in enterprise training</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Identify areas for assistance</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Provide technical assistance as requested</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
4.0 TVET INSTITUTIONAL NEEDS

4.1 ADMINISTRATIVE ISSUES

4.1.1 MANAGEMENT ISSUES
4.1.2 LIAISON WITH COMMUNITY GROUPS
4.1.3 LINKAGE WITH EMPLOYERS' AND WORKERS' ORGANIZATIONS
4.1.4 DIVERSIFICATION OF COURSE OFFERINGS
4.1.5 DISSEMINATION OF PILOT SCHOOL EXPERIENCE
4.1.6 MULTIPLE FACILITIES UTILIZATION
4.1.7 PROCUREMENT OF CAPITAL ITEMS, GOODS AND SERVICES
4.1.8 INTEGRATION WITH EMPLOYMENT SERVICES AT TRAINING INSTITUTION LEVEL
4.1.9 INTRODUCE TRAINING CUM PRODUCTION ACTIVITIES
4.1.10 DEVELOP BUSINESS, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND MICRO CREDIT AWARENESS
4.1.11 PROMOTE SME’S AND SOCIAL PARTNER INVOLVEMENT
## 4.0 TVET INSTITUTIONAL NEEDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Indicators of achievement</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>Assumptions and risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>4.1. Administrative Issues</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Objective</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To strengthen the capacity of directors of training institutions</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Objective(s)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>To provide a structured staff training and development plan for all staff</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Staff training and development plan approved and implemented</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Identify needs of all professional TVET staff</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Develop group training courses</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Agree on individual development plans</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assess potential for retraining, upgrading and promotion through accession planning</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 4.0 TVET INSTITUTIONAL NEEDS

#### 4.1 Administrative Issues

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4.1.1 Management of Finances</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall Objective</th>
<th>Project Objective(s)</th>
<th>Results</th>
<th>Activities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| • To improve and diversify the resources locally available for TVET | • To increase the financial resources locally available for TVET delivery | • Increased numbers of trained personnel at current or lower cost to the Government | • Assess existing legislation on financial control  
• Recommend changes in accordance with self-reliant potential of the training provider |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4.0 TVET INSTITUTIONAL NEEDS</th>
<th>Indicators of achievement</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>Assumptions and risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Administrative Issues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.2 Liaison with Community Groups</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Overall Objective</strong></td>
<td>• To improve communication and feed back on employment and training issues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Project Objective(s)</strong></td>
<td>• To establish links at local level with key informants</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| **Results** | • Key informants system established  
• Linkages between employers, credit sources, training providers strengthened | | |
| **Activities** | • Identify all key informants in the community  
• Promote the use of the public training provider as a community resource  
• Develop simple cost effective methods of data collection  
• Establish a local community body to advise on TVET Employment issues | | |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4.0</th>
<th>TVET INSTITUTIONAL NEEDS</th>
<th>Indicators of achievement</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>Assumptions and risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Administrative Issues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.3</td>
<td>Linkage with employers’ and workers’ organizations</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Objective</td>
<td>• To promote TVET in enterprises</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Objective(s)</td>
<td>• To assist employers to utilize the services of the training provider</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>• Increase in trained personnel from enterprises</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>• Develop ENA and TNA for priority economic sectors</td>
<td>• Conduct survey of labour market</td>
<td>• Promote involvement of Employers’ and Workers’ Organization</td>
<td>• Prioritize training in accordance with resources</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>TVET INSTITUTIONAL NEEDS</td>
<td>Indicators of achievement</td>
<td>Sources of information</td>
<td>Assumptions and risks</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Administrative Issues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.4</td>
<td>Diversification of Course Offerings</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Overall Objective**
- To provide flexible and timely TVET delivery

**Project Objective(s)**
- To respond to demands of the labour market

**Results**
- Courses delivered to meet individual and enterprise needs

**Activities**
- Review existing legislation to increase the percentage of income generated that can be assigned to payment of teachers
- Develop a variety of options and acceptable procedures to generate income and provide guidelines for approval
- Determine the impact of offering services in competition with the private sector
- Discuss with the employers' and workers' organizations and reach consensus at local level on limits
- Assess the capacity of the staff to deliver flexible content/duration courses
- Determine physical resources required to deliver
- Deliver courses that are feasible and within resource limitations
- Develop courses for implementation that are self-funding
- Develop courses for vulnerable groups
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4.0 TVET INSTITUTIONAL NEEDS</th>
<th>Indicators of achievement</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>Assumptions and risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Administrative Issues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4.1.5 Dissemination of Pilot School Experience</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Overall Objective**
- To learn from and disseminate pilot school experience

**Project Objective(s)**
- To assess and analyse pilot school experience

**Results**
- Reports prepared based on agreed national criteria for comparative analysis

**Activities**
- Determine criteria for comparative analysis
- Develop consulting/researcher capacity to conduct comparative analysis
- Review projects in pilot schools
- Analyse results and confirm findings with PMUs
- Publish findings
- Disseminate findings
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4.0 TVET INSTITUTIONAL NEEDS</th>
<th>Indicators of achievement</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>Assumptions and risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1 Administrative Issues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.6 Multiple Facilities Utilization</td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Objective</td>
<td>● To improve internal efficiency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Objective(s)</td>
<td>● To develop procedures and methodologies to improve internal efficiency</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>● Multiple utilization strategies implemented</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| Activities | ● Investigate legal indicators for multiple utilization strategies  
● Request changes to existing legislation  
● Pilot strategy  
● Validate results |                       |                      |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4.0</th>
<th>TVET INSTITUTIONAL NEEDS</th>
<th>Indicators of achievement</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>Assumptions and risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Administrative Issues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.7</td>
<td>Procurement of capital, items, goods and services</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Overall Objective**
- To provide cost effective procurement

**Project Objective(s)**
- To develop improved procedures to purchase equipment, goods and services locally where feasible

**Results**
- More economic procurement procedures implemented

**Activities**
- Assess level of purchasing potential at local level
- Review Government procedures and recommend any changes
- Establish preferences suppliers system for recurrent goods/services
- Identify local, national and international suppliers of appropriate capital items
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4.0</th>
<th>TVET INSTITUTIONAL NEEDS</th>
<th>Indicators of achievement</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>Assumptions and risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Administrative Actions</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>4.1.8</td>
<td>Integration with employment services at training institution level</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overall Objective</td>
<td>To improve the linkage between employment services and training outputs</td>
<td>Improved communication between Governments involved in employment and training issues</td>
<td>Procedures established to report on collaboration</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Project Objective(s)</td>
<td>To establish linkages between the local/regional NES office and all accredited training providers as a basis for future national linkage with employment opportunities</td>
<td>Linkages established using appropriate technology</td>
<td>Use-rate of employment services in relation to training offered</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Placement-rate of trained graduates</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Register of accredited training providers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>Job opportunities matched closer to training places</td>
<td>Employers use the NES as a source of trained labour</td>
<td>Employers requests for information on training output</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Trainees assisted to match job aspirations</td>
<td>Trainees and unemployed seek advice from the NES and the training provider</td>
<td>Employers reports on standards of training received by new employees</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reports showing analysis of employment needs produced for key priority regions</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Reports showing the results of training need assessment</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Attendance and job placement records</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>
## 4.0 TVET INSTITUTIONAL NEEDS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Indicators of achievement</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>Assumptions and risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Conduct employment and training needs assessments</td>
<td>• Employers provide details for the identification of jobs</td>
<td>• Closer matching of supply and demand</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Gather data jointly using staff from the training provider and the NES for priority occupations in priority regions of the country</td>
<td>• Better understanding of the role of the employment service and the training provider</td>
<td>• Increased requests for courses to meet local demand</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Assist the NES to analyse the data</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Provide technical assistance to NES on job classification systems</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• Develop courses on demand for identified employment opportunities in the relevant economic sectors of the community</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>TVET INSTITUTIONAL NEEDS</td>
<td>Indicators of achievement</td>
<td>Sources of information</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>Administrative Issues</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.1.9</td>
<td>Introduce training cum production activities</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Overall Objective**
- To improve the transition from school to work whilst recovering training costs

**Project Objective(s)**
- To improve the internal efficiency of the training institution

**Results**
- Improved transition from school to work
- Improved financial situation for the training provider
- Increased linkages with the employer
- Higher profile in the community

**Activities**
- Assess facilities and resources available to the training provider
- Assess the potential to produce goods and services for the community
- Discuss with employers’ and workers’ organizations
- Promote services of the training provider
- Provide training in the processes of tendering for provision of goods and services in the community.
- Conduct pilot proposal with an enterprise
- Evaluate from and economic and training and development perspective.
- Replicate if successful
# 4.0 TVET INSTITUTIONAL NEEDS

## 4.1 Administrative Issues

### 4.1.10 Develop SME's Entrepreneurship and Micro-Credit Awareness

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Overall Objective</th>
<th>Indicators of achievement</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>Assumptions and risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To provide eligible frames with financial support</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Project Objective(s)</th>
<th>Indicators of achievement</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>Assumptions and risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>To increase the opportunity for frames to enter into business or become entrepreneurs</td>
<td></td>
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</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Results</th>
<th>Indicators of achievement</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>Assumptions and risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Increased numbers of trainees enter self or micro-level enterprise employment or become entrepreneurs</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Indicators of achievement</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>Assumptions and risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identify potential sources of credit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop linkages with credit providers local development agencies and commercial financial institutions</td>
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<td>Introduce business principles into TVET courses</td>
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<td>Provide guidance on application preparation for credit</td>
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<td>Provide follow up on business initiative</td>
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<td>Establish links with extension workers for rural businesses</td>
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<td>4.0</td>
<td>TVET INSTITUTIONAL NEEDS</td>
<td>Indicators of achievement</td>
<td>Sources of information</td>
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<td>4.1. Administrative Issues</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.1.11 Promote Small and medium enterprise development and social partner (SP) involvement</td>
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</table>

| Overall Objective | ● To promote the role of the SMEs and social partners in the development process | | | |
| Project Objective(s) | ● To assist SMEs and entrepreneurs to be familiar with philosophy of and means by which the TVET system operates | | | |
| Results | ● Improved understanding of the role each sector of the community plays in the strengthening of the TVET system | | | |
| Activities | ● Training seminars and workshops developed and delivered at national, regional and local level for SP’s covering:  
   ● TVET policies  
   ● TVET legislation  
   ● TVET strategies  
   ● TVET financing  
   ● TVET LMI/TNA  
   ● The role and contribution of SP’s in TVET | | | |
4.0 TVET INSTITUTIONAL NEEDS

4.2 PROFESSIONAL ISSUES

4.2.1 PROVIDE AND SUPPORT CAREER COUNSELING OF STAFF AT ALL LEVELS
4.2.2 ARRANGE STAFF TRAINING IN STUDENT GUIDANCE AND JOB COUNSELING OF TRAINEES/STUDENTS
4.2.3 DEVELOP A DIVERSIFIED METHODS OF TRAINING DELIVERY
4.2.4 LIAISE WITH OTHER LOCAL/REGIONAL TRAINING PROVIDERS
4.2.5 LIAISE WITH PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYERS 'AND WORKERS' ORGANIZATIONS
4.2.6 DEVELOP MENTORING SYSTEMS FOR JUNIOR STAFF
4.2.7 ESTABLISH STUDENT ASSOCIATION
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4.0 TVET INSTITUTIONAL NEEDS</th>
<th>Indicators of achievement</th>
<th>Sources of information</th>
<th>Assumptions and risks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4.2 Professional Leadership</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overall Objective</td>
<td>● To strengthen capacity of senior staff to professionally lead the training institution</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project Objective(s)</td>
<td>● To provide development for senior staff</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
| Results                       | ● Improved staff efficiency  
● Increased responsibility accepted  
● Improved motivation |                       |                       |
<p>| Activities                    | ● Establish internal staff development committee |                       |                       |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>4.0</th>
<th>TVET INSTITUTIONAL NEEDS</th>
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<tr>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>Professional Leadership</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.2.1</td>
<td>Career counselling of staff</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Overall Objective**
- To provide guidance on career development

**Project Objective(s)**
- plan

**Results**
- Individual career plans agreed
- Individual progress reports prepared

**Activities**
- Review career progression system within national TVET system
- Prepare career plan possibilities with available constraints
- Provide professional assistance at appropriate level and time
- Ensure teacher training upgrading, in-service course attendance
- Enable individual training needs to be achieved
- Arrange for technical area work experience on regular basis with employer(s)
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<tr>
<th>4.0 TVET INSTITUTIONAL NEEDS</th>
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<tr>
<td>4.2 Professional Leadership</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.2.2 Training of staff in guidance and counselling of trainees</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overall Objective</td>
<td>To improve the external efficiency of the TVET system</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project Objective(s)</td>
<td>To provide guidance and counselling to trainees/students</td>
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<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>Trainees/students provided with:</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Career guidance materials</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>- TVET opportunities information</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Access to NES data at local, regional, national level</td>
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<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>Identify priority occupations in accordance with Government policy</td>
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<td></td>
<td>In collaboration with the NES, develop career guidance materials</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Promote liaison with the NES and the MoE and MoL</td>
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<td></td>
<td>training schools/ centres</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Train selected teachers NES officials in career guidance</td>
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### 4.0 TVET INSTITUTIONAL NEEDS

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#### 4.2 Professional Leadership

#### 4.2.3 Diversified methods of training delivery

| Overall Objective | | |
|-------------------|-----------------------------|
| To provide diversified training delivery methods | |

| Project Objective(s) | | |
|----------------------|-----------------------------|
| To identify and develop appropriate methods of training delivery | |

| Results | | |
|---------|-----------------------------|
| Diversified training delivery methods available to trainees | |

| Activities | | |
|-------------|-----------------------------|
| Recommend economic alternatives for course structure and training materials to cater for individual differences and circumstances of trainees/students | |
| Assess current types of training materials utilized | |
| Assess structure of curricula and syllabi | |
| Estimate potential of national utilization of diversified training materials | |
| Develop and pilot prototype materials | |
| Estimate cost to produce | |
| Seek funds for final development | |
| Develop and disseminate | |
### 4.0 TVET INSTITUTIONAL NEEDS

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<td>4.2 Professional Leadership</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.2.4 Liaise with other local/regional training providers</td>
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#### Overall Objective
- To improve cross-fertilization of ideas on TVET issues

#### Project Objective(s)
- To develop a network of TVET training providers in the catchment area

#### Results
- Increased interchange of professional staff
- Improved awareness of TVET offerings
- Exchange of TVET training materials/information

#### Activities
- Establish linkages through regular exchanges of professional issues
- Provide technical and material assistance to other training providers within financial limits
- Conduct joint employment needs assessment and training needs analysis
- Provide and share teacher training courses and staff development programmes
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<tr>
<th>4.2</th>
<th>Professional Leadership</th>
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<tr>
<td>4.2.5</td>
<td>Liaison with professional employers’ and workers’ organizations (E&amp;WOs)</td>
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**Overall Objective**
- To strengthen tripartite collaboration on TVET issues

**Project Objective(s)**
- To promote the involvement of employers’ and workers’ representatives in all levels of the TVET decision-making, monitoring and evaluation process

**Results**
- Workers’ and employers’ representatives agree to participate in TVET

**Activities**
- Invite W&O representatives to TVET meetings, conferences, and workshops
- Offer membership of local, regional, national quasi-national and ad-hoc bodies
- Request participation of W&O representatives on technical committees such as boards of studies, trainee disciplinary committees, governing bodies and local promotional agencies that can impact on the TVET programme.
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<th>4.0 TVET INSTITUTIONAL NEEDS</th>
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<tr>
<td>4.2 Professional Leadership</td>
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<tr>
<td>4.2.6 Mentoring systems for junior staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>Overall Objective</td>
<td>• To improve the capacity of junior staff in TVET institutions</td>
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<tr>
<td>Project Objective(s)</td>
<td>• To introduce an appropriate mentoring system</td>
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<tr>
<td>Results</td>
<td>• Junior staff provided with individual or group mentoring</td>
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<tr>
<td>Activities</td>
<td>• Discuss individual needs with junior staff</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Determine numbers, skill and knowledge areas that can be strengthened through mentoring</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Identify mentors and discuss implications of the mentoring role</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Reach agreement between partners</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Introduce mentoring system</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Monitor and evaluate mentoring system</td>
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<td>• Review individual progress through self-evaluation</td>
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<td>• Report on progress for comparative analysis</td>
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<td>4.2</td>
<td>Professional Leadership</td>
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<td>4.2.7</td>
<td>Establishment of student and staff association</td>
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**Overall Objective**
- To encourage increased student/trainee participation in the governance and operation of the TVET institution

**Project Objective(s)**
- To integrate students/trainees at each level of institutional activity

**Results**
- Student/trainees represented:
  - on school board/council etc.
  - on course committees
  - on disciplinary committees

**Activities**
- Develop procedures to ensure that students/trainees are included at each level of the decision-making process
- Counsel students/trainees on protocols of memberships
- Encourage development of an active student/trainee association
- Provide resources to enable a student/trainee body to be sustainable