Sustaining the unsustainable
Police and Community Safety Review, final report

August 2013
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The Honourable Jack Dempsey MP
Minister for Police and Community Safety
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BRISBANE QLD 4000

Dear Minister,

I am pleased to provide you with the final report of the Queensland Police and Community Safety Review.

Since the review commenced on 2 January 2013 the review team has conducted more than 265 meetings and interviews across Queensland with staff, volunteers and stakeholders of each of the portfolio agencies.

I have called the report *Sustaining the Unsustainable*. This title reflects the enormous efforts of staff and volunteers alike that have resulted in positive outcomes for the community, but who have been supported by systems and processes that are in some cases inefficient and in many cases unsustainable.

One of the key findings of the review has been that response services, which must be reactive to demand, should be aligned with those services which can prevent or mitigate this demand. The portfolio approach proposed in this report is designed to drive improved collaboration and reduce duplication and inefficiency.

The report’s recommendations entail significant reform to the portfolio. Implementation teams will need to analyse the legislative, policy and structural issues, and negotiate the details of a model that provides the best possible outcomes for Government and the community.

Although the reforms proposed will result in significant change for many stakeholders I have been pleased with the opportunity to positively engage with staff, executives and stakeholder groups including the key unions.

The intention of the recommendations contained in this report is to build a foundation for Public Safety agencies that will support better processes and outcomes for staff and volunteers. I believe this will ultimately provide a more sustainable approach to delivering quality public safety outcomes for all Queenslanders.

M.J. Keelty AO APM
29 August 2013

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1. Executive summary

Background and method

The Police and Community Safety Review (the Review) was initiated by the Minister for Police and Community Safety in late 2012. The Review commenced on 2 January 2013 against the background Queensland public sector reform and a restructure of the Queensland Police Service undertaken by the recently appointed Commissioner.

The Terms of Reference for the Review are attached. The review was to cover the two departments within the Minister’s portfolio i.e. the Queensland Police Service and the Department of Community Safety. It is to be noted that the Department of Community Safety is comprised of a number of discrete operational agencies – that is, the Queensland Ambulance Service, Queensland Corrective Services, the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service (which incorporates the Rural Fire Service) and Emergency Management Queensland (which incorporates the State Emergency Service).

The portfolio of Police and Community Safety has a combined budget of approximately $4 billion and more than 25,000 full-time equivalent staff. Given the size and complexity of the portfolio, the review team has taken the approach, in consultation with the Minister, to focus on interoperability across the portfolio and issues that impact on interoperability and good practice. Hence the review does not focus in detail on individual agencies, and instead is concerned with issues that prevent efficiencies, effectiveness and interoperability across the portfolio of Police and Community Safety.

The Queensland Commission of Audit Report and the Callinan Review of the Crime and Misconduct Commission were also delivered during the course of the Review, as was The Malone Review into Rural Fire Services in Queensland 2013 (The Malone Review) on Rural Fire. In addition, the Queensland government had commenced a review of the various air services contracted to several different government agencies. The Review has been conducted independently of these initiatives, although the Review team has provided advice to the Minister on the outcomes of the Malone Review.
The Review is only a review, not an Inquiry and hence had no powers to apply to its processes, such as calling for submissions and taking evidence. We relied solely upon the goodwill and cooperation of government agencies, employee representative groups, academics and other persons with a genuine desire to improve the delivery of front line services. For example, the Commissioner, South Australian Police provided a very comprehensive submission to the Review.

Additionally, on 6 February 2013 the Minister for Police and Community Safety wrote to the Review team requesting that the review team include in its final report a review of the 2013 flooding events, limited to the Review Terms of Reference.

The Review team wrote to each agency and also received several representations although there was no general call for submissions. We sought to understand the strategic alignment of each agency as well as the level of interoperability.

The Review team conducted interviews across the state with representatives from all of the portfolio agencies. The Review team either met with or conducted video conferences with several interstate and overseas agencies in Victoria, New South Wales, Australian Capital Territory, Western Australia, South Australia and the Commonwealth agencies, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and Canada. The team visited, Gatton, Cairns, Townsville, Mareeba, Emerald, Rockhampton, Logan, Gold Coast, Pine Rivers, Bundaberg and many districts within the Brisbane metropolitan area.

In all, 265 interviews or meetings were conducted. During the course of conducting the Review, several submissions were made to the Public Sector Renewal Board and an Interim Report was delivered to the Minister on 27 March 2013. As sections of this report on each of the agencies were completed, they were sense checked wherever possible with members of the relevant agency and then released to government, as we were very much aware of the impending 2013-14 storm season.
It is clear that over recent times most of the Department of Community Safety agencies have featured prominently in what have been a series of high profile natural disaster responses, criminal investigations, public order events and tragic fires. Some of these events have resulted in multiple deaths and/or injuries.

It follows that the portfolio is a critical one for both the government and the Queensland community. It is a portfolio of agencies that is often at the centre of news stories and is therefore always high in profile.

Through all of these activities in recent times, the agencies have been publicly lauded. Successive governments have quite rightly singled them out for praise. During the time that the Review was conducted the Reader’s Digest released the results of a 2013 survey of the most trusted professions\(^1\). Firefighters and Paramedics tied for first place and rescue volunteers were in third position. They all do a great job in extraordinarily challenging circumstances.

While parts of this report are critical, one of the purposes of this review was to provide constructive criticism to build upon existing strengths. As we discovered mistakes and anomalies we raised them with the respective agencies and sometimes engaged the employee representative groups.

Our overwhelming position is that everyone in the portfolio, from volunteers to executive level professionals and political leaders (at all levels of government and oppositions) do their best at a time of crisis. Everybody works for the benefit of all Queenslanders (and beyond where required).

That said, we also observed on occasions that the system works well almost in spite of itself. Separate reviews of the 2013 Bundaberg floods, the 2011 Floods Commission of Inquiry and other reviews all point to improvements that can be made. This report is no different.

On the 2013 Bundaberg floods we found commonality of opinion amongst several senior and experienced professionals and volunteers who think that the system sometimes works through a network of ‘mates’ rather than any formalised processes.

It is important to also note at this point the invaluable contribution of the Australian Defence Force. The Australian Defence Force has a significant presence in Queensland and there is no doubt that it has been of enormous value in providing aid to the civilian agencies. Equally, the private sector is part of the mosaic of entities helping create sustainable resilience to critical events.

The Review team was also encouraged by the level of engagement with academic institutions, mostly based within Queensland that are providing valuable contributions in terms of research outcomes and emerging technologies.

A significant contribution to the efforts of government agencies is also made by the members of the Queensland community itself through its various volunteer streams. Our report recognises this and we engaged the Queensland Department of Education in an attempt to create an identifiable pathway to capitalise on a volunteering ethos developed through primary and secondary education.

Hopefully, young Queenslanders will be able to choose a pathway that leads into roles such as the Rural Volunteer Fire Services, the State Emergency Services or similar streams.

It is clear that the challenge of natural disaster events is not likely to recede and there will be other major challenges as the State continues to grow and develop. Events such as the G20 summit (2014) and the Commonwealth Games (2016) will be a feature of the future landscape of Queensland as it attracts a diverse range of opportunities for its people and its economy.
In conducting this review we have been cognisant that there have been no catastrophic outcomes resulting from the action or inaction of any particular emergency service agency. When it is all said and done, in the community safety and emergency management space, every stakeholder wants the same outcome: to be protected and where that has not been possible: to be saved and minimise the impact. Although not immediately apparent, the same outcomes can be said to apply to correctional services.

Our review was mindful of the overarching social justice principle to provide an equitable delivery of service regardless of a person’s background or social standing in the community. This is important not only because of the diversity and makeup of the Queensland community but also because of the remoteness of some of its localities, particularly Indigenous communities. Suggestions of privatisation or contestability of all the emergency services and/or correctional services needs to bear this last point in mind because in some locations, the private sector will have little or no interest in delivering services because it simply cannot achieve a profit.

That is not to say that some remote services cannot be delivered by the private sector, it is merely to point out that in some cases, government may be the only supplier with a desire and remit to deliver. Partnering with non-government organisations and the private sector should continue to be on the table, as it were, but there are some realities about the state of Queensland, its remoteness and its international border with Papua New Guinea that are inescapable.

For example, it will be expensive to have a State Department of Public Prosecutions office in every district just as it will be difficult to place correctional services in every area. Equally, if the police have a station in a remote area, then it will often be the case that they take on multiple roles on behalf of the government.
Issues and findings

It became clear as our review continued that what is known as the police and emergency services portfolio of agencies is not operating efficiently and has some endemic challenges particularly in the areas of information and communication technology and human resources, as well as demand management and service delivery.

Interoperability

We found that, despite the obvious successes of recent years, the portfolio has been limited in its effectiveness by inefficient operating systems where salaries and rosters are sometimes managed in manual systems, cost attribution is not easily available and true measures of performance are elusive.

Within the broader portfolio of Police and Community Safety the Review team has found:

- a culture of ‘entitlement’ amongst portfolio agencies has prospered giving unions covering the workforces of the portfolio an unsustainable and sometimes unrealistic outlook (e.g. the sustainability of specialist allowances for activities that once were specialist but today are basic qualifications)

- agencies have advanced their own positions without linking with other portfolio agencies performing similar roles (e.g. intelligent traffic analysis system, iROAM and Queensland Fire and Rescue Service’s Rapid Damage Assessments)\(^2\)

- It follows that there have been missed opportunities to capitalise on economies of scale across the portfolio

- the Department of Community Safety and the Queensland Police Service do not take a role in the cross portfolio executive development of staff leading to many at executive level having limited experience which is inimical to developing a strong, diverse, innovative and experienced executive team that can identify opportunities and drive change

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\(^2\) These systems are more fully explained in the Police, Ambulance and Fire chapters respectively
- the Department of Community Safety and the Queensland Police Service have either not addressed or have been unable to advance better models for interoperability and coordination of funding and accountability for preparedness for disaster between the Department of Community Safety, local governments and volunteers.

There have been insufficient information technology links between agencies within the portfolio caused by internal and external factors. For example, whereas the Queensland Police Service is committed to WEBEOC as part of an Australia wide connectivity of police organisations, local governments are committed to GUARDIAN, which is consistent with many other local governments around the country. The Department of Community Safety has advanced a model of an event management system using Microsoft SharePoint technology; however this is recognised by all as interim, and insufficient.

As was highlighted during the January 2013 flood event there was no direct linking between the local government, police, the Department of Community Safety and other government department systems. This is critical both in disaster situations such as the January 2013 events and in terms of ongoing connectivity and investment. There is no ‘end to end’ event management system for emergency and non-emergency situations meaning that there is no ‘single point of truth’ upon which agencies and the government can base decisions. This is a crucial issue, given that “the core of all coordination and cooperation is ease of access to information.”

The building of a technical solution, which has been managed by the Department of Community Safety, commenced in 2010 and has to date cost over $6.5 million. A single event management system is not expected to be delivered before the 2014–15 storm season.

The Review team has expressed concern to the Department of Community Safety about the situation in numerous meetings. The Review team is not claiming credit for raising this

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3 The Review were invited and did see a proof of concept model after lengthy discussion with the Department of Community Safety but it was not fully operational at the time of writing.

4 Professor Simon Bronitt, Director, Centre of Excellence in Policing and Security, Griffith University, in the Review meeting 24 January 2013
deficiency as it was well known to all involved but it highlighted a deficiency in project governance and interoperability.

The Public Safety Communications Steering Committee which is discussed later was raised as a point of concern. Despite the existence of the Public Safety Communications Steering Committee, agencies still tended to develop information and communication technology solutions for outcomes desired by their agency alone giving rise to the suggestion that the Public Safety Communications Steering Committee is redundant in its present form.

The genesis of the Public Safety Communications Steering Committee appears largely as a result of the outcomes of the joint computer aided dispatch platform project which in 2003 found:

- A common computer aided dispatch system is feasible and offers improvements in service delivery, as well as economies of acquisition and operating costs. The key activity is the development of a functional specification based upon operational requirements as a precursor to acquisition.

- Further rationalisation of communications centres is feasible and offers improvements in service delivery, as well as a cost benefit ratio that is a practical and sustainable way of dealing with the substantial increases in likely demand. The key activity is to accurately measure the demand for service across all public safety services and forecast medium term changes.

- A single public safety network is feasible, and offers a cost benefit ratio that is a practical and sustainable way of continuing to meet service requirements for communication, in the face of significant technological change. The key activity is the development of a joint communications strategy that maximises the benefits of synergies available in information distribution channels and acquisition.\(^5\)

Documents still existing on the Department of Community Safety portal acknowledge that:

\(^5\) Vision and feasibility statement: Joint Queensland Police Service and Department of Emergency Services Communications and computer aided dispatch Platform Project, January 2003
In 2003 Cabinet Budget Review Committee advised the three Services that they should work together on developing a joint submission regarding funding for future service delivery using a common computer aided dispatch system, operating across a common radio and information and communication technology network through rationalised and possibly co-located communications centres. In November 2003, the Queensland Police Service and Department of Emergency Services along with representatives from the following Government departments: Premier and Cabinet, Treasury and State Works signed an agreement to facilitate a Cabinet Budget Review Committee submission on this issue.6

In the years since these observations were made, the Queensland Police Service and Department of Community Safety (formerly the Department of Emergency Services) failed to deliver fundamental initiatives in information and communication technology through the formation of the committee charged with progressing these outcomes. In our report we recommend that the Public Safety Communications Steering Committee be discontinued. Indeed our recommendations regarding a Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business would make the committee redundant.

Today, leveraging off the digital platform is not commonplace although the Queensland Ambulance Service and the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service have made significant inroads in the development of their systems to take advantage of this technology which will deliver even better outcomes over time. Technological opportunities such as systems that provide real time information should mean that key decision makers in the disaster management space particularly the State Disaster Coordination Group and State Disaster Management Group are afforded the best possible data upon which to make critical decisions.

The Review team has formed the view that portfolio agencies operate in silos, often in counterproductive ways that push resource consumption and time delays into other parts of the system’s value chain (e.g. out of prisons, into watch-houses).

It has to be said, that the emergency services sector in Queensland is characterised by many people having familial connections that extend within and between agencies. Longevity in senior positions has a point of diminishing returns. While it provides stability it can also stifle growth and reduce opportunities for new ideas and a fresh approach.

**Queensland Police Service**

The Review team has been concerned by the extent to which the Queensland Police Service lags behind other jurisdictions in terms of its information and communication technology approach. Work around solutions and ad hoc systems development are common in the Queensland Police Service. The Queensland Police Service information and communication technology is significantly behind other policing agencies in the country and overseas with no agency wide modern case management system. Queensland Police Service is significantly behind other portfolio agencies (Queensland Fire and Rescue Service and Queensland Ambulance Service) in the development of both mobile and portable information and communication technology capability.

The Review team is concerned with the efficacy of the Policelink system. This system is designed to operate for the benefit of both the police and the community and is an alternative to triple zero (000) calls for police assistance in non emergency matters. It is also used by police as a contact point for the recording of incident reports.

To enter data onto QPrime, police are required to return to the station to type it in, or call Policelink so the data can be entered by an operator. As it currently stands, if police wish to call the report in from the incident scene, they may need to use the complainant’s own phone to dial in and register the details of the matter. The Queensland Police Service say that they can then wait upwards of 15 to 40 minutes in order to register their report on Policelink which is the very same system used by the public to register their reports of crime. Frustration with this cumbersome and time consuming process could be resulting in under reporting but there is no real way of telling.
An emerging problem for the Queensland Police Service and the portfolio (and some other Australian police organisations) is data storage where officers are using their own devices to capture information and store it. Worryingly, some officers are storing images captured in the course of their duties on their personal computers at home. This issue was discussed with senior Queensland Police Service officers, who did not see any problems with the practice. However, our conversation with the Privacy Commissioner revealed real concerns with the practice.

There are inconsistencies in how the Police performance is measured when compared with other agencies in the portfolio. For example the Queensland Ambulance Service has a performance measure for attending an emergency call with targets of about 8 at the 50th percentile and 16 minutes at the 90th percentile and the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service have a target of about 7.5 minutes at the 50th and 12 minutes at the 90th percentile for response. However, the police do not report on response times because they see their key performance indicators differently (as well as needing to be in alignment with other police organisations reporting in the Productivity Commission’s Report on Government Services 2013).

Police performance is measured largely in terms of incident and clearance rates rather than how quickly they get to a job. Police per population ratio, which is reported in the Productivity Commission’s Report on Government Services 2013, has been an important measure for Government in the past. There is no cross-sectoral collaboration between the portfolio agencies on performance measures, and they all seem to use different metrics despite being clustered together as ‘emergency services’.

This sense of separateness was made evident to the Review team when we received a briefing on an emerging piece of technology known as emergency vehicle priority system. The system is being developed and trialled in partnership with the Department of Main Roads and Transport, Queensland Ambulance Service, Queensland Fire and Rescue Service and the Queensland Police Service.
The concept under trial is designed to enable an interactive process between an emergency vehicle travelling under lights and siren and traffic control lights at a given intersection. The objective of emergency vehicle priority system is to clear intersections before the arrival of the emergency vehicle\(^7\).

The emergency vehicle priority system trial is providing more than 600 green lights for emergency response vehicles each week. The system has delivered an improvement in travel time of between 10 and 20 per cent. During peak periods, indications are that the improvements are significantly greater.

While the other agencies have been active participants in the discussions, planning and trials, the Queensland Police Service have had limited input with the reason provided to the Review team that the Queensland Police Service do not see themselves as an "emergency response organisation". This reply supports the notion that the police will respond ‘when they can’ as opposed to within a certain number of minutes.

This issue is dealt with in more detail in the body of the report but it exemplifies how the police operate as a standalone agency without a portfolio outlook.

The Review team has identified numerous examples of where siloed approaches to the adoption and implementation of information and communication technology have hindered meaningful outcomes. The Review team considers one of the most dramatic examples of this is the purchase and implementation of computer aided dispatch systems. The fact that the Queensland Ambulance Service/Queensland Fire and Rescue Service and the Queensland Police Service have purchased modified and continues to support different systems is a major concern on its own.

\(^7\) The National 2013 iAwards, which recognise achievements and innovation made in information and communication technology across all facets of the economy, recently announced the emergency vehicle priority system Project as winner of the Service Domain - Government Category. The emergency vehicle priority system Project won the Queensland 2013 iAward in June in the same Category. The emergency vehicle priority system will now compete for the Asia Pacific information and communication technology Awards, to be held in Hong Kong in November 2013.
Issues are exacerbated however when one finds that there is no automated means of inter-computer aided dispatch system messaging, meaning operators still need to telephone between the Queensland Ambulance Service/Queensland Fire and Rescue Service and the Queensland Police Service to advise of incidents (whereas the Queensland Ambulance Service/Queensland Fire and Rescue Service system automatically advises the other service of an incident). Additionally, the Review team was informed that the plans to develop such a facility have been suspended.

Furthermore, the Queensland Police Service implementation of their system is dependent on a static response model, meaning that operators have no way knowing the closest or most appropriate resource to send to an incident and are dependent on units either updating their location over the radio or answering requests for available units. While the Review team acknowledges there may have been competing financial pressures, we consider the adoption of automatic vehicle or resource location and integration with a computer aided despatch system fundamental to achieving the benefits such systems offer. Failure to do so was not only a lost opportunity but a flawed strategic decision.

The Review team discovered that the position adopted by the Queensland Police Service (as well as several other examples provided to the Review team) is impacting upon the way in which the Queensland Police Service is perceived by others. Other Queensland agencies and entities perceive that the Queensland Police Service considers itself as being too big or too important to be involved in their activities. The Queensland Police Service is seen as being intransigent on some policy issues, lacking in innovation on others and exhibiting a strongly ‘risk averse’ culture in its senior management. It follows that the staff of Queensland Police Service and other agencies have developed ‘work-arounds’ to get things done.

Many in the sector, especially the Police do not seem to see themselves as public servants. Attempts to engage them more fully into the public sector have been met with the response that they need to be independent. The Fitzgerald Report of 1989 is used both as an excuse not to be included in the wider government priorities and as a defence for continuing inefficient structures and processes. Presumably this posture is to avoid the inference that it is unduly influenced by the government of the day.
By way of example, when questioned about the apparently excessive number of sergeants and senior sergeants providing a span of control of 1 sergeant to only 2.3 constables the reason given by the Queensland Police Service was that Fitzgerald recommendations had required increased supervision.

Former Justice Tony Fitzgerald AC QC reported nearly 25 years ago and it is time for the Queensland Police Service to draw a line in the sand and get on with its work engaging an appropriate level of oversight, accountability and transparency having learned from the past.

The Review’s final report addresses the lack of a Ministerial Direction despite provision for such an instrument in the legislation. The chapter on the Queensland Police Service also points to the similarity in problems identified in the Fitzgerald Review and those discovered during the course of this review. These are not issues of corruption or alleged corruption – they are ongoing inefficiencies and a failure to adopt contemporary work practices.

The lack of transparency into the inner workings of the Queensland Police Service corporate services seems to have enabled a complicated set of governance arrangements and uncoordinated decision making. A good recent example given in the body of the report relates to how the Queensland Police Service assigns costs to its services.

Until recently the organisation used what is known as a State-wide activity survey of 30 per cent of its staff twice yearly to report on the cost of its services (in the Service Delivery Statement). The State-wide activity survey took about 2,800 hours of officer time on each occasion it was conducted. In January 2013 a decision was taken to abandon the survey.

In June 2013, the Executive Conference (a Queensland Police Service senior management team) directed that the Queensland Police Service Intelligent Traffic Analysis System (used by a large proportion of police but not by all) be examined as an option to replace the State-wide activity survey and gather the data for external reporting.

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8 Section 4.6 Police Service Administration Act 1990
No return date was identified to complete that project and in a separate review by Deloitte on Queensland Police Service governance, it was recommended that the Queensland Police Service replace the Executive Conference – the very same body who commissioned the abandonment of State-wide activity survey in favour of the Intelligent Traffic Analysis System (I-TAS).

The issue raises the question of transparency for government and the community around governance structures in the Queensland Police Service. While the Review team agrees with the Deloitte recommendation, when a decision such as this, that impacts on key external reporting, can disappear from consideration without a return date or milestones it becomes evident that the governance systems require review.

This type of inertia is preventing the Queensland Police Service from future proofing itself. It is not agile and is firmly rooted in tradition and proven methods of operation. The body of this report discusses the time taken to carry out some police functions that have not changed over decades. Such practices can no longer be afforded by the government or the community without a thorough examination of their efficiency.

The Review team did observe however, that the Queensland Police Service has now taken significant steps since being made aware of our criticisms of the lack of contemporary approach to demand drivers/demand management and interaction with clients and stakeholders, especially the public.

However, those steps need to be more than just window dressing such as recent publicity given to a roll out of smart phones and iPads that were still undergoing proof of concept at the time of writing and are not due to be trialled until October, 2013 some three months after the announcement.
Another example has been publicity given to the use of automated number plate recognition system on patrol cars. The publicity given to the roll out did not disclose that the system has been in place for some time having first been adopted by the Queensland Police Service nearly three years ago but in any event, at the time of writing, only about a dozen cars have been fitted with the system. Informed observers will know that automated number plate recognition technology has been around for some time and it is in use at major shopping centres as well as the Brisbane Airport.

Interstate police are well ahead in rolling out the system and the rank and file police know this to be the case. For example, New South Wales Police have more than two hundred units in operation across the state. All New South Wales Police highway patrol cars have both the automated number plate recognition technology as well as internal and external camera recording capability.

Accessing accurate information from the Queensland Police Service on the state of its corporate position was both time consuming and difficult in terms of establishing single points of truth. We discuss the use of State-wide activity survey and external reporting elsewhere but everyday HR data was difficult to acquire. As information trickled through to the Review team, caveats were placed on the accuracy or content of the data as it was claimed matters were already under review.

The Review team experience in this regard is not an isolated one. Interviews with senior officials from many Queensland state government agencies revealed the existence of the ‘blue iron curtain’ that either prevents access to or prevaricates about data. Frustrated by this, at one point the Review team demanded to be provided a list of current reviews being undertaken in the Queensland Police Service. A list was duly provided the next day but it still did not include two other major reviews concurrently being conducted on HR and governance. We concluded that there was nothing untoward in this except to say that even the police liaison officers provided to assist the review were frustrated at how difficult it is to extract accurate information from their own organisation. Simple questions when answered were responded with pages of reply containing significant amounts of unnecessary or unwanted data.
Department of Community Safety

The combined budget of what is currently known as the Department of Community Safety is $1.9 billion. The source of funding for the sector is a mix of government appropriations, government imposed levies, local government funding, private sector funding and community donations. It is a complex mix of revenue and an equally complex mix of expenditure especially in the areas of capital acquisition (including land), procurement and industrial awards.

The total number of staff employed in the Department is over 10,800. Worthy of note however is that it appears there is no formal accounting, when resourcing decisions are made, for the fact that the Department of Community Safety employs over 40,000 volunteers to deliver key frontline services. This is significant when considering resourcing implications. All of these volunteers require recruitment, equipping and training in order to deliver vital services.

The concept of a single Department of Community Safety has proved to be amorphous because there is a high level of ambiguity in its legislative underpinning. Whereas most of the Department of Community Safety operational divisions are clearly established in legislation, the Department of Community Safety itself is not. This has led to systemic problems such as:

- No commonly agreed definition of ‘Community Safety’ upon which the government, the community and the public sector can rely

- The Director-General of the Department of Community Safety does not sufficiently control its operational divisions. Instead, they have been established under separate legislation (with the exception of Emergency Management Queensland, which is not established by legislation) and are therefore managed as though they are separately funded.

- Most operational agencies have a ‘Commissioner’ as their head, yet the Director-General is formally the Chief Executive Officer of each agency
• The lack of effective control by the Department of Community Safety over the operational divisions has led to a myopic, internal focus within its divisions without sufficient remit to intervene to better co-ordinate across agencies in policy, legislation, practice and procurement.

• Information and communication technology development in the Department of Community Safety has been predicated on assessments of risk rather than of benefit.

• The lack of coordination of information and communication technology development across the Department of Community Safety raises serious questions about the efficacy of the Department of Community Safety as an overarching coordinating department.

• Because of the cluster arrangement of ‘community safety’ divisions within the Department of Community Safety, customer identification and service key performance indicators are blurred at the departmental level.

The lack of definition of a universally and well understood definition ‘community safety’ along with gaps and disconnects between some of those agencies and the broader community caused the Review team to look at alternatives. Defining the client and improving frontline services to the client is the main motivation for our recommended disaggregation of the Department of Community Safety.

**Emergency Management Queensland and disaster management arrangements**

In terms of disaster management the Review team has found:

• Emergency Management Queensland finds itself in an invidious position having no line authority over the significant collective capability of other agencies and is considered to be floundering

• the lack of clarity on these issues makes accountability of decision makers unclear and creates tension leading to a sometimes uncoordinated capability

• the same lack of clarity makes it also difficult to find ‘the person in charge’.
Observations by the Review team of Emergency Management Queensland in action as well as several interviews in Queensland, New South Wales, Western Australia and Victoria have identified some concerns with the operations of Emergency Management Queensland and disaster management arrangements.

While other operational divisions within the Department of Community Safety are established by legislation, Emergency Management Queensland exists to oversee delivery of aspects of the *Disaster Management Act 2003*, by virtue of authority delegated by the Chief Executive Officer of the department that administers the Act (Director-General Department of Community Safety). This authority could equally be delegated to another agency within the department that administers the Act and so we have recommended that the delegations move to the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service.

Emergency Management Queensland is a non-combat agency attempting to do combat work. The authority delegated to Emergency Management Queensland is in fact mostly an advisory role in support of the State Disaster Management Group. However, due to the Department of Community Safety role in administering this whole-of-Government legislation, many additional responsibilities are handed to Emergency Management Queensland by default. To further complicate this, stakeholders have commented to the Review team that Emergency Management Queensland “push themselves forward” in disaster situations “to make themselves relevant”.

The success of the current model relies on people rather than systems, meaning that many people are bypassing state operated information and communication technology systems and deliberations. Accountability within the system is therefore blurred and in some instances will be impossible to determine.
The structure and physical build of the State Coordination Centre at Kedron does not lend itself to efficient operations and media management. Despite widespread support in the United Kingdom no thought appears to have been given to simplifying responses in the emergency management space to emulate the ‘gold, silver, bronze’ approach to structure, briefing and decision making. Equally, the centre at Kedron does not use the COBR\(^9\) type arrangements. The Australian government agencies have at least considered if not adopted these models.

In practice, the Queensland Police Service have been the lead agency in disaster operations for the State, and this role is widely supported by state and local government agencies; however the level of their commitment has been criticised. A critical issue regarding interoperability on emergency management is the parlous state of some of the Queensland Police Service operating systems (information and communication technology) and the fact that the Queensland Police Service is an operational agency with little latent capacity to focus on a state disaster until it is upon them.

In the future, this will have to change if the Queensland Police Service maintains its role in disaster management and the Review has recommended that the Deputy Commissioner Regional Operations be identified as the default State Disaster Coordinator. The Review team considered the Victorian model for emergency management appreciating the value of an all hazards approach with individual expertise in a particular discipline. In this model the Emergency Management Commissioner is responsible for appointing a suitably qualified person as the State Controller for major natural hazard emergencies. However, given that in Queensland the police are already identified in the legislation, are placed across the state in positions of authority and accountability and that there is a need for strong command and control to be exercised in a disaster, the Review team has decided to reinforce the policing role in disaster management.

The Queensland Police Service has to understand this responsibility and step up to the challenge with a collegiate whole of government outlook rather than ‘imposing’ themselves onto the system which has been the case in some instances and even acknowledged by some of their members during debriefs.

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\(^9\) Cabinet Office Briefing Rooms used for crisis management by the UK Cabinet Office during a crisis
Disasters operate within three streams being the political, the bureaucratic and operational command. These streams do not necessarily complement each other and tension arises between the ‘in field’ emergency and the whole of government emergency management.

The recent 2013 floods exposed some entrenched flaws with the current system such as:

- operational personnel in the field being obliged to continue to report to their agency head so they communicate outside the state controlled systems; the Review team accepts the requirements to “brief up” but it should not be to the exclusion of the disaster management system
- air assets are not properly managed or organised as a State capability.
- role confusion between the State Disaster Coordination Group and the State Disaster Management Group
- the existence of substandard plans, exposing a major issue about standards and audit
- a reliance on old technology such as faxes to transmit critical requests for assistance, which in fact broke down during the crisis.

To ensure that active attention is given to emergency management during non-combat periods, the Review team has made a recommendation along the lines of the Victorian government proposal of introducing a role of ‘Inspector-General of Emergency Management’. The function will be a standards and audit type function to ensure that the state of readiness is appropriately and continuously maintained.

**Queensland Fire and Rescue Service**

The Review team has been impressed by the capability and professionalism of the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service. That said there is value in more closely examining the operations of the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service and its funding sources. The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service spends little time actually extinguishing fires. It spends even less time extinguishing structural fires (around 5 per cent of total activities) raising questions about government and community understanding of what it is buying in terms of services.
The trend to less structural fire fighting work for the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service is understandable given the focus over the past two decades on ‘fire prevention’. Assisted by technological advancements and a commensurate role in fire protection design for buildings and building materials, a drop in structural fires was inevitable.

The trend towards non fire work for fire brigades across the world has been very similar. The degree of latent capacity arising from fewer fires has been utilised by the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service to grow its business into rescue roles and disaster operations support.

Governments have tended not to react to the dramatic change in role for the fire services and have given either express or tacit approval to the incremental creep into other roles such as road and water rescue. These roles duplicate in part some State Emergency Service capabilities in other states.

Analysing the activities of the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service reveals a major inefficiency in dealing with false alarms or ‘unwanted alarms’, as they are referred to by the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service. About 30 per cent of total Queensland Fire and Rescue Service activity is spent in this area which needs a major rethink. While there is a fee charged for ‘unwanted alarms’ it only represents 2.5 per cent of total budget so there is an inequity that needs to be addressed.

Logically it might be thought that the salary and wages paid for doing core business (fighting structural fires) might have dropped in line with the demand for this service but this is not the case.

What has in fact happened over recent years is that there have been allowances or adjustments made to the core salary of fire officers to reflect the new roles in road, swift water rescue and other rescue disciplines with no apparent reduction in their base salary which presumably is based around fighting structural fires.
The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service is sometimes seen to be ‘doing its own thing’ rather than being a team player which is likely reflected in its relationship with the Rural Fire Service, volunteers and other stakeholders. Having said that, the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service, does its ‘own thing’ relatively well and appears to be hard to beat in a contestable market.

The Review team notes that there are significant shortcomings in the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service current strategic planning processes predominantly as a result of a lack of a robust Departmental process within the Department of Community Safety. There is a lack of any approved service delivery criterion which leaves the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service and Government exposed to criticism and prevents authoritative debate on the issue about appropriate resourcing levels for any given community.

The Review team has observed that the prevailing paradigm is very much centred on responding to fires using traditional vehicles from traditional stations with a traditional crew profile. This is not sustainable into the future.

The popularity of the fire service with the community should not mask inefficiencies imposed upon government and the community nor should it be a barrier for governments seeking a new way to do business. At one extreme, there is no real reason why the use of the term ‘fire’ in the title of the organisation does not become a secondary consideration so as to properly reflect their modern role in road and swift water rescue.

This, to some, would be heresy. The Review team has decided that this is not a battle worth fighting for now. However, despite a lack of will to take Fire out of the title, the Review team is recommending a fundamental change to the culture and services. By taking on a broader role, it is expected that fire-fighters should see themselves as delivering a broader set of emergency and disaster management services for the community. This is change will be fundamental to its ongoing relevance and value for money.
Equally, there is no reason why the operations of a fire service could not be contestable and if proved more efficient be given over to the private sector. Indeed, many mining companies and other parts of Australia have private fire service providers especially in the commercial inspection role.

Unfortunately, turf wars also dominate relationships in the fire agencies. Disputes between the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service fire fighters, the auxiliary fire fighters and the Queensland Rural Fire Service are common. Morale between the entities is not good and each of the entities tends to look upon the other with disdain. The Malone Review of the Rural Fire Service made a number of excellent recommendations in this regard.

This tension between urban and rural fire-fighters is not uncommon across the Australia and it requires strong leadership, oversight and determination to make sure that those engaged in these activities recognise that wildfires are the problem – not each other.

Although the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service is a highly professional organisation doing good work for the community its monopoly position and culture is in danger of reducing its value for money in today’s economy. The Review team’s recommendations are intended to improve the fire services’ value proposition by broadening and improving its services to the community.

**Queensland Ambulance Service**

Since the Queensland Ambulance Service was established in 1991 as an amalgamation of nearly one hundred separate ambulance services across the state, the Queensland Ambulance Service has evolved into a highly professional and effective ambulance service. Credit for its current standing belongs to their current and former executives who have worked hard to align Queensland Ambulance Service with the Queensland health services.
The Queensland Ambulance Service is one of the first ambulance services in the world to introduce pre-hospital ultrasound and the first in Australia to undertake pre-hospital blood transfusion. The Queensland Ambulance Service has developed the largest pre-hospital led coronary artery reperfusion strategy (clot-breaking drugs suffering from heart attack) in Australasia and is the only ambulance service in Australia to gain advanced training accreditation from the Australasian College for Emergency Medicine.

In terms of alignment with Queensland Health the Review found that 83.3 per cent (833,243 in 2011–12) of Queensland Ambulance Service incident responses interfaced with Queensland Health. The executive of the Queensland Ambulance Service had already aligned the regions of the ambulance service to those of the hospitals in Queensland Health prior to the commencement of the Review.

Staff of the Queensland Ambulance Service are better educated and more of a health professional than was once the case. Modern technology should allow patient details to be shared between Queensland Health and the Queensland Ambulance Service when called to treat a patient meaning that a patient’s existing condition and allergies will already be in the possession of a paramedic on the front line.

Moving the Queensland Ambulance Service out of the Department of Community Safety portfolio of agencies will not only better align it with its core function as an emergency health service, but it will also help capitalise on the Metropolitan Emergency Department Access Initiative that is improving access to Emergency Departments. The Review team also recognised that this alignment will assist in the development of other triage and pre-emergency department options in the future.

As detailed in chapter about the Queensland Ambulance Service, the Review team also strongly supports the notion that the Queensland Ambulance Service retains its identity and not be fully absorbed into the Health portfolio. We do not wish to diminish any of the gains the Queensland Ambulance Service has made towards professionalism.
It is also important to bear in mind that the Queensland Ambulance Service is strongly supported by the community both financially and otherwise. The Queensland Ambulance Auxiliary made representations to the Review team and we strongly endorse their continuing role as well as commend them for their work.

It was made evident to the Review team that many Queenslanders bequeath money to their ambulance service and in the case of the Bundaberg Ambulance station by way of example; $1.5 million had been raised by the community to build that facility which was lost during the 2013 storms and floods.

The Review team has recommended that the Queensland Ambulance Service be transferred to Queensland Health by a machinery of government change. The Review strongly recommends that the Queensland Ambulance Service be maintained as a state-wide service into the future. The Review supports the notion that the ambulance service is stronger and more efficacious as a state-wide entity. It has also been recommended that the Queensland Ambulance Service maintain its own identity to ensure their role is not lost and there is a focus on key performance indicators, such as response times; and to build on the goodwill the Queensland Ambulance Service has with the community.

The review team has also recommended that Queensland Health recognise and foster the important contributions of Local Ambulance Committees to supporting effective community focussed ambulance services across the state.

Queensland Corrective Services

Queensland Corrective Services operates a combination of private/public sector institutions. The Queensland Corrective Services appears on the surface to be an efficient operation but there are some current and emerging issues that the Review team wishes to highlight:

- There is a cost imposition on the Queensland Police Service if the Queensland Corrective Services operations are not efficiently coordinated which appears to be the case in some instances.
Holding persons in police watch houses for lengthy periods is happening as a result of the inability of the Queensland Police Service to efficiently transfer some prisoners/people on remand to Queensland Corrective Services.

At present, health professionals do not provide restricted drugs for transport with prisoners (e.g. schedule 8) and the Review team heard many accounts of police watch-house staff having to make arrangements for a medical assessment and purchase of prescribed drugs.

The efficiency gains in private institutions could mask inefficiencies in the publicly funded institutions.

Prisoner transports and police watch house operations should be considered for outsourcing as is the case in other jurisdictions both in Australia and overseas.

A large proportion of Queensland Corrective Services work is engagement with persons on parole or probation orders which is really an extension of the authority of the Courts giving rise to the suggestion that Queensland Corrective Services is better aligned with the Department of Justice and Attorney-General.

Consideration was given by the Review team to placing Queensland Corrective Services with the Queensland Police Service but it was decided that such a move would be fraught given the conflicts of interest between prisoners and police in recent high profile inquiries. Two such inquiries cited during our review were the Victorian government inquiry into the murder of Carl Williams while in a high security prison and the Crime and Misconduct Commission’s report into the Queensland Police Service officers having inappropriate engagement with prisoners in Rockhampton. Joining corrections with police also risks meddling with the orders of the Courts, which are designed to be implemented by Corrective Services rather than by the Queensland Police Service.

A more detailed examination of options for improving the interoperability and front line services of Queensland Corrective Services is outlined in a separate chapter on Queensland Corrective Services.
We have concluded that Queensland Corrective Services would be better placed in the Department of Justice and Attorney-General portfolio given the alignment of core functions as opposed to the Queensland Corrective Services alignment as an emergency service.

The Review team meetings with the DPP, the Chief Justice, the Chief Magistrate, the Queensland Law Society, the Queensland Bar Association, Queensland Legal Aid Commission, the Queensland Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Legal Service and other stakeholders revealed wide support for using technology instead of imposing prisoner transports to and from court venues.

The use of technology instead of transporting prisoners is often more humane when travel over long distances is required. Continuing with the use of technology to conduct mention matters will also greatly reduce the need for prisoner and custodial transfers by either the Queensland Police Service or Queensland Corrective Services. The Review team was impressed by the willingness of all parties involved (led by the Chief Justice and the Chief magistrate as well as the DPP) to streamline their activities even to the point where uncontested mention matters can be dealt with by email.

The Review team also noted other models for prisoner custody and transport such as in New Zealand where corrections staff have replaced police in watch houses and we are satisfied that prisoner transport is an activity that should not be undertaken by police wherever practicable and if moved to corrections, it should be made contestable.

**A portfolio approach**

Throughout this report we have identified a range of issues to be resolved. A key finding of the review has been that the Ambulance and Corrective Services did not align with the core portfolio.
Once Queensland Ambulance Service and Queensland Corrective Services are removed from the portfolio it will allow a concentration of effort on the interoperability of the remaining agencies being the Queensland Police Service, Queensland Fire and Rescue Service and Emergency Management Queensland. In this model the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service would incorporate most of the functions of the current Emergency Management Queensland including State Emergency Service functions.

We have also sought to recognise and capitalise on the strengths within the portfolio to enhance future performance. The review team considered that one of the strengths embedded within the current arrangements was having one Minister responsible for Police, Fire and Emergency Services.

The Review team has concluded that reforming the organisational structure will ensure proper collaboration, cooperation, accountability, transparency of Governance and provide the best value for money outcome. A portfolio approach will provide government with a clear view of where portfolio inconsistencies exist and enable these to be addressed. (E.g. to HR, information and communication technology, communication centres etc.)

There is substantial duplication of effort and regional inconsistencies across the portfolio even after removing the Queensland Ambulance Service and the Queensland Corrective Services from the departmental structure.
The chart below depicts these issues.
Perhaps the most critical issue facing the portfolio agencies that future structures and leaders must overcome is the discrete and embedded cultures of each separate agency. Most operate as monopolies. They have little or no competition. They have little motivation to alter their systems, service delivery or interface with the community unless it is driven by the government through either new policies or changed funding arrangements. It seems that they have had little real incentive to interoperate, even in an environment of austerity.

The Review team examined and considered a number of possible portfolio and organisational structures aimed at addressing our findings, these included:

- a Director-General leading the current Fire, Police and Emergency Management Queensland structures
- a Board arrangement over existing structures
- a temporary fix that would see a panel of experts oversee a reformed structure
- the Commissioner of Police assuming overall responsibility for portfolio agencies
- a traditional shared service approach to all supporting functions
- the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service and Queensland Police Service maintaining their own corporate functions and reporting directly to the Minister.

The Review team concluded that none of the above on their own would offer solutions to all the issues identified and so we researched various models utilised by the Australian Government. We looked at the model utilised by the Australian Defence Force (ADF) in relation to Defence Materiel and that of the Defence Support Reform Group. The Review team met and discussed these models at some length with the Australian Defence Force.

This report proposes a major structural change to corporate governance in the Queensland Police Service, Queensland Fire and Rescue Service and emergency management to provide government with the timely and accurate responses it needs. We advocate in our report for the creation of a Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business. Such a position will ensure that lost opportunities of the past are reduced. It will also ensure that emerging issues are dealt with using modern and accountable solutions.
The Review team has recommended a new portfolio approach the chief aims of which are to:

- ensure opportunities for interoperability are maximised
- improve Government’s visibility of portfolio business capacity and operational efficacy
- provide an enabling capacity for operations;
- ensure appropriate skills and expertise in the portfolio’s enabling services
- provide a balance of operational service delivery and governance
- provide an oversight mechanism to ensure these and other portfolio objectives are achieved.
Creation of Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business

As part of the move to a portfolio approach the Review team recommends the creation of a new position of Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business in order to:

- provide corporate service capabilities for the Queensland Police Service and the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service which will require additional focus following the breakup of the Department of Community Safety
- grow business acumen in the executives of the Queensland Police Service and Queensland Fire and Rescue Service
- provide a window for government and other stakeholders on critical corporate decisions such as information and communication technology enterprise architecture and procurement

- reduce waste and duplication across the agencies.

It is proposed that the Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business would hold all the infrastructure, fleet and information and communication technology assets of the portfolio and provide these capabilities to the Commissioners. The Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business would manage HR, financial management, legal and policy, media management and strategic planning. By creating the Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business the government will have increased transparency over these matters in which it has the greatest interest and investment on behalf of the State. This will leave the Commissioners to deliver their operational outcomes with the same degree of independence they enjoy today.

The Review team considered creating a Board to sit between the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service and the Queensland Police Service and the Minister but in terms of raising, training and sustaining – the Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business was considered to be a better option as it would consolidate effort and maximise output. The Review team looked at other models including the Review of Defence Procurement\(^\text{10}\) by David Mortimer AO and the model used by the Defence Support and Reform Group\(^\text{11}\). The Review team considers the proposed model can provide clearer accountability on any issue, be it operational, which is clearly the purview of the Commissioners, or support services as provided by the Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business. The Review team has observed that present structures and arrangements allow for divestment of responsibility through a myriad of committee structures. This is not sustainable.

The portfolio of agencies, in their own way, impose an overhead for government that may not be sustainable into the future unless a more agile and flexible approach is adopted in the areas of procurement and capital infrastructure. For example, every major town in Queensland will have or expect to have a police, fire or ambulance station. This bricks and mortar approach contrasts with the move to digital platforms by many agencies including

\(^{10}\) 2008 Going the Next level: The Report of the Defence Procurement and Sustainment Review

Queensland Ambulance Service whereby the ‘home station’ is less relevant. The future will provide more opportunities for the virtual emergency service ‘station’ or office. The Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business will provide an assurance about standards for the operational services and to this extent remove a level of risk for the Commissioners.

Expensive practices have developed over many decades and it will take generational change to communicate and present alternative and more sustainable practices. In the United States for example, many police do not have a police station from which they work. They have a small centre which houses lockers for their equipment and acts as a handover/takeover point for shifts. Their operational activities are not always supported by a bricks and mortar police station.

It is proposed that the Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business would hold the infrastructure and fleet assets of the portfolio. The Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business would therefore negotiate with Commissioners about appropriate assets, with both the efficacy of the services and the Government’s fiscal environment as key drivers. Equally, the Commissioners will be entitled to negotiate deliverables from the Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business.

The instrument of accountability to ensure the robustness and mutual understanding of exactly what is being delivered and by whom will be achieved through service level agreements. It will be important to ensure that the Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business remains committed to providing a high level of service to the Commissioners.

**Recommendation:**

That the performance contract of the Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business holds a significant (for example 20 per cent) at-risk component which is contingent upon the achievement of performance measures set by the Commissioners in collaboration with the Chief Executive Officer. The Commissioners would determine whether these measures had been achieved. This would be in addition to the usual conventions of a Chief Executive Officer performance contract.
Recommendation:

That the performance contract measures set by the Commissioners in consultation with the Chief Executive Officer have measureable and clearly definable outcomes, with a minimum of five measures, and no more than two measures relying on satisfaction as an outcome.

We now have an opportunity with modern technology to rethink the way we have set up these high cost institutionalised structures and work in more of a virtual world which can deliver greater flexibility and options at much lower cost. The other problem with continuing the current approach is that it presumes that the demand for police, fire or medical services will remain as a constant at a given location. If it were a private sector service, it is likely to be built and maintained with a much higher degree of flexibility to enable the service to rapidly reflect changes in the external environment.

The Review team considers that a Chief Executive Officer of portfolio business would independently gauge the opportunities for contestability or to simply adopt a different approach to practices of the past, in consultation with the Commissioners. The agencies within the current portfolio have been unable to identify and implement these changes of their own accord. Examples of innovation that Review team saw included:

- The Yellow Cab fleet in Brisbane which services various areas of both Queensland and Tasmania from its Brisbane communications centre and has an APP with proximity indicator identifying the closest taxi to a customer.

- The Brisbane City Council’s operations and communications area and level of interoperability with the Department of Transport and main roads is impressive. It is a sound platform upon which to continue to build future disaster and crisis management operations as well as managing major event activities.

Opening a fire station, police station or ambulance station is often a popular community event accompanied by political representation from all levels of government so it will be important for political leaders to understand that this practice is not sustainable into the future. It must change to become more flexible because communities change as well. The size, ethnic makeup and socio economic standing of a community does not remain stable. It
follows that the demand for services will change as well. Community expectations will also need to be addressed through open access to accurate agency held data and performance information.

Most of the agencies in the portfolio have not until recently looked for opportunities to outsource or make functions contestable. The Queensland Police Service has started on that journey but in the opinion of the Review team there are many functions that either do not belong in the police service or that can be outsourced. Watch-houses and prisoner transport are two good examples. The Office of Portfolio Business would be responsible for implementing contestability.

The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service undertakes commercial activities that are a source of revenue for the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service but the question needs to be asked why the commercial activities are not made contestable, opening up competition to the whole market. Attending unwanted or ‘false’ alarms for the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service could also be redesigned to emulate the system adopted by security companies where codes are used to discern the legitimacy or otherwise of an alarm before sending fire trucks to respond.

Equally, the Review team recommends in our report that alternatives to fire trucks be considered especially for the CBD of cities where smaller, more nimble vehicles would suffice. This is the practice adopted in many major cities overseas and it better reflects the modern building standard and fire prevention technologies. A move in this direction will drive reform of standard operating procedures that today dictate the number of personnel required to respond to an incident.

The Review team considers that the Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business will offer objective advice to Government about resourcing decisions. The Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business will also ensure that the portfolio agencies deliver on promised efficiency and effectiveness outcomes arising from new initiatives.
If the police had a transparent priority system for matters that are referred to them – they may choose to not respond at all to an event using instead a combination of technologies whereby a complainant may capture images, upload them onto a portal, receive a police report number for future reference and complete the transaction remotely.

The police will need to be accountable for ensuring that they are not just a repository for such complaints in that they can provide integrated systems to expose criminal trends or activities that do require a physical response. Either way, the use of modern technology should manage demand and free up frontline services to keep police highly mobile, highly visible and focussed on the highest priority work. The Review team anticipates that the Office of Portfolio Business will offer expert advice and support and ensure the provision of up to date information and communication technology systems.

Another dimension to operational frontline activity is that there are no well developed joint key performance indicators or opportunities to engage the public on major events that disrupt their lives such as fires, serious motor vehicle collisions and the like where major roads and parts of a city/suburb are closed. It seems that the same process that has always been used is put into place with little or no regard to economic impact or doing the job differently. The Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business will be accountable for developing portfolio wide performance measures and supporting the Commissioners and Inspector General Emergency Management in developing robust measures of performance. The need for this was reinforced during our review when we asked a relatively simple question about key performance indicators for road closures and accidents. After several exchanges with the Queensland Police Service and several pages of explanation the simple answer to our question is that there are no key performance indicators for these events.

The Review team observed a culture of ‘a job for life,’ evidenced by the inter-generational makeup of the workforce. This culture extends to those in executive positions and, coupled with a lack of any talent identification or succession management plan, creates an environment where there is no incentive to leave. The ‘job for life’ culture has been accompanied by a strong expectation of financial entitlement to do anything over and above what is perceived to be the norm in service delivery. The best example of this is found in the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service.
The Review team also discovered that many people are not tertiary qualified for their positions and in fact learn ‘on the job’ which can lead to being satisfied with a level of mediocrity. This was especially so in the area of information and communication technology. The Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business will implement consistent and up to date human resource and Industrial relations practices, including appropriate workforce planning.

There is limited capability within portfolio agencies to link human resources and finance, information and communication technology systems leading to an inability to accurately record costs therefore a lost opportunity to undertake activity costing models. The Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business will be accountable for the development of cost attribution models for the portfolio as a priority.

It is envisaged that the Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business could also oversight the implementation of a joined up approach to media and capitalising on the availability of significant media cooperation and good will\(^{12}\).

The Review team is aware of the outstanding contribution made through social networking by the Queensland Police Service media section during the 2010–11 floods however this was not as evident in 2013. The Review team did a ‘point in time’ capture of all the major agencies during the 2013 ex-tropical Cyclone Oswald. The best source of information appeared to be the Courier Mail’s website which had combined information from a number of government and community sources. The point of this is that no Queensland government agency had the best and most accurate information to share with the community. The Brisbane City Council also provided excellent information but the emergency was not centred in Brisbane alone.

\(^{12}\) For example, Mr Ian Mannix PSM an experienced and authoritative figure in reporting of Australia’s natural disasters could be engaged more fully engaged when disasters are being managed. Mr Mannix from the ABC has been attending disasters all around Australia and was present during both the 2011–2011 floods and the 2013 storms and floods.
This raises the question as to whether a state government agency needs to be in the single source of truth for the community during events such as these. Some might say that it is an objective and official source of information. The reality is that in today’s world the community will source its information from wherever they feel they are accessing the information they need and they have a large number of choices. This will drive government agencies to ensure they are up to date or else look at alternatives such as partnering with media organisations.

The Review team interviewed the Editor of the Courier Mail who undertook to remove the subscription fee on the website for the newspaper in the event of a major community emergency such as those reviewed in this report. This is an important commitment to community safety which will ensure the community has access to timely information about disaster events in Queensland. The future challenges for those involved in crisis management and media is to ask how much each leverage off the other. Should government agencies compete in the media space where the private sector already spends millions of dollars trying to stay ahead with the latest technology?

The Review team concluded that a combined ‘community safety’ media portfolio partnering with media agencies could actually provide both the government and the community with a first class information exchange using the latest technologies. This makes sense when you consider the purpose for providing the information, which is to inform decision makers. Decision making is not merely the province of government in these events, the members of the community also need to be empowered to decide on a range of matters that are personally important to them to help maintain their resilience.

The proposed Department of Fire and Emergency Services

A key part of the portfolio arrangement is the proposed new Department of Fire and Emergency Services. The current Queensland Fire and Rescue Service will form the foundation of this department, which will be supplemented with resources from the current Emergency Management Queensland.
From the Review team’s viewpoint, it is essential that this new department takes a broader view of its role than does the current Queensland Fire and Rescue Service. Although the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service has clearly broadened its mandate since the mid-nineties to include rescue and community safety services, the Review team has formed the view that the organisation still fundamentally views itself as a fire service.

The review team believes that it will be essential to the efficacy of the proposed new Department of Fire and Emergency Services that the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service Commissioner takes a leadership role in broadening the self-view of the current Queensland Fire and Rescue Service to incorporate disaster management as a key role. This means operational staff will have a role in working with communities and local governments in disaster mitigation, prevention and preparedness in addition to working with the Queensland Police Service and the Queensland Disaster Management system for disaster response.

In this report we propose a new office of Emergency Management under the command of the Deputy Commissioner Operations. This office will incorporate many of the current functions of Emergency Management Queensland, as described elsewhere in this report. It will also have the task of embedding an emergency management approach across Department of Fire and Emergency Services, and supporting fire-fighters to work with local governments in disaster planning and exercising, and improve resilience in communities across Queensland.

The new Department of Fire and Emergency Services will also incorporate a broadened volunteering role. The proposed new Deputy Commissioner Rural Fire Service and State Emergency Service is in line with proposals made in the Malone review. This approach will aim to improve support for volunteers and reduce duplication and waste across these two vital services.
The Review team has considered a number of approaches to command and control structures across various jurisdictions and considers that Queensland should closely examine the methodology being followed by West Australian authorities. The concept is based upon identifying and matching both the competence of individuals and the hazard type to predetermined incident management regimes. This type of approach will be essential to incorporating and leveraging the skills and abilities that the current Emergency Management Queensland staff will bring to the proposed Department of Fire and Emergency Services.

The Review team commends this approach to Queensland and considers it worthy of further investigation in conjunction with the recommendations made within the Disaster Management chapter regarding the appointment of Deputy District Disaster Coordinators.

One of the key recommendations to support this change is the recommendation that the legislation be amended to enable a suitably qualified person who may or may not be a firefighter to be appointed as the Commissioner of the Department of Fire and Emergency Services. This signals the new approach for Department of Fire and Emergency Services and welcomes emergency management staff into the organisation, enabling them to aspire to leadership positions within the department.

The Review team notes in this report that for successful State Disaster Coordination Centre operations, a unified approach is essential, with all parties responsible for contributing to the outcome being equally engaged. Failure to be able to assure that all necessary and appropriate resources for this capability have been identified, trained and exercised is a significant vulnerability which has the capacity to directly impact the Queensland community.

The goal of these reforms is to create a system which is not only in a state of continued readiness but one which is able to draw upon the latent capacity and expertise of the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service and Emergency Management Queensland to become a force multiplier for the Queensland Police Service’s efforts, enhancing their capability and greatly increasing the likelihood of successful operations.
The Review team believes the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service has the structure, discipline and capacity to perform this role, while Emergency Management Queensland can provide a level of support which, when combined, will provide Police with a significantly enhanced control presence and capability. Transferring responsibilities of Emergency Management directly to the Queensland Police Service was considered. However, the greater latent capacity, combined with the structure and discipline of the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service will facilitate close day to day management and deliver a ‘ready to use’ service. Of critical importance is the need for even greater interoperability between the current Queensland Fire and Rescue Service, Emergency Management Queensland and the Queensland Police Service along with other agencies of Government. This will require interoperable systems, training and exercises particularly on the part of the Queensland Police Service at the State, district and local levels.

The strength of State Emergency Service and the volunteers who deliver the service is the local aspect of their commitment and dedication to service. While a localised approach to management of this capability is ideal for routine and indeed high volume incidents, the capacity issues associated with major events dictates a different approach to ensure optimal utilisation.

To ensure the State Emergency Service is afforded the necessary support to manage in either circumstance, greater coordination of effort and support is required at a state level. The Review team considers it essential that this support does not detract from local autonomy but that it is seen as assisting local arrangements and not an unnecessary, state imposed bureaucracy.

**Creation of Inspector General Emergency Management**

The Review team has noted that there have been a number of reviews within recent Queensland history dealing with Queensland’s disaster management arrangements. Variously they have found along the lines of the Queensland Audit Office report of 2005, that “there was no evidence to indicate that the disaster management system has failed to respond to disasters or support the community”\(^{13}\). Indeed in announcing Review, Minister

Dempsey recognised that “It’s about making sure we are ahead of the game” and “there are always better ways of serving the community”.  

Although all reviews have found scope for improvement, the disappointing aspect is that these improvements have either not been realised or are agonisingly slow in being actioned. O’Sullivan\textsuperscript{15} noted in 2009 that the system is effective if “the elements work together in a trusting cooperative way”. The issues raised by the Review team are largely the same as those observed in previous reviews, giving rise to a view that the current cooperative arrangements which rely so heavily on personalities, good will and collaboration are not sustainable as the sole means of ensuring continuous improvement and offering the government assurance of the systems capability to protect Queenslanders.

The Review has recommended the creation of a new position charged with the responsibility of providing the Premier, Government and people of Queensland an assurance of public safety, through the setting of standards, robust auditing and monitoring of performance regarding the preparedness and management of disasters and emergencies.

Accountable to the Premier of Queensland, and reporting to the Minister for Police, Corrective Services and Emergency Services, the Inspector General Emergency Management will lead an office committed to contributing to the achievement of safe and secure Queensland communities.

The review team has designed the portfolio approach so that additional oversight can be achieved as required by strengthening the role of the Inspector General.

The Inspector General Emergency Management will provide vision, direction and leadership to ensure organisational and systems capability and performance to deliver the

Government’s objectives and key disaster management related legislative requirements. Key focus areas for the Inspector General Emergency Management will include:

- ensuring the interoperability of systems across portfolio agencies and those who support Queensland’s disaster management arrangements
- establishing and implementing a performance standards and assurance framework to direct, guide and focus work of all agencies across all tiers of Government to desired outcomes of Queensland’s disaster management arrangements
- conducting regular benchmarking and quality assurance exercises against best practice public safety agencies to ensure standards remain contemporary
- working with emergency services, government departments and the community to identify and continuously improve disaster and emergency management arrangements
- ensuring a continued focus on improved relationships, systems, processes and procedures between portfolio agencies and all other stakeholders including local Government and non-government organisations
- promoting the development of effective community engagement with local Governments, State and Commonwealth Government agencies and other significant stakeholders including non-government organisations operating in the disaster management arena to ensure cooperative and effective arrangements
- ensuring that disaster planning at a State, District and Local level utilises contemporary risk management strategies and appropriately considers local geographic and demographic variances
- strengthening capability through evaluation of emergency and disaster management planning, training and exercising arrangements.

**Conclusion**

The review team has observed that in many instances the wisdom of the crowd and of individual community members has often led to good outcomes for the community. For example, recent disasters have highlighted the way people provide information to one another through social networking. Given the potential for self-organisation of ideas, information and effort, we believe that now is the time to consider shifting a level of risk back to the community and empowering people to assist each other and themselves to make their communities safer.
Government should not see itself as the only option to solving community problems. Given the opportunity, the community and private sector may offer a range of more efficient and effective alternatives.

In recommending changes to the current arrangements, the Review team has recognised that some agencies in the cluster are ‘demand takers’ while other agencies are ‘demand creators’. For example, if those in the justice system do not fully embrace the use of modern technology the demand for having to move prisoners from prisons to courts will be higher. Equally, if police make more arrests and retain people in custody, this creates more demand on both Corrections and the Courts.

One of the key findings of the review is that response services, which must be reactive to demand, should be aligned with those services which can prevent or mitigate this demand. The review team has therefore recommended that the Queensland Ambulance Service and Corrections be transferred to departments with which they have a stronger alignment. Often the effectiveness of the relationships will depend upon who has any ‘skin in the game’. If an agency can operate without considering the impact of its operations on the effectiveness of a stakeholder agency then it tends to do so. The efficacy of the coordination of all of the players in the system is therefore paramount. Leadership and culture at all levels is just as important as structure for the system to work effectively. Nonetheless, recognising that structure should follow strategy, the review team has proposed a portfolio approach which we believe will provide both better outcomes and better value for money for the Government and the community.

The Review team’s conclusion is that the Police and Community Safety agencies are not broken, as the Minister stated in commissioning this review. However, we did find significant flaws making the current arrangements unsustainable despite the goodwill and hard fought efforts of frontline staff.
Our proposed solution has been to design a portfolio approach which we believe will strengthen transparency and accountability and ensure sustained improvements in efficiency, effectiveness and interoperability.

We believe our proposals align with the vision previously articulated by Public Service Commission, for:

“...a new era of public service delivery that:

- prioritises resources towards frontline service delivery
- recognises frontline services need to be supported by efficient and decisive management and policy capability
- focuses on services not who owns the service
- facilitates services to the community rather than delivers the service itself.”

Our recommendations entail significant reform to the delivery of business capacity across the portfolio. An implementation team will need to examine the legislative, policy and structural issues in detail to negotiate a model that provides the best possible set of outcomes for Government and the community.

16 Public Service Commission presentation approx April 2012
2. Queensland Ambulance Service

“Importantly, Queensland health services will operate as an integrated system so that patients can move easily between services ranging from preventative and primary healthcare through to specialised sub-acute care in hospitals and non-hospital settings.”

Blueprint for better healthcare in Queensland (February 2013)

Introduction

The Police and Community Safety Review (the Review) has recommended the structural alignment of the Queensland Ambulance Service within Queensland Health is a key opportunity to improve services and revitalise frontline service delivery in the emergency health sector. At the time of writing the Police and Community Safety Review’s Interim Report, Queensland Health and the Queensland Ambulance Service had provided submissions to the Review in support of the concept of structural alignment; with the condition a staged approach is undertaken to enable the development of appropriate governance and transition arrangements.

Background

The Queensland Ambulance Service is one of the major entry points to Queensland’s public and private hospital system, along with other pathways such as doctor’s surgeries, specialist health practitioners, health clinics and emergency departments. There has also been the recent development of triage centres within super clinics, and other states have a variety of different pathways. In situations of emergency, and perceived emergency, the Queensland Ambulance Service provides a safe conduit into the health care system. Ambulances are often the first point of contact for patients experiencing a health crisis. In this way, the Queensland Ambulance Service has a unique opportunity to triage for both the patient and the wider health portfolio. This opportunity needs to be recognised and leveraged to the benefit of all Queenslanders.
Taking a systems view of the Queensland Ambulance Service, it is clear that the service is an integral part of the health system. The red and blue lights that are a key symbol of the service may appear on the face of it to identify the service as an emergency response service; however a closer examination reveals this to be only part of the purpose of the service. A rapid response is only one of the factors, albeit the key factor, that contributes to optimal patient outcomes. This is reflected in the Queensland Ambulance Service’s focus on measuring patient outcomes and clinical interventions as indicators of performance in addition to the long standing measures around timeliness of response. The rank structure is a further artefact of an emergency services culture; and this contrasts with the organisation’s primary direction towards a health professional pathway for paramedics. The review acknowledges that the rank structure may play a role in larger scale emergencies and disasters and that Queensland Ambulance Service would potentially be a significant contributor in such events alongside other emergency services. The following table illustrates that the overwhelming proportion of Queensland Ambulance Service incidents have a Queensland Health interface.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage **</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Incidents with Queensland Health interface – to, from and between a health facility</td>
<td>693,756</td>
<td>83.3%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incidents with Queensland Police Service attendance</td>
<td>113,191</td>
<td>13.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incidents with Queensland Fire and Rescue Service attendance</td>
<td>29,644</td>
<td>3.6%</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

* In 2011–12 total Queensland Ambulance Service incidents were 833,243.

** As one ambulance incident may have multiple interfaces (e.g. with Queensland Fire and Rescue Service and with a hospital) these categories are not mutually exclusive and the percentages do not therefore add to 100.

The links between Queensland Ambulance Service and Queensland Health have been strengthened as a result of the recent Queensland Ambulance Service restructure which has realigned Queensland Ambulance Service regions to Queensland Health hospital and health service boundaries. The net effect has been the abolition of the seven former Regions and twenty one Areas, replaced by sixteen Local Ambulance Service Networks.
The reform has also enabled efficiencies in the collaboration between the Queensland Ambulance Service and Queensland Health at the hospital and health service boundaries level, by personalising the relationship between the senior management at local level for the management of joint issues such as ambulance ramping. This is enabling the development and coordinated implementation of local policy solutions that meet local needs.

To facilitate the effective transition to the Local Ambulance Service Networks operational model, the Queensland Ambulance Service State headquarters command structure has also been redesigned to complement the Queensland Health system manager role. In this model Queensland Ambulance Service State headquarters takes overall responsibility for the delivery of ambulance services in Queensland. Like Queensland Health, this includes State-wide planning, industrial relations, major capital works and overall system performance. However, the Queensland Ambulance Service system manager role is different to the Queensland Health model in that it is designed to deliver services as a State-wide, coordinated system through its Local Ambulance Service Networks each of which, although having local responsibilities, have key dependencies on the Queensland Ambulance Service central structure and resources. That is, whereas the Queensland Health system manager role is as a purchaser of services, the Queensland Ambulance Service system manager role is as a provider of services on a State-wide basis.

The *Queensland Commission of Audit Interim Report June 2012* found that health expenditure has been the second fastest growing expense over the last decade, increasing at an average annual rate of 12 per cent. In 2010–11 health comprised 26 per cent of general Government recurrent expenses, compared to 19 per cent in 2000–01. With a budget that is only a small fraction of the Queensland Health budget (in 2012–13 the Queensland Health budget was $11.8 billion, whereas the Queensland Ambulance Service budget was $581 million) perhaps the most significant opportunity for the Queensland Ambulance Service to improve value for money for Queenslanders is in minimising costs and optimising patient outcomes as an integral part of a larger health services value chain.
The structural alignment of the Queensland Ambulance Service with Queensland Health can also benefit the Queensland Ambulance Service itself. Arguably response services, which must be reactive to demand, should be aligned with those services which can prevent or mitigate this demand. The inclusion of Queensland Ambulance Service within Queensland Health’s strategic remit would support Queensland Ambulance Service in achieving stronger demand management outcomes.

Non-urgent patient transport is also a significant segment of the Queensland Ambulance Service business, distinct in many respects from the emergency ambulance services provided. The lower barriers to entry evident in this segment of the business (including lower infrastructure and capital expenses, and lower training requirements for staff) make it a compelling opportunity for contestability.

**Demand pressures**

According to the *Report on Government Services 2013*, in 2011–12, 29.1 per cent of emergency department patients arrived by ambulance, air ambulance or helicopter (in this sense, helicopters can be seen as another form of ambulance). Of all patients presenting at Queensland emergency departments, ambulance services brought 85.7 per cent of triage category 1 (resuscitation) and 52.9 per cent of triage category 2 (emergency) patients and 37.9 per cent of category 3 (urgent). (*Report on Government Services 2013*, Table 9A.32).

According to the *Report on Government Services 2013*, in 2011–12 ambulance services in Queensland brought to the emergency department only 15.9 per cent and 4.6 per cent respectively of patients subsequently triaged as category 4 and 5. **However, it can be deduced from the *Report on Government Services 2013* data that if the Queensland Ambulance Service could reduce the number of low acuity patients transported to the emergency department by only five per cent, there could have been about 4,136 fewer patients presenting at Queensland emergency departments in 2011–12.** Such a reduction would have significant positive impacts upon the timeliness and reach of health services.
Table 2 – *Report on Government Services 2013* (Table 9A.32)

Emergency department patients who arrived by ambulance, air ambulance or helicopter, by triage category (Queensland)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Triage category</th>
<th>Number of emergency department patients who arrived by ambulance, air ambulance or helicopter</th>
<th>% of patients who arrived by ambulance, air ambulance or helicopter</th>
<th>Total number of emergency department presentations</th>
<th>Patients diverted from emergency department with a 5 percentage point reduction in the number of transports in that triage category</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4 – semi-urgent</td>
<td>79,101</td>
<td>15.9%</td>
<td>496,881</td>
<td>3,955</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 – non-urgent</td>
<td>3,625</td>
<td>4.6%</td>
<td>78,861</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total category 4 and 5</td>
<td>82,726</td>
<td>14.4%</td>
<td>575,742</td>
<td>4,136</td>
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Furthermore, with the Australian Institute of Health and Welfare estimating about 30 per cent of people in hospital emergency departments are likely to be more suited to treatment in GP clinics, it is essential the Queensland Ambulance Service work with Queensland Health to develop these pathways to their fullest extent.

### Efficacy of Queensland Ambulance Service demand management strategies

Implementation of the Secondary Triage and Referral Service within QAS has, according to the Queensland Ambulance Service, had a significant impact on the alignment of services to demand. **However, the extent to which it has had an impact on the actual management of demand is less significant. As a result, Government is not accruing value for money in terms of the intended benefit from this investment.** The Secondary Triage and Referral Service is a system that enables the ambulance service to further assess callers who have been identified in the initial triple zero call as low acuity.
The outcome of the reassessment of a call could be the identification of alternative health pathways for the patient (e.g. going to see a GP) and may even be a means to identify that the patient is in fact of higher acuity than was found in the first assessment. In practice however, it tends to continue to result in a full ambulance response. The Secondary Triage and Referral service was implemented as an outcome of the 2007 Queensland Ambulance Service Audit to manage demand. However, of 21,922 calls triaged in 2011–12 only 2,667 (or 12.2 per cent of calls triaged) were cancelled. Table 3 illustrates outcomes from 2009–10 to 2011–12.

Table 3 – Secondary Triage and Referral (STAR) – Proportion of ambulance responses cancelled

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<tr>
<td>Total calls STAR Triaged</td>
<td>10,481</td>
<td>14,915</td>
<td>21,922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Responses cancelled</td>
<td>1,545</td>
<td>2,163</td>
<td>2,667</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cancelled as a %</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>14.5%</td>
<td>12.2%</td>
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</table>

An evaluation of the Secondary Triage and Referral program found it to be an effective patient safety tool to complement the existing triple zero despatch system, however the evaluation found that the number of cases not requiring an ambulance response was quite low due mainly to a lack of alternative referral/treatment options. The Queensland Ambulance Service concluded that the identification of alternative treatment and transportation strategies for low acuity patients is necessary to efficiently manage operational resources, and ensure all patients receive optimal care. The Queensland Ambulance Service and Queensland Health have indicated that there is potential to remove the duplication and overlap in the Secondary Triage and Referral program and the Queensland Health contact centre–13HEALTH.

Accordingly, interventions have tended to be focused on patient care and reducing the cost of response assets. For example the Queensland Ambulance Service is developing a proposal to trial a Low Acuity Alternative Response Program – whereby for a certain cohort of patients (low acuity and able to mobilise), response could be via a specially trained solo paramedic in a standard sedan (as opposed to an ambulance).
The primary aim of this program, according to the Queensland Ambulance Service is to ensure that low acuity patients receive the most appropriate care to meet their needs. A secondary aim is to reduce the number of transports made by the more resource intensive two-paramedic ambulance, rather than to decrease the number of transports to emergency departments. It is perhaps noteworthy that the focus has been on reducing costs to the Queensland Ambulance Service (in the context of appropriate patient care) as opposed to reducing overall demand in the system.

The Review team considered the paradox that people in rural areas are likely to use alternative means of accessing health services, whereas in urban centres, where there is a well-resourced ambulance service capacity, the community is more predisposed to utilise the Queensland Ambulance Service option.

The Ambulance Audit 2007 recommended that:

...the option of having the Queensland Ambulance Service integrated organisationally with Queensland Health be considered in the medium to longer term in the event demand management and Queensland Ambulance Service/Queensland Health services integration measures do not deliver appropriate results.

The Report on Government Services 2013 demonstrates continuing high numbers of incidents, responses and patients, as well as continuing growth in these indicators:

- Queensland reported the highest number (185) of ambulance incidents per 1,000 people in 2011–12 when compared to six other reporting jurisdictions. This result is above the national result of 142 and is an increase of 5.1 per cent since 2010–11 and 6.9 per cent since 2007-08.

- Queensland reported the highest number (206) of ambulance responses per 1,000 people in 2011–12 when compared to all other jurisdictions. This result is above the national result of 172 and is an increase of 4.6 per cent since 2010–11 and 1.5 per cent since 2007-08.

- Queensland reported the second highest number (173) of ambulance patients per 1,000 people in 2011–12 when compared to all other jurisdictions. This result is above the national result of 136 and is an increase of 6.8 per cent since 2010–11 and 12.3 per cent since 2007–08.
Much of this demand has been in emergency code 1 incidents. Between 2011–12 and 2010–11 there was a 12.5 per cent increase in emergency code 1 incidents, with growth in urgent incidents only 1.4 per cent and non-emergency incidents decreasing by -1.5 per cent. Over the years since the Queensland Ambulance Service Audit (2007–08) the growth in emergency incidents has been 31.1 per cent, with urgent incidents growing by 8.2 per cent and non-emergency incidents growing by 5.7 per cent.

**Efficacy of system coordination**

According to the Department of Community Safety’s submission to the Queensland Commission of Audit (August 2012), the key demand pressure for the Queensland Ambulance Service is for urgent ambulance responses, which has increased by 64 per cent since 2003–04, or an average annual increase over the last ten years of 6.4 per cent. Additionally, the total time in hours exceeding 30 minutes off-stretcher time across the 27 Queensland Health major reporting hospitals increased to 39,003 hours in 2011–12. In response to demand, the Queensland Ambulance Service models its workforce in consideration of case cycle times based on times of less than 30 minutes spent at a hospital emergency department. Time lost, as a result of emergency department access impacts on the Queensland Ambulance Service’s ability to respond to other incidents. According to the Queensland Ambulance Service, this equated to a loss of capacity of approximately 107 hours per day.

It is acknowledged that the structural alignment of the Queensland Ambulance Service within Queensland Health will not of itself resolve ambulance ramping and lead to improved patient off-stretcher times. However, structural alignment under the one Minister and Director General will provide clear lines of accountability and support improved coordination, cooperation and significant system improvements. The *Metropolitan Emergency Department Access Initiative – a report on ambulance ramping in metropolitan hospitals July 2012*, (the MEDAI Report) sets out 15 recommendations that aim to improve the way ambulance ramping and bypass are managed across all Queensland public hospitals. The MEDAI Report was tabled in the Queensland Parliament in August 2012, and the Queensland Ambulance Service and Queensland Health began implementing the recommendations in October 2012; and all the recommendations were implemented by 1 January 2013.
A key principle of the MEDAI Report is improving coordination and integration between the Queensland Ambulance Service and Queensland Health. The Queensland Ambulance Service and Queensland Health established the Emergency Services Management Committee to monitor the implementation of the recommendations. Emergency Services Management Committee has also established Local Ambulance Service Networks level sub-committees to enable formal collaboration between Local Ambulance Service Networks managers and hospital and health service districts Chief Executives’. The Emergency Services Management Committee is also currently in the process of developing terms of reference for high-level reference groups to investigate joint solutions and innovation including in relation to patient flow, clinical governance and patient safety, disaster management and preparedness; and information and communication technology.

While the Queensland Ambulance Service and Queensland Health maintain that it is too early to conclude the adoption of the MEDAI Report recommendations has contributed to a sustained improvement in emergency department access – and consequently improved patient off-stretcher times – early performance trends are encouraging. According to the Queensland Health Blueprint from July 2012 to February 2013 the proportion of patients transferred off-stretcher within 30 minutes has improved from 75 per cent to 86.3 per cent. Figure 1 illustrates there is a strong correlation between average off-stretcher times and the Queensland Ambulance response times performance. Therefore, the faster patients are able to be transferred off an ambulance stretcher; the faster ambulances are able to respond to patients in the community.

Figure 2
Patient outcomes

Paramedics are health professionals who provide specialist out of hospital emergency health care and unscheduled care to the community. Paramedic interventions have the capacity to keep patients out of the hospital system entirely, reduce morbidity, reduce the length of hospital stay and reduce hospital based interventions – all of which may contribute significantly to a reduction in the social and economic burden of the health system.

Clinical excellence in the Queensland Ambulance Service is focussed on building capability in the ambulance service which will produce significant savings in the larger health system. If the beginning of the value-chain is effective it can support savings and efficiencies further down the supply chain. For example, effective clinical interventions by paramedics can reduce the amount of time a patient would need to spend in intensive care, or similar resource intensive health care environments. Clinical excellence in paramedic services, for example pre-hospital coronary artery reperfusion in the case of cardiac arrest, also enables the key intervention to occur in a lower cost part of the health services value chain, as opposed to the entire service needing to be provided through hospital resources and infrastructure.

Paramedics in focus groups around the state have indicated that they would welcome improved access to patient records in order to provide better care. For example one paramedic stated that they would like to have access to the last few electrocardiogram test results for a patient to help establish whether it was likely the patient was having a heart attack. As the medical records online systems mature, these systems could offer real opportunities for paramedics to have access to patient information – provided they are part of the health system.
In rural and remote areas, the opportunity exists for paramedics based at the local area health service to assist the medical staff, for example by giving injections and by providing preventative health information. As submitted by Queensland Health to the Review:

“There are several areas of efficiency that could be gained especially in rural and remote areas. The co-location of services would not only result in a potential reduction in shared running costs and shared infrastructure, but also could lead to flexible workforce models to deliver emergency, ambulance and health services with paramedics and nurses providing integrated services to the community."

Queensland Health contends that the alignment offers the potential for an extended continuum of care between pre-hospital, primary and hospital based care with improved clinical and administrative interface between the ambulances service and Queensland public hospitals. Queensland Health also submitted that the structural alignment of the two services would increase the ability to undertake services re-design and introduce alternative service models such as extended care paramedic practitioners, treat and leave paramedics, state-wide tele-health support and the potential increased use of GP services and private providers.

**Frontline staff**

The Queensland Ambulance Service has transitioned from vocational education and training to university degree and double degree education of paramedic recruits. Australia and New Zealand paramedic education programs are located within various universities’ faculties of health science or equivalent; or within the medical schools. These environments afford opportunities for interdisciplinary learning within the higher education environment and between the various health disciplines including medicine, nursing and other allied health areas. Alignment with Queensland Health offers the option to build capability in the paramedic workforce through the introduction of new skills and enhanced career pathways.
A systems view

The interface between the Queensland Ambulance Service and Queensland Health is constant and active part of the Queensland Ambulance Service’s business. Its major focus is relationships and access to information to better manage patient flow. The Queensland Ambulance Service has implemented numerous strategies, procedures and activities in consultation and collaboration with Queensland Health to support patient flow strategies, including Queensland Health implementation of patient off-stretcher time policy, hospital liaison officers at major hospitals, the Ambulance Access Board, access to emergency department ECHO system and regular meetings between the Queensland Ambulance Service and Queensland Health at the local and executive levels.

As indicated in a response to a transactional analysis requested by the Review team, about 3.5 per cent of the overall Queensland Ambulance Service budget is spent on services that are not directly health services. These services however, support the health mission and are:

- counter disaster planning including coordination of all volunteer first aid groups for major emergencies or disasters
- providing community and workplace education in first aid, CPR and other related matters
- identifying and marketing products/services incidental to health (e.g. baby capsule hire, mine site contract services, special event contract services).

According to Queensland Health’s strategic action-plan – *Blueprint for better healthcare in Queensland* (February 2013), “improving State-wide planning for the longer term sustainability of the health system is a focus for Queensland Health”. Queensland Health’s submission to the Review supported integration and alignment of policy, and strategic and operational priorities. In terms of the relationship between the Queensland Ambulance Service and other emergency service organisations, staff in a number of focus groups commented that the relationship between the Queensland Ambulance Service and the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service works well on the ground, and that this isn’t made better or worse by the fact that they are in the same department.
The *Report on Government Services 2013* shows that Queensland had the third lowest rate of patients who were treated and not transported (10 per cent, compared to the national average of 12 per cent). **One of the primary reasons has been the limited range and uncoordinated nature of referral pathways evident to the Ambulance Service.**

Alignment of the Queensland Ambulance Service within Queensland Health will further strengthen joint work already underway to develop a range of pathways alternative to emergency departments. In providing pathways to an additional range of services, the Queensland Ambulance Service needs to ensure its access through communications was able to cope with any increase in demand for services, which may increase due to improved access to health pathways. This may be resolved by improving portals for the public, for example clearly having 13Health as access to non-urgent health pathways, with triple zero being aimed at urgent and emergency access and with the two portals being able to transfer patients between them.

**Consultation**

Given the sensitivity of the issue, in the lead up to the *Police and Community Safety Review—Interim Report*, the Review Team had limited consultation about this matter. The Review team consulted with the following stakeholders:

- The Hon Jack Dempsey MP, Minister for Police and Community Safety
- The Hon Lawrence Springborg MP, Minister for Health
- The Director General Queensland Health
- The Director General Department of Community Safety
- The Commissioner Queensland Ambulance Service.

The Review team also visited NSW Health, where the ambulance service has been successfully integrated into its health service. NSW Health advised that the benefits to paramedics, patients and the overall health system were major advantages of this structural alignment.
The Police and Community Safety Review—Interim Report was submitted to the Minister for Police and Community Safety on 27 March 2013. Since March 2013, consultation on this issue has widened to include senior executives of Queensland Health, the Queensland Ambulance Service and the relevant executives within the Department of the Premier and Cabinet.

The Review team has also consulted with a number of stakeholders and external experts including the United Voice union during the course of the review. The Review team appreciated the opportunity to consult constructively with United Voice.

Alignment with key values

The proposals in this paper align with the six key values identified by the Queensland Government to assess the suitability of all new health initiatives:

1. **Better service for patients** – by ensuring paramedics have the best possible information available on a patient from the outset.
2. **Better healthcare in the community** – by enabling improved pathways and options for patients.
3. **Valuing our employees and empowering frontline staff** – by ensuring paramedics have the best possible training and are further aligned with the health profession.
4. **Empowering local communities with greater say** – by continuing to value the contributions of Local Ambulance Committees.
5. **Value for money for taxpayers** – by ensuring the ambulance service and Queensland Health work together to provide the best services, at the best time and in the best place and therefore reduce waste and duplication.
6. **Openness** – by enabling greater sharing of information between the services.
Recommendations

1. That the Queensland Ambulance Service is transferred to Queensland Health by a machinery-of-Government change as soon as is practicable and that the Commissioner report directly to the Director General Queensland Health.

2. That the Queensland Ambulance Service is maintained as a state-wide service into the future.

3. That negotiation takes place between Queensland Health and the Queensland Ambulance Service to determine the broad governance requirements of any such arrangements.

4. That the Queensland Ambulance Service maintains its own identity to:
   - ensure their role is not lost
   - focus on key performance indicators, such as response times
   - build on the goodwill the Queensland Ambulance Service has with the community.

5. That Queensland Health continues to recognise and foster the important contributions of Local Ambulance Committees to supporting effective community focused ambulance services across the State.
3. Queensland Corrective Services

The Corrective Services Act 2006, section 3 provides that:

(1) the purpose of corrective services is community safety and crime prevention through the humane containment, supervision and rehabilitation of offenders;

(2) this Act recognises that every member of society has certain basic human entitlements, and that, for this reason, an offender’s entitlements, other than those that are necessarily diminished because of imprisonment or another court sentence, should be safeguarded.

(3) this Act also recognises—

(a) the need to respect an offender’s dignity; and

(b) the special needs of some offenders by taking into account—

(i) an offender’s age, sex or cultural background; and

(ii) any disability an offender has.

Queensland Corrective Services is administered in accordance with the provisions of the Corrective Services Act 2006 and the Parole Orders (Transfer) Act 1984. This includes:

- management of correctional facilities for the secure and humane containment of prisoners and the safety of the community
- supervision of offenders in the community who are on parole and community based orders, such as probation and community service to provide reparation to the community
- monitoring and supervision of high risk sexual offenders subject to continuing supervision under the Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders Act) 2003
- supervision of low risk offenders in work camps undertaking community service projects to support rural and remote communities.
The Report on Government Services 2013 outlines the role of corrective services as implementing the correctional sanctions determined by the courts, and the orders of releasing authorities such as parole boards. Queensland Corrective Services is responsible for managing offenders on community corrections’ orders. It administers services and programs which aim to reduce prisoners’ and offenders’ risk of re-offending, and also provide advice to courts and releasing authorities.

The Queensland Government funds two services within the Department of Community Safety that are delivered by Queensland Corrective Services.

Table 4 – Budget and staffing

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service area</th>
<th>2013–14 Sources of revenue</th>
<th>Staffing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Total cost</td>
<td>State contribution</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Custodial</td>
<td>581,112</td>
<td>556,419</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probation and Parole</td>
<td>84,571</td>
<td>84,571</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>665,683</strong></td>
<td><strong>640,990</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: State Budget 2013–14 Service Delivery Statements – Department of Community Safety, pages 7 and 10

It is important to note that the Review is not a review of the individual agencies within the portfolio, but rather is focussed on the interoperability, and issues impacting upon the interoperability, of services delivered by the portfolio. From the machinery-of-Government perspective, Queensland Corrective Services is one of the four operational divisions of the Department of Community Safety. The Review notes that such nomenclature reinforces the divide between divisions of the department, where in fact the goal should be structural alignment.
Queensland Corrective Services is headed by a Commissioner, although this position is not currently provided for by legislation. The Corrective Services structure includes:

- State-wide operations including 13 publicly operated correctional facilities (excluding the Princess Alexandra Hospital Secure Unit) and seven probation and parole regions
- specialist operations
- operational support services (including the Queensland Corrective Services Academy)
- Chief Inspector
- two privately operated correctional centres, contract managed by Operational Support Services.

There are three parole boards that are independent statutory bodies that make decisions about prisoners’ parole applications. The parole boards are Southern Queensland Regional Parole Board, Central and Northern Queensland Regional Parole Board, and the Queensland Parole Board. Secretariat support for the parole boards is provided by Specialist Operations. There are 20 Community Advisory Committees and Secure Custody Coordination Committees of approximately 90 members. These committees represent the activities and interests of the local community where Queensland Corrective Services facilities or services are located such as a correctional centre, work camp or probation and parole offices.

The Department of Community Safety provides the Queensland Corrective Services with corporate services support through its centralised Corporate Support Division. Other background information:

- major capital works investment at Lotus Glen Correctional Centre of $442.78 million ($28.278 million 2012–13 and at least $2.5 million for post occupancy works in 2013–14) and Arthur Gorrie Correctional Centre $33 million ($19.5 million in 2013–14)
- State-wide capacity (as at 5 June 2012), State-wide built cell capacity was 6,421 and operating capacity was approximately 6,068. Prisoner numbers were 5,998.
Demand pressures

According to the 2010 Queensland Criminal Justice Sector research paper – Demand drivers and approaches to managing demand in the Queensland Criminal Justice Sector, the incidence of crime and public anxiety about crime are significant drivers in demand for services in the criminal justice sector. Demographic changes, legislation that responds to new types of crime or that increases penalties, resourcing and operational practices of police and decisions of the courts drive demand for correctional services. The following generic drivers have been identified as impacting on the criminal justice system and corrective services:

1. changes in the demographic structure of the population
2. economic factors, especially changing rates of consumption and employment
3. illicit drug use and drug-related crime
4. impacts of new legislation and policy
5. changes in resources directed at crime prevention and control, especially policing
6. systemic factors associated with re-offending and breaches of court orders (e.g. sentencing regime).

A significant body of literature demonstrates misuse of licit drugs (e.g. alcohol) as contributing to increased demand in the criminal justice system. There is a strong relationship between demand for criminal justice services and unemployment, schooling and property crime (Chapman et al, 2002). As State and national police operations target certain crime types there are downstream effects on the prisoner population and its demographics. The Penalties and Sentences Act 1992 and Dangerous Prisoners (Sexual Offenders) Act 2003 have a direct impact on demand for correctional services to the extent that offenders are directed to custodial or non-custodial sentences and the length of sentencing. This was widely acknowledged in interviews conducted by the Review and in a submission to the Review by the Commissioner of Queensland Corrective Services. These Acts are administered by the Department of Justice and Attorney-General.

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Efficacy of demand management strategies

The major strategies available to Queensland Corrective Services for reducing demand for imprisonment are effective supervision of community based orders (probation, community service orders and other orders) and parole. The Corrective Services Act 2006 introduced court-ordered parole, which has a significant effect on prisoner numbers. Queensland Corrective Services has also restructured its community supervision model to better focus on the risk of offenders. Since 2007–08, the rate of offenders subject to supervision in the community has increased from 419.9 per 100,000 in 2007–08 to 434 in 2011–12. The rate of imprisonment has remained relatively stable, with a slight decline from 168.7 in 2007–08 to 161.5 in 2011–12. Overall, however, the demand for corrective services has increased over this period.

Table 5 – Queensland: Imprisonment, periodic detention and community corrections rates, by year (per 100 000 adults)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Imprisonment</th>
<th>Community corrections</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2007–08</td>
<td>168.7</td>
<td>419.9</td>
<td>588.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008–09</td>
<td>168.0</td>
<td>431.7</td>
<td>599.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009–10</td>
<td>163.1</td>
<td>436.0</td>
<td>599.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010–11</td>
<td>157.4</td>
<td>440.6</td>
<td>598.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011–12</td>
<td>161.5</td>
<td>434.0</td>
<td>595.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These increasing demand pressures place a significant responsibility on Queensland Corrective Services and the broader criminal justice system to innovate or achieve high performance by:

1. doing more with less using technology or productivity improvements; or
2. reducing the risk of re-offending using improved or new programs or partnerships.

Current and proposed practice in relation to these points is dealt with in the following sections.

Recidivism

Recidivism is one of the key indicators of the performance of Queensland Corrective Services, and is one of the key strategies over which QCS has a level of control and which can produce demand management outcomes. According to the Report on Government
Services 2013, Queensland reported that approximately 38 out of every 100 adult prisoners released from prison during 2009–10, returned to prison within two years (i.e. by 2011–12). This is the fourth highest when compared to all other Australian jurisdictions. However, it is below the national average of approximately 39 prisoners per hundred. This result has remained steady over the long term as follows:

- 2007–08 approximately 34 out of every 100
- 2008–09 approximately 38 out of every 100
- 2009–10 approximately 34 out of every 100
- 2010–11 approximately 35 out of every 100
- 2011–12 approximately 38 out of every 100

Five states – Victoria, Western Australia, South Australia and Tasmania performed better than Queensland in 2011–12 on this metric of recidivism. Queensland reported that approximately 43 out of every 100 adult prisoners released from prison during 2009–10, returned to corrective services within two years (i.e. by 2011–12). This includes returning with a new prison sentence or community corrections order. Queensland’s result is 2nd lowest when compared to all other jurisdictions and below the national result of approximately 46. It is noted that the Report on Government Services 2013 measure includes returns to prison for parole violation, which may only be technical violations and not necessarily re-offending per se. The Review also acknowledges that these rates are influenced by a range of factors, including crime rates, police activity, sentencing practices, community supervision practices, parole board decision making and socio-economic contexts, but notes the continuing importance of benchmarking outcomes.

Specific data on recidivism results by correctional facility or by specific program are not yet well developed for a range of reasons (e.g. movement of prisoners across facilities based on risk profile and after sentencing). Queensland Corrective Services has identified the need for improved case management as part of a draft strategy document Stronger Corrections to improve recidivism, and this would need to be supported by improved, place or program based measures of recidivism.
Queensland Corrective Services is currently developing a new recidivism index which will provide a more sensitive measure of performance and which will be applied at regional level to better attribute performance and account for regional differences. This is a positive initiative supported by the Review team. The Review further notes the development of effective metrics on recidivism is a key success factor in the development of effective social benefit bonds for youth justice and adult corrections.

**A Systems view**

In a submission to the Review the Commissioner of Queensland Corrective Services identified as an opportunity arising from closer alignment between Queensland Corrective Services and the Department of Justice and Attorney-General the potential to jointly develop new whole of system initiatives that could reduce criminal justice costs, such as bail support and diversionary initiatives. It was also identified that there may be opportunities for improved coordination of advice to Government on opportunities to amend sentencing legislation, including analysis of impacts on prison capacity and future infrastructure requirements –taking a broader system approach, as opposed to considering only the Department of Justice and Attorney-General or Queensland Corrective Services sections of the system. Such opportunities offer real potential to manage demand in the system and are strongly supported by the Review.

**Efficacy of system coordination**

*Separating decision making between the component parts of the criminal justice system*

There are direct connections at the business or service delivery level across police, corrections and the courts that have high cost drivers and high public value in terms of the rights of individuals. The *Report on Government Services 2013* outlines the service delivery performance indicators across the justice system (see *Report on Government Services 2013* chapters 6–8) demonstrates the interconnected nature of the system. Importantly though, public confidence and the rights of individuals can only be maintained when the fundamental components of the system are transparent and any perceived or actual conflict of interest or interference between component parts is avoided.
Ideally, police would detain and charge offenders, courts would sentence offenders, and corrections would care for prisoners after charging or sentencing. Practically, there are good reasons for overlap throughout the system, for example where police are required to transport or hold corrective services prisoners in watch-houses.

However, there needs to be clear delineation between the Queensland Police Service and Queensland Corrective Services for maintaining integrity and good governance. An example of this is found in the Victorian Ombudsman’s report—*The death of Mr Carl Williams at HM Barwon Prison – investigation into Corrections Victoria April 2012*[^18]. The Victorian Ombudsman’s report outlines compelling reasons for strong separation and control over the interaction between police and corrective services where the safety of prisoners can be compromised as a result of police having interaction with prisoners to solve and prosecute serious criminal offences. The Crime and Misconduct Commission’s 2009 report—*Dangerous Liaisons: A report arising from a CMC investigation into allegations of police misconduct (Operation Capri)* (Dangerous Liaisons report) also provides an insight into how police misuse of temporary removals of prisoners from Corrective Services custody can have serious consequences for prisoner and public safety, and can also significantly tarnish the ethical integrity of police. (Crime and Misconduct Commission, 2009, pp 20–44)

Since the Dangerous Liaisons report and the death of Carl Williams, Queensland Corrective Services amended delegations for approving removal of prisoners for law enforcement purposes to include a requirement to notify the Commissioner of Queensland Corrective Services. The Queensland Police Service procedures for prisoners removed by police for law enforcement purposes have also been reviewed. Notwithstanding these changes, these reports illustrate that there is a clear risk to the safety of prisoners and the community, as well as to the integrity of the system, where police and corrective services do not have strong but separate roles where one investigates and the other cares for the safety and security of prisoners.

[^18]: *The Death of Mr Carl Williams at HM Barwon Prison – Investigation into Corrections Victoria April 2012*. Victorian Ombudsman
The above cases also add weight to the proposition that Queensland Corrective Services is best placed within a Department of Justice, or the Department of Justice and Attorney-General, as it is now. The Review team recognises that unilaterally moving prisoners, for whatever reason, impacts upon the integrity of the sentence issued by the court and that this should be recognised by the Queensland Corrective Services and Queensland Police Service as they interoperate. The handling and movement of prisoners outside of the lawful purpose applied by Queensland Corrective Services can become a second tier sanctions and reward system that needs to be monitored.

The community is also an important stakeholder in these arrangements and has a right to expect that when a court makes an order that no organisation or person within it will interfere with that order. By placing Queensland Corrective Services into a Department of Justice, it provides an option for oversight of events that impact upon the sentencing made by a court.

**Business alignment and improved value for money**

In terms of daily activity and business alignment, correctional services have most interaction with the courts or police. There is scope for continued efficiencies to be made through the criminal justice system by improving business alignment to support better value for money. Key system issues include:

1. The cost, including opportunity costs, of police officers providing watch-house and prisoner transport services is significant. It also brings with it a tension between those responsible for arrest and initiating prosecution, and those responsible for the care of persons in custody.

2. The need to reduce the costs of prisoners/offenders/witnesses appearances before courts. Significant coordination is required to reduce costs on all of the components including police, corrections, court services, the judiciary, the legal profession, victims, and defendants;

3. The need to improve planning for the construction of prisons to ensure it takes into account local demographics, infrastructure and community/economic needs. For example, placing prisons at great distance from medical services may make sense from a security and community perspective, but given that the majority of prisoners have health issues, such arrangements impose significant coordination costs in transferring prisoners, for example a prisoner may have the need for dialysis services. It also
imposes a burden on smaller rural health centres. Prisons should be located as close as practicable to health, community services and transport infrastructure.

4. The need to increase the use of technology to facilitate court appearances and to share information appropriately across the criminal justice system, including the legal profession. This could be extended to the use of a range of technologies. For example, biometrics is being used within probation and parole, but could also be used in the police and courts role (e.g. reporting for bail).

In terms of business alignment, the Review also found that prisoners and persons in custody who are lawfully consuming prescribed drugs could be better managed if the Queensland Corrective Services was responsible for prisoner transfers and watch-house operations. At present, health professionals do not provide restricted drugs for transport with prisoners (e.g. schedule 8 drugs under the Standard for the Uniform Scheduling of Drugs and Poisons) and the Review team heard many accounts of police watch-house staff having to make arrangements for a medical assessment and purchase of prescribed drugs.

On this last point, it is clear that this too can impact on human rights, as denying a person their prescribed drugs is neither lawful nor beneficial to the health of the person in the custody of the State. This would be in direct contravention of the Corrective Services Act 2006 which recognises the need to respect an offender’s dignity and the special needs of some offenders. It is also clear to the Review team that persons suffering from co-morbidity particularly mental health patients can become quite violent when denied access to their prescribed drugs, which brings with it additional disturbance to the watch-house environment.

In these circumstances, when you examine the chain of processes involved, with persons on prescribed drugs being held in the custody of the State, costs are incurred at more than one point in the system and the outcomes for the individual, the custodial agencies and the government are worse. It was suggested to the Review team a better system would be to deal with the prisoner and the prisoner’s prescribed drugs as one so that they travel together through the system for whatever purpose. The Review team agrees with this proposal.
Another issue that interfaces with the health system is the issue of opioid replacement therapy. The Review notes that drug services in prisons do not match the standard of services available in the community. To the extent that this lack of service impacts on prisoners, corrections centre staff and ultimately on rehabilitation and recidivism, PACSR recommends that QCS within the Department of Justice work with Queensland Health to address this issue.

At present there are limited incentives, and practical disincentives, for the system to work as a whole (e.g. Queensland Corrective Services to accept prisoners at times that reflect the operations of the courts and police). There are many examples of corrective services providers delivering police watch-house services effectively including two centres in Melbourne, Victoria. Queensland Corrective Services management of the Queensland Supreme Court cells demonstrates an existing capacity to undertake these types of duties.

Business alignment and reducing reoffending

The Queensland Corrective Services has an important interface with youth justice services in so far as youth justice services form part of the criminal justice system. From a systems perspective, Queensland Corrective Services or adult correctional services are the next step in what is too often a continuum from juvenile offending and detention, to adult offending and detention. There is a considerable link between the child protection system and youth justice, with many victims becoming offenders as juveniles then as adults. For example, a research paper by Queensland Corrective Services shows that offenders who enter custody at 17–18 years of age, and to a lesser extent at 19–21 years of age, have a high risk of lengthy custodial careers with high recidivism. Moving Queensland Corrective Services into a Department of Justice could provide a more holistic outlook on the drivers for criminal convictions and identify the best interventions to reduce entry into the system at the youth level and recidivism.

Only Western Australia and the Northern Territory have youth justice services within a Department of Corrections. All other Australian jurisdictions have youth justice services within either the justice or human services sectors. Interviews conducted by the Review team found little support for youth justice being joined with adult correctional facilities.

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19 Research Brief No.22 February 2013 The Criminal Careers of a Prisoner Cohort
However, there was common ground that there is room for better coordination, collaboration, case management, program and infrastructure planning across youth justice, adult corrections, court services and support or human services. It was also suggested to the Review team that future infrastructure development and contract management in relation to youth detention centres could benefit from the organisational expertise and experience within the current Queensland Corrective Services.

There are opportunities for improved services or efficiencies by closer alignment of youth justice and adult correctional service. For example, the Commissioner of Queensland Corrective Services provided the Review with information on opportunities such as:

1. A ‘dual track’ system currently used in Victoria where some vulnerable young offenders up to the age of 21 can be placed within the youth justice program rather than the adult correctional program. Courts must be satisfied that there are reasonable prospects for rehabilitation of the offender or that the offender is particularly impressionable, immature or likely to be subjected to undesirable influences in an adult prison.

2. Improved supervised community work projects such as the Repay WA scheme where community partnerships are developed that offer training, particularly trade skills training, and provide life skills to offenders while engaging in community activities. This type of project, and other forms of commissioning, could be planned to include suitable participants from both the youth justice and adult corrections cohorts.

3. Improvements that can be made to managing infrastructure and other programs associated with both youth and adult detention and community based orders. Given the large rate and specific needs of Indigenous offenders, there may be scope for some programs to include participants from both youth justice and adult corrections, after appropriate risk assessment. There may also be opportunities for a more integrated approach to managing girls and young women, given their minority status in both the youth justice and adult corrections systems.

These examples highlight the opportunities that may arise from moving Queensland Corrective Services into a Department of Justice which also contains youth justice programs. However, in line with input provided by a variety of expert stakeholders, the Review team does not support the placement of youth justice within Queensland Corrective Services. The Review recommends youth justice should be maintained as a separate division of the
Department of Justice, including so that it can maintain a dedicated case management approach and also so that it continues to be recognised as a vital and separate component of the justice system. Youth justice must balance the accountability that offenders must have for their actions with the need to rehabilitate these young offenders within the clear context that their cognitive and social faculties are still developing. Therefore, youth justice has different imperatives and priorities and requires different program design.

However, the Review team notes that recent examples of shared infrastructure design, including the redesign of the Cleveland facility which was assisted by Queensland Corrective Services staff, should be strengthened by the inclusion of the two services within one Department of Justice.

Better business alignment and improved approaches to dynamic case management also present a range of opportunities to reduce recidivism. Over the course of the Review, it was clear that most experienced practitioners favoured an approach that was case and person specific. Although initially more expensive, there was significant support for a dedicated approach to individual case and place management to reduce recidivism. The draft Queensland Corrective Services Stronger Corrections document articulates extension of “dynamic offender case management”. In the areas of education and community services, there have also been moves to support more specific case management.

**Performance and outcomes**

Queensland Corrective Services provides an integral component of the overall justice system that has significant impacts on other components (i.e. police and the courts). A large proportion of Queensland Corrective Services work is engagement with persons on parole or probation orders which is really an extension of the authority of the courts. These agencies should be seen as clients, customers or at least key partners where Queensland Corrective Services performance should be closely monitored.
In a response to an enquiry from the Review team about the strategic alignment of each agency, Queensland Corrective Services described its service recipients as being compelled or mandated, rather than being voluntary (i.e. prisoners and offenders). In the Review team’s view the primary customer of Queensland Corrective Services is the community (and particularly the taxpayer) and therefore the Queensland Corrective Service’s service/value chain models should incorporate this notion at their foundation. As a result, the Queensland Corrective Service model of a value chain did not clearly articulate how its services supported the government’s priorities or client, stakeholder and community expectations. As a corollary to this, Queensland Corrective Service has yet to develop performance measures focussed on customer outcomes.

A study for the Home Office, United Kingdom by Hough and Roberts (2004, p 1) found that “most people in developed countries have little accurate knowledge about the function of the criminal justice system” and that “news media coverage … contribute to low levels of public confidence in criminal justice”. Indermaur and Roberts, in a study published by the Australian Institute of Criminology (2009, pp 4-5), found that public knowledge and direct experience with the three parts of the system (police, courts and corrections) declines with progress through it, and that where there is no direct experience, the public relies on media portrayals. They further argued that the best way to improve confidence in the system is for police and courts to provide the public with better information that focuses on sentencing and improved services to victims. It was also found to be important to “enhance and optimise the perception that the institution is acting on behalf of citizens and representing their interests”. In the Ministry of Justice in the United Kingdom has implemented a community education program showing video stories on YouTube to educate the public about how judges make sentencing decisions. The viewer gets to watch an outline of a scenario, based on real life cases, and then is able to make a judgement on the case. The viewer is then provided with the judge’s verdict. (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-bNnmqEDcH0)

A lack of direct experience with the system provides the average member of the community with little if any reliable information to make assessments of performance. This creates a distinct problem in convincing the community of the benefits of specific programs or the successes of the criminal justice system. The lack of transparency in this area also leaves open the opportunity for poor performance to go unchecked.
The complex interactions and systems used across police, corrections, the courts, youth justice and the legal profession is not examined nor easily understood by the public. Only those that come within the system are subject of the quality of these interactions and systems.

While the corrections environment has relatively mature performance indicators within the Report on Government Services 2013 reporting framework, more specific assessment of performance could be undertaken involving those within the system. **Public confidence in the system should be a key performance indicator**, given the taxpayer is the primary customer (though not generally the direct consumer) of custodial and community corrections services. However; it is clear to the Review team that people who are exposed to or are part of the system (victims, witnesses, legal practitioners, commissioning partners) are more able to provide informed assessments of performance. **Better metrics targeted at these direct stakeholders has the potential to provide useful information and thus measurable improvements that could then inform public confidence in the system.** Furthermore, the cost of transporting prisoners, the cost of health services for prisoners, the reduced cost of appearances through use of technology and the level of recidivism after specific interventions or programs could all be measured more accurately.

**Frontline staff**

The Review team observed that Queensland Corrective Services staff are for the most part dedicated and focussed on delivering better outcomes for the persons in their care and custody, and by extension, for the Queensland community. The Review proposes that improved alignment with the justice system, to be achieved by placing Queensland Corrective Services within a Department of Justice, would offer systems improvements that would have tangible positive effects on issues that QCS staff care about, including opportunities to:

- reduce recidivism
- provide targeted programs and improved infrastructure for young offenders
- improve the care of prisoners with prescribed drugs across the system.
The result on persons in custody of not having access to their prescribed drugs has significant mental and physical impacts on the staff (police and Queensland Corrective Services) who manage their care and custody. These impacts on staff are also felt as a result of any extended stays in watch-house custody, which can produce despair and violence in detainees. The proposals contained in this Review also offer the opportunity to ensure that more police are able to be on the road by reducing their role in large watch-houses and in prisoner transport. In a submission to the Review, the Queensland Law Society provided input that the Queensland Police Service should continue to be the body exercising the power to fingerprint and gain DNA samples, and the Review team acknowledges and supports this.

**Interoperability**

**The efficacy of interoperability and demand management**

The Review has found that part of the criminal justice system still operates in silos, and at times, even in conflict with other parts of the system. The following provides some of the observations about interoperability and system outcomes:

**Systems**

- Paper based systems are used to deal with the request for an appearance of a prisoner before a court by their legal representative
- Paper based systems are used for the transfer of prisoners from QCS to Queensland Police Service at the watch-house
- Police must wait for a paper based decision from the court before they can transfer a prisoner to QCS

**Video conferencing**

- Video conferencing facilities are used for many appearances but could be used more often, subject to identified barriers. It is noted that the Chief Magistrate has strongly committed to the use of video conferencing, and also that the Department of Community Safety is coordinating a project to improve the uptake of video conferencing.
- While supported by the legal profession, the profession rightly has concerns about the security and confidentiality of video conferencing. However, there are cost effective solutions to address these concerns using commercially available technologies. Parallel
video conferences will need to be introduced to enable different geographical locations to simultaneously conduct court sessions.

Watch-houses

- Prisoners remain in a police watch-house until a court can hear their matter.

- Prisoners can remain in a police watch-house for several days waiting for the court to be able to hear their matter, with most courts not commencing matters until 10am.

- At times matters might be heard in the prisoner’s absence even though they are at the courts disposal, in the watch-house.

- The Review team found that some prisoners can remain in the watch-house for up to two weeks, with around seven days custody not being uncommon. Given the recommended threshold has been seven days since the mid-nineties; it appears that staff are managing to this threshold.

- Furthermore, it appears that there are regular discrepancies between the data held by Queensland Corrective Service and police on the length of time Queensland Corrective Service prisoners have been held in watch-houses – better data in this regard is central to improved management of the issue.

- There is scope for courts to have better integrated court lists so that inefficiencies within Queensland Corrective Service and Queensland Police Service can be addressed; particularly the length of time a prisoner is held in a watch-house.

- Police watch-houses, particularly older watch-houses, are not designed for long term custody and security risks and human rights outcomes deteriorate as the number of prisoners and the average length of stay rises. Most police watch-houses do not have sufficient facilities to occupy or manage prisoners, which can result in behavioural issues.

- Prisoners may be in the police watch-house without prescription medication or a medication plan from Queensland Corrective Service. Queensland Health professionals within publically run prisons do not provide restricted drugs for transport with prisoners, for example to the watch-house. As a result, prisoners can often arrive at a watch-house without the medications required for very serious illnesses. As a result, police may be required to call on the services of a government medical officer to attend and prescribe. This can be a large cost impost on the Queensland Police Service, and by extension on
the public purse. It also presents a significant risk of causing prisoners to act violently while in watch-house custody.

- Queensland Corrective Service generally only accepts prisoners before early afternoon (2pm) – with the exceptions of Arthur Gorrie and Brisbane Correctional Centre (from some watch-houses). This means that if police cannot transport a prisoner to a correctional facility before early afternoon, prisoners may have to wait until the next weekday to be transported. This occurs regularly.

- Watch-houses are in some cases used as a punishment station for poor performing police. Furthermore, the placement of poor performing police is likely to be counter-effective to improving watch-house outcomes.

- Considerable resources are used by the Queensland Police Service to provide police watch-house services. Up to 292 positions, including 155 established positions and a further 137 rotational positions, are dedicated to police watch-houses.

- Risks associated with prisoners and persons in custody are increasingly complex, with many having one or more of the following: mental health, drug or alcohol dependency, infectious or contagious diseases, significant health issues that make them high risk of death in custody, propensity for violence, affiliations with rival gangs, clans or groups. This requires significant operational planning and use of integrated intelligence and early warning systems so that risks to the individual, other prisoners and staff are managed.

- There are also issues with the use of facilities that are ageing that require increased security controls, usually requiring increased numbers of police or corrective services officers.

**Prisoner Transport**

- Police officers are used to escort prisoners and to act as court orderlies in courts outside of inner Brisbane. As an example, many medium sized police stations provide at least three (but up to eight) officers each day to provide prisoner security, transport and court orderly duties.

- Police officers who would otherwise be attending to calls for service, investigations or operations are regularly required to transport prisoners.

- Where part-time or unfamiliar staff are used in the care of prisoners risks, including liability of the State, increases.
• Using the arresting agency in the transport and care of prisoners raises risks for the safety of those officers.

At present, a detained person can be held in a police watch-house for 21 days or longer where the person cannot be conveniently taken to a correctional facility (see section 6 of the Corrective Services Act 2006). The Review team is concerned about the human rights implications for those held in watch-house custody for extended periods.

The Corrective Services Act 2006 recognises offenders' entitlements, other than those that are necessarily diminished by imprisonment of another court sentence, should be safeguarded. The difference between a watch-house and a correctional facility is significant, with most watch-houses being designed for very short term detention and most are inappropriate for holding detainees for lengthy periods beyond 48–72 hours.

There are some practical reasons why the law extends this power, including providing some flexibility in the system. However, these powers can act as a disincentive for Queensland Corrective Service to take timely custody of a person from the Queensland Police Service. The 1996 Criminal Justice Commission Report on Police Watch-houses in Queensland recommended that prisoners should not spend more than three days in a watch-house. Any reforms around such a proposed reduction in maximum watch-house days would have to occur in the context of the system’s capacity. In any case, the Review team would recommend that in the process of reviewing the Corrective Services Act 2006, Queensland Corrective Service should ensure that the provision be amended that enables persons to be detained in the watch-house until they are able to be conveniently take to a corrective services facility, so as to ensure a stronger onus is placed on Queensland Corrective Service to receive prisoners in a timely manner. It may be that the reform arising from the Stronger Corrections strategy would support a reduction in the maximum number of days a Queensland Corrective Service prisoner can spend in a watch-house – the Review would strongly support such an outcome.
Queensland Corrective Service is well placed to work with the Queensland Police Service to have some police watch-houses staffed by persons other than police. It may be more efficient for small and or remote facilities to remain with the Queensland Police Service and for Queensland Corrective Service to manage those larger watch-houses in regional locations that can be operated as hubs. Police should continue to have a role in the management of watch-houses, but police officers should not undertake the majority of roles within a watch-house where economies of scale allow alternatives.

Furthermore, it is proposed that vertically integrating prisoner transport, corrective services and larger watch-houses would improve the system’s flexibility enabling Queensland Corrective Service to prioritise and plan based on risk and prisoner needs. As stated at the beginning of this section, the Review has formed the view that the criminal justice system in Queensland operates in silos, often in counterproductive ways that push resource consumption and time delays into other parts of the system’s value chain (e.g. out of prisons, into watch-houses). The Review has observed that this affects all the contributing agencies differently (police, corrections and the courts), but that the police tend to be caught in the middle with even the most defensible business of the courts and corrections having the potential to cause demand and delays in the system. The opportunities that can be gained to manage demand and delays in the system by aligning corrections and the justice system within a department of justice are the primary reasons that the Review proposes the realignment of Queensland Corrective Service by machinery-of- Government arrangements.

**Structural alignment**

The core aim of corrective services is to implement correctional sanctions determined by the courts and to reduce re-offending.

The Review found:

1. Queensland Corrective Service had limited cultural fit with the broader emergency services other than adherence to a historically based, militaristic rank structure, hierarchy and approach. Although it is noted that across the current portfolio there is a culture of providing care to individuals, there is little alignment of operations, services, culture or clients.
2. Queensland Corrective Service had little in common with Queensland Fire and Rescue Service, Queensland Ambulance Service and Emergency Management Queensland other than a need for timely and effective corporate support or business enablement.

3. One of the key findings of the review is that response services, which must be reactive to demand, should be aligned with those services which can prevent or mitigate this demand. There are a range of significant opportunities for improvement if business alignment occurs that will provide better value for money and the potential to reduce reoffending.

4. Queensland Corrective Service had greater business alignment with the courts and police.

5. There is considerable risk from an accountability and customer focus point of view to alignment of corrections too closely with police.

A transactional analysis of the services provided by Queensland Corrective Service demonstrated that Queensland Corrective Service had significant interface with the current Department of Justice and Attorney General (through the courts and their orders) and police (transport, care and intelligence of prisoners and offenders). Queensland Corrective Service has an interface with the Queensland Health in terms of the need to provide health services to prisoners and offenders, and through rehabilitation programs. Queensland Corrective Service also has an interface with the broader human services sector, including the Department of Communities and in the area of mental health. A significant portion of prisoners are diagnosed with a mental health condition and there is a direct link between unemployment and reoffending.

Apart from social and demographic changes, demand for correctional services is driven largely by police activity and sentencing practices. The Department of Justice and Attorney-General administers legislation relevant to sentencing practices. While a range of machinery of government options can be developed, the options most likely to provide business alignment are:

1. Queensland Corrective Service and Queensland Police Service as one department

2. Queensland Corrective Service and the Department of Justice and Attorney-General as one department
3. Queensland Corrective Service as a stand-alone department.

It is abundantly clear that there is little if any connection between the work of corrections and that of the emergency services other than police. There are significant risks associated with the Queensland Police Service and Queensland Corrective Service being part of the one department. The strong separation of responsibilities is a key control to the risks associated with police initiated prisoner movements. Efficiencies in terms of shared intelligence, transport and watch-house services can still be obtained through either service delivery agreements or contestable processes without the Queensland Police Service and Queensland Corrective Service being part of a single agency. There is also a significant role for Queensland Corrective Service in carrying out the orders of the courts, with police remaining as a separate function associated with initiating prosecutions.

Table 3, provided by Queensland Corrective Services, outlines the machinery-of-Government arrangements for youth justice and adult corrective services across Australian jurisdictions. In New South Wales, Victoria, Tasmania the Northern Territory and the Australian Capital Territory corrective services form part of a broader Department of Justice. Only South Australia and Western Australia currently have separate departmental arrangements for corrections.

New Zealand also has a stand-alone Department of Corrections; however it services a much larger prison population than Queensland, as a single jurisdiction within a federation. In the United Kingdom Her Majesty’s Prison Service is part of the Ministry for Justice. In Canada, at the national level, a Department of Public Safety is responsible for security intelligence services, border services, police, corrections, parole and coordinates emergency management.
### Table 6

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jurisdiction</th>
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<tr>
<td>Victoria</td>
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<td>Australian Capital Territory</td>
<td>Department of Justice and Community Safety</td>
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<td>Tasmania</td>
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<td>Western Australia</td>
<td>Department of Corrective Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>Queensland</td>
<td>Department of Community Safety</td>
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A number of the opportunities for improvement outlined in this paper could be addressed by Queensland Corrective Service as a single agency. Indeed, the numbers currently employed within Queensland Corrective Service (3,412 full-time equivalent staff) are sufficient for a stand-alone department. However, the Review team is of the view that there is considerably more scope for delivery of improved innovation, coordination, business alignment, case management and sentencing options across youth justice, corrections and the courts by integrating these services within one portfolio.

The Review team believes that a standalone model for corrective services risks becoming isolated from its key partners, and focussed on internal systems and processes, despite having operational links to Queensland Health, Queensland Police Service and elements of the Department of Justice and Attorney General. The private/public mix in QCS will most likely change into the future as more prisons become privatised bringing with it a considerable focus on contract management capability.
A standalone corrective services model would incur increased costs for corporate services. All stakeholders consulted agreed that there is room for better coordination, collaboration, case management, program and infrastructure planning across youth justice, adult corrections, court services and support or human services. The Review proposes that Queensland Corrective Service is best placed within the current Department of Justice and Attorney General.

Other areas for improvement

Alternative provision of correctional services

About 20 per cent of all prisoners in Queensland are currently managed by private providers contracted by Queensland Corrective Service, this compares to the United Kingdom where approximately 15.3 per cent of prisoners are held in prisons run by private companies\(^{20}\). The Review team found no systemic evidence to suggest that these services were any less professional or sub-optimal when compared to services provided by the traditional public sector provider. In fact, the Review team observed that Queensland Corrective Service used private contractors (Arthur Gorrie and Southern Downs Correctional Centres) rather than the public sector to provide a flexible, short term ‘surge’ capacity to deal with fluctuations in prisoner numbers. These facilities, being contracted services, have more flexible employment arrangements that support efficient, timely and cost effective frontline service delivery.

The Review team observed that Queensland Corrective Service has a relatively mature contract management capability in terms of the provision of correctional facilities management. As Queensland has twenty years of experience it has become an informed purchaser of correctional facility management services. The success of Queensland in this area provides a solid platform for progressively opening the management of all correctional facilities within Queensland to contestability, as proposed in the Queensland Commission of Audit report. Given that this model has demonstrated an ability to provide appropriate service levels alongside savings to the taxpayer, this should provide the public with assurance that further value for money with a similar or better level of service provision can be obtained in a contestable correctional services market.

The Review team notes that some Queensland Corrective Service staff have put forward arguments about needing to maintain its status as a provider of some correctional services in order to ensure it continues to be an informed purchaser. In contrast, the Review team takes the view that being in the business can blind you to best practice, with the assumption that your model of provision is the best model. For example, with many jurisdictions having completely privatised public transport provision, this is akin to saying one of the trains on the track must be government run in order to be apprised of best practice. The market can set the parameters of best practice, and the progressive opening up of correctional facilities should support the market to do so. Models of service delivery should not be constrained by traditional public sector approaches.

Queensland has not moved towards **contracted arrangements for the provision of infrastructure, i.e. the actual correctional facility**, but the opportunity exists for this to be the subject of detailed business cases should new facilities be needed.

However, there needs to be further work undertaken by Queensland Corrective Service to improve understanding of **cost attribution** and activities outside of the private provider model (i.e. the public sector of Queensland Corrective Service, including probation and parole). To ensure the best outcomes are achieved from contestability, it is essential that the true cost of activities is well understood. Similarly, it is important that barriers that reduce potential competitors from entering the market, including legislative and policy requirements are removed where practicable.

While the Review did not complete a full analysis, opportunities exist for probation and parole services to be delivered in partnership with not for profit, non-government organisations or local governments, particularly with respect to the supervision of community service orders. Linkages of community service order programs with development of skills that could lead to employment could be considered as part of case management approaches. The cost of probation and parole services in Queensland is significantly less than the national average. However, opportunities to ensure court orders are appropriately carried out and that may reduce recidivism for specific types of offenders should be tested.
Social benefit bonds

Social benefit bonds offer an alternative model to involve the community sector and private organisations in the delivery of improved outcomes. There is an opportunity for case management focused on the individual as a means of reducing recidivism and in conjunction with commissioning rehabilitation opportunities with the business and not for profit sectors, which could be leveraged through social benefit bonds. The potential for such programs, particularly around recidivism, are being considered within Queensland Corrective Service and will benefit from strengthened partnerships across the criminal justice system. Trials occurring in the United Kingdom and New South Wales offer examples of how such financial instruments can be used to target social outcomes. For example, in London a social impact bond has raised £5M to fund a three year program targeting homelessness in central London\(^{21}\). With programs being developed in the United States, United Kingdom and here in Australia (New South Wales) these financial instruments are becoming more advanced and Queensland can benefit from learnings in other jurisdictions. **Social benefit bonds and other opportunities with the business and not for profit sectors should be developed, in collaboration with experts such as Queensland Treasury, to reduce reoffending and to provide rehabilitation programs.**

Video conferencing

Meetings with the Director of Public Prosecutions and other stakeholders have revealed wide support for continuing with the use of technology to conduct mention matters which in turn will reduce the need for prisoner and custodial transfers by either police officers or corrective services staff but more work will need to be done in this regard. Unfortunately the Queensland Police Service was unable to provide any costing of prisoner transport services. There are also opportunities to reduce duplication in these functions.

The Review team observed a need to have some specific locations modified to improve the take up rate of technological solutions that benefit the defendant and the system. A move to email or video/teleconferencing as the default or routine process for certain matters (e.g. mentions), so that the onus is reversed in favour of video-conferencing, should be considered.

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\(^{21}\) The Economist, Social Impact Bonds Commerce and conscience, February 23 2013
The legal and judicial representatives interviewed by the Review team raised the particular problem associated with signed instructions. The Review team observed the need to implement the capability for electronic signatures, as already occurs in other sectors of the community – for example credit card transactions.

There are practical issues associated with the legal process particularly around high volume matters in the lower courts where interaction between counsel (prosecutors and solicitors) provides significant efficiency in and of itself. There are technical solutions that could be developed after examination of a number of practical issues including the need for:

1. A capacity for last minute or immediate communication of documents between parties.
2. A capacity for prisoners to be able to access and respond to documents in a secure way. While this raises security questions for legal representatives and for the management of prisoners, technology exists which easily demonstrates secure communications can occur that are auditable.
3. Examination of hubs or technical solutions so that the diverse range of legal practitioners and firms across the State can access and use technology.

Traditional video conferencing facilities are expensive. Tablets, smart phones and other applications are all able to use real time conference calls that will provide more cost effective solutions to assist conferencing in the courts. A review by the Honourable Martin Moynihan AO QC has produced significant improvements in the time taken for committal matters and reduced delays in criminal trials.

**Prisoner transports**

Greater use of technology (i.e. video conferencing or the like) to facilitate court business should result in a reduced need to transport prisoners. This is also acknowledged in the Queensland Commission of Audit report.
The use of police in transporting prisoners has long been recognised as inefficient where there is sufficient demand or economies of scale to support provision by more cost effective resources, such as by Queensland Corrective Service or by private contractors. Not only is this type of duty cost ineffective for police, the Review team notes the deleterious affect it can have on morale.

An issue to be considered, by the implementation team, in transferring this service to Queensland Corrective Service is that the service is not specifically resourced by the Queensland Police Service. Furthermore, as the Queensland Police Service budget is structured predominantly towards meeting commitments for police officer numbers, any reduction in the Queensland Police Service budget would place pressure on the non-labour component of the Queensland Police Service.

**Prisoner transports and police watch house operations should be transferred to Queensland Corrective Service and considered as a priority for outsourcing. A specific business case that examines increased use of technology by courts, prisoner transports and other providers managing police watch-houses should be developed.**

**Queensland Corrective Services training**
Queensland Corrective Service currently has its own training facility that has associated infrastructure costs. There are a range of private providers that can provide the training conducted by Queensland Corrective Service. It should ensure the provision of training is contestable given that it already uses private providers that are providing training to meet the same competencies as the Queensland Corrective Service curriculum.

**Probation and parole services**
There is an opportunity for technology to be used more effectively across agencies. Biometric tools used within probation and parole offices have the potential to be used for other demands including bail reporting and monitoring of child sex offenders. This opportunity should addressed by the Queensland Corrective Service in conjunction with the Queensland Police Service, the Department of Justice and Attorney-General and other possible partners across Government.
The partnerships between probation and parole and the Queensland Police Service, particularly in regional and remote areas, provide a sound basis for further innovation to reduce the risk of reoffending or to prevent and detect crime. The Queensland Police Service and Queensland Corrective Service should continue to work together in this area. Innovation in the area of probation and parole has the potential to reduce the risk of reoffending. Respective Commissioners should consider performance management processes that reflect this opportunity.

The Review team was provided with evidence of the significant complexities that now surround probation and parole, sentence calculation and other technicalities that impact on an inmate’s term of imprisonment. Any mistakes in this area could mean that a prisoner services a shorter or longer sentence than was imposed by the court, leaving the government exposed to litigation. This supports the proposition that Queensland Corrective Service should become a part of the Department of Justice and Attorney-General. Further, while not a term of reference for the Review, having examined models in a number of jurisdictions it is suggested that the Department of Justice and Attorney-General could be reformed into a single Department of Justice. The Review team believes that such a move would better reflect the transactional nature of a contemporary Department of Justice.

**Alignment with Government Priorities**

In a transactional analysis provided by Queensland Corrective Service to the Review team, it was able to cite three clear agency priorities; however the response did not clearly demonstrate their alignment to Government priorities. The analysis instead focussed on describing the paths through the criminal justice system in Queensland. Although this demonstrated the service chain in which Queensland Corrective Service is located and its particular mission within that service chain, it did not help to elucidate Queensland Corrective Service’s broader contribution to the Government’s priorities. Furthermore, it was not clear from this response that Queensland Corrective Service includes the community in their definition of the customer. It is therefore proposed that Queensland Corrective Service should undertake further business analysis and planning within the context of the Department of Justice, to clearly identify its customers and its role in delivering on the Government’s priorities. The Stronger Corrections document offers a way forward in this regard.
Recommendations

Structure

1. That Queensland Corrective Services be transferred to the Department of Justice and Attorney-General by a machinery-of-Government change as soon as is practicable.

2. That Queensland Corrective Service remains a separate program within the Department of Justice and Attorney-General so that while opportunities for improved services and efficacy can be realised, there is a clear separation from the youth justice services.

3. That responsibility for prisoner transport and non-managerial roles within the larger watch-houses is transferred to Queensland Corrective Service.

4. That the Commissioner of Queensland Corrective Service report directly to the Director-General the Department of Justice and Attorney-General.

Systems

5. That Queensland Corrective Service should increase the use of technology as an alternative to court appearances and ensure the provision of appropriate number and level of facilities under its control.

6. That planning, especially for infrastructure, must take into account the service delivery model (e.g. the fact that prisoners have high level health needs).

7. That a system should be designed so that the prisoner and the prisoner’s prescribed drugs are treated as one and therefore travel together through the system for whatever purpose.

8. That Queensland Corrective Service, the Queensland Police Service and Queensland Health should work together to develop a position that enables prisoners to have timely access to their prescribed medication despite travel between facilities and without the need for costly re-preservation.

9. That as part of reviewing its legislation, Queensland Corrective Service should ensure that amendments be made to ensure a stronger onus is placed upon a more efficient process to receive prisoners with a view to reducing the time spent in police watch houses.
Contestability

10. That specific business cases should be developed for contestability of correctional services in Queensland, including:
   
a. develop business cases for contract management of each facility (noting that business cases may be for individual facilities, or for groups of facilities)
   
b. ensure any new facilities are contestable on a full greenfield basis (i.e. first the building, then the facility management).

11. That prisoner transport and non-managerial roles within watch-houses should be a priority for contestability.

12. That all Queensland Corrective Service provision of training should be contestable.

Performance

13. That Queensland Corrective Service conduct business analysis and planning to clearly identify its customers and its contribution to the Government’s priorities

14. That Queensland Corrective Service, in consultation with key partners in the criminal justice and social services sectors, develop specific performance indicators focused on efficiencies and customer/stakeholder outcomes across the criminal justice system.

15. That Queensland Corrective Service continue to develop its proposed recidivism index as a priority, including place and program based measures.

Other

16. That social benefit bonds and other opportunities with the business and not-for-profit sectors be developed to reduce reoffending and to provide rehabilitation programs. Such an instrument should be available to the market within two years.

17. That any changed arrangements to the operations of Queensland Corrective Service ensure anti-corruption, prisoner management, and accountability processes are defined and established.

18. That biometric tools be leveraged for other demands (e.g. bail reporting).

19. That probation and parole should continue to work together with the Queensland Police Service to reduce the risk of reoffending and reduce crime.
4. Department of Community Safety

Introduction
The Department of Community Safety (Community Safety) is comprised of four service delivery arms, being the Queensland Ambulance Service, Queensland Corrective Services, Emergency Management Queensland and Queensland Fire and Rescue Service. The Corporate Service provides human resources, finance, information services and Strategy and Legal Services across the department. The three major pieces of legislation which establish entities within Community Safety are the Ambulance Service Act 1991, the Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990; and the Corrective Services Act 2006. The department also administers the Disaster Management Act 2003.

Organisational structure
Background—the history of the Department of Community Safety

The current Department of Community Safety was formed on 26 March 2009 as a result of machinery-of-Government changes, amalgamating the former Department of Emergency Services and former Queensland Corrective Services. Over the past 25 years, the Government has implemented different operating and governance models to manage emergency services and corrective services. This section outlines the historical and legislative context of the operating models.

Corrective Services

Following the Commission of Review into Corrective Services in Queensland 1988 – Final Report (Kennedy Report), the Queensland Corrective Services Commission was established on 15 December 1988. Under other reforms made following the Kennedy Report, separate Acts dealing with prisons and probation and parole were replaced by more integrated corrective services legislation. Prisons became known as correctional centres and the Probation and Parole Board was replaced by the Queensland Community Corrections Board.

In September 1997, the Queensland Corrective Services Commission was corporatised and divided into separate purchaser and provider agencies. The Queensland Corrective Services Commission continued to exist in a regulatory and purchasing role, while a new Government-owned corporation, Queensland Corrections (QCORR) was created to deliver custodial, community and juvenile correctional services. The former Department of Corrective Services was established in May 1999 by the Corrective Services Legislation Amendment Act 1999. This included the abolishment of the Queensland Corrective Services Commission and the Government-owned corporation Queensland Corrections (QCORR). A major emphasis of the new Department was on the provision of services to assist in the reduction of recidivism, with emphasis on rehabilitation programs, skill development through prison industries and implementation of culturally appropriate needs based services for Indigenous offenders. Changes made at the time included the formation of the Board of Management. Community Corrections was restructured into probation and parole. On 28 August 2006, the department became known as Queensland Corrective Services.

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23 Department of Corrective Services Annual Report 1998-99
Emergency services
The original Department of Emergency Services was formed in 1996 as part of an evolutionary process following the formation of the Bureau of Emergency Services in 1989, which was the first time all agencies with a role in delivering an emergency service were combined into one agency.

During this period, and through to 1998, various reporting and governance structures were implemented (including a period when both the Queensland Ambulance Service and Queensland Fire and Rescue Service were statutory authorities) until the introduction of the *Emergency Services Legislation Amendment Act 1998* which established the Director-General of the Department as the chief executive officer of the various services, a structure that remains in place today.

The forerunner to the Department of Emergency Services – the Bureau of Emergency Services (the Bureau) – was established on 7 December 1989, in accordance with a Government decision to amalgamate all groups involved in delivering an emergency service under a single body. The establishment of the Bureau included the creation of a central corporate service for the Bureau. The Bureau was established as a division of the Queensland Department of Police. The Bureau included six major divisions: Queensland Fire Service, Queensland Ambulance Service, State Emergency Service, Chemical Hazards and Emergency Management (CHEM) Unit, the Aviation Division and Corporate Services.

Prior to this amalgamation, emergency services were scattered throughout various government departments:

- State Fire Services, the Rural Fire Board and the State Emergency Service were the responsibility of the former Department of Emergency Services and Administrative Services. This former Department also included the Prisons Department, Probation

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24 Queensland Fire Service Strategic Plan 1991-1996
26 http://www.emergency.qld.gov.au/about/history.htm

- The Chemical Hazards and Emergency Management (CHEM) Unit and the Ministerial Air Unit both operated under the Department of the Premier, Economic and Trade Development.

- Responsibility for Volunteer Marine Rescue Organisations rested with the former Department of Harbours and Marine.

**Queensland Ambulance Service**

Ambulance services in Queensland began in 1892, with the formation of the Queensland City Ambulance Transport Brigade in Brisbane. Queensland Ambulance Transport Brigades were formed when local citizens organised a local ambulance service and raised funds through a contribution scheme. A State Council consisting of representatives of all Queensland Ambulance Transport Brigades met on a regular basis to encourage state-wide policy development. The Queensland Ambulance Transport Brigades operated under the *Hospitals Act 1936*.

In 1967, the Ambulance Services Act was passed to provide a legislative framework for ambulance services and to reduce the size of the State Council. In 1980 a major review of ambulance services completed recommended the formation of a State-wide ambulance service.

In 1990, a joint Parliamentary Select Committee of Inquiry recommended the formation of the Queensland Ambulance Service. Following the tabling of the first report of the All-Party Parliamentary Select Committee of Inquiry into Ambulance Services, the *Ambulance Service Act 1991* was introduced in 1991 and the Queensland Ambulance Service formed as a division of the Bureau of Emergency Services on 1 July 1991. Following a review in 1996, the Queensland Ambulance Service was established as a statutory authority.

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27 Annual Report of the Department of Emergency Services and Administrative Services for the year ended 30th June, 1989
Historically, ambulance services in Queensland were a product of local community
deuvoir, driven by benevolent intention and community need\(^{28}\). This high level of local
participation and investment, often across several generations, led to strong feelings of
ownership, commitment and attachment to the local service\(^ {29}\). The local ambulance
committees now play a very important role providing advice and funds to support the
operation of their local ambulance service.\(^ {30}\)

**Queensland Fire and Rescue Service**

The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service is the oldest formal volunteer brigade in Australia,
undertaking its first operation in October 1860 after a fire destroyed a Brisbane cabinet
making workshop and was only contained as a result of a bucket brigade of police and
volunteer helpers. Following disastrous fires in central and southern Queensland in the
1920s, a body to coordinate, oversee and administer rural fire control in Queensland was
created and subsequently the Rural Fires Board and *Rural Fires Act 1927* were introduced.

Urban brigades across the State were created and based around local townships, operated
independently of each other and were governed by equally autonomous boards. The
shortcomings of this ad-hoc development were highlighted in May 1963 when fire engulfed a
bulk sugar storage warehouse in Townsville. The size and duration of the fire meant that the
local Townsville Brigade needed support from as far away as Cairns and Mackay,
unfortunately because of the autonomous nature of the Brigades, hose couplings were
incompatible, command and control arrangements were dangerously different (for example:
one blast from a whistle in Townsville indicated to turn water on while the crews from Ingham
understood it to be danger signal and to evacuate the building); and communications were
nonexistent.

The Government of the day instigated the State Fire Services Council made up of a
Chairman appointed by the Minister, two members nominated by the Fire and Accident
Underwriters' Association of Queensland, one member appointed by the Local Government

\(^ {28}\) PSC (Parliamentary Select Committee of Inquiry into Ambulance Services) (1990). First Report. Brisbane,
study in organisational reform*.


Association of Queensland, and one member appointed by the Minister charged with the administration of the Queensland Civil Defence Organisation.

Duties of the State Fire Services Council included:

- advising the Minister on administration of the Act
- providing for inspection and training of the Fire Brigade Boards
- ensuring the Boards' compliance with the Act
- coordinating fire services of the Boards to ensure assistance for civil defence or other emergency
- supervising and encouraging developments in fire protection methods
- examining and advising on financial and procurement matters relating to the Boards and related duties.

The Council was charged with establishing the Fire Service Inspectorate, including the Chief Inspector of Fire Services and any number of inspectors. The premises, personnel, equipment, methods and organisation of each Fire Brigade Board were to be inspected every twelve months, and the Chief Inspector reported findings and recommendations directly to the State Fire Services Council.

The Fire Brigades Act and Other Acts Amendment Act 1984, re-assigned the majority of the State Fire Services Council's duties and powers to the Minister, and the State Fire Services Council became an advisory body only, subsequently the Fire Brigades Act and Fire Safety Act Amendment Act 1985 as of 1 July 1985 dissolved the State Fire Services Council and allocated its advisory responsibilities to the Queensland Fire Services Association.
The Queensland Fire Service and the Rural Fires Council were formed in 1990 to replace 81 Fire Boards and the Rural Fires Board. In 1990, the *Fire Services Act 1990* was proclaimed replacing the boards and creating a single State-wide Queensland Fire Service incorporating the Rural Fire Division. This restructuring included regionalisation of the fire service and the introduction of strategic management within the service. Following a review of the Queensland Fire Service in 1996, it was established as a statutory authority and renamed Queensland Fire and Rescue Authority in 1997. It evolved into the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service in 2001.

**Emergency Management Queensland**

Prior to the 1970s, Queensland did not have formal disaster management structures or arrangements. Instead the focus was on civil defence which was able to provide some level of coordinated response to disasters and civil emergencies.

In the 1970s a series of natural disasters including the 1974 Brisbane Floods and the destruction of Darwin by Cyclone Tracy highlighted the need for the development of a disaster management system in Queensland that would ensure effective whole-of-Government and cross-government coordination and response during disasters. States and territories throughout Australia commenced developing legislation and disaster/emergency management structures that shifted emphasis away from civil defence and focused on managing the community consequence associated with disasters.

In 1975, Queensland developed the *State Counter-Disaster Organisation Act 1975*. The legislation underpinned the Queensland Disaster Management System and provided for:

- The establishment of the State Counter Disaster Organisation as the umbrella body to ensure effective coordination and collaboration in the event of disasters.
- The establishment of the State Emergency Service.
- It provided special legal powers to enhance the preservation of human life such as ordering an evacuation or the commandeering of assets.

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31 Queensland Fire Service Strategic Plan 1991-1996
During 2002–03 the former Department of Emergency Services undertook a comprehensive review of the *State Counter-Disaster Organisation Act 1975*. The review resulted in the development of the *Disaster Management Act 2003*. The new *Disaster Management Act 2003* maintained many elements of the existing system, while adding contemporary elements such as disaster mitigation, prevention, preparedness, response and recovery.

**State Emergency Service**

The State Emergency Service itself is enigmatic, formed by virtue of State legislation in 1975; the State Emergency Service (SES) has evolved from the former Queensland Civil Defence Organisation that had been in operation since 1961. From its beginning in 1961 until November 1973, the Queensland Civil Defence Organisation was set up to deal with emergencies in the event of a nuclear war. It took no part in natural disaster operations other than operations following Cyclone Althea in December 1971. Responsibility for civil defence fell to the State Fire Services Council when it was formed in 1965.

In November 1973, a tornado caused considerable damage in the Brisbane area and the Civil Defence Organisation was activated to assist in disaster relief. The Civil Defence Organisation saw a much larger involvement in natural disasters during the 1974 Brisbane Floods. The need emerged for a service that was capable of dealing with natural disasters as well as undertaking a civil defence role. The *State Counter-Disaster Organisation Act 1975* established the State Emergency Service to provide disaster response capability.

The current arrangements under the *Disaster Management Act 2003*, every local authority in Queensland is responsible for maintaining a disaster response capability. For local governments, this means the ability to provide equipment and a suitable number of persons, using the resources available to the local government, to effectively deal with, or help another entity to deal with, an emergency situation or a disaster in the local government’s area. Typically this means the formation of an SES group.

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The chief executive officer (currently the Director-General of the Department of Community Safety) is responsible for establishing management and support services, setting policy and training standards, appointing key SES Unit personnel and for entering into agreements with local governments regarding responsibilities of each party.

Hence the enigma, SES Units exists within their local communities with some councils expending considerable time, effort, physical and financial resources in support of their local unit— yet the State determines policy, procedure and strategic direction.

The Review team has made recommendations within the Report regarding the future structure of the Emergency Management Queensland including responsibility for SES moving to a new position of Deputy Commissioner charged with responsibility for volunteers in a broader sense. The Review team have also made recommendations regarding regional structure for the new entity comprising Fire and Emergency Services.

Through discussions the Review team had with a number of Mayors, council Chief Executive Officers and other council officials it is clear there are a range of views on the value add of current Emergency Management Queensland arrangements across Queensland. Some were very complimentary and appreciative of training support in particular; others provided a more critical view and felt that Emergency Management Queensland support of SES did not add value to what they could achieve independently.

The Review team have concluded that there is a clear need for agreements to exist with every local government and that these need to take account of individual variances in the geography, demography, capability and capacity that exists within each of these authorities. Specifically, these agreements should be developed in conjunction with the Queensland Police Service Disaster Management Unit, and with local officers who will play key roles at local and district disaster management groups.
Recommendation:
That the Deputy Commissioner, Operations (of the proposed Department of Fire and Emergency Services) is made responsible for the production and efficacy of these agreements and that work commence on these as early as possible.

Funding arrangements
The Department of Community Safety is largely funded by the State (in 2013–14 $1.3 billion of its $1.9 billion budget is from consolidated funds)\(^{34}\). The largest portion of other revenue for the department is from the Fire and Emergency Services Levy, which provides approximately $404 million for emergency management, fire and rescue in 2013–14\(^{35}\). With the exception of the levy, which has traditionally been apportioned directly to Queensland Fire and Rescue Service, the majority of the other funds are allocated to each service area, with a portion also allocated to the Corporate Service division.

Perhaps due to the fact that the agencies are by and large established in legislation, it has been the view that each agency is separately appropriated. In fact it is the Department of Community Safety’s service areas that are appropriated, as follows:

- ambulance
- custodial
- probation and parole
- emergency management; and fire and rescue

Corporate service arrangements
The current corporate service arrangements were formed in 2012 by amalgamating the Corporate Support Division with the Strategic Policy and Executive Services Division to provide the support services to the department’s service areas.

\(^{34}\) 2013-14 Queensland State Budget Service Delivery Statements - Department of Community Safety p.10
\(^{35}\) Ibid p10
The Corporate Service Division employs approximately 469 full time equivalent staff including: 46 in human resources, 62 in infrastructure and procurement and 35 in finance branch. The strategy and Legal Branch, which includes media and communications, internal audit, legal services, policy, performance and planning areas, has a total of about 84 full time equivalent staff. Information and Communications Systems Branch is the largest branch in the Corporate Service with about 227 full time equivalent staff. In 2012–13 the proportion of corporate staff for the Department of Community Safety was 4.5 per cent, with the other 95.5 per cent comprised of operational staff, including paramedics, fire-fighters, custodial officers and helicopter rescue pilots.

It has been the established protocol to apportion the Department of Community Safety’s funding to the operational services, with each notionally providing a portion of its budget to fund corporate services. The amount provided for the corporate service is not based on a fee-for-service arrangement; rather it is a set amount, based on historical decisions, projected out over a five-year period. When further funding is needed for corporate services it may be sought through a variety of means, including being provided by one division only or apportioned across a range number of divisions.

Operational divisions have tended to take the view that because a portion of their budget is notionally provided to fund the corporate service; therefore, the Corporate Service Division exists solely to provide services to them. In fact, although some service are provided directly in support of the operational divisions, the Corporate Service Division also plays an important role in providing objective advice, independent of the operational divisions, to the Director-General of the Department of Community Safety and central agencies on issues including policy, strategy and resourcing. The Corporate Service Division also plays a role in ensuring the government’s priorities are implemented by the operational divisions. An example of this is the coordinating role the Corporate Service Division has taken in developing and implementing the department’s Public Sector Renewal Board initiatives.
The current funding model that requires notionally providing a portion of each operational service’s budget to the corporate services has caused contention and disharmony between the Corporate Service Division and the operational divisions as it encourages the perception that Corporate Service Division is a service provider to the operational divisions rather than providing a broader corporate governance role.

This contention also exists around the policy, strategy and resourcing areas with the Corporate Service Division and the operational divisions. Operational divisions have at times, sought to duplicate some of these functions as an owned corporate capacity. However, the decentralised model reinforces silo-like behaviours and inefficiencies, and overlooks the advantages and efficiencies yielded by cross-service policy, legislation, strategy, resourcing and funding. The centralised model provides economies of scale and integrated policy and investment across the different emergency service functions particularly in the application of Government direction and policy.

The Review heard varying accounts of the efficacy of the Corporate Service Division. Some executives hold the view that the level of support they are paying for is not delivered, and would prefer to have a separately owned corporate service capacity. Others feel that although they could not operate without the support of the Corporate Service Division, or that the Corporate Service Division does not know their business well enough. This is particularly a concern for divisions where the Corporate Service Division is responsible for providing the main interface with the central agencies (that is, the Department of the Premier and Cabinet and Queensland Treasury and Trade), however this is key to its role as an objective advisor to Government and central agencies.

We acknowledge these concerns. There must be a balance between independence and the provision of adequate support. Some areas of the Corporate Service Division have been of particular concern to the Review team. For example, the Review team was asked to examine the response to the January 2013 disaster events. In discussions with a range of stakeholders, including local governments, the Queensland Police Service, Emergency Management Queensland and other agencies represented on the State Disaster Coordination Group; the Review team learned that one of the key impediments to an effectively coordinated response was the lack of a task or incident management system that
works across all agencies. The Review team was told that this was a major risk that had been identified in previous events. Despite this, it seemed to the Review team that little progress had been made by Corporate Service Division’s Information and Communication Systems area to develop a timely solution.

**Finding:**

Given the high risk and high priority of such a system, the Review team believes the inability to develop a timely solution is a major missed opportunity for the Department of Community Safety to add-value to the business of its operational divisions.

The Review team has come to the view that the independent advice giving role of the corporate service provides an important check and balance between the Minister and the operational divisions, and thus plays an important role in ensuring government priorities are embedded in operational services.

**Finding:**

The Review team believes the key public good produced by corporate services on behalf of Queensland amounts to good governance – and thus an assurance that the resources of the portfolio are being expended in an efficient and effective manner in line with the government’s priorities.

**Finding:**

The Review team has concluded that any future arrangements must reinforce the independence of the corporate services role while at the same time ensuring that it is responsive to the needs of any operational organisation that it is charged with supporting.

**Finding:**

The Review team considers that without this ‘managed service’ approach there is significant risk that operational organisations will focus on what they are good at. They will not necessarily therefore focus upon the broader position of Government or like organisations thus perpetuating the current situation committing Government to further lost opportunities and continued inefficiency.
Efficacy of the Department of Community Safety

Efficacy of combining operational agencies

As described earlier, the Department of Emergency Services was formed in 1996. The intention of joining the emergency services together under one departmental structure included to:

- provide a platform for integrated services across the State
- enable single-point ministerial accountability for emergency services
- provide services covering all phases of emergency and disaster management—prevention, preparedness, response and recovery
- support cooperation and coordination of operational staff in communities during emergencies and disasters.

With the addition of Queensland Corrective Services in 2009, the Department of Emergency Services remit was expanded from emergency services to a broader scope of business to be called Community Safety. The Department of Emergency Services raison d’être was never more closely defined and few staff would have been able to provide a clear account of the purpose of aligning corrective services with emergency services.

Over recent years the Queensland Ambulance Service has been moving away from an identity as an emergency service. The Queensland Ambulance Service has made significant advances in professionalising its workforce, with the introduction of university based training and the addition of roles such as intensive care paramedics. The strategic direction emerging in the ambulance service gradually became one that was very strongly aligned with health services, and recently the Queensland Ambulance Service has aligned its business structure to that of Queensland Health, with the introduction of Local Ambulance Services Networks. The vast majority of the Queensland Ambulance Service’s incidents are now serviced in conjunction with Health, with only a small proportion of incidents also involving the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service.
The Review team also believes that Corrective Services has not assimilated well into the Department of Community Safety, due mainly to the very different nature of its business—it is not an emergency service. This factor, combined with the Queensland Ambulance Service having grown into a professionalised emergency health service, renders the original intent of an integrated set of services less practical. Indeed, forcing these unalike services together becomes inimical to delivering better coordination of Government funded entities.

The opportunity to align these businesses with other services within the customer value chain offers a chance to improve their strategic alignment and clarify their purpose and role in serving the Queensland community.

**Finding:**

The Review team believes that response services, which must be reactive to demand, should be aligned with those services which can prevent or mitigate this demand.

**Responsibilities of the Department of Community Safety**

Unless you consider the Corporate Service Division to be the Department of Community Safety, it is difficult to identify a tangible ‘department’. With each operational division providing quite separate sets of services, there is little to unify the department except for a general strategic direction. An analysis of the Department of Community Safety’s current Strategic Plan (2012–2016) illustrates this issue:

- there are no shared goals
- each of the four operational divisions has a separate goal and discrete performance indicators
- there are no goals or performance indicators set out for the Corporate Service Division.

The Corporate Service Division does have some performance measures that are reported internally, for example about the efficiency of the executive services and information privacy areas. It is likely that no measures of their effectiveness are reported externally because the Corporate Service Division is simply viewed as a business overhead. The Review team
believes that the Corporate Service Division does provide a service directly to the Queensland community by developing, implementing and monitoring governance.

**Recommendation:**
That the efficacy of corporate services should be measured and monitored, and that this is implemented by the proposed new Office of Portfolio Business as part of a broader strategic planning process.

At the departmental level, the Director-General is responsible for the efficiency, effectiveness and appropriateness of the services of the Department of Community Safety. Many executives interviewed had some reservations as to whether it would be the Director-General or the relevant Commissioner who would be held to account in the case any significant fiscal or service provision incident. Nonetheless, it is clear that it is, in policy terms, the Director-General who is accountable in the first instance.

The Director-General does not have a role in delivering frontline services. The *Disaster Management Act 2003* provides a role for the Director-General to review and provide advice to the State Disaster Management Group and the Minister on key aspects of disaster management; however the Review observed that the Director-General’s role seemed to become redundant during a disaster as:

- there is no defined role for the Director-General, Department of Community Safety
- the Director-General does not command operational staff
- operational commanders held the critical information.

**Finding:**
The Review team considers that, based on interviews with key stakeholders in Queensland and with interstate colleagues, as well as on our observations of the 2013 disaster events, that the Minister and Government need a direct line of accountability to their operational Commissioners. This is essential in times of disaster.
Efficacy of funding arrangement

The way the Department of Community Safety has been funded (described above) has limited the efficacy of a departmental approach. Despite apparently separate budgets, the department’s governance structure is designed as though the Commissioners have shared goals and accountabilities. As such, each governance committee is represented by each division, with one division’s head taking the position of Chair. In fact, Executives told the review team that, by and large, each division is mainly concerned by their own division’s initiatives and little is achieved that can be considered whole-of-department.

For example, although executives from each division sit on the Information and Communications Steering Committee, initiatives such as iRoam have been able to be developed solely within one division. This is largely because the Queensland Ambulance Service chose to allocate resources to the program, and even if other divisions had taken a substantive interest, there was no mechanism to force an integrated departmental approach.

Finding:

In the current Department of Community Safety arrangements each agency is largely left to make its own decisions about how to allocate such resources.

The fact that agencies have until recently been able in most cases to build separate ambulance and fire stations is an example of the department’s inability to drive a departmental approach to service delivery. Separate stations have continued to be built, despite a need for fiscal restraint over a number of recent budget cycles. This has occurred largely as a result of current practices where divisions have separate business models, strategic approaches and budgets.

However, it must also be recognised that the Department of Community Safety has allowed these separate approaches and has not taken control of these budgets. Recently, this has changed with the Government’s clear direction for joint stations which has enabled the Department of Community Safety to take a stronger position. Even in this environment, corporate service executives report the need to take a consultative approach, with divisions continuing to resist some such proposals. A key advantage to the way the Department of Community Safety has been structured is that operational divisions have access to one set of corporate services.
Finding:
A portfolio model offers a significantly streamlined and cost effective arrangement as opposed to each division having a separate media, legal, finance, information and communication technology, human resources; and policy capability.

Shared media services are a key example of a successful combined arrangement. The success of this area lies in the force multiplier effect that is gained from having the combined resources available to any one division in times of high activity. Daily, each division is supported by dedicated team of individuals, however these teams are agile and well versed in the overall department’s activities and can be flexibly deployed to maximise output.

There have been successes in delivering an integrated approach between some divisions in the Department of Community Safety. A current example, led by the Corporate Service Division, is the development of the Emergency Vehicle Priority project, which involves the fire and ambulance services. ESCAD (Emergency Services Computer Aided Despatch) is another example of the success a joined up approach can deliver even when significant barriers are encountered. Through the implementation of the current Computer Aided Despatch system a number of problems arose. Although not related directly to the software (e.g. poor geo verification of data, poor supporting infrastructure, poor maintenance procedures and policies) it was the system that bore the adverse media and staff commentary. The integrated approach enabled executives from operational divisions and corporate to jointly own the problem and share the need to find a resolution. It is clear there has been some success in supporting interoperability, and the review team wishes to foster such approaches in any new arrangements.
Conclusion

The review team has concluded that there are significant advantages to having a central corporate service; however we see this as quite a separate issue to having a Department of Community Safety.

The lack of shared strategic intent, combined with an entrenched view that each agency has a separate budget has ensured that the department itself is little more than a conceptual entity.

The Review team does not believe that isolated instances of interoperability are a sufficient reason for the Department of Community Safety to exist as a department. While interoperability enables instances of shared arrangements, it does not equate to a shared strategic interest. Lacking a shared strategic intent and set of common goals, accountability for outcomes at the departmental level can be blurred and it would seem that Commissioners are more clearly accountable for most of the outcomes of the Department of Community Safety.

The arrangements proposed in the body of the report aim to grow and embed the need for not only a shared strategic intent and common goals but provide clarity in terms of accountability. The notion of clearly defined, contributory responsibilities is essential to diminish the possibility of organisations becoming too self centred (at the cost of lost opportunities for others) as has been the case in the past.

The Review team is concerned that even throughout this review, where opportunities have been identified and acted upon (which is to be lauded) these have been progressed in isolation. This lack of due consideration for the benefits achievable by other organisations indicates either a lack of willingness or inability to consider the greater potential outcome deliverable by adopting a collaborative mind set.

Given these issues and the structural changes proposed—to remove the Queensland Ambulance Service and Queensland Corrective Services from the Department of Community Safety—we recommend that it be renamed the Department of Fire and Emergency Services and be led by a Commissioner. As discussed in Chapter 6 –
Queensland Fire and Rescue Services, the Review team recommends that the fire service takes a broader view of its role as an emergency management organisation. The Review team strongly believes that such an organisation would have a clear strategic intent and thus clearer accountability than the current Department of Community Services structure.

Furthermore, the adoption of the proposed Chief Executive Officer Business Portfolio will deliver the rigour and discipline required to ensure the most efficient and efficacious outcome for Government, this is detailed more fully in the body of the Report.

The Review team recommends that the funding model for the Portfolio Business is not based on fee-for-service arrangements or notional contributions from the operational services.

Recommendation:
That a budget based on the desired functional accountabilities should be appropriated to the Portfolio Business as part of the Government budget process.

Recommendation:
That the Office of Portfolio Business follows the same budget processes as other agencies.

Recommendation:
The Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business establishes a set of performance indicators to provide a transparent process for government to monitor its performance.
5. Disaster management

Introduction
Prior to the disastrous Brisbane floods of 1974, emergency management arrangements within Queensland, and indeed Australia, were based on civil defence arrangements rather than the management of large scale natural disasters. The Brisbane floods, in conjunction with the effects of Cyclone Tracy in Darwin, highlighted the need for the development of a disaster management system in Queensland.

The State Counter Disaster Organisation Act 1975 was legislated to facilitate the effective coordination of response and recovery arrangements following major disasters. The State Counter Disaster Organisation Act 1975 was particularly concerned with a whole-of-Government and cross government approach.

The State Counter Disaster Organisation Act 1975:
- established the State Counter Disaster Organisation
- established the State Emergency Service (SES)
- established legal powers for times of disaster including the requirement to evacuate and the ability to commandeer assets.

The State Counter Disaster Organisation Act 1975 provided the genesis for what have become the Queensland disaster management arrangements under today’s Disaster Management Act 2003. The Disaster Management Act 2003 was a result of a comprehensive review of the State Counter Disaster Organisation Act 1975. The Disaster Management Act 2003 provides for a multi-tiered system of committees and coordination centres at state, district and local levels.
The *Disaster Management Act 2003* has evolved over time in response to the changing risk environment and last underwent a major review in 2009. The changing environment has seen the emergence of bio-security risks such as citrus canker\(^{36}\) and sugar cane smut\(^{37}\) as well as equine influenza and the spread of infectious diseases through human pandemic. The emergence of threats from deliberate acts has also had to be considered, these include threats against technology and critical infrastructure, storage and transportation of hazardous materials and terrorism.

The main objects as set out in part 3 the *Disaster Management Act 2003* are:

(a) to help communities—

(i) mitigate the potential adverse effects of an event; and

(ii) prepare for managing the effects of an event; and

(iii) effectively respond to, and recover from, a disaster or an emergency situation;

(b) to provide for effective disaster management for the State;

(c) to establish a framework for the management of the State Emergency Service and emergency service units to ensure the effective performance of their functions.

**Current Queensland disaster management arrangements**

Response to disasters within Queensland is predicated on local capability and capacity, supported and augmented through a scalable responsive model. The model builds upon the availability and coordination of support at a district, State and national level.

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\(^{37}\) Sugar cane smut was detected in Childers in 2006. It is a disease caused by a fungus. [www.daff.qld.gov.au/26_11404.htm](http://www.daff.qld.gov.au/26_11404.htm)
These arrangements include several key management and coordination structures through which the functions of the *Disaster Management Act 2003* are delivered. The principal structures that make up Queensland’s disaster management arrangements are:

- Disaster management groups operating at local, district and state levels. These groups are responsible for the planning, organisation, coordination and implementation of measures across the prevention, preparedness, response and recovery continuum.

- Coordination centres at local, district and state levels that support disaster management groups and source necessary assistance and services required for disaster operations.

- State government functional agencies coordinated across Government.

The *Disaster Management Act 2003* outlines the key functions, responsibilities and structures of these various groups. It specifies functions and responsibilities for the Premier, Minister, the Chief Executive of the Department and a range of other named officers including the Director General of the Department of the Premier and Cabinet and the Commissioner of the Queensland Police Service. Functions are also established for various roles including the Chairs of District Disaster Management Groups and Local Disaster Management Groups, the Executive Officer State Disaster Management Group, a State Disaster Coordinator and a State Recovery Coordinator.

On Friday 1 February 2013 the Premier announced that the former Department of Local Government would become the Department of Local Government, Community Recovery and Resilience. As part of these changes the Minister is now responsible for the Queensland Reconstruction Authority, which now has a stronger focus on disaster resilience. The Police and Community Safety Review team (the Review team) supports the approach taken to partner with local governments and the private sector to build resilience and help communities recover from the events of early 2013. We also note that in New Zealand, a permanent Earthquake Commission has been established by the government to administer the Natural Disaster Fund and support research and education on natural disasters. The establishment of such permanent bodies within government helps to build resilience and sustainability.

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At the local government level, the *Disaster Management Act 2003* requires that local governments have a local disaster management plan and a disaster response capability. The local government has prime responsibility for the preparation, prevention, response and recovery from disaster within its boundaries. During a disaster, it is also the responsibility of the Local Disaster Management Group to ensure information about an event or a disaster in its area is promptly reported to the District Disaster Coordinator in order to provide an early warning to the district of the need for any additional support.

Having said that, the Review team concluded there are differing capabilities between local governments and no single point of reference that identifies and lists these capabilities. It follows that the capabilities are not sufficiently audited. Put simply, some local government areas are more resilient than others and the State needs to be aware of this in order to judge what capability is required from a State perspective.

A number of local governments also raised with us a strong preference for the State to provide only strategic and not tactical direction, arguing that they are well experienced in dealing with the wet season. In this context it is essential that the State disaster coordination group and State disaster management group have a clear understanding of the capability of individual local governments. The proposed Inspector General Emergency Management (discussed later in this Report) would have a role in assessing this capability.

Under the plan the Local Disaster Management Group may approach the District Disaster Management Group regarding:

- requests for assistance
- consideration of the declaration of a disaster situation
- activation of commonwealth and state relief arrangements, such as those delivered by the Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements.\(^{39}\)

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\(^{39}\) Experience during the 2013 post TC Oswald event highlighted the need for education in these aspects across Local Disaster Management Groups and District Disaster Coordinators, with an example cited by an Assistant Commissioner of Police regarding requests from a Local Disaster Management Group for Ministerial declaration of a disaster in order to activate Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements.
Queensland’s disaster management arrangements are shown diagrammatically below:

Queensland disaster management arrangements

It is the responsibility of District Disaster Management Groups and subsequently the State Disaster Management Group (through the State Disaster Coordination Centre) to provide local governments with resources and support to help carry out disaster operations.

During disaster operations, the State Disaster Management Group will provide strategic direction through the State Disaster Coordinator for disaster response operations and the State Recovery Coordinator for disaster recovery issues.

The Review team noted that during the events of January 2013, no one was appointed to the position of State Disaster Coordinator. The Review team found that the overall coordination of the 2013 event was less than optimal and that this was largely due to the absence of the controlling influence of a State Disaster Coordinator. This is further discussed later in this chapter.
Recommendation
That primacy of control for disaster operations remains with the Queensland Police Service and be reinforced.

Recommendation
That primacy of control should rest with the State Disaster Coordinator. This position should, by default, be the Deputy Commissioner, Regional Operations, Queensland Police Service.

In order to ensure the efficacy of the system and oversee the possibility of multiple Local Disaster Management Groups and District Disaster Management Groups being activated at the same time, the State Disaster Coordination Group has been formed as part of the State Disaster Coordination Centre structure. The value of this has been well demonstrated in the past when multiple Local Disaster Management Groups are competing not just for resources but also public and political attention. For example, during the 2010–11 events multiple local authorities across the state were experiencing disaster, and each had specific needs and requests.

The State Disaster Coordination Group played a pivotal role in determining relative priorities and, with the benefit of the knowledge of the State’s resources, solving complex issues that were beyond the capacity of the Local Disaster Management Groups. These included coordinated plans to refuel generators for mobile phone cells across multiple local governments and logistics planning for large scale resupply and evacuation operations.

One of the key functions of the State Disaster Coordination Group is to collate and analyse situation reports from District Disaster Management Groups in order to provide cohesive, consistent, relevant and succinct information to the State Disaster Management Group. The aim is to facilitate a shared understanding of risk and priorities, enabling the focusing of resources and critical thinking on the most important issues at hand.
The Review team carefully examined this process during the January 2013 events and formed the view that the systems in place to enable this are dysfunctional. We considered that the multiplicity of reporting systems resulted in a lack of a single-point-of-truth about the ‘current state’ and posed a significant risk to decision making and leadership across the system.

The Review team also witnessed examples of situation reports taking up to 24 hours to be provided from some Local Disaster Management Groups to the State level. Numerous stakeholders at the local level related stories of having to prepare their situation reports at dawn, or before, in order to meet the briefing timeframes at State level. The problem with this is was that in the north of the State it is still dark and considered dangerous to send people out into the field.

One of the central issues was that the information technology system—Guardian—used by local governments currently does not interface with the police event management system —Web EOC or the Department of Community Safety’s SharePoint system. This results in time and resource wastage. A key issue here is that the State disaster management system is working with old information and furthermore is vulnerable to emerging issues. Clearly an events management system that can coordinate the information of all participating agencies is urgently needed. Recommendations in this regard are made later in this Report.

The Review team was also provided examples of high priority rescue taskings needing to be run between buildings at Kedron on little more than ‘sticky notes’. Further examples were provided of requests for assistance being unanswered because they had been sent to a fax machine that had no paper and of situation reports being written in one location then read over the phone to be re-typed onto a system at the State Disaster Coordination Centre. It almost goes without saying that duplication of effort and the potential for error are multiplied in such a system.
The Review team observed that there is a critical need for suitable information and communication technology system which can be used to provide information at all levels and provides:

- situational awareness
- decision support
- event management
- a log of critical decisions
- deadlines
- audit capability to ensure jobs are completed
- logistics
- intelligence.

This is discussed further in the section on technology.

The role of the Department of Community Safety

The Administrative Arrangement Orders establish the Director-General, Department of Community Safety as the Chief Executive Officer for the purposes of the Disaster Management Act 2003.

The current Department of Community Safety administers the Disaster Management Act 2003 on behalf of the Minister for Police and Community Safety. Due to the Minister’s role to administer the Disaster Management Act 2003, the Minister is ipso facto responsible for ensuring that the necessary measures (including systems, policies and arrangements) are in place to fulfil the objectives of the Disaster Management Act 2003.

The Disaster Management Act 2003 is relatively flexible in supporting Government to implement effective disaster management arrangements across any set of machinery-of-Government arrangements. Most of the preventative and preparatory steps and many of the response functions and responsibilities for state level disaster management arrangements
rest with the Department of Community Safety. Emergency Management Queensland contributes the majority of disaster management policy, planning, training and support to local governments. The Department of Community Safety has a role to support the State Emergency Services, which is an important element of the State’s disaster response capacity. Emergency Management Queensland’s operational roles include managing resupply operations and managing the State Disaster Coordination Centre at Kedron. The Emergency Management Queensland’s responsibilities as set out in the State Disaster Management Plan 2012 are.

- functional lead agency for warnings as an agency within the Department of Community Safety
- functional lead agency for emergency supply
- review, assess and report on the effectiveness of disaster management by the state
- provide advice and support to the State Disaster Management Group, district disaster management groups and local disaster management groups in relation to disaster management and disaster operations
- prepare guidelines on behalf of the State Disaster Management Group per s 49 and s 63 of the Disaster Management Act 2003
- establish and maintain arrangements between the state and Commonwealth on disaster management issues
- ensure that disaster management and disaster operations within the state are consistent with the state’s policy framework, plans, and guidelines
- ensure that persons performing functions under the Disaster Management Act 2003 in relation to disaster operations are appropriately trained
- coordinate reception operations
- perform the following responsibilities in support of disaster operations:
  - develop, maintain, monitor and continuously improve the state’s disaster management arrangements and systems
  - ensure the availability, maintenance and operation of the State Disaster Coordination Centre
  - manage resupply operations
  - coordinate the logistics support framework
  - assist agencies source disaster response-related (emergency) supplies and equipment
  - coordinate, support and manage the deployment of SES resources (as required, in consultation with local government, appoint a suitably experienced and/or qualified officer as SES Coordinator to support the coordination of SES operations)
- support the provision of state government owned rotary wing assets to the disaster response
- support the deployment of Queensland Corrective Services resources.

The Department of Community Safety also manages the Natural Disaster Resilience Program established under the National Partnership Agreement on Natural Disaster Resilience.

The Review team have carefully considered the role of the newly established Department of Local Government, Community Recovery and Resilience regarding their role to manage the Queensland Reconstruction Authority. The clear focus of the Department of Local Government, Community Recovery and Resilience is to build resilience at the local level and their responsibility to administer Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements. The Natural Disaster Resilience Program is a disaster mitigation and community resilience competitive grant program. Therefore, the Review team consider it entirely appropriate that they should also oversee the Natural Disaster Resilience Program.

**Recommendation**

That funding, staffing and responsibility associated with administration of the NDRP be transferred from Emergency Management Queensland to the Department of Local Government, Community Recovery and Resilience.

The Department’s response capacity includes its helicopter service (part of Emergency Management Queensland), the fire service and the ambulance service. The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service, Queensland Ambulance Service and even the Queensland Corrective Service’s disaster management roles and responsibilities are separately set out in the State disaster management plan. In addition to these functions, the Department of Community Safety is also responsible for hazard analysis and modelling and situational reporting during an event. The *Disaster Management Act 2003* provides for a wide range of generalised functions and responsibilities for disaster management which are the responsibility of the administering department (currently the Department of Community Safety). In addition, there is a more specific set of functions that have been explicitly delegated by the Director-General Department of Community Safety to the Assistant Director-General Emergency Management Queensland.
All functions under section 16A of the *Disaster Management Act 2003* were delegated to the Assistant Director General Emergency Management Queensland, and are as follows:

*Disaster Management Act 2003*

16A Functions of chief executive

(a) to—

(i) regularly review and assess the effectiveness of disaster management by the State, including the State disaster management plan and its implementation; and

(ii) regularly report to the State Disaster Management Group on the effectiveness of—

(A) disaster management by the State; and

(B) the implementation of the State disaster management plan;

(b) to regularly review and assess the effectiveness of disaster management by District Disaster Management Groups and Local Disaster Management Groups, including district and local disaster management plans;

(c) to establish and maintain arrangements between the State and the Commonwealth about matters relating to effective disaster management;

(d) to ensure that disaster management and disaster operations in the State are consistent with the following—

(i) the State Disaster Management Group’s strategic policy framework for disaster management for the State;

(ii) the State disaster management plan;

(iii) any disaster management guidelines;

(e) to ensure that persons performing functions under this Act in relation to disaster operations are appropriately trained;

(f) to provide advice and support to the State Disaster Management Group and local and District Disaster Management Groups in relation to disaster management and disaster operations.
The responsibilities to ensure effective disaster management and appropriate training are set out in these functions. They require Emergency Management Queensland to establish and provide a range of services, programs, plans and policies for a complex array of stakeholders including the State Disaster Management Group, other government departments, local governments, members of disaster management groups, the community, and the Minister and Director-General.

Most agencies within the Department of Community Safety are established by legislation. Emergency Management Queensland’s roles and functions however are delegated by Authority of the chief executive officer of the Department of Community Safety. The specific functions and powers delegated by the chief executive officer of the Department of Community Safety to the Assistant Director-General Emergency Management Queensland, include those in part 16a above, as well as parts relating to rescue officers, offence provisions, emergency services units and the State Emergency Service. This authority could equally be delegated to any other appropriately qualified officer within the chief executive officer’s department.

**Whole-of-Government disaster management responsibilities**

The Interim State Disaster Management Plan 2012 sets out the roles and responsibilities of various state agencies for disaster management. It sets out the lead, functional lead and primary agency roles of agencies in planning, risk assessment, prevention and preparedness, response and recovery.

The reality is that day to day management of issues essential to effective disaster management requires acceptance of responsibility and active participation by all Government departments. The Interim State Disaster Management Plan 2012 sets out that each department is responsible for operational planning and specifically lists each agency’s accountabilities. However, the Review team notes that there have been cases where agencies, being unable to meet their requirements under the Interim State Disaster Management Plan 2012, have successfully called upon the Department of Community Safety (and in effect Emergency Management Queensland) to undertake these responsibilities.
For example, Emergency Management Queensland now coordinates State level procurement of emergency supply, formerly a role of the Department of Public Housing and Works.

The need for a coordinated effort extends beyond State Government to local governments, non-government organisations and utilities. The Local Government Association of Queensland recognises that “Queensland has a high level of vulnerability to a range of natural disasters including flood, cyclone, storm surge, severe storms, landslide, bushfire, and earthquake” and that “such a situation calls for a need to reduce community vulnerability and work to increase community resilience.”

The Department of Community Safety operates in regions, areas and zones. The Queensland Police Service operates in regions, districts and patrol areas. The Department of Transport and Main Roads operates in regions and districts. The Review team noted that not all State government entities accord with local government boundaries. There is some overlap with regard to regions and districts, and the Review team notes that problems are most likely to arise as a result of the differences in the district boundaries.

Disaster districts should be prescribed under a regulation. The Queensland Police Service recently restructured its district arrangements to reduce the number of districts from 31 to 15. The Review team has had difficulty ascertaining the level of consultation that occurred between the Queensland Police Service and the Department of Community Safety about any proposed effects of this change on disaster districts. The Review found that the lack of transparency around this issue is likely to be a symptom of the, at times, contested relationship between Emergency Management Queensland and the police service. This situation is not sustainable.

The Disaster Management Act 2003 establishes the primacy of local government and its role in disaster management. The Review notes that the Queensland Audit Office commented on this issue as far back as 2004–05: “Unless a consistent whole-of-Government approach to

the demarcation of areas within the State is taken, the resources within the disaster management system may not be appropriately allocated across the regions.41"

Recommendation:
That in establishing new disaster districts, the first guiding principle must be to align with local government boundaries and that divergence should only occur when there is a need to address a unique local circumstance.

The role of the Queensland Police Service
Emergency Management Queensland42 is the key state agency charged with the responsibility of providing assurance to the State Disaster Management Group that the Queensland disaster management arrangements meet the needs of Queenslanders. The Queensland Police Service also plays a central role in this assurance due to the role that agency plays both as a key advisor to the State Disaster Management Group and because it is the agency charged with coordinating response under the State disaster management plan.

The Disaster Management Act 2003 places legislative obligations upon the Commissioner of Police to appoint key positions, central to the effective operations of Queensland’s disaster management arrangements. These positions include the Chair, Deputy Chair and Executive Officer of all District Disaster Management Groups and the Executive Officer to the State Disaster Management Group. The Police Commissioner must also be consulted by the Chair of the State Disaster Management Group when considering the appointment of a State Disaster Coordinator or State Recovery Coordinator.

The Review team observed that currently all the above positions appointed by the Commissioner are filled by Queensland Police Service members. The Disaster Management Act 2003 does not currently specify that these positions need to be serving police officers, however it does require the Commissioner to be “satisfied the person has the necessary expertise or experience to perform the functions and exercise the powers” of the position.

41 Queensland Auditor General Report No. 2 2004-05 Audit of the Queensland Disaster Management System p.9
42 by way of its requirement to deliver on section 16A of the Disaster Management Act.
The Review team considers the appointment of senior police officers as District Disaster Coordinators (and Chair of a District Disaster Management Group) is entirely appropriate. The Queensland Police Service is well positioned to bring key stakeholders together across the disaster district, due to their unique position within communities and exposure across agencies. Therefore, the Queensland Police Service should assume primacy of control in disaster situations. The Queensland Police Service and District Disaster Coordinators must however recognise the value of Local Disaster Management Groups being chaired by a councillor from the local government, which is in any case required by the *Disaster Management Act 2003*. The chairs and the executive officers need to have qualifications and current skills in disaster management.

Acknowledging that the Commissioner of Police must be assured of an individual's expertise and experience, when appointing staff to disaster management roles, the Review team noted that other agencies may also have staff well qualified and experienced in such roles. The consideration of these staff could act as a force multiplier in terms of the overall capability and expertise of a particular group.

The role of a Deputy District Disaster Coordinator in a response phase could be assigned to an agency other than the Queensland Police Service, dependent upon the specific hazard and an individual's command skill and experience. The Review team considers that District Disaster Coordinators may also benefit from the expertise of an appropriately trained officer from another agency to carry out the role of Disaster District Executive Officer. The possible benefits relate not only to a broadened support base for the group but may also free up valuable police resources for frontline activity during an event.

It is worth noting that the role of the Queensland Police Service in the Local Disaster Management Groups and District Disaster Management Groups is not supported by all mayors. Many local governments will have staff who have experienced local disasters over many years. The resilience of these groups needs to be acknowledged and not ignored.
Finding:
Queensland Police Service needs to work on its relationship development and not rely solely upon its legislative powers to provide a coordinated response.

Recommendation:
That, where appropriate, the Commissioner of Police appoints appropriately trained and experienced public service officers to appropriate roles in the disaster management system to support District Disaster Coordinators in their vital roles.

Observations about the SDCG – January 2013 Disaster Events
The Review team attended the State Disaster Coordination Group and State Disaster Management Group meetings during the 2013 disaster events. Our observations of the State Disaster Coordination Group were that:

- The Queensland Police Service and Emergency Management Queensland jointly chair the State Disaster Coordination Group. While commendable in terms of the ‘optics’ of collaboration, joint chairs can confuse accountability in times of crisis. It is recommended that the agencies agree on a chair or a rotating chair for a prescribed period (e.g. 12 months). There was an extraordinary number of people in attendance at the meeting (in excess of 45), limiting effective meeting outcomes.
- There were a large number of proxies in attendance. Departments undertake to identify and dedicate appropriate officers to the State Disaster Coordination Group. Although there will be occasions when substitution is required, this should be kept to a minimum and all efforts should be made to ensure that primary contacts represent their agency at the briefings.
- The Review team was concerned to observe that when the opportunity arose for Emergency Management Queensland to co-chair and lead the meeting, the Queensland Police Service’s preference was for a more junior officer to assume the role of chair. The Review team takes the view that it would be more appropriate for the more senior Emergency Management Queensland representative to have undertaken responsibility to chair the meeting in this circumstance.
- Bureau of Meteorology briefings were extensive and detailed however, no modelling was displayed either electronically (as has been available for other events) or in hard copy.
• District Disaster Coordinator reports also tended to be extensive with no visual or written information or summary available as a reference. Given the fact that District Disaster Management Groups all provide situation reports to the State Disaster Coordination Centre it should be possible to refer to these and only update those parts that have altered since the previous briefing. Those issues that need to be escalated through either a request for assistance or further analysis at state level should be highlighted.

• Agency reports exposed a number of issues that required further coordination and investigation but were not further discussed. The reports also exposed a number of areas where problem solving was occurring in isolation, thereby not making the most of the combined knowledge of the group.

• The State Disaster Coordination Group may have benefitted from the ability to have the up-to-date agency information captured, analysed and displayed in a common environment so that all members have some visibility of current issues and the ability to contribute to solutions.

• The meeting lasted in excess of 90 minutes, with some participants having been involved with meetings immediately preceding and following. In particular, participants from the Queensland Police Service had been in meetings immediately preceding the State Disaster Coordination Group meeting. They were then required to brief the State Disaster Management Group meeting immediately afterwards. The Review team observed that the quality of briefing probably suffered from a lack of preparation time.

• The relatively unstructured manner in which situation reports were delivered in the State Disaster Coordination Group resulted in an inability of that group to turn their minds to problem solving, which should be the key strength of this group.

• The physical setup of the room should be improved by providing dedicated and clearly marked seating arrangements both at the table and for ‘second row’ support personnel.

• There needs to be greater use of technology including video-conferencing, display of real time (or close to) imagery and interactive conferencing software. For instance, no projections or reports of inundation were available nor reports of damage assessments.

As discussed above, the State Disaster Management Group meeting began as the State Disaster Coordination Group meeting ended, giving little opportunity to prepare cogent briefs for the State Disaster Management Group’s consideration.
Finding:
With problem solving not able to be appropriately facilitated at the State Disaster Coordination Group meeting, and the lack of strategic level briefing, State Disaster Coordination Group members were placed in the invidious position of managing non-strategic and sometimes minor issues, rather than being able to provide a broad commander's intent, to be actioned at officer level.

The disaster management system needs to enable the State Disaster Management Group to focus on real risk, and provide their “Commanders intent”, so that options and solutions can be worked out at the State Disaster Coordination Group level. This is not currently the case.

Previous reviews

There have been a number of reviews dealing with the disaster management arrangements in Queensland. Most have made findings similar to that of the Queensland Audit Office Report of 2004, that “there was no evidence to indicate that the disaster management system has failed to respond to disasters or support the community”43. Indeed in announcing Police and Community Safety Review, Minister Dempsey recognised that “It’s about making sure we are ahead of the game” and that “there are always better ways of serving the community”. 44

However, all reviews have found some scope for improvement. The disappointing aspect is that these improvements have either not been realised or have been agonisingly slow in being actioned. O’Sullivan45 noted in 2009 that the system is effective if “the elements work together in a trusting cooperative way”.

Finding:
The issues observed by the Review team are largely the same: that the current cooperative arrangements which rely so heavily on personalities, good will and collaboration are not sustainable as the sole means of ensuring continuous improvement and are not offering the government an assurance of the system’s capability to protect Queenslanders.

In 2004–05 the Queensland Audit Office found:

- an absence of a suitable strategic governance framework which encompasses strategic priorities, policy directives, standards and procedures at the local, district and State levels
- the lack of consistency in the content and format of disaster management plans
- an absence of a suitable monitoring and reporting framework to ensure that disaster management plans remain up-to-date, relevant and reliable
- an absence of a suitable State-wide hazard risk profile which identifies key risks to be managed across the State
- the need for a stronger governance framework, which includes clarity of roles and responsibilities and suitable performance monitoring\(^{46}\)
- the need to give greater priority to risk identification, analysis, assessment, treatment, monitoring and review processes at all levels of government
- the need for a more robust risk management framework given the complex and dynamic nature of the environment in which the disaster management system operates, which includes changing demographics and national initiatives.

The Review team, through observations of the January 2013 events and in consideration of various submissions from the Department of Community Safety observes that significant headway has been made in addressing these issues. However, improvements suggested in the Auditor–General of Queensland Report no. 2 2004–05 – Audit of the Queensland Disaster Management System, p.28 states ‘...core of this governance structure is how responsibilities and information are coordinated and shared at the state, district and local level to provide a seamless approach to the delivery of disaster management services to the community.’

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\(^{46}\) Auditor-General of Queensland Report No.2 2004-2005: Audit of the Queensland Disaster Management System, p.28
Disaster Management System need to be re-stated and re-emphasised as matters for continuing action. For example the need still exists for improved planning including the development of coordinated strategic and operational priorities for disaster management at the local, district and State levels coupled with an associated performance management and monitoring framework.

The Review team also supports the need to implement the Queensland Audit Office’s recommendation for the development of a more coordinated approach to communication throughout the system. The Review team was told of many examples of agencies developing separate media releases, and having separate approaches to social media. Significant opportunity may arise from improved use of the professional media in disaster events. The ABC for example, provides dedicated staff with specific training in emergency broadcasting, and ensures that the newsroom remains independent of warnings functions\(^{47}\). The Review was advised that Queensland’s disaster management system was not proactive in engaging with the ABC during the 2013 floods.

**Finding:**  
The review team noted that the best information available to the public during the 2013 events came from the Courier Mail and the ABC news websites rather than any particular government website and consider greater use of the ABC and commercial media in warnings and emergency broadcasting in preference to duplicating this capability within departments.

**Recommendation:**  
That the Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business and Commissioners establish a high level working group with the ABC and commercial media to identify and implement an improved information flow to the community on disasters.

Communication within the system is problematic with people often going outside the disaster management system and instead using political contacts, or bureaucratic and chain of command lines to achieve outcomes. The disaster management system is predicated on

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\(^{47}\) The review team interviewed Ian Mannix PSM Manager Emergency Broadcasting and Community Development ABC Local Radio
dual roles across many managerial positions. In ‘peace time’ people have a role and invariably are part of a bureaucratic hierarchy. In times of a disaster event, those roles are replaced by a role within the disaster management chain of command. The review team observed operational personnel in the field being obliged to continue to report to their agency head. The Review accepts the requirements to ‘brief up’ the bureaucratic chain of command, but we note that it should not be to the exclusion of the disaster management chain of command.

In a system where the political, bureaucratic and command systems must all contribute to outcomes it is important that the disaster management system is an integrating system, to avoid issues falling ‘between the cracks’. There is a need to ensure that people who are outside these systems are not disadvantaged.

Finding:
The Auditor General's report – Auditor–General of Queensland Report no. 2 2004–05 – Audit of the Queensland Disaster Management System recommended a review of the current disaster district boundary framework. The boundaries have not been amended since before the enactment of the Disaster Management Act 2003. This failure to review the boundaries is despite significant changes to local government boundaries due to local council amalgamations, and the recent changes to police boundaries.

Recommendation:
That the Commissioners of Police and the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service review the current district disaster boundaries as a matter of urgency in-line with the findings and recommendations of the Auditor–General’s report into the Queensland disaster management system.

The development of monitoring mechanisms to ensure local, district, functional and threat specific disaster management plans are relevant, up-to-date, and reliable and linked to overall State-wide strategies for disaster management also is deficient. A situation where governments at all levels cannot be guaranteed the ‘state of readiness’ is not sustainable. To this end, this report recommends the introduction of an Inspector General Emergency Management.
Demand pressures

The Productivity Commission’s Report on Government Services 2013\textsuperscript{48} cites the factors that can affect disaster resilience as including:

- remoteness
- access to services
- population density and mobility
- socio-economic status
- age profile
- percentage of population for whom English is a second language.

Certainly other issues combine to influence the community’s ability to withstand the effect of disasters and therefore the demands for assistance. Issues such as land use approvals determine whether or not, and the extent to which, residents will be exposed to a range of risks and vulnerabilities. As population tends to migrate to areas traditionally serviced through volunteer rather than permanent full time services (for example sea changers moving to small coastal towns), volunteer capacity can be stretched unless additional people can be encouraged to join volunteer emergency services. Issues in relation to volunteers are further dealt with in Chapter 7.

Over the course of the Police and Community Safety Review, many emergency and disaster responders commented to the Review team that it would seem that communities that once would have helped themselves have become reliant on external support. Multiple examples of this were provided to the Review team, all serving as stark examples of partial or total reliance, including:

- able bodied residents sitting on verandas while SES volunteers clean their house
- waste of goods thrown out of houses because they were wet from flood water.

\textsuperscript{48} Productivity Commission, Report on Government Services 2013
Finding:
The demand for government (at all levels) and non-government services as well as and corporate Australia to respond in times of disaster and emergencies will only intensify and become more problematic unless the community is involved in building its own level of resilience.

This notion is well supported in the literature, including in the Council of Australian Government’s 2010 National Strategy for Disaster Resilience49 and the 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission50.

Efficacy of demand management strategies

Disaster management operations

Following the incidents of recent years, significant work has been undertaken to ensure the sustainability of Queensland’s disaster management arrangements. Through organised after action reviews, gaps have been identified in relation to the operation of the State Disaster Coordination Centre and various strategies put in place to address them.

Issues identified previously include a lack of trained staff, deficiencies in technology (especially a singular event management platform), a lack of standard operating procedures, and deficiencies in the exercising of plans. These issues were identified in various reviews, not the least of which was the Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry Interim Report51 which noted that a “general acceptance that an increased emphasis on training in disaster management roles and responsibilities would enhance Queensland’s overall disaster preparedness and response”.

Despite these issues having been identified on a number of occasions, the Review team has made similar observations and considers those lessons and recommendations remain

49 National Strategy for Disaster Resilience – Building the resilience of our nation to disasters Council of Australian Governments February 2010
51 Queensland Flood Commission of Inquiry 2011: Interim report
relevant. In fact, as recently as March 2013 Emergency Management Queensland’s post event analysis for Ex-Tropical Cyclone Oswald found the following in relation to disaster management training:

- “Currently there are no role descriptions or supporting training programs that are offered to Emergency Management Queensland staff who are deployed to provide assistance to local and district disaster management groups, and limited training to those supporting the State Disaster Coordination Centre”

- “Training and other capability development programs offered by Emergency Management Queensland under the Queensland disaster management arrangements framework in some locations are not to the expectation of local government, and they seek a more locally based, risk lead approach to capability development”

- “There is a lack of policy, procedure, training and support for the SES State Operations Centre...”

In his 2009 report O’Sullivan\(^52\) noted that: “Disaster Management in Queensland is reported to lack efficiency and effectiveness because...

- (there is a) lack of clear unity of State control and authority to direct responses (that) can cause confusion and duplication between State agencies.

- Local levels do report receiving conflicting information, advice or direction from State levels during disaster responses.

- Slow and confused or contradictory decisions about committing State resources and spending money was a frequently expressed experience.”

In line with the O’Sullivan findings, the Review team also heard from a number of stakeholders at the Local Disaster Management Group level about issues of the State coming in over the top of local government to provide resources \textit{without consultation}.  

\(^{52}\) Report on a Review Of Disaster Management Legislation And Policy In Queensland Jim O’Sullivan, AC, APM, and The Consultancy Bureau Pty Ltd August 2009, p.51
This often results in the provision of equipment and resources that were neither requested nor needed, leaving the local government to deal with the problem. Similarly, local stakeholders were critical of the tendency for the state to form up working groups for ideas that had not been sense-checked at the local level.

A number of stakeholders raised the point that if assets are requested at a local level they should be managed at the local level. For example, there was a strong feeling from local governments that if aircraft had been requested it would be more effective for these assets to be managed at the local level. The Review team consider that the use of such a model based on centralised control but which allows decentralised command to overcome local issues quickly and effectively is fundamental to the success of these operations. The Review team recognises the potential for assigned resources to be underutilised however consider the benefits outweigh the risks and that the advent of a single event management system will allow greater oversight and overcome any issue in this regard.

**Finding:**

We consider these issues to be symptomatic of a system that requires close control and strong leadership at a state level during times of disaster. In short, the system (during the 2013 floods) worked almost in spite of itself. It was characterised by ‘work-arounds’ and mates calling mates. Individuals had to expend higher levels of effort and energy to make the system function.

**The State Disaster Coordination Centre**

In excess of 30 trained and experienced personnel are required to be on duty to fill key positions during full activation of the State Disaster Coordination Centre. The Review team was advised that particular effort was paid during 2012 to ensure that an adequate number of trained staff was available to ensure sustained effective operation of the State Disaster Coordination Centre.

To this end, negotiations were undertaken between the Department of Community Safety, the Public Service Commission and the Department of Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services. As a result of these negotiations a new Public Service Commission Chief Executive Directive was published (09/12). This directive established a shared requirement
on all State Government Departments and Agencies to provide whole-of-Government personnel to staff and operate the State Disaster Coordination Centre during events.

The directive outlines the responsibilities of the Departments of Community Safety and Communities, Child Safety and Disability Services “as lead agencies, departments and individual employees to prepare for and contribute to the critical incident response and recovery (‘response and recovery’) effort”. However the development of this directive has been criticised by Queensland Police Service personnel due to a lack of consultation.

Throughout 2012, Emergency Management Queensland sought nominations for staff across Government to be trained and exercised in State Disaster Coordination Centre functions as well as continuing work on the development of key standard operating procedures. Given the high likelihood of police filling key positions at the district level, their supporting role to the State Disaster Management Group and involvement at local government level, it is essential that the Queensland Police Service maintain a highly visible and active presence within the operation of the State Disaster Coordination Centre.

In reviewing the work done to ensure staff capability and capacity it became evident that the State Disaster Coordination Centre ‘Response Team’ model, developed to ensure sustainable operations within the State Disaster Coordination Centre was well supported across Government. The Queensland Police Service did not participate in this pre disaster season training.

The result was that when Queensland Police officers attended the State Disaster Coordination Centre as part of the management for the 2013 events, it was in fact the first time many police had been exposed to the revised means of operating the centre. In hindsight this was a critical issue that contributed to a number of weaknesses in the response to these events. During the Queensland Police Service debrief of the State Disaster Coordination Centre operations senior police personnel present expressed concern about attending the centre without knowing the requirements of the job they were asked to fulfil.
Additionally, a post-event analysis report by Emergency Management Queensland found that there was limited training support provided to Emergency Management Queensland staff supporting the State Disaster Coordination Centre. The Review team concludes that neither Emergency Management Queensland nor Queensland Police Service staff had been adequately and currently trained to support the State Disaster Coordination Centre. This is a major concern given the Queensland Police Service’s centrality to the Queensland disaster management arrangements.

Finding:
The Review team members sought information regarding this situation from Emergency Management Queensland and the Queensland Police Service. The responses made it clear that there is a cultural divide that needs to be overcome. We consider that ensuring key stakeholders work closely together to produce joint outcomes is fundamental to the success of Queensland’s disaster management arrangements.

Without attributing blame or criticism to any organisation, work unit or individual, it is clear that there has been a key error in judgement regarding the importance of a collaborative approach that not only delivers, but is seen to deliver, a seamless and integrated Government approach.

The PACSR team has observed a number of examples of lack of cooperation between keys agencies. We consider it symptomatic of cultural issues which have developed through mistrust and misaligned priorities. At best, it may be the result of a lack of understanding of each other’s key drivers. This is one of the major issues to be addressed in the implementation of any new structure. To this end, we recommend that the Queensland Police Service disaster management unit be permanently collocated at the State Disaster Coordination Centre.

Finding:
The matter of police officers needing to be suitably trained and embedded within the State Disaster Coordination Centre cells was an issue raised at both the debrief of Queensland Police Service officers who attended the Centre and the State Disaster Management Group debrief.
Finding:
The presence of police within the State Disaster Coordination Centre and not forming part of the basic structure leads to duplication of effort, uncertainty of purpose and results in poor decision making.

Recommendation:
That the Queensland Police Service Disaster Management Unit is to be permanently located at the State Disaster Coordination Centre to work on a day to day basis with the proposed new Department of Fire and Emergency Services.

Recommendation:
That the presence of police in State Disaster Coordination Centre response teams is mandated and formalised through documented standard operating procedures.

For successful State Disaster Coordination Centre operations, a unified approach is essential, with all parties responsible for contributing to the outcome being equally engaged. Failure to be able to assure that all necessary and appropriate resources for this capability have been identified, trained and exercised is a significant vulnerability. It directly impacts the Queensland community.

Issues such as these should not surprise an observer given that similar findings have been made in most if not all reviews of disasters within Australia in the past decade, none the less it is disappointing that they continue to be issues. The Review of Recent Australian Disaster Inquiries conducted on behalf of Monash University Research Institute found that\textsuperscript{53}:

"State arrangements are sometimes less than adequate. The State-led reviews ..... highlight these problems repeatedly. ..... these issues are well recognised by both the State emergency management sector and the State governments."

Further that:

\textsuperscript{53} Dr. Natassia Goode, Dr. Caroline Spencer, Professor Frank Archer, Dr. Paul Salmon, Mr Dudley McArdle, and Professor Rod McClure: Monash University 2011. Review of Recent Australian Disaster Inquiries.
“current arrangements support an environment in which agencies compete for funding and power. When the responsibility for the disaster is clear (e.g. fire), then the response is highly organised. However, when the responsibility for the disaster (e.g. in the case of flood) is distributed between the agencies, the horizontal co-ordination between the agencies becomes highly fraught...”

The Review team also observed that the structure and physical build of the State Disaster Coordination Centre at Kedron does not lend itself to efficient operations and media management. Media are not allotted a space from which to operate, and as such are left to access their own space, sometimes in hallways outside of meeting rooms. The Review team visited a number of similar operations centres in other jurisdictions and noted that many of these centres provide a specific area for media to observe and appropriately record proceedings, without being privy to sensitive deliberations. Opportunities to provide appropriate media access will also help the community to understand the size and complexity of the problems being addressed. The Review team noted the media arrangements in place at the New South Wales Rural Fire Service coordination centre at Homebush and believes this is a good model for the future.

As mentioned elsewhere in this chapter, concerns were also expressed about the aviation cell being located at a distance from the State Disaster Coordination Centre resulting in delays in processing aerial support.

The Review team is not convinced that the separate models for each emergency service at the Kedron centre is facilitating optimal information exchange. Live or close to live images should be transmitted to the site by responding agencies, however only the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service has this capability at the moment.

The availability of timely and accurate information and expert advice from the Bureau of Meteorology was raised as a key issue during the response to the events surrounding ex-Tropical Cyclone Oswald. The review team is also aware of that this has been a key issue in other events including during the ‘super storm’ which hit Brisbane and surrounding areas on
17 November 2012. While visiting New South Wales Rural Fire Brigades to observe operations and systems during their bushfire events of early 2013, Review team was advised of arrangements between New South Wales Rural Fire Service and the Bureau of Meteorology whereby a forecaster is seconded from the Bureau of Meteorology and embedded within the Rural Fire Service operations centre on a year round basis.

Finding:
The Review team supports an embedded Bureau of Meteorology capability as good practice, although interviews with the Bureau of Meteorology indicate that money needs to be made available for this purpose.

Recommendation:
That Queensland enters into a similar arrangement with Bureau of Meteorology to have an experienced forecaster seconded to Kedron State Disaster Coordination Centre for at least the duration of fire and storm seasons.

Command and control
The issues of command and control noted by O'Sullivan (2009, p51) have largely been addressed through legislative change that enables the appointment of a State Disaster Coordinator, however this is only effective when one is appointed, as was the case in the 2010–11 disasters. The lack of an appointment of an operational state disaster coordinator for the January 2013 events arguably resulted in less than effective coordination.

The Review team considers that the current provisions of the Disaster Management Act 2003 provide an inference of police control but the role of the Commissioner of Police is not explicit. This creates uncertainty in terms of control when the disaster management system becomes operational. The Review team notes comments by a number of stakeholders that Emergency Management Queensland “push themselves forward” in disaster situations “to make themselves relevant”. Despite the shortcomings of the Queensland Police Service in the January 2013 events, we support the notion of police control in disaster situations, with Emergency Management Queensland disaster management staff providing expert advice, support and assistance.

The review team was often told that police are seen as “reverting to type” in disaster situations. That is, they rely on their positions of authority and traditional command and control approaches. The Review team has observed the central role of disaster
management is bringing together the resources available to the State, including resources from a range of government and non-government organisations. Excessive reliance on command and control can marginalise and de-motivate contributing agencies.

**Finding:**
Police need to step up to the challenge by taking a more collegiate, whole-of-Government outlook, rather than imposing themselves onto the system.

**Recommendation:**
That the *Disaster Management Act 2003* be amended to:

- Specify the Commissioner of Police as Deputy Chair of the State Disaster Management Group,
- Identify that a Deputy Commissioner of Police would be the default choice for appointment as State Disaster Coordinator.

Furthermore, to cement the Queensland Police Service as the lead agency in the response phase it is recommended that the Queensland Police Service are given carriage of development of the state disaster management plan, with the assistance of resources from within the current Emergency Management Queensland.

**Recommendation:**
That the Queensland Police Service Disaster Management Unit be given responsibility for production of the State disaster management plan for the State Disaster Management Group’s approval.

**Recommendation**
That the Queensland Police Service Disaster Management Unit work with emergency management staff in the new portfolio to produce the State disaster management plan.

The State Disaster Coordination Centre is crucial in the effective delivery of state level disaster management. To ensure the delivery of these arrangements, it is essential that there are clear lines of accountability and well-rehearsed and understood protocols.
Finding:
While support to the district and Local Disaster Management Groups is the result of well-coordinated action, it is imperative that the activities and operations of the State Disaster Coordination Centre itself are closely controlled. This requires the clear identification of an individual who has accountability for these operations at all times.

Recommendation:
That the Deputy Commissioner, Operations (of the proposed new Department of Fire and Emergency Services) should be responsible for ensuring the readiness of the disaster operations system, including the State Disaster Coordination Centre, enabling seamless transition to police control when required.

Disaster management standards
The review of recent Australian disaster inquiries by Monash University\(^4\) found that nationally, a focus on pro-active risk-based approach to the Planning, Preparation, Response and Recovery (PPRR) spectrum is needed. Such an approach should strengthen and support efficiencies in resource allocation and effectiveness in capability development.

We note that considerable work is underway by the Emergency Management Queensland Disaster Management Standards Unit to review the efficacy of local and district disaster management planning. Preliminary results indicate a high level of non-compliance with the Disaster Management Act 2003. A report by Emergency Management Queensland has indicated that only 23 per cent of local plan elements met legislative requirements. The top five non-compliant elements, as cited by Emergency Management Queensland were that:

1. the plan provides for the State Disaster Management Group’s strategic policy framework
2. the plan outlines the roles and responsibilities if entities involved in disaster operations and management

\(^4\) Dr. Natassia Goode, Dr. Caroline Spencer, Professor Frank Archer, Dr. Paul Salmon, Mr Dudley McArdle, and Professor Rod McClure: Monash University 2011. Review of Recent Australian Disaster Inquiries.
3. the plan includes the coordination of disaster operations and activities relating to disaster management entities

4. the plan is consistent with disaster management guidelines

5. an annual review of plan effectiveness had been undertaken.

The Review team considers this an unacceptable situation given the number of recent disasters and reviews in Queensland in recent years. However, we heard from local authorities that they consider the review of local disaster management plans to be too focussed on compliance rather than on the outcomes a plan will deliver. This is a critical issue to be resolved; ensuring that all plans are risk based and tested for their ability to produce results.

The Review team notes that Emergency Management Queensland has recognised that a more contemporary approach to disaster planning at all levels is required. Best practice models that develop the capability and capacity of local governments as well as district and State Disaster Management Groups need to be implemented. As stated earlier, ensuring alignment with the needs of local communities is vital in this process rather than a model imposed upon communities that, in some cases, are well practiced in disaster management.

The quandary for the person responsible for administering the *Disaster Management Act 2003* is how to ensure the functions of the *Disaster Management Act 2003* are fulfilled without clear authority to hold responsible entities and individuals to account. Key stakeholders commented that although Emergency Management Queensland have been relatively good at building relationships with local governments, this relationship makes it difficult for them to also play the role of enforcer.

**Finding:**

A continuous and objective review and monitoring function will assist the Minister, the SDMG and other major parties who are a part of Queensland’s disaster management arrangements to be assured of the efficacy and readiness of the system.
We therefore recommend a new role in the disaster management arrangements (proposed to be called the Inspector General Emergency Management) to provide a higher level of assurance to Government about disaster management, particularly focusing on disaster planning. We note that this role could be seen as having less importance at times when there have been fewer disasters. **It is therefore important that this position be separately resourced.** If this was not to happen it would diminish the effectiveness of the role and not differ from the current situation.

An Inspector General Emergency Management would be responsible for providing an assurance of public safety to government, through the setting of standards, robust auditing and monitoring of performance regarding the preparedness and management of disasters and emergencies. Essentially this would comprise those functions currently listed under part 16A of the *Disaster Management Act 2003*, with the exception of 16A(c) which would be the responsibility of the department’s emergency management function, proposed to be placed within a restructured Department of Fire and Emergency Service.

The Inspector General Emergency Management could participate in, and examine post event analysis. Recognising that every entity involved in disaster response has a responsibility to review their own performance and identify ways to improve, the Inspector General Emergency Management will be responsible for ensuring that these reviews and are robust and honest. The position will ensure agency reviews are aligned to Government priorities and their recommendations are achievable. The Inspector General Emergency Management would also have a role in auditing disaster management preparedness, including planning and capability of local governments and other state government entities, to provide advice to the State Disaster Management Group.

It is proposed that the Inspector General Emergency Management be set up as a public service office reporting directly to the Minister for Police and Community Safety. The Inspector General’s office would incorporate the current Emergency Management Queensland functions of disaster management standards. Please refer to the Executive Summary to view the proposed new structure for the Police and Community Safety portfolio.
Recommendation:
That the Minister establish a public sector office to be headed by an Inspector General of Emergency Management. The Inspector General of Emergency Management will be responsible for most of the functions listed under part 16A of the current *Disaster Management Act 2003*.

Recommendation:
That the position of Inspector General Emergency Management (in addition to some of the responsibilities of the chief executive officer under the current *Disaster Management Act 2003*) will:

- Ensure interoperability of systems across portfolio agencies and those who support Queensland Disaster Management Arrangements (QDMA).
- Ensure compliance by Queensland Government agencies with their emergency or disaster management responsibilities.
- Establish and implement a performance standards and assurance framework to direct, guide and focus work of all agencies across all tiers of Government to desired outcomes of QDMA.
- Conduct regular benchmarking and quality assurance exercises with public safety agencies to ensure standards remain contemporary.
- Provide independent advice and leadership to government on any matter in relation to emergency management or interoperability between agencies within the public safety portfolio.
- Work with emergency services, government departments and the community to identify and continuously improve community resilience, volunteer capacity and disaster and emergency management arrangements.
- Identify areas for cooperative partnerships, alliances and research opportunities to improve community outcomes, ensuring appropriate Queensland input into the Bushfire and Natural Hazard Cooperative Research Centre.

Given that disaster management is essentially about coordinating the resources of government to prepare for, respond to and recover from disasters, interoperability is a cornerstone to successful disaster management. The Victorian Emergency Management Reform White Paper provides an example of the type of tool that could be applied to assess interoperability.
Recommendation:
That the Inspector General Emergency Management provide continuing advice to Government on the level of interoperability in disaster management arrangements, as well as the level of interoperability being achieved within the new portfolio.

Figure 3- The Interoperability Continuum

State Emergency Service – frontline capability
The State Emergency Service is established under the Disaster Management Act 2003. The Department of Community Safety relationship with the SES under the Disaster Management Act 2003 is largely a supporting and enabling role. Under the Disaster Management Act 2003, the chief executive officer (Director-General) of the Department of Community Safety has a range of administrative responsibilities (which have been delegated to the Assistant Director-General Emergency Management Queensland) including:

• establishing management and support services for the SES
• developing policies to help the SES perform its functions effectively and efficiently
• ensuring that the SES safely and efficiently performs its functions.

Under the *Disaster Management Act 2003* local governments are responsible for ensuring a disaster response capability, which is defined as:

*The ability to provide equipment and a suitable number of persons, using the resources available to the local government, to effectively deal with, or help another entity to deal with, an emergency situation or a disaster in the local government's area.*

The Assistant Director-General Emergency Management Queensland also has a delegated role in appointing SES members, establishing SES units and deciding their functions. Functions under the Act\(^{56}\) enable the SES to “raise funds to support the SES in performance of its functions”, however the overall issue of funding of the service (particularly cost sharing arrangements between State Government and Local Governments) is one that will require considerable work into the future to ensure a sustainable capability. Currently there are significant differences across the state in terms of the ability of local government to support local SES units, either financially or in kind.

The issue of ‘ownership’ of the SES is one that will require ongoing work between State and Local Government. Paradoxically the entity is called the ‘State’ Emergency Service but it is largely seen by local governments to be a local emergency service.

Oversight and support in terms of training and equipment is provided by the state through Emergency Management Queensland. However, the issue of command has the potential to be a key source of friction. The Review team recognises that the strength of the SES and its volunteers is *their dedication to delivering services in support of their local community.*

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\(^{56}\) Part 6, Division 1, 82 (e)
In Brisbane at the State level, the SES tends to be considered a state capability to be deployed as the state sees fit. In reality, however, many SES units are mostly funded and supported by both local governments and local communities.

The Review was advised that a potential source of friction between the SES and the Queensland Police Service, arising from the Queensland Police Service’s reliance on SES volunteers’ dedication, is that volunteers are sometimes seen to be given the more difficult and less desirable jobs. Examples were cited of SES volunteers crawling through mud to search for crime scene evidence while police observed from the comfort of an air conditioned car.

**Recommendation:**
That the Queensland Police Service and SES develop clear operational protocols to ensure that SES assistance is not exploited.

**Recommendation:**
That the protocols developed by the Queensland Police Service and SES for operations define the respective roles and responsibilities as well as recognise the varying capabilities of SES units across the State.

The Review team considers that for the majority of SES activations that involve routine and indeed high volume incidents within a local community, local management of the SES is ideal. However, for major events or disasters the local capacity to effectively manage the SES may be overwhelmed. To ensure that the SES is able to support such requests that arise in a disaster and provide management assistance to Local Disaster Management Groups, greater coordination of effort and planning is required at a State level. It is important that this assistance is not seen as being imposed by the state on local authorities but is achieved in an enabling fashion.

The Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry found that in a large scale event where requests for assistance exceed the capacity of a local unit to respond, there was uncertainty about when the command and control arrangements for SES operations may be moved to a
higher level\textsuperscript{57}. The Inquiry therefore recommended that the Disaster Management Act 2003 should be amended to give the chief executive the authority to appoint an SES Coordinator.

As a result, the Department of Community Safety has progressed amendments to the Disaster Management Act 2003 to establish the role of SES Coordinators. To ensure the primacy of local area response, the amendments include supporting provisions such as the extraordinary circumstances in which the appointment can be made and the authorising framework for activation of the role, including consultation with the local government. The amendments also require that approval of the Chair of the State Disaster Management Group is obtained before an SES Coordinator can be appointed. The amendments support a cooperative approach between state and local level responses, recognising that local disaster management is the cornerstone of disaster response in Queensland.

The Review team considers that these recent amendments to the \textit{Disaster Management Act 2003} should facilitate the coordination of support and provide for a balanced approach to control of SES assets deployed to assist. We note that these arrangements were utilised for the first time during the 2013 flood events. The review has not received any adverse comment around these arrangements and how they were exercised during these events. After action reviews have confirmed that the appointment and operation of the SES Coordinator was a positive action.

The Review team however did hear from affected local authorities who were critical of the practice of ‘fly in’ Emergency Management Queensland managers. This occurred outside of any request for assistance, adding to the confusion of accountability, and was described as not adding value to the overall management of the event.

The Review team has noted progress has been made regarding the command and control of the SES through the amendment to the Disaster Management Act 2003 and supporting training. However, the current arrangements still defer decisions of command and control until a disaster event occurs. Local disaster management plans should contain a clear assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of the local SES and plan accordingly. The

\textsuperscript{57} Queensland Floods Commission of Inquiry – Final report p 407
decision to request additional SES support should be guided by key events that have been
defined (i.e. trigger points) that enable early action.

**Finding:**
The Review team considers that good disaster management planning and
exercising should mean that local governments are aware of the point at which
assistance will be required, thus enabling disaster managers to make timely
and considered requests for assistance.

**Recommendation:**
That the current SES memoranda of agreement between the Department of
Community Safety and local governments be revised to include a clear
statement as to the command and control arrangements between State and
respective local governments. These arrangements should also be reflected in
the local disaster management plans.

**Recommendation:**
That the Inspector General Emergency Management assess the effectiveness
of plans and policy in relation to SES deployment and command and control.

The Review team considers that there are many opportunities to be leveraged with other like
volunteer organisations, particularly the Rural Fire Service. Such opportunities include
training, accommodation, fleet, equipment and operational response. The joining up of some
of these functions needs to be more closely considered to provide not only economies of
scale, but also to maximize the advantages to individual members who volunteer their time
freely.

The Review team has heard from various stakeholders (including local authorities) about the
frustrations experienced at the local level caused by the current approach to issues such as
the recruitment, selection and training of volunteers. The Review team has noted and agreed
with a number of the recommendations of the Malone Review in terms of current training and
standards and practices. The Review team agreed with the majority of recommendations in
the Malone Review, Annexe 3 in Chapter 6 outlines which recommendations were
supported, supported in principle or not supported.
Although the Review team has identified the need to ensure the SES is afforded greater coordination of effort and support at a state level, it is viewed as essential that this support does not detract from local autonomy. Any arrangements must assist and be seen to assist local arrangements and rather than imposing unnecessary, State-level bureaucracy.

**Recommendation:**

The establishment, management, support and education of the State Emergency Service (SES) become the responsibility of a Deputy Commissioner, Fire and Emergency Services and this person should also be responsible for Rural Fire Service Queensland.

A key requirement of this position will be to ensure optimal use of resources and effort across both volunteer streams, maximising opportunities for efficiency and increasing efficacy of service. The level of this position should reflect the importance of volunteers to the community and provide a significant voice for volunteers. The position would be responsible for improving support for volunteers while ensuring locally based priorities of volunteers and their communities are met.

The Review team considers that the key strength of the current system is that of the commitment and dedication of volunteers, local government, police and emergency service workers who deliver services locally for their community.

**Finding:**

The Review team strongly believes that the disaster management system must support the concept of local solutions to local issues and that District and State arrangements must be seen as supportive rather than overriding these efforts.
Outcomes

The Review team observed the various debriefs and analysis of events arising from ex-Tropical Cyclone Oswald and the associated flooding that commenced on Monday 21 January 2013 and continued through until 9 February 2013. The review team found that across a range of agencies, there was a lack of willingness from participants to be forthright and engage in constructive criticism.

The Review team acknowledges the point made in the Bundaberg debrief that there were a series of events being managed, including storm surge on Friday 25 January, tornados on Saturday and flooding on the Sunday – this was a difficult operation managed on many fronts. However, the purpose of these review activities is to identify opportunities for improvement. By necessity this must include the exposure of shortcomings.

The Review team recognises that this may be uncomfortable for participants and can result in matters being documented that some would prefer were not. We consider that only through open, honest and frank discussion of future improvements can these matters be truly considered as lessons learned. Lessons learned are essential to continuous improvement and ultimately the maintenance of a relevant and robust set of disaster management arrangements.

Air operations were the subject of considerable criticism in the debrief sessions about the Bundaberg disaster events. The Review team considers these debrief offered the best and worst examples of post event debriefs. The Review team attended the Bundaberg District Disaster Management Group debrief as observers and heard of frustration regarding interactions with the aviation coordination centre in Brisbane. The debrief was well conducted and the intent was constructive. We are aware that District Disaster Management Group members in Bundaberg consider the fact that there was not a serious incident involving helicopters during the operation to be one of luck and not good management. We unreservedly support the views expressed at the Bundaberg District Disaster Management Group brief in relation to aviation operations.
The written review of air operations provided by Emergency Management Queensland highlights a series of systemic issues that need to be addressed including policy and procedural matters. Queensland Health was responsible for air operations during the crisis. The Queensland Health report on Bundaberg air operations would seem to indicate that it was a relatively successful aviation operation. They found that there were “no adverse outcomes” which is taken as an indicator of success.

There were distinct differences in perspective on some aspects of the operation. For example, although the Queensland Health debrief indicated that the location of the Aviation Cell was positive, a number of other key agencies, including police officers and key defence personnel indicated that it was in fact, problematic. Delays were identified in staff having to walk pieces of paper from one building in Kedron to another to engage air operations personnel. It is not evident that there has been a resolution of these differences to date.

The Review team was approached by an owner of a helicopter business whose helicopters were used during the Bundaberg floods. The owner provided graphic insight into the operation that posed significant risk to pilots, evacuees and the public due to the:

- lack of coordinated ground support
- lack of coordinated flight circuit planning
- lack of clear tasking protocols
- lack of clear communication plan
- a general lack of coordination and an absence of control.

The Review also notes that during the Bundaberg floods the District Disaster Management Group was co-located with the Local Disaster Management Group. The Queensland Police Service and local government officials provided a number of reasons for this approach, including more timely information sharing. The Review notes however, that this resulted in an over-emphasis on Bundaberg issues. The decision to collocate appeared to create a loss of situational awareness about the wider district (North Burnett). While the review team acknowledges the high level of cooperation between the Queensland Police Service and local government that led to this decision, it could quite easily have resulted in tragedy.
In analysing the North Burnett situation, we began to ask the question “who is accountable?” as we examined other Local Disaster Management Group and District Disaster Management Group arrangements around the State. Some local government officials were adamant that accountability rested with them, but some Local Disaster Management Groups were not so clear. Other Local Disaster Management Groups seemed to interchange the chief executive officer’s role (Director-General of Department of Community Safety) with the Mayor’s role, making accountability even less clear. The Inspector General Emergency Management will play an important role in clarifying these issues as a part of examining local plans and arrangements.

Even in instances where there is only one District Disaster Management Group in a local government area, the Review would not support the collocation of Local Disaster Management Groups with District Disaster Management Groups. The accountability of a local government for an area is a central factor in the success of the disaster management system, and must not be weakened by abrogating all decisions to the District Disaster Management Group.

Recommendation:
That the Inspector General Emergency Management ensures that improvement strategies identified are acted upon and improvement strategies embedded within agencies as standard practice.

Recommendation:
That the role of the Inspector General Emergency Management not extend to conducting reviews on behalf of agencies and that the role consider the effectiveness of all agencies and how their work contributes to a whole of Government response.

A systems view

Technology
The Review team considers that one of the key problems in recent Queensland events has been the lack of a timely and accurate means of accessing current information. The issue of suitable information technology to support the disaster management system is not a new one but one that has led to various government departments and other agencies developing
their own system. This has created a network where systems do not share data, are not accessible to others, and add little or no value to the system as a whole.

The duplication of effort created could be reduced if a single system existed which provided for the automated exchange of vital event information and coordination.

**Finding:**

The review team found that this lack of common situational awareness poses the single greatest risk to the efficacy of the disaster management system.

A number of systems are being used in the disaster management space. These include Web EOC by the Queensland Police Service, Guardian by a large number of local Councils, and NOGGIN by Emergency Management Australia. We understand that to mandate one system for use is not realistic and does not answer the individual needs of agencies. However, it is vital that information and data held by stakeholders is made available for use by all other relevant stakeholders.

We consider that pertinent data should be ‘published’ by agencies allowing it to be ‘consumed’ within others systems. We strongly believe however that there must be one system utilised within the State Disaster Coordination Centre to display information and to brief all parties in a common manner. We raised this with the information and communication technology sections of the Department of Community Services and the Queensland Police Service; and recommended in our Interim Report that these matters be urgently addressed. We acknowledge some progress has been made but cannot understand why the Queensland Police Service did not work together with the Department of Community Safety on this project as recommended.

The Review team was presented with information regarding the progress of the All Hazards Information Management Project. One of the main aims of All Hazards Information Management Project is to provide a level of transparency across agencies. We were given an assurance of the good progress made and the near end state of the project. The Review team requested a demonstration of completed modules, which in the first instance proved to be a presentation about the proposed rather than actual capabilities of the system.
When the Review team noted this disappointing outcome, we were told that we had actually not been allowed to see the full demonstration due to licensing issues which meant it could not be shown to non-departmental staff (i.e. the senior Queensland Police officer on the Review team). This position was quickly reversed when the issue was escalated to the Director-General of the Department of Community Safety. Our review team did finally view a second demonstration, which provided a successful proof of concept. That said the system requires further development and testing prior to the 2013–14 wet season. The project needs to continue as a priority to ensure that it will be fully functional in time for the 2013–14 wet season.

Finding:
The Review team, after interviewing the key disaster management stakeholders across the Department of Community Safety, has concluded that the information and communication technology approach in the Department of Community Safety, while being apparently predicated on a risk rather than benefits basis, has missed addressing one of the major organisational and cross-Government risks under its area of responsibility by failing to develop this system in a timely manner.

Finding:
The Review considers this to be evidence of the lost opportunities across both the Department of Community Safety and the Queensland Police Service in terms of information technology systems.

Finding:
The inability to provide disaster managers and Government with confidence in a ‘single-point-of-truth’ remains a major vulnerability to the successful management of any disaster event in Queensland.

Recommendation:
That the information and communication technology solution being developed to provide situational awareness, decision support, event management and that logs critical decisions receives urgent attention to ensure timely completion.
Recommendation:
That all agencies participating in these activities should, as far as legally possible, share data sets whether or not the relevance is immediately obvious.

Future disaster management arrangements

Organisational structure:
One of the key themes the Review team noted in its observations of the Police and Community Safety portfolio in relation to disaster management is the latent capacity and expertise that exists within the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service. We also recognise the expertise, and lack of latent capacity, of the Queensland Police Service. As stated earlier, the Review team considers it necessary to reinforce the role of the Queensland Police Service in control of disasters but noted a lack of commitment at some levels of the Queensland Police Service and the perception by other stakeholders that police “force” themselves into the model.

The Review team notes that for the State Disaster Coordination Centre to operate successfully, a unified approach is essential, with all parties responsible for contributing to the outcome being equally engaged. Failure to be able to assure that all necessary and appropriate resources for this capability have been identified, trained and exercised is a significant vulnerability; and it has the capacity to directly impact the Queensland community.

The aim of the proposed reforms is to create a system that is not only in a state of continued readiness but one which is able to draw upon the latent capacity and expertise of the current Queensland Fire and Rescue Service and Emergency Management Queensland. It should enable a force multiplier for the Queensland Police Service efforts, enhancing their capability and greatly increasing the likelihood of successful operations.

The Review team believes that Queensland Fire and Rescue Service have the structure, discipline and capacity to perform this role. Emergency Management Queensland can provide a level of support which, when combined, will provide Police with a significantly enhanced control presence and capability.
The Review team carefully considered the option of transferring responsibilities of Emergency Management directly to the Queensland Police Service. However, we consider the greater latent capacity, combined with the structure and discipline of the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service, will facilitate close day to day management and deliver a ‘ready to use’ service. In other sections of this report we have been highly critical of Queensland Police Service systems and believe that the urgency of reform demands the solution we are proposing. Put simply, neither the corporate governance, nor the cultural issues in the Queensland Police Service identified throughout this review, lend themselves to any better alternative other than to use the latent capacity of Queensland Fire and Rescue Service in this way.

Of critical importance is the need for even greater interoperability between the current Queensland Fire and Rescue Service and Emergency Management Queensland and the Queensland Police Service along with other agencies of Government. This will require interoperable systems, training and exercises particularly on the part of the Queensland Police Service at the State, district and local levels.

Finding:
The creation of the Inspector General Emergency Management is critical to identifying and overcoming deficiencies in planning and exercising.

Recommendation:
That the Inspector General Emergency Management be empowered to provide an assurance to Government that the disaster management system is both appropriate and capable of dealing with complex events.

Current Emergency Management organisational structure reflects the functions of the Disaster Management Act 2003 through:

- Operations branch: Including SES management and support, disaster management services, regional operations, education and training services and disaster information capability
- Disaster management standards branch: standards improvement, disaster management system assessment, relief and recovery and community education.
• Governance and performance branch: development of divisional corporate governance frameworks and standards.

It is proposed that the resources of the Disaster management standards branch be transferred into the office of the Inspector General Emergency Management. The other functions would be transferred to a broadened Fire and Emergency Services agency. The volunteer aspect of the current arrangements should be placed under the remit of a new Deputy Commissioner with responsibility for rural fire and now also SES volunteer programs.

Recommendation
That Emergency Management Queensland be integrated with the current Queensland Fire and Rescue to become the Department of Fire and Emergency Services.

Recommendation
That the following units of Emergency Management Queensland transition to the control of the Deputy Commissioner of Regional Operations (Department of Fire and Emergency Services):

• disaster management services and State Disaster Coordination Centre operations.
• disaster information capability.
• part of regional operations.
• part of Governance and Performance Branch.

Recommendation
That the following units of Emergency Management Queensland transition to the control of the position of Deputy Commissioner Rural Fire Service Queensland and State Emergency Services:

• SES Management and Support Services
• part of Regional operations
• part of Governance and Performance Branch.

Recommendation
That the Disaster Management Standards Branch element of Standards Improvement, transition to the Inspector General Emergency Management.
Recommendation

That the remainder of the current Emergency Management structure transition to the Commissioner, Fire and Emergency Services for further consideration regarding the most appropriate reporting alignment giving due consideration to existing capacity. This should be done in consultation with the Commissioner, Queensland Police Service to ensure proper collaboration with Queensland Police Service Disaster Management Unit staff.

Recommendation

That the ‘Functions of Chief Executive’ under the *Disaster Management Act 2003* are amended to remove those functions that will become the role of the proposed Inspector General of Emergency Management.

Recommendation

That the Department of Fire and Emergency Services be created through the renaming and amendment to the existing *Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990* including:


- Transfer those sections of the *Disaster Management Act 2003* pertinent to State Emergency Service and Emergency Service Units into the Fire and Emergency Services Act’ 2013.

- Removal of the specific requirement for the QFRS Commissioner to be an experienced ‘fire officer’.
6. Queensland Fire and Rescue Service

Introduction

The Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990 establishes the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service and provides for the prevention of and response to fires and hazardous materials, emergencies endangering persons, property or the environment, and for related purposes.

8B. The functions of the service are—

(a) to protect persons, property and the environment from fire and hazardous materials emergencies; and

(b) to protect persons trapped in a vehicle or building or otherwise endangered, to the extent that the service’s personnel and equipment can reasonably be deployed or used for the purpose; and

(c) to provide an advisory service, and undertake other measures, to promote—

(i) fire prevention and fire control; and

(ii) safety and other procedures if a fire or hazardous materials emergency happens; and

(d) to cooperate with any entity that provides an emergency service; and

(e) to perform other functions given to the service under this Act or another Act; and

(f) to perform functions incidental to its other functions; and

(g) to identify and market products and services incidental to its functions.

The Act has two subordinate pieces of legislation:

- The Building Fire Safety Regulation 2008, which establishes mandatory building fire safety compliance with the Fire and Rescue Services Act 1990. The main objects of this regulation are:
(a) to ensure persons can evacuate buildings safely and quickly if a fire or hazardous materials emergency happens; and 

(b) to ensure prescribed fire safety installations for buildings are maintained.

- The *Fire and Rescue Services Regulation 2011* which establishes a set of responsibilities for the control and prevention of fires, funding for the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service and prescribes urban fire levies.

There are also a number of other pieces of legislation that impact on the functions and activities of the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service:

- *Building Act 1975* which establishes requirements for the inspection and testing of special fire service installations and sets out fire safety standards for budget accommodation.

- The *Disaster Management Act 2003* which provides for the appointment and powers of fire officers in a disaster situation, and also provides for the establishment of Emergency Services Units which may have fire fighting or fire prevention functions and responsibilities.

- The *Public Safety Preservation Act 1986* – which provides for fire officers to be authorised to exercise powers in the case of chemical, biological, radiological emergency (ambulance officers are also able to be authorised)

- *Building Code of Australia* which contains technical provisions for the design, fire resistance and construction of buildings and other structures covering matters such as structure, fire resistance access and egress, services and equipment.

The rescue element of the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service was legislated in 1990, with motor vehicle rescue being specified in 1998. The building and infrastructure safety services have increased significantly with the introduction of amended legislation in 2002. This legislation was a direct response to the Childers backpackers' hostel fire tragedy. In conjunction with the then Department of Local Government and Planning, the *Fire and Rescue Services Act 1990* put in place more rigorous requirements for compliance with fire safety provisions.
The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service operates from 242 urban fire stations, over 1500 Rural Brigades and a number of offices that deal with community safety matters such as the inspection of existing and new buildings. It has a workforce of more than 39,000 full–time, part–time and volunteer personnel. The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service delivers a broad range of key frontline services to the community, local government and industry.

These include response to structural fire, bushfire and grassfire incidents, road traffic crashes, chemical and hazardous material management, swift water rescue, urban search and rescue, vertical rescue, fire investigation, rapid damage assessments, fire alarm monitoring, building fire safety advice, commercial training and community education.

Funding arrangements
To fully understand the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service’s current position the Review team considers it necessary to revisit the history of the service, and particularly the funding model that has existed for almost 30 years. The major focus of the disparate fire boards of 30 years ago was to ensure their organisations could respond to and control fires. There was little focus on proactive measures that would serve to reduce the occurrence of fire and little consideration of delivering services other than fire fighting. Today, the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service is responsible for significant non–firefighting related services, particularly in the areas of rescue and community safety.

In 1984, and with further amendments in 1985, the government of the day introduced the Fire Service Levy which shifted the accountability for funding of the service (delivered then through a multiplicity of local fire boards) from the insurance industry (and therefore dependant on policy holders) to a property based levy. This property based system continues today. An outcome of this funding arrangement is that while fire services are limited in terms of funding to those amounts raised by levy, plus Government contributions and income from fee for service activities, the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service can reasonably accurately predict future budgets. This assurance not only enables but encourages the matching of expenditure to revenue in budget planning.
However, this budget planning has largely occurred in the absence of any clear organisational strategic planning and resource alignment. Sir Ken Knight\textsuperscript{58} in his review conducted in 2013 of fire services in England similarly found that “fire and rescue authorities spend to their budgets, not their risk.” For this reason the Review team considers the introduction of program aligned, zero–based budgeting is an essential exercise to ensure appropriate alignment and justification of expenditure across the department.

The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service has been funded in large part through a property based fire levy, with the owners of prescribed properties required to contribute to the cost of administering and giving effect to the \textit{Fire and Rescue Services Act 1990}. Section 144 of the \textit{Fire and Rescue Services Act 1990} allows the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service to charge for any service provided under the \textit{Fire and Rescue Services Act 1990}, except for:

- responding to fires on properties subject to the urban fire levy, or
- to respond to grassfires on any property.

Within the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service the reasoning has been that because properties can’t be charged for these services, these must therefore be the services paid for by the levy.

Since the levy was introduced increases have largely been in line with the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Although services such as community education and enhanced rescue capability, provided since 1995, are not specifically services paid for under the fire levy (according to the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service reasoning, cited above), they have nonetheless been funded from within the existing allocation. The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service has effectively used its latent fire capacity to provide these services.

Ahead of the 2013–14 Budget, the Queensland Government amended and broadened the fire levy to establish the Emergency Management Fire and Rescue fund. This occurred in the latter stages of this Review, and has been the most significant change in the levy’s design in recent times. The \textit{Revenue Amendment and Trade and Investment Queensland Act 2013} amends the \textit{Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990} so that:

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\textsuperscript{58}Knight, K 2013, \textit{Facing the future: Findings from the review of efficiencies and operations in fire and rescue authorities in England}, p8.
“...the fund be applied not just to the purposes of the Fire and Rescue Act, but to the management, by the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service or another entity administered or funded wholly or partly by the State, of the adverse effects or potential adverse effects of an incident or event.”

Effectively, the purposes for which an amount is payable from the fund have been expanded beyond fire and rescue services. This will support an expansion of their role in line with the findings of this Review by giving legitimacy to these additional roles as a modern public safety service.

The Review team is concerned that there must be a fundamental shift in performance management metrics. The practice of simply spending to budget is not sufficient in terms of financial performance; there must be an inexorable link between risk, strategy, funding and performance.

Rescue and Community Safety Services

In October 1995 the then Queensland Emergency Services commissioned the Australian Bureau of Statistics to conduct the first formal survey of community awareness of fire services. The survey found 40 per cent of Queensland homes had smoke alarms installed. Smoke alarms have been compulsory since 2007 and as a result over 86 per cent of Queensland homes have a smoke alarm installed. This strategy has provided a level of resilience that has led to fewer structural fire responses (<5 per cent of total responses are a result of structural fires).

In 1996 the Queensland Fire Service Review conducted by Lyn Staib, on the role of the Queensland Fire Service, noted there had been a “shift in emphasis from suppression to prevention and public safety largely in response to community expectations” (Staib 1996, p7). The Staib’s review led to the formation of the statutory authority of the Queensland Fire and Rescue Authority. The Queensland Fire and Rescue Authority ceased to exist in 2001 with the formation of the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service—a division of the Department of Emergency Services with the Director–General legislatively becoming the Chief Executive Officer of the service. A key reform priority, following the formation of the Queensland Fire and Rescue Authority (later Queensland Fire and Rescue Service) as a result of Staib’s review, was for the service to have a much greater involvement in community safety activities and to drive a change in culture which embraced a more proactive approach.
Data from the Productivity Commission’s *Report on Government Services 2013* indicates that Queensland is significantly better placed than other states in terms of accidental residential fires per 100,000 households, presenting a downward trend over recent years.

**Chart 1 – Accidental Residential Fires per 100,000 Households**

International comparison of fire deaths per 1,000,000 shows both Queensland and Australia favourably compare with the UK\(^{60}\) and USA\(^{61}\).

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\(^{59}\) 2013 Report on Government Services – Table 9A.14

\(^{60}\) UK Department for Communities and Local Government: Fire Statistics, Great Britain, 2010-11 November 2011

At about the same time as the 1995 Australian Bureau of Statistics survey, the National Emergency Management Committee endorsed a proposal that “Australia should develop a multi-agency Urban Search and Rescue (USAR) capability such as that which exists in the United States and United Kingdom.” Since that time, ongoing development between state and federal governments has resulted in two Australian urban search and rescue teams gaining United Nations Accreditation for international deployment: Queensland in 2008 and New South Wales in 2012.

The ‘local risk, local response’ model currently being progressed by the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service recognises that Queensland communities face a variety of risks, whether natural or man-made, that can best be addressed through a collaborative customised approach. The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service actively promote safety in the built and natural environments through the provision of expert advice as well as encouraging risk owners to take on greater responsibility. Particular focus is placed on encouraging improved onsite and offsite planning for public safety–related infrastructure such as major hazard facilities and dangerous good sites.

The breadth of skills and expertise developed has been demonstrated through response to a diverse range of emergency and disaster events both in Queensland and internationally, including:

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- Tropical Cyclone Oswald in 2013
- the Queensland floods and severe Tropical Cyclone Yasi in 2010–11
- severe Tropical Cyclone Larry in 2006
- the Mackay floods in 2009
- the North West Brisbane storms in 2008
- the Japan earthquake and Tsunami in 2011
- the Christchurch earthquake in 2011
- the Padang earthquake in 2009
- the Samoa Tsunami in 2009.

Unfortunately in some of these instances the self–view of the effectiveness of the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service in local events varies significantly to the views held by some key stakeholders, as evidenced by debriefs conducted by Emergency Management Queensland following the 2012 flooding events in South West Queensland where the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service received criticism for early and uncoordinated deployment to the town of Mitchell in particular. Despite this divergence of views, it is apparent that the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service, through their staff and volunteers have the capacity and capability to add significant value in protecting the community. An example of this is the growing role that the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service is playing in gathering rapid damage assessment intelligence in communities affected by severe weather events. This role, conducted in conjunction with the Queensland Reconstruction Authority provides vital information to support disaster management response and recovery activities. The Review team witnessed this capability in action during the 2013 Bundaberg Floods, and was impressed by its effectiveness.
Budget

Between 2002–03 and 2011–12 Queensland Fire and Rescue Service expenses increased by 98.7 per cent compared to the overall state budget for the general government sector which has increased by 133.5 per cent. Over the same period, the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service revenue increased by 85.0 per cent compared to state budget of 131.1 per cent. Queensland Fire and Rescue Service revenue growth per annum since 2002–03 has been 6.4 per cent compared with an increase in expenses for the same period of 6.9 per cent per annum. Capital investment has averaged $31.9M per annum. In the main, the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service is required to fully fund both operating and capital expenditure from annual revenues.

Chart 3 –Queensland Fire and Rescue Service major operating expenses

Performance benchmarking against other comparable agencies (Source: Productivity Commission, Report on Government Services 2013) shows that the cost of delivering fire and rescue service per person in Queensland has been the lowest of all Australian states and territories since 2006–07. The cost of delivering these services in Queensland increased by only $11.56 per person per annum from 2006–07 to 2011–12, and remains over $35 less per person per annum than the national average.
The Review team considers that while this is informative in a comparative sense, it is limited in usefulness because it assumes that like agencies are providing like services and that the services are the result of a considered planning and validation process. This is not necessarily the case.

**The Malone Review into Rural Fire Services in Queensland**

The Review team acknowledges that its review has been undertaken at a time of significant unrest and uncertainty within the Rural Operations sector of the Service. The Assistant Minister for Emergency Volunteers, Mr Ted Malone MP has delivered a report – *The Malone Review into Rural Fire Services in Queensland 2013* (The Malone Review) to Government with a range of recommendations on the future structure and function of rural fire services within Queensland. The Review team considered the recommendations of The Malone Review and our response is outlined in Annexe 3.

Queensland is currently one of only two states that operate with a single fire service model, protecting both urban and rural communities under a single organisational structure. The Review team supports this model as an effective, efficient approach to deal with fire wherever it manifests.

**Finding:**

*Fire is tenure blind and in times of adversity, Rural Fire Service Queensland and Urban Fire resources must operate as one entity with a common foe under common protocols.*

While the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service management espouses a collaborative approach, the Review team notes that there is also a very different view amongst a number of stakeholders, particularly in the rural sector, who feel disenfranchised and disenchanted with the service. It is important that these views are heard and respected. To this end the Review team has been actively working to facilitate the implementation of a number of recommendations arising from The Malone Review into rural operations within the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service.
Service demand

The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service groups its activities into a number of major services:

- structural fire services to the urban community
- all hazards and rescue services
- managing the risk and impact of landscape fires
- community risk mitigation through education and fire safety
- building and infrastructure safety
- Supporting disaster operations and community assistance services.

The following chart identifies the relative amounts of time dedicated to these service groups over preceding years, which provides an indication of demand for these services:

Chart 4 – Proportion of Queensland Fire and Rescue Service employee task and incident time by service delivery category by financial year

Note: Data extracted from the IDC Data Warehouse on 12/03/13
The data demonstrates that firefighting services (structural and landscape fire services) are a small part of the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service’s activities. As a result there has been a level of latent capacity that has led to expansion into a range of other services, including:

- incident management
- Urban Search and Rescue
- Rapid damage assessment
- providing emergency accommodation for emergency service workers and/or community members
- the Air Operations Unit for aviation based bushfire fighting
- hazardous materials and emergency management through its Scientific Branch

The Review acknowledges the ability of Queensland Fire and Rescue Service to provide data on time spent on tasks by staff however hold the same concerns identified with the other services regarding the lack of any linkage to HR and Finance systems. The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service acknowledges this has been an issue in the past and have commented in regard the difficulty in reconciling required data for NDRRA claims as a result of Disaster Operations work. Given the focus of the Service on this type of operation this is a clear example of why the issue requires resolution.

Although demand for firefighting services is low and can reasonably be expected to remain low given that building standards and community preparedness remain at a high level; there are a number of issues that place demand on the current service delivery model. These issues are:

- Increasing complexity and scope of service delivery:
  - Increased environmental compliance and community expectations particularly for hazardous material incidents and structure fire incidents where for example
atmospheric and/or effluent–based chemicals, hydrocarbons or asbestos are involved.

- Increased use of air operations for observation, mapping, support services for disaster operations, bushfire mitigation and suppression activities.

- Increased incidents in tunnels and on major transport infrastructure with the need to reduce the duration of events (to get traffic moving again on busy transport routes) in order to manage the economic and other impacts

- Increases in volume of services:
  - An increase in the number of hazardous condition incidents.
  - An increase in responses to natural disasters/weather events has seen an increase in the number of swift water and other water rescues.

- Pressures on the volunteering and staffing model:
  - Turnover rates across the volunteer and part–time staff of the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service cause significant impost for ongoing recruitment, training and support.
  - Recruitment of volunteers is an ongoing issue for rural operations. The aging population and difficulty in attracting young people are among the factors that need to be continually monitored and managed.
  - The diversity of community risk across the State requires specific localised strategies for attracting the right number and mix of operational and non–operational volunteers.

- Need for better information to support decision making:
  - Need to be able to provide timely information to the public across a variety of mediums.
  - Need to more accurately account for resources usage.
Efficacy of Demand Management Strategies

Regional Structure

The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service operates on a traditional hierarchical model with an organisational structure consisting of seven regions each headed by an Assistant Commissioner at Senior Executive level who oversees all urban operations within that region and reports to the Deputy Commissioner. Each region also has a Regional Manager of Rural Operations who reports directly to the Assistant Commissioner, Rural Operations.

Chart 5
Within the Disaster Management chapter the Review has highlighted the discrepancies that exist across regional boundaries of various departments and local government. The Review team considers that the prime driver of district and regional boundaries of all Departments should be an alignment with disaster districts and by default local government. The Review team considers it particularly important for the key agencies of the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service and the Queensland Police Service to be aligned to each other and disaster districts.

The management model currently in place poses a number of potential and real friction points between regional and state management. The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service has, for a number of years, worked to a functional management model where core activities have been divided across the functions:

- operations management
- community safety operations
- professional development
- operations business management.

The concept provides policy and procedural consistency from station to State. There is however the potential for conflict due to the fact that while strategy and intent may be developed at a state level for a particular imperative, responsibility for delivery rests with the regions.

Within regions, each of the functional streams report directly through the regional Assistant Commissioner and simultaneously have indirect accountability to the functional executive responsible for the strategic direction of that particular function. This creates a potential for conflict between the Regional Assistant Commissioners and functional senior executives.
Finding:
The current structural arrangements have the potential to blur accountability and/or result in failure to achieve desired organisational outcomes based on local interpretation and implementation.

Chart 6 Current Queensland Fire and Rescue Service structure

Recommendation:
That the current Queensland Fire and Rescue Service model of functional management be expanded, shifting line management responsibility for community safety operations and professional development from Regional Assistant Commissioners to the State Commanders. Regional Assistant Commissioners become responsible for operations and coordination of departmental support within geographic locations and report to the Deputy Commissioner operations.
Recommendation:
That a reduced regional model for fire and emergency services be generally aligned to that of the Queensland Police Service with a district structure that accords with disaster districts.

Traditional service delivery models
The Review team acknowledges that the service delivered by the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service is of a very high standard and recognises the effort that has gone into capability development including equipping and training of staff. The Review team notes, for example, the recognition by the United Nations of its deployable urban search and rescue capability. However, the Review team has observed that the prevailing paradigm is very much centred on responding traditional vehicles from traditional stations with a traditional crew profile. We note that overseas services are able to use alternative response capacities, including smaller vehicles, to respond to lower risk events such as fires in litter bins, whereas the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service continues to respond traditional vehicles and crews to such events. A number of fire brigades for example now use motor cycles and advanced portable high pressure extinguisher systems for attending car fires, this enables a faster response through traffic and does not further contribute to congestion as does a large truck.

Finding:
The Review team considers that the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service must broaden its outlook to identify more contemporary and innovative ways to deliver a service that matches response, assets and staffing to both risk and government priorities through improved strategic and operational planning.

Similarly, the location of fire stations is steeped in tradition, primarily rooted in historical linkages to funding. The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service urban boundaries determine the area within which all properties are charged the Urban Fire Levy. The extent of the boundary is determined by identifying an area to which a 14 minute response time is achievable for 90 per cent of the time. There are four classifications of Urban Fire Levy area based on the response capability provided by the service. The response may be provided by either permanent or auxiliary fire-fighters.
Findings:

The Review team is concerned that there is no absolute nexus between the risk profile of a community, the amount of the levy raised and the level of service provided. This can result in investment in building and staffing of fire stations and provides limited flexibility for the service as the risk profile changes.

Currently there are 242 urban fire stations across Queensland, of these only 66 are staffed on a continuous 24–hour basis, the vast majority of stations are staffed by part–time auxiliary firefighters who are essentially members of their local community, paid to attend a minimum of training on a weekly basis and attend incidents in their local areas. Eighteen stations are staffed on a mixed basis of full–time paid firefighters who work either seven days or five days a week during daytime hours with auxiliary fire–fighters providing response for ‘out of hours’ incidents. There is no defined protocol to determine the appropriate staffing arrangement for any given location or triggers to objectively argue for change to service delivery models.

Apart from response times, there is no means to provide Government with a consistent, convincing and defensible position on resourcing levels in a given community. This continues to be a point of tension between industrial bodies, the fire service and Government.

The lack of any approved service delivery criterion leaves the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service and government exposed to criticism and prevents authoritative debate. The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service and successive governments have been criticised and pressured by the unions to increase the number of stations and staff based on an increase in a community’s population. In most instances, response and workload analysis will show that despite increases in population there has been no significant degradation of response times and that capacity exists to cope with increased demand. The data also shows no real increase in fires as shown in Chart 8.

A clear example of this is Toowoomba. Unions will argue that there has been no increase in staff or stations for some 20 years. However, an analysis of population growth and an analysis of incidents and response times shows that the total number of incidents remains
stable. The number of structure fires has declined and response time to structure fires within the urban boundary remains well within the current target.

Chart 7
Table 7: Total number of incidents attended by Toowoomba stations

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Anzac Avenue</td>
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<td>689</td>
<td>727</td>
<td>700</td>
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<td>25</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goombungee</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td>Highfields</td>
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<td>53</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>44</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oakey</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pittsworth</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toowoomba</td>
<td>954</td>
<td>901</td>
<td>887</td>
<td>917</td>
<td>842</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total for Toowoomba Command</td>
<td>1745</td>
<td>1804</td>
<td>1776</td>
<td>1836</td>
<td>1690</td>
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Table 8: Number of structure fires with station areas.

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<tbody>
<tr>
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<td>47</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>Crows Nest</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goombungee</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Highfields</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oakey</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pittsworth</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Toowoomba</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total for Toowoomba</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The issue remains, however, that the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service does not have an approved approach or formula for determining the service delivery model that should be applied in a given location. There is also no formula or model to be applied to ascertain where specialist (e.g. rescue) skills or equipment need to be located.

The outcome of such discussions has been the perpetuation of ‘over servicing’ a number of communities and the lack of ability to argue successfully for increased resources in other communities. For example, there are a number of fire stations across the state that have considerable overlaps in their response areas. There are also examples of auxiliary stations within the response areas of 24–hour stations. Many auxiliary stations are in smaller communities where it is increasingly difficult to maintain staffing numbers to provide a full service. In some of these communities there is opportunity to revert to a volunteer rural fire brigade.

Finding:
The Government cannot currently be assured that consistent and appropriate service delivery standards are being applied across Queensland. The lack of any approved service delivery criterion leaves the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service and Government exposed to criticism and prevents authoritative debate.

Recommendation:
That the Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business collaborate with the two portfolio Commissioners to:

- develop an analytical tool to identify the most appropriate level of service
- identify the need for new or enhanced services
- reduce the level of resources where appropriate
- identify current anomalies regarding service delivery and therefore opportunities for rationalisation of stations
- consider collocation with other services as a first principle before committing to new capital projects.
Responses to unwanted automatic fire alarms.

By far the most common of the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service responses is to unwanted automatic alarm activations. Current and historical figures indicate that these account for approximately 30 per cent of all the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service emergency responses. Given the availability of intelligent systems, and with the benefit of many years of data in relation to the likely authenticity of these calls, a different standard operating procedure clearly needs to be developed.

The average time in attendance for these events is over 35 minutes and with an average of 20,000 events per annum. This is clearly a significant time and resource impost. Given that the current standard operating procedure requires a response by at least one (often more) fire engine plus four crew members, with siren and lights activated – this activity presents a high risk and resource intensive response to something that is in most cases a low risk event. Although there are few incidences of fire vehicles being involved in road crashes, it is reasonable to assume that vehicles driving under lights and siren present a heightened risk to staff and the community. A different approach could provide a considerable reduction in risk to the community.

Chart 8
The Review team acknowledges that considerable effort has been expended on trying to reduce unwanted alarm activations, including efforts to engage directly with building owners and occupiers. However, the results are not convincing and the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service has not considered the most basic of questions: “why attend”? The Review team considers that a range of options need to be pursued including a combination of technological, contractual, policy, procedural and behavioural strategies before physically responding to automatic alarms.

There are numerous examples of these strategies being adopted overseas. The fact that it has not been done in Australia before should not be a deterrent to the development of such strategies. The links provided below provide insight into the changed thinking internationally.

http://www.kent.fire-uk.org/your_business/change_to_afa_policy.aspx


Firefighters consulted by the Review team supported the notion of using smaller crews and different vehicles to investigate alarm responses. Given that approximately only five per cent of calls for service are structural fires the service should also consider whether every vehicle placed in service needs to be designed for structural fire response. Vehicles and equipment appear to be chosen based upon a ‘worst case’ scenario. This type of ‘what if’ thinking also seems to dominate strategic consideration of asset type and placement. This is an expensive investment. For example, recent publicity to a unit fire in the central business district led to calls for higher ladders. The media repeated the call without apparently asking some other basic questions such as how often such equipment would be used, or what it would add to operating costs. The corollary of this line of thinking is that you would need equipment for every building of every height. This is of course impracticable.

Finding:
The Current approach of traditional response protocols, vehicle design and station location and staffing are no longer sustainable.
Recommendation:
That the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service should introduce alternative means of response to automatic alarms such as small first response investigative crews e.g. two fire-fighters in a sedan (not responding under lights and siren).

The following photographs are indicative of some international approaches to changing from large fire engines to more contemporary solutions.

Warwicksire Fire and Rescue Service, England

French Fire Services

Greater Manchester Fire and Rescue Service England
Recommendation:
That the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service examine alternative contractual arrangements with building owners which would reduce the need for physical attendance at alarm activations.

Recommendation:
That the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service undertake a review of all standing orders, incident directives and guidelines regarding response protocols with a view to reducing risk to staff and other road users associated with urgent duty driving.

Community safety operations
The key function of the State Community Safety Unit is to deliver community safety services across the ‘built’ environment. The State Community Safety Unit is structured to provide fire advice at the various stages of the life cycle of a building from planning; through construction till occupation.

The Community Education Unit was established to allow the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service to impart fire safety knowledge to the community for the purposes of strengthening prevention capability and resilience. Programs are targeted at the broader Queensland community, key stakeholders, and ‘at risk’ and priority groups. The success of these programs over many years has contributed significantly to a reduction in structural fires.
The Major Development Unit was established following significant investment in Queensland in major infrastructure projects such as tunnels, hospitals and mining ventures. To expedite this process and to support the focus on a one stop shop approach the unit is the single Queensland Fire and Rescue Service point of contact for industry and other government agencies. The Major Development Unit input ensures the appropriate fire safety systems are installed in major infrastructure.

The Fire Engineering Unit is a referral (advice) agency under the *Sustainable Planning Act 2009* for building designs that utilise fire–engineered alternative solutions. The Fire Engineering Unit provides the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service with professional engineering advice on submitted alternative solution designs. The unit is also a strong advocate for the advancement of fire safety in Queensland and works closely with key stakeholders towards enhanced community fire safety standards.

Similarly the Building Fire Safety Unit is a referral agency to provide specialised advice to private certifiers within nominated jurisdictions. Firstly the building design is assessed at plan stage for suitability. Secondly, at the commissioning stage, the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service is again involved in testing to ensure the fire safety systems in the building are fit for purpose.

The excellent work of these units is acknowledged by the Review team. However, the Review team noted that there are strong feelings of discontent within the building industry regarding the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service involvement in the building process. This dissatisfaction seems to relate to a few key factors, but the primary factor seems to be the fee–for–service charged by the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service. The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service have progressively moved towards a full cost recovery model for inspection of plans and buildings which has added to the cost of construction in Queensland. It has also added a layer of bureaucracy to building approvals at the front end.

The very clear view espoused to the Review team in discussion with those officers delivering this service is that their role is one of ‘keeping the business honest’ and feel that without their involvement fire safety standards would lag.
Finding:
The Review team has some sympathy for both arguments but believe that the true driver for the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service’s continued involvement should be subject to a review of the current costing policy. The Review team acknowledges that in a time of fiscal restraint a decrease in revenue may not be desirable for the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service, however it is likely that in a contestable market others could provide this advice to industry with the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service providing an audit role.

Recommendation:
That the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service community safety operations be joined in the efficiency review of the Queensland Police Service focussing on both the community safety outcomes achieved and the extent to which they support the Government’s economic priorities.

While generation of revenue is helpful to the balance sheet of the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service it is not core business. The safety of the public is the foremost reason for the effort of this Building Fire Safety Unit. Prices which impose an unacceptable burden to the building industry could encourage counterproductive behaviour.

The Review team notes that these units may have overlapping and duplicated roles. It is likely that these roles have flourished in the context of the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service’s independent funding arrangements and consequent reduced accountability to the Department of Community Safety.

The role of the Safety Assessment Unit focuses on building inspections to satisfy the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service’s accountability to regulate the Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990 and Building Fire Safety Regulation 2008. A critical role of Safety Assessment Officers is to monitor changes made to the use or layout of a building after construction. There are numerous examples of buildings being constructed as open plan areas such as warehouses which are subsequently converted by tenants to office space thereby changing escape distances and requirements for firefighting equipment.
Budget accommodation, particularly the practice of some landlords to maximise income by flaunting laws regarding the maximum allowable number of occupants, has been a significant issue in Queensland. Safety Assessment officers play an important role as an independent regulator by inspecting buildings, enforcing the relevant laws and, where necessary, instigating prosecution.

The Compliance and Prosecution Unit enforces compliance with the Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990 and Building Fire Safety Regulation 2008. The unit coordinates all enforcement action against entities that fail to comply with the legislated fire safety standards and instigates consequent prosecution actions for the state. Within the provision of these statutes are criminal offences which carry significant penalties including imprisonment for up to six months and heavy fines.

Finding:
The Review team considers that there are efficiencies to be gained by applying Police prosecutions resources to the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service prosecutions rather than maintaining separate capabilities. Comparatively, the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service has very few matters to be prosecuted and it is not envisaged that this would be a significant or onerous task for the Queensland Police Service.

Recommendation:
That the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service enters into discussion with the Queensland Police Service regarding the possibility for the Queensland Police Service to assist with prosecutions that may arise out of fire safety matters.

The Review team acknowledges fire safety work is now one of the major functions of the fire service. The paradox is that the better fire services perform this role the less a need there may appear to be for their core fire fighting services. Effort by Queensland Fire and Rescue Service personnel in this area is indicated in the following graph:
Chart 9

Time Attribution of QFRS Personnel 2011-12

Note: reference to structural and landscape fire services include time attributed to activities associated with preventing and preparing for these events not just response.

Commercial enterprise

The Training and Emergency Management Unit was originally intended to provide quality commercial training products in areas of business and industry associated with improved safety and to build community and industry resilience in emergency management. Its purpose now also includes providing fire and safety awareness to the industry, commerce and the global community on a fee for service basis and to generate revenue from the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service skills, knowledge and intellectual property. A promotional video outlining the activities provided by the Training and Emergency Management Unit is available for viewing at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OwJKszkorC4.
Table 9 TEM annual cost of services versus revenue return for the past five years

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Training and emergency management performance</th>
<th>08–09 ($m)</th>
<th>09–10 ($m)</th>
<th>10–11 ($m)</th>
<th>11–12 ($m)</th>
<th>12–13 Feb ($m)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Revenue</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>12.4</td>
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<td>7.2</td>
<td>8.3</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td>5.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Margin</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>2.8</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Return %</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>15%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

While operating a commercial enterprise that raises revenue for the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service arguably reduces its reliance on government funding, clearly this part of the business operates in a sector where there is considerable competition. The extent to which these services offer value for money, and therefore whether they need to be provided by the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service, needs independent verification to assure Government that it provides value for money.

Finding:

Although the Review team has been advised that the Training and Emergency Management Unit operates within the boundaries of the National Competition Policy and has implemented a Full Cost Pricing Policy the Review team cannot be assured.

Recommendation:

That as part of its efficiency review, the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service instigate an independent review of commercial operations in terms of statutory obligations and current ‘full cost pricing’ methodology to ensure:

a. compliance with all necessary obligations
b. that if current understanding of profitability is not valid, then Training and Emergency Management Unit operations should be wound up.
Outcomes

The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service measures performance across a range of operational and supportive activities. Details of activities are recorded daily with monthly reports provided online, searchable to local area level. Fire Service performance measure reports form part of standard report to the Commissioner. Annexe 1 provides a roll up of the results for Queensland Fire and Rescue Service.

One of the key measures of the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service performance has been its response times to structure fires. The following data is taken from the Productivity Commission Report on Government Services 2013.

Table 10

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reporting Period</th>
<th>NSW</th>
<th>VIC</th>
<th>QLD</th>
<th>WA</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>TAS</th>
<th>ACT</th>
<th>NT</th>
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<td>8.6</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>8.3</td>
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na – not available

Table 11

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Reporting Period</th>
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<th>VIC</th>
<th>QLD</th>
<th>WA</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>TAS</th>
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<tr>
<td>2008–09</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>12.3</td>
<td>15.4</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>10.7</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Response times to structure fires, including call taking time, state–wide
90th percentile (minutes)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reporting Period</th>
<th>NSW</th>
<th>VIC</th>
<th>QLD</th>
<th>WA</th>
<th>SA</th>
<th>TAS</th>
<th>ACT</th>
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<td>16.9</td>
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<td>2011–12</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>10.6</td>
<td><strong>11.3</strong></td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>na</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

na – not available

Queensland’s performance:

- In 2011–12, Queensland responded to 50 per cent of all structure fires within 7.3 minutes (including call taking time).

- This is the 2nd fastest result, and represents an improvement compared to the previous three years.

- In 2011–12, Queensland responded to 90 per cent of all structure fires within 11.3 minutes (including call taking time).

- This is the 2nd fastest result across jurisdictions. This is also Queensland’s fastest response time over the last five year.

Alignment with Government priorities

The objective of the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service as outlined within the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service divisional plan is to provide fire and rescue services in partnership with the community for a safer Queensland. The Government priorities and Department of Community Safety strategies are included in the 2012–16 of the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service Divisional Plan and the 2012–13 Queensland Fire and Rescue Service Commissioner’s Priorities. This plan is deployed through operational plans developed at business unit and regional level. The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service refers to its planning and management process as State-wide integrated operational planning process which has been in place for over eight years.
Within the State-wide integrated operational planning process framework, the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service uses a functional management (process based) model of two core processes (operations management and community safety operations) and two support processes (professional development and operations business management) through a State-to-station model. The consistent application of the model across the organisation supports the management of business as usual activities and the deployment of initiatives.

The priorities outlined by the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service appear to be relatively robust; however in a response to the Review team regarding its strategic alignment, the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service did not articulate how its priorities link to those of the Queensland Government, leaving the Review team to question whether the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service clearly understands its contribution to the Government’s priorities.

The Review team notes that there are significant shortcomings in the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service current strategic planning processes predominantly as a result of a lack of a robust process within the Department of Community Safety. The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service has advised that:

- no environmental scan has been conducted since 2007
- no client satisfaction survey has been conducted since 2006
- no staff satisfaction survey has been conducted since 2008.

The Review team were advised that strategy development was done well in the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service in the past, had considerable support from staff and industrial bodies, and was considered to have been fundamental to organisational reform. For example, the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service used the Managing for Outcomes agenda to drive planning from station-to-State level and assist staff to see clear links to organisational outcomes. In contrast, planning processes over the last five years have been seen by staff as planning for planning’s sake; repeating previous year’s targets rather than taking an evidence-based approach. The Review team has been advised that this has been largely as a result of the Department of Community Safety taking responsibility for planning across the department.
Staff in the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service see limited connection between their work and the broader, more generic strategies of the Department of Community Safety.

**Frontline staff**

**The Commissioner**

The Review team has noted the changing response profile of the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service over time and their increased role across a more diverse range of services, including road crash, swift water, confined space and urban search and rescue, with structural fires now accounting for only approximately five per cent of incidents attended.

The reforms suggested within this report will see the Commissioner responsible for considerably more than the current Queensland Fire and Rescue Service with a strong focus on Disaster Management and responsibility to ensure a constant state of readiness of systems on behalf of Queensland.

The Commissioner’s position will be accountable for an ongoing collaborative relationship with the Queensland Police Service in particular, with an emphasis on sharing of organisational knowledge, capability and intellect to achieve improved outcomes and remedy the shortcomings the Review team has identified within current arrangements.

**Finding:**

The Review team has concluded that given proposed changes, it is more appropriate that a broad range of applicants should be able to be considered for the position of Commissioner in the future.

**Recommendation:**

That the Fire and Rescue Act 1990 be amended so that Commissioner’s position is not limited to a “person with professional experience in fire prevention and fire fighting”.
Professional development
The School of Fire and Rescue Training is the central hub of all Queensland Fire and Rescue Service training and is responsible for the delivery, coordination and management of all state training as well as administration of registered training organisation obligations. In the past decade the School of Fire and Rescue Training has taken on a much stronger coordinating and management role, which has been a significant factor in creating synergy, standardised practice and advances in the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service capability.

Industrial issues
Wage growth (illustrated below) is clearly a significant impost on Queensland Fire and Rescue Service costs and has, in the past, contributed to the operating costs of the organisation outstripping revenue growth. Our primary concern in relation to this growth is that a culture of entitlement and expectation has developed within the organisation.

Chart 10
An obvious symptom of this culture is that before adopting many new technologies, tools and fire fighting methods, Unions may demand the payment of additional allowances. The allowance mentality is demonstrated by the resistance to the introduction a number of industry improvements in recent years including those of automatic external defibrillators, compressed air foam systems, electronic command and control systems and operational support units.

The Review team considers the most concerning of these to be the resistance to the introduction of automatic external defibrillators on to appliances. This resistance appears to be based upon a misapprehension that Firefighters will be used as a first response to accidents and therefore they should be paid an allowance.

**Finding:**
The Review team acknowledges that at the time of writing, the parties were in the midst of a difficult Enterprise Bargaining process however, it is apparent that this allowance mentality has existed for some time. The Review team considers that the current culture is limiting innovation and the ability of the service to reach its full potential as a community service provider.

**Recommendation:**
That the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service work to change the culture of entitlement so that firefighters recognise that firefighting is only one of a range of skills they bring to their core role of emergency management.

The Review team notes the proposals of Queensland Fire and Rescue Service currently before Queensland Industrial Relations Commission QIRC in terms of flexible employment strategies and considers these entirely appropriate for a contemporary organisation focussed on not just service delivery but the provision of variable employment opportunities for existing and new employees.
Recommendation:
That the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service actively progress initiatives for flexible employment including:

- part-time employment and casual employment (with no degradation of competency)
- abridged recruit courses for transition from auxiliary to full-time
- flexible roster models based on a risk approach.

The tables shown at Annexe 2 outline the number of staff within Queensland Fire and Rescue Service at 31 December 2012 by full time equivalent (FTE) and headcount. These are key figures used in identifying appropriate levels of support services (e.g., HR services). The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service also have responsibility for a considerable number of volunteers and part-time (auxiliary) firefighters.

The FTE model does not account for volunteers at all and is limited when it comes to considering part-time employees. The Review team noted in particular the vast difference between the FTE and headcount numbers for auxiliary firefighters. The Review team considers this an important consideration to take into account in any model that calculates appropriate support numbers as a proportion of staff employed.

To consider Queensland Fire and Rescue Service Auxiliary firefighters firstly; each of these individuals is recruited into the service via some form of campaign, advertising program or local recruitment. The Review team were advised in Emerald that the attrition rate in that area for auxiliary firefighters was in the vicinity of 30 per cent per annum. Administrative staff advised that they can spend up to 80 per cent of their time dealing with recruitment and associated human resource requirements. Each newly recruited firefighter needs to attend training, be equipped with personal protective equipment, complete time sheets and be paid through the same arrangements that apply to full-time staff. However, in an FTE count, auxiliary firefighters count as 0.1 FTE. In terms of rural volunteer firefighters, although these firefighters need to be recruited, trained and equipped they are not counted in terms of either FTE or headcount because they are not paid.
In stark contrast to the attrition rate within the auxiliary ranks, Queensland Fire and Rescue Service experiences a very low staff attrition rate across permanent staff. The current rate of attrition is approximately 3.5 per cent which is well below rates across Government of between 5 per cent and 9 per cent. While this may mean reduced costs in terms of recruit courses and other associated costs, the downside is a lack of stimulus from new staff and therefore new thinking.

**Finding:**

The Review team considers that current systems do not sufficiently take into account the worth of the volunteer or the effort required in order to ensure their operational readiness.

**Recommendation:**

That the CEO Portfolio Business and the Commissioner Queensland Fire and Rescue Service find a more appropriate method of accounting for part time and volunteer staff when considering the support required to raise, train and sustain this very large part of the workforce.

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**A Systems view**

**Operations business management**

The Operations Business and Strategy Directorate reports directly to the Commissioner and provides advice and governance on business and project management, financial and asset management, information technology, risk and performance management, strategic planning and policy and management of the urban fire levy. The Directorate includes the following units:

- Queensland Fire and Rescue Service Revenue, Information & Data Command
- Risk, Planning & Reporting Command
- Engineering Services Command
- Business Systems Command
- State Alarms Management Command
- Capital Works Command.
In examining the functions performed by these and other units the Review team observed that although these services deliver benefits to the business in which they are located, there is a level of duplication of these services across the Department of Community Services divisions, and indeed across the portfolio (i.e. with Queensland Police Service). There are many examples of lost opportunities for efficiency and synergistic outcomes across agencies, especially in the technology and business systems areas. The Review team notes that many information and communication technology related projects, in particular, have been developed largely in isolation to other divisions within the Department of Community Safety and certainly without visibility across the portfolio or across Government.

**The Review team has recommended the formation of an Office of Portfolio Business, providing support and governance across a range of corporate functions that are essential to the delivery of frontline services. The Review team considers that the functions of the Operations Business and Strategy Directorate should become part of that Office and that any exception should be carefully considered by those charged with implementation of approved recommendations.**

**Technology**

Queensland Fire and Rescue Service uses both shared and specialised systems to manage its operational and business activities. There are a number of opportunities particularly in the use of mobile technology where the adoption of joint solutions across the portfolio could provide productivity improvements and better quality data. There are also opportunities to reduce duplicated data entry and to provide better information to a range of stakeholders through the integration of data held within current systems. For example, if CAD data could be consumed by command and control systems as well as human resource systems it would be significantly easier to attribute cost to incidents and to reconcile for matters such as Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements accounts.

The Review team is aware of a number of public safety initiatives regarding replacements for elements of the current analogue radio network, and development of other carrier solutions that will provide long term benefits. However, it is apparent that progress in this regard is slow, uncoordinated and has not produced tangible benefits. The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service co-chairs the Public Safety Communication Steering Committee with the
Queensland Police Service. The Review team has attended committee meetings, reviewed minutes of meetings and read the business case, which is now over ten years old. The Review team has formed the view that this committee is achieving little and receiving poor advice to enable it to progress.

Systems such as CAD, and telephony systems are established as joint initiatives between Queensland Ambulance Service and Queensland Fire and Rescue Service and are progressed as core business. These systems are commercial-off-the-shelf configured to support specific agency and architected to provide a level of shared resilience. A major shortcoming brought about through the separate processes used by the department and the Queensland Police Service in selecting systems is that there is no inter-CAD connectivity between the Queensland Police Service systems and Queensland Fire and Rescue Service/Queensland Ambulance Service. The Department of Community Safety last year determined that inter-CAD messaging was not a priority. Given that work is now well advanced in New South Wales to establish this facility between agencies in that state, the Review team considers this to be a wasted opportunity that resulted from a lack of strategic consideration by the information and communication technology section of the Department of Community Safety.

The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service operates seven communication centres across the State, with the Queensland Police Service operating 21 individual centres. The Review team considers there are significant efficiencies to be made through the reduction in the number of centres. Validation of the optimal number of centres should be a joint priority of Queensland Fire and Rescue Service, Queensland Ambulance Service and the Queensland Police Service, with a view to sharing infrastructure costs. In the interim Queensland Fire and Rescue Service has taken steps to upgrade communication centres for a five year life span for demand and business continuity purposes.

The Review team considers the development of a strategic direction for communication centres needs to be addressed as a matter of priority and does not need to be subject of a lengthy committee process. The proposals made elsewhere in this report about the role of a Chief Executive Officer Portfolio business would be an important factor in ensuring a portfolio approach is taken to resolving such issues. There is an urgent need for investment
in communication centres for Queensland Fire and Rescue Service and the Review team strongly considers that advancement of upgrades across a number of centres is neither wise nor efficient. The reality of contemporary call taking systems and technology means that Queensland Fire and Rescue Service could undoubtedly operate with a single communication centre for the state. However, there needs to be a robust level of redundancy for such critical infrastructure and that this could not be achieved with a single centre.

Finding:

The Review team have found there to be considerable inefficiencies in the current business model for communication centres, not just within Queensland Fire and Rescue Service but across the sector. The Review team have noted that Government approval for a joined up approach across the sector has existed for over ten years, that there has been an enduring committee charged with progressing these issues and yet there is little evidence of progress in this regard.

Recommendation:

That the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service reduce the number of communication centres to two, with one being a primary site and the other site providing redundancy and business continuity functionality.

The following comprises the major systems in use by Queensland Fire and Rescue Service, and the key issues associated with each system:

Automatic vehicle location is used in the South East corner of the state. Automatic vehicle location enables the Despatch system to know the location of each vehicle and identify the closest to any new incident received. This enables the selection of the most appropriate resources to respond to incidents. Having automatic vehicle location available in all major regional centres would enhance the coordination of resources at large scale and remote incidents.

Queensland Fire and Rescue Service is developing mobile data solutions to reduce radio traffic, provide additional information to the crews en–route and capture more accurate information from the incident while in progress. The Review team has observed the pilot system in place at Roma Street Station and notes the potential for significant benefit to both operational crews and the business. The major issue initially was the ability to provide
guaranteed connectivity through commercial providers, issues of reliability will be significant in gaining full staff support. While commendable in direction, it is disappointing that this is another example of lost opportunity through one service progressing a technological solution in isolation of other services and Departments.

The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service has developed an impressive mobile communication capability used in specialist command appliances. There are also a number of satellite systems which are supported by the Department of Community Safety information and communication technology staff. This communication capability was extensively used during the recent weather events.

The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service utilises a range of technology to capture incident data and provide this back to Queensland Fire and Rescue Service systems, local government and various other stakeholders. For example, Queensland Fire and Rescue Service provides rapid damage assessment services post-impact of cyclones, building collapse, flooding. This data is used by a range of agencies, including local governments and the Queensland Reconstruction Authority to get a picture of the number of properties affected and the extent of damage. This service supports planning for disaster recovery. The Review team notes that sometimes an agency can capture data, for example images, without realising its significance to another agency.

The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service use an electronic incident action plan in incident command, which is an initiative through the Australasian Fire Authorities Council supported by a number of Fire Services across the country. Queensland Fire and Rescue Service pays a contribution to development and maintenance. It has been used extensively and provides a cost effective solution.

The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service have developed two systems to manage its non-emergency fire specific requirements—an operations management system and the community safety operating system.

**The operations management system** is used to manage stations and the activities conducted out of stations. It includes the recording of information from emergency response
incidents and activities. Modules include Rostering and Crewing. It is also used by rural operational and administrative staff and brigades for a range of activities for Brigade Management and Incident reporting. A development roadmap has been created for the 2012–2013 support and maintenance program.

The **Community Safety Operating System** has been developed to assist in managing Queensland Fire and Rescue Service specific building fire safety and community safety activities undertaken in specialist areas at State and Region level. It includes e-lodgement which will enable Building Certifiers to electronically lodge applications and for them to be dealt with in electronic form through the whole approval process by Queensland Fire and Rescue Service staff in any location.

In general terms the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service appears to have dealt with the issue of technology assisting business relatively well. However, the development of these systems has been undertaken under the general governance of the departmental Information and Communication Strategy group; however they have been driven by the parochial needs of the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service. In fact, all the emergency agencies have individually developed systems that answer the individual business needs of that service.

Although with each project it would be possible to highlight compliance with governance requirements there appears to be very little consideration given to the possibility of joint ventures within the department. Although it is difficult to quantify these lost opportunities, there is no doubting that the Queensland Police Service and the Department of Community Safety have not ensured the best outcomes by failing to properly leverage off joint development of systems and not ensuring complementary systems. For example, the iRoam system developed within the Queensland Ambulance Service could have delivered similar outcomes for the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service. The Review team considers that Queensland Fire and Rescue Service could have benefitted significantly by being able to access the same levels of functionality in terms of CAD data such as:

- the ability to easily replay vehicle location information
- the ability to easily search by active incidents
- display real time operational activity in a simplified and meaningful manner.
The Review team has concluded that a lack of true collaboration, leadership and governance across the information and communication technology portfolio within the department has resulted in a number of missed opportunities for greater success.

**Rural Fire Service Queensland**

As mentioned earlier in this report, the Review team has provided a response to The Malone Review, which is attached as an annex to the Report.

In general the Review team recognises that the current independent structure and nature of Rural Fire operations, whilst appropriate and effective could be improved through increased autonomy delivered through strengthened leadership and advocacy.

This should be achieved through the creation and appointment of a Deputy Chief Executive Officer of the Service. The role of this position has been further examined within the broader context of the Police and Community Safety Review to consider the opportunity for improvements in the efficiency, effectiveness and appropriateness of services delivered across all portfolio volunteer streams.

**Finding:**

The Review team considers that there is a need to provide the volunteer workforce with leadership that recognises the particular challenges of being a volunteer. Ideally this person would have not only significant senior experience within an organisation whose service is delivered predominantly by volunteers but should also have considerable knowledge of contemporary issues facing volunteer based organisations, and possess significant knowledge of the rural firefighting industry.

**Recommendation:**

That a new Deputy Commissioner position be created to manage volunteer emergency services including the Rural Fire Service and the State Emergency Service.
The issue of volunteer identity and ‘voice’ is one that has been raised on a number of occasions throughout the review process. This position would be critical in addressing these matters. The position should have full accountability and responsibility to the Chief Executive Officer of the service for all matters relating to day to day running of rural fire operations.

The proposed Department of Fire and Emergency Services

This report makes a number of recommendations about the proposed structure for the portfolio of public safety. A key part of the portfolio is the proposed new Department of Fire and Emergency Services. The current Queensland Fire and Rescue Service will form the foundation of this department, which will be supplemented with resources from the current Emergency Management Queensland.

From the Review team’s viewpoint, it is essential that the new Department of Fire and Emergency Services takes a broader view of its role than does the current Queensland Fire and Rescue Service. Although Queensland Fire and Rescue Service has clearly broadened its mandate since the mid–nineties to include rescue and community safety services, Review team has formed the view that the organisation still fundamentally views itself as a fire service.

The review team believes that it will be essential to the efficacy of the proposed new Department of Fire and Emergency Services that the Commissioner takes a leadership role in broadening the self–view of the current Queensland Fire and Rescue Service to incorporate disaster management as a key role. This means operational staff will have a role in working with communities and local governments in disaster mitigation, prevention and preparedness in addition to working with the Queensland Police Service and the Queensland disaster management system for disaster response.

One of the key recommendations to support this change is the recommendation that the legislation be amended to enable a suitably qualified person who may or may not be a fire–fighter to be appointed as the Commissioner of the Department of Fire and Emergency Services. This signals the new approach for the Department of Fire and Emergency Services.
and welcomes emergency management staff into the organisation, enabling them to aspire to leadership positions within the department.

Finding:
The Review team have recognised that the current independent structure and nature of Rural Fire operations, whilst appropriate and effective could be improved through increased autonomy delivered through strengthened leadership and advocacy. The Review team also recognise that fire is tenure blind and that in times of adversity, Rural Fire Service Queensland, Urban Fire resources and in the future SES resources must operate as one entity with a common foe under common protocols.

Recommendation:
That the new Department of Fire and Emergency Services develop a common doctrine to protect people from fire and emergencies.

In this report we propose a new office of Emergency Management under the command of The Deputy Commissioner Operations. This office will incorporate many of the current functions of Emergency Management Queensland, as described elsewhere in this report. It will also have the task of embedding an emergency management approach across Department of Fire and Emergency Services, and supporting firefighters to work with local governments in disaster planning and exercising, and improve resilience in communities across Queensland.

The new Department of Fire and Emergency Services will also incorporate a broadened volunteering role. The proposed new Deputy Commissioner Rural Fire Service and State Emergency Service is in line with proposals made in The Malone Review. This approach will aim to improve support for volunteers and reduce duplication and waste across these two vital services.
The Review team has considered a number approaches to command and control structures across various jurisdictions and considers that Queensland should closely examine the methodology being followed by West Australian Authorities. The concept developed is based upon identifying and matching both the competence of individuals and the hazard type to predetermined incident management regimes.

The Review team commend this approach to Queensland and considers it worthy of further investigation in conjunction with the recommendations made within the Disaster Management chapter regarding the appointment of Deputy District Disaster Coordinators.
7. Volunteers

Background

Volunteers contribute significantly to outcomes across the Police and Community Safety portfolio. Over 40,000 members of Queensland communities commit to volunteering in support of the services and agencies within the portfolio. Their contribution is most evident during disasters such as the significant weather events and fires of the last few years. However, not so obvious is the time that these volunteers give freely throughout the year to ensure they are well prepared to support their communities. The volunteers of the Police and Community Safety portfolio form an important and valued part of the organisation and the Queensland community.

A number of challenges now face the volunteers and portfolio agencies. The portfolio must act to improve the way in which they raise, train and sustain volunteers. Demographic trends indicate that in the coming decade there will be enhanced competition for volunteers and that there is likely to be fewer overall volunteers. Failure to prepare appropriately for the changes create a risk that there will not be sufficient emergency volunteers to meet the needs of Queensland. The recent The Malone Review into Rural Fire Services in Queensland 2013 (The Malone Review) into the Rural Fire Service Queensland\textsuperscript{63} has raised a number of the general volunteer issues, as well as focussing on the specific issues of Rural Fire Service Queensland.

During the course of the review, specifically during the disaster events of January, the Review team were fortunate to attend a range of Disaster Management meetings. During these meetings the Review team was particularly impressed with the representation of the Surf Life Saving Australia movement and their contribution, regarding volunteers and volunteering issues.

The Review team is aware of past discussions with Surf Life Saving Australia regarding use of their volunteers and this is one worthwhile aspect. However, we also feel there would be much to be gained from further engagement with Surf Life Saving Australia on the broader

\textsuperscript{63} The Malone Review into Rural Fire Services in Queensland 2013
issues of volunteerism. The Review team were particularly impressed with their approach to raising, training and sustaining their volunteer workforce and consider there is much that can be learned and applied in the Emergency Services sector. While the Review team have not pursued this discussion with Surf Life Saving Australia further during the review, we support such ongoing, collaborative arrangements be entered into in the future.

Volunteering

The Australian Bureau of Statistics\textsuperscript{64} indicates that over six million Australians volunteer annually, which constitutes 36 per cent of the population offering their services for free. The Australian Bureau of Statistics has taken a broad inclusive, interpretation of what activities contribute to ‘volunteering’. The Queensland Office of Economic and Statistical Research uses a narrower scope to define volunteering and hence the disparity between 36 per cent\textsuperscript{65} and 17.8 per cent\textsuperscript{66} of the population. The Office of Economic and Statistical Research\textsuperscript{67} states that the Queensland volunteer rate of 18.7 per cent is slightly higher than the national average of 17.8%. OESR also observed that, in percentage terms, volunteering is stronger in smaller communities. As can be seen in Chart11 emergency services are one of the smaller areas of volunteering, and have a greater proportion of males to females.

Chart 11: Queensland Distribution of Volunteering by Type of Service\textsuperscript{68}

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{chart11.png}
\caption{Queensland Distribution of Volunteering by Type of Service}
\end{figure}

\begin{itemize}
\item[]\textsuperscript{64} Australian Bureau of Statistics \textit{Voluntary Work Australia} 4441.0 2010 table 1 p.9
\item[]\textsuperscript{65} Australian Bureau of Statistics
\item[]\textsuperscript{66} Office of Economic and Statistical Research
\item[]\textsuperscript{67} OESR Census 2011: Volunteering in Queensland
\item[]\textsuperscript{68} Compiled from OESR Census 2011: Volunteering in Queensland
\end{itemize}
Chart 12 below provides the distribution of volunteers by age. There are clearly significantly more volunteers in the 35 to 44 year age group than in the preceding age groups, and a rise again in the 65 years and over age group.

Volunteers within the Police and Community Safety Portfolio most closely align to the notion of formal volunteers. Volunteering Australia defines formal volunteering as:

An activity which takes place through not for profit organisations or projects and is undertaken to:

- to be of benefit to the community and the volunteer
- of the volunteer’s own free will and without coercion
- for no financial payment
- in designated volunteer positions only.

Volunteers contribute in diverse ways and without any remuneration. Queensland is fortunate to have a strong volunteer sentiment in the community.

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69 Compiled from Australian Bureau of Statistics Voluntary Work Australia 4441.0 2010
Volunteers within the Queensland Police Service and the Department of Community Safety

Volunteers contribute directly to the operations of the Police and Community Safety portfolio through:

- the Rural Fire Service Queensland
- the State Emergency Service
- honorary Ambulance Officers
- local Ambulance Committees
- volunteers in policing
- Neighbourhood Watch
- Crime Stopper volunteers.

Additionally, the Department of Community Safety currently provides support and financial assistance to other volunteer organisations that contribute to public safety:

- Australian Volunteer Coast Guard Association
- Volunteer Marine Rescue Association Queensland
- Surf Life Saving Queensland
- Royal Life Saving Society Queensland

The Queensland Police Service supports the independent Queensland Police and Citizens Youth and Welfare Association, commonly referred to as Police Citizens Youth Clubs (PCYC). The Department of Community Safety is currently collaborating with PCYC to deliver the revised Emergency Service Cadet Program.
The value of volunteering in economic terms is significant. There are two principally different ways to calculate the economic contribution of volunteers\textsuperscript{71}: an output approach and an input approach. The output approach calculates value based on the outputs achieved, for example: lives saved or property protected. The input approach costs the time the volunteers contribute through training, preparation and operational activations.

At conservative estimate, using the input approach, the members of the State Emergency Service contribute:

- training and preparation $25.2$ million
- operational activations $1.6$ million

Similarly, the members of the Rural Fire Service contribute:

- training and preparation $2.9$ million\textsuperscript{72}
- operational activations $7.8$ million

Calculations were based on estimates of hours of training/operational responses and utilised a national average hourly rate\textsuperscript{73}. The economic contribution of volunteers is clearly significant as demonstrated by the State Emergency Service and Rural Fire Service Queensland calculations. In addition to the economic contribution there is also a societal contribution that goes to building more resilient communities.


\textsuperscript{72} This figure is based primarily on an estimate of formal training hours. Records are not kept on the following brigade activities: community education, brigade meetings, in-brigade training, unreported incident response, recruiting, fundraising and administration.

\textsuperscript{73} http://www.payscale.com/research/AU/Country=Australia/Hourly_Rate#by_City accessed on 21 June 2013. The rate used was $21.04$ per hour.
Broad challenges to volunteers

The broad challenges to volunteering have been fairly consistent over the last decade. The Australian Emergency Management Volunteer Forum [74] has identified the key challenges as:

- time
- training
- costs
- recognition
- people.

Time: Volunteers have to continually balance the demands of family, work and volunteering. Fundamentally, volunteers’ available time is decreasing whilst the time demands of volunteering are increasing.

Training: In recent years there has been a steady growth in the professionalisation of volunteers. Volunteers are required to be competent and safe. This has resulted in additional training demands which directly relates to increased time demands.

Costs: Volunteers, by definition, receive no financial payment. However, it costs volunteers to participate including costs such as driving to attend activities, use of their telephone, and purchasing supplemental equipment. All such costs are of course subject to rises in the cost of living, putting further pressure on volunteers.

Recognition: Recognition is not just about medals and certificates. Volunteers are part of the emergency services ‘team’ but the community often does not appreciate that they are volunteers.

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The *National Volunteering Strategy* sets out a range of actions to be taken to address the challenges of volunteering and encourage, support and recognise volunteers. The strategy includes six focus areas for action:

1. respond to trends in volunteering
2. harness technology
3. (develop) better regulation and risk management
4. strengthen management and training
5. strengthen relationships and advocacy
6. recognise and value volunteering.

**Demand pressures**

**Training/professionalisation**

Recent developments which have resulted in more consistent and higher standards of training for volunteers should provide a more competent and capable volunteer workforce.

However, it is widely perceived that the increase in standards has come at the high cost of increased bureaucracy. Meeting the standards of the Australian Qualifications Framework and requirements of a registered training organisation are frequently cited as burdens on the volunteer’s limited time. The competing perspective is that volunteers highly value the benefits of attaining nationally recognised qualifications.

The perceived inability to readily recognise existing skills and knowledge is often criticised. The majority of volunteers possess skills and knowledge gained through previous employment and training. Across the portfolio the recognition of prior learning process

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75 National Volunteering Strategy, 2011  Source: Licensed from the Commonwealth of Australia under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Australia Licence.

76 The AQF is the quality assured national framework of qualifications in the school, vocational education and training, and higher education sectors in Australia. See www.asqa.gov.au
appears to be relatively well implemented. However, there appears to be different degrees of interpretation across the portfolio.

The Review team found that most volunteers readily accept that they have a training obligation to meet. However, the burden of unnecessary or duplicated training causes considerable frustration, particularly for those who are time challenged. There is extreme frustration when prior learning and skills are not recognised.

While the Review team recognises that Emergency Management Queensland's Education and Training Support Unit has centralised recognition of prior learning; and has made significant progress in consistently and promptly dealing with the SES's recognition of prior learning applications, the Review team heard from volunteers and Local Government Councils that there is significant frustration regarding the recognition of training and skills. Perhaps the most frustrating of all was to hear of a Queensland Ambulance Officer who became a SES volunteer needing to do a first aid course as their skills were not recognised. In the same location the Review team were told of similar examples including vertical rescue operatives from the mining industry not having skills recognized. Other examples, not as dramatic, exposed a lack of recognition between the Rural Fire Service (RFS) and SES in this regard as well.

Another criticism of the bureaucratic approach of the Australian Qualifications Framework system is that the requirements are subject to frequent change and appear to be focussed on full-time employees. The changes to the ‘Train the Trainer’ course over the last decade have been perceived as more bureaucratic than effective in improving the quality of training. The transition process from each variant of the Train the Trainer course (i.e. the BSZ to TAA to TAE)\textsuperscript{77} has caused confusion and frustration. The time burden to meet the changes is most significant on volunteers. Full-time trainers accept the demands of compliance and address the changes accordingly, whereas for volunteers, this repeating of training is seen as holding volunteers back from new and more challenging training.

\textsuperscript{77} The courses given as an example are: BSZ 40198 \textit{Train the Trainer}, TAA 40104 \textit{Training and Assessment}, TAE 40110 \textit{Training and Assessment}.
Approaches to training are being challenged from other directions as well. Traditional training times, that is a week-night and weekends, are becoming less suitable due to changing workforce demographics. In the broader community there is an increase in the number of casual workers who work irregular hours. The concept of ‘fly in, fly out’ for persons working in the mining industry, for example, creates demand for more flexible training opportunities. Queensland Fire and Rescue Service and Emergency Management Queensland are currently making sound use of eLearning products but there is scope to further expand offerings into more flexible formats.

The Review team found that the general frustration with training system requirements is more frequently generating the question: Why do we need to do certified training? The Australian Qualifications Framework offers standards and assurance but a balance needs to be established as to just how much training needs national standardisation. Equally, the risks and financial exposure for governments should the Australian Qualifications Framework standards not be followed are substantial.

**Recommendation**

That training for volunteers be reviewed to determine which courses require national standardisation. Organisational training should then address the remaining training needs. The review should take into account the risk exposure to government agencies if changes are to be made.

**Safety**

The *Workplace Health and Safety Act 2011* seeks to ‘secure the health and safety of workers and workplaces’. The *Workplace Health and Safety Act 2011* requires a number of systems and mechanisms to be put into effect in order to achieve its purpose. Non-compliance attracts a penalty. The communication and/or miscommunication around the new *Workplace Health and Safety Act 2011* have caused considerable concern for some volunteers, especially those who hold executive appointments. There has been at least one significant example of a senior office bearer resigning from a volunteer appointment because of concern about the risk to reputation, personal finances and ‘the family home’.
Emergency volunteers work in risky environments. A responsible and sensible approach must be taken toward the management of risk and the protection of employees. The role of volunteers should be considered in the forming of Workplace Health and Safety policies developed by agencies in the portfolio. Inclusion of volunteers in relevant safety committees and accessible information systems will likely enhance the participation rate by volunteers. At present, it appears there is significant under-reporting of workplace health and safety incidents. This is not because there is an adverse culture toward reporting but simply because it is not easy to compile a report. The result is that the available information is inadequate and likely risks are more difficult to discern.

Recommendation: That the workplace health and safety reporting system be reviewed to facilitate ease of reporting.

Recognition of volunteers (understanding who volunteers are)

Recognition of volunteers has been an enduring issue. The initial response to recognition saw access given to volunteers to existing honours and awards and the creation of new awards. These awards have been received and are worn with pride by volunteers. Likewise, recognition of training has been achieved through the Australian Qualifications Framework and the awarding of nationally recognised qualifications.

Volunteers are also recognised specifically through National Volunteer Week, usually held in May, which is Australia’s largest celebration of volunteers and volunteerism. The SES has their own national recognition through SES Week, usually conducted in November. SES Week is a national celebration of the dedication and commitment of state and territory emergency service volunteers.

The range of disasters that have impacted Queensland in the last several years have placed emergency volunteers at the forefront of media attention. The media has been quite effusive in its praise for emergency volunteers and volunteers in general.

78 The RFSQ members are eligible to receive the QFRS Diligent and Ethical Service Medal, and SES members are eligible to receive the Meritorious Service Medal after meeting the respective criteria. Both services are eligible to receive the National Medal from the Commonwealth.
They are the orange army, working tirelessly for the community and never asking for thanks. State Emergency Service volunteers save lives, clean up after floods and fires and search for missing people, providing physical and emotional support for those in need. With the service operational 24 hours a day, volunteers can be called to an emergency situation any time of the day across Queensland and do so with an energy and love for the community.79

"It's helping other people out, you're able to help people so you do," the South Mackay resident said. The importance of volunteer rural firefighters has been thrust into the national spotlight this week, as rural crews battle raging infernos across much of the country.80

However, the demands on the volunteer have changed. Community expectations of emergency volunteers are blurred with the expectations of full-time emergency services. It is not uncommon that a community member expects a response time of minutes from a volunteer service. Volunteers are not a full time emergency response service and community expectations about response times need to reflect this fact.

This is rarely practical or achievable. There have even been examples where volunteers have been denigrated for not meeting a person’s expectation. The Review team was advised that it is not uncommon for community members to not know or understand that the Rural Fire Service and SES were unpaid volunteers. It is this type of issue that has given rise to the demand for volunteers to be recognised as different from full-time emergency services.

The Review also discovered that there was disappointment amongst volunteers that some of their full-time counterparts failed to appreciate that volunteers come from all walks of life and they bring a variety of experience and skills. It was suggested that many volunteers are treated as people with limited or no experience, lacking in life skills and having little intellect. A quick scan of the Queensland Police Service and Community Safety Portfolio’s volunteers will readily discover highly skilled and highly competent people in the ranks of the volunteers.

79 Sunday Mail, 24 March 2013
Employer/family support

The two key competitors for a volunteer’s time are their family and their job. Long-term volunteers are masters at finding a balance between volunteering, employment and family. In many rural Queensland towns it is not uncommon for all eligible family members to have joined either the Rural Fire Service or SES.

Programs are in place to recognise employer support to volunteers. However, the programs appear to be sporadic. There is room for improvement to recognise the significant contribution that employers make to the volunteer programs. The Department of Defence, through the Employer Support Division, offers a very robust model of employer engagement and support. Employer engagement, recognition and participation are all used to make a statement about the value of employer support.

Families are often informally recognised for their support. However, as with employers, there appears to be scope to formally recognise the families who support their volunteers.

Although not true volunteers (as they are paid for training and response) Auxiliary Firefighters, their families and employers face the same issues. These people, who may be full time teachers, nurses, vets or even police officers, often volunteer far more of their time than that for which they are paid. Their contribution is often at the expense of their normal employment.

The Review team believes that several strategies could be considered to improve the current standing of employers and families of volunteers.

**Recommendation**

That the current employer and family recognition practices be reviewed with a view to meet the needs of volunteers, their families and their employers.
Efficacy of demand management strategies

Time spent on administration (red tape)

Volunteers join their respective services to deliver a function to support their community. They accept that there is a requirement for some basic administration. However, there is a strong negative reaction to what is perceived as unnecessary administration, or ‘red tape’.

The challenge for the Queensland Police Service and the Department of Community Safety has been to minimise the amount of red tape whilst meeting the regulatory demands of recording and reporting.

The Queensland Police Service and the Department of Community Safety have information systems that support and assist their volunteers. Some of the systems are complex. Access to the system is often through multiple layers of firewalls and the systems are often designed without the volunteer in mind. Volunteers across the state do not necessarily have access to high speed internet. A system that works well on corporate hardware may barely function for a volunteer in Burketown or Birdsville.

Finding:
The demand for data and information is unlikely to abate.

Recommendation:
That the Queensland Police Service and the Department of Community Safety develop intuitive, easily accessible systems that reduce the administrative burden on volunteers and their time. Greater exploitation of technology to deliver intuitive, simple and practical systems is required.
Efficacy of system coordination

Training (registered training organisation, recognition of skills, shared program, common program)

The Review team observed that the current training systems of the Rural Fire Service and SES are largely independent of each other and almost totally independent of any other volunteers. The Rural Fire Service and SES operate independently even though there are obvious areas of overlap and commonality. The training development work, in both services, appears to be of high quality and technology is embraced. The use of on-line learning and distributed learning both support the face-to-face training being delivered across the state.

There appears to be a missed opportunity to cooperate with the broad family of volunteers on common training: safety, train the trainer, Australasian Inter-service Incident Management System (AIIMS), driver training, and first aid. Enhanced cooperation potentially offers more opportunities to train and gives greater flexibility to volunteers.

**Recommendations:**

That impedimenta to the publication of an annual training calendar of core skills be removed.

**Recommendation:**

That the annual training calendar identify course, training location and the coordinating authority.

This would enable Rural Fire Service and SES volunteers to apply for courses well in advance. Volunteers would be able to plan their time with family and employer better. Where practical, other volunteers\(^8\) would also be able to attend courses.

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\(^8\) This could include any volunteers from the portfolio, as well as the supported volunteer associations: Australian Volunteer Coast Guard Association, Volunteer Marine Rescue Association of Queensland, Surf Life Saving Society Queensland, Royal Life Saving Queensland and the PCYC ESCP.
Recruitment and Retention

When an organisation retains a volunteer, that volunteer develops skills and acquires experience, and he or she may eventually become a volunteer leader. Retention is therefore a critical factor to success. The cost of high turnover is lost skills and experience. It may also affect recruitment, if separating volunteers have had bad experiences of volunteering.

Recruitment and retention are important factors in volunteer overheads. ‘In-house’ training comes at a financial and time cost that is sometimes lost. For example, a volunteer may require several courses before they can be employed on operational tasking. Those courses may take several months to complete. If a volunteer leaves then this investment in that person is largely lost to the organisation.

A key to understanding both recruitment and retention is to understand what motivates volunteers. Research indicates that the principal reasons people volunteer are to:

- assist their community
- learn new skills
- earn a sense of achievement
- be part of a group or team

Motivations and expectations may change with time. However, the Review team found that these motivations remain high even in volunteer executives, who typically have over fifteen years of service.

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82 Fahey, Christine, 2XXX, Training can be a recruitment and retention tool for emergency service volunteers, pp.3-7.
83 Discussion at the SES Local controllers’ Conference, May 2013.
The retention rate for the SES is approximately 83 per cent, whilst the retention rate for Rural Fire Service is 95 per cent\textsuperscript{84}. While there is a marked difference in the retention rate of the two organisations, this is explained through the nature of the services and how they conduct their business. The demands and diversity of training for the SES are generally higher than the Rural Fire Service. The Rural Fire Service itself has significant differences in its membership: many primary producer members serve for long periods.

Some analysis of SES recruitment and retention data shows that a large proportion of new recruits are in the age range of (18–25 years) (see Figure 3). However, this age cohort has the smallest number of volunteers. The implication is that the 18–25 years olds are not being retained in comparable numbers.

The Review team considers that a clearer, identifiable pathway needs to be developed by portfolio agencies to capitalise on the opportunities that youth provides to the system of volunteering. For example, the Review team met with the Department of Education and Training to discuss the development of the “volunteer ethos” in adolescents. The Queensland secondary schools program appears to recognise this challenge and Department of Education and Training is supportive of engendering the notion of volunteering. Rewards and recognition form part of the Queensland education system. It is equally important that portfolio agencies develop ways to capture and nurture the growth of volunteers in a systemic way so that the motivation at school age is not lost.

**Criminal history checks**

The Review team were also told of instances where people were subject to multiple criminal history checks because they were members of both SES and the Rural Fire Service.

The criminal history check process is usually completed within a matter of weeks. The exception to this is where an adverse finding is reported. Determinations on adverse findings are typically resolved in a number of months. However, it is not unusual for adverse finding determinations to take in excess of six months. When an adverse finding is

\textsuperscript{84} Retention rate is calculated as a percentage of staff turnover, e.g. for the SES approx. 1000 members leave each year (ie 16.7%) leaving 83% of the organisation ‘retained’. 

discovered through a criminal history check, policies provide for discretion with regard to the nature of offence, its currency and the disposition of the applicant. A criminal history check is not the final determinant as to whether an applicant will be accepted as a volunteer.

Policies state that a volunteer must report any criminal offences they are charged with after they become a volunteer. The criticism of this is that only ‘honest’ volunteers will do so and therefore there is cause for concerns about the long term relevance of the current system of criminal history checks.

**Recommendations:**

That the recommendations of The Malone Review in relation to Criminal History checks, so far as supported, by the Review team in this report be progressed inclusive of SES issues.

**Shared facilities**

Facilities are costly investments and wherever possible every opportunity should be taken to maximise their use. Given the part-time nature of volunteering it is clear that there is residual capacity in most SES/Rural Fire Service facilities. For example a SES ‘shed’ that is used for training and meetings for four evenings and one weekend in a month will stand vacant for the remainder of that month. On the surface, it appears very logical and efficient to combine use by several volunteer organisations. However, there are a number of factors that need to be taken into consideration. For the SES the land, and often the facility, is provided by the local government whereas Rural Brigades largely self fund these facilities. Typically, the Rural Fire Service only contributes a maximum of $10 000 toward a rural fire station. The brigade raises the majority of the funds through the local Rural Fire Levy and other fundraising. Because of this, there is a great feeling of ownership from the brigade.

However, wherever practical and with concurrence of volunteers and local government, a joint facility should be considered. The cost of a single expanded facility should provide for a larger better resourced facility than two separate facilities. Any shared facility would have to provide for discrete storage areas for the Rural Fire Service and SES equipment.
In addition to the Rural Fire Service and SES, the facility might also be a venue for the PCYC Emergency Service Cadet Program or other community based groups.

**Recommendation**
That where practicable, the consideration for new or enhanced facilities include an assessment of the viability of creating a Rural Fire Service /SES common user facility.

**Volunteer engagement (frequency, extent, etc)**
Volunteers are keenly interested in decisions and developments that affect them personally, or that affect their group/brigade, or that affect how they train and operate. Communication with volunteers is therefore a cornerstone of engagement.

The Review team believes that the Department of Community Safety and the Queensland Police Service are relatively effective in terms of communicating to volunteers. The internet, volunteer portals, and newsletters all provide information to volunteers. However, the flow of information is primarily one way which is not ideal for allowing volunteers to express their opinions.

The SES Volunteer Executive Committee is designed to provide a forum for SES members to communicate ideas, opinions and concerns to Emergency Management Queensland's senior management. The SES Volunteer Executive Committee is comprised of volunteer members from across the State. In recent years the SES Volunteer Executive Committee has been less active. However, at the 2013 Local Controllers Conference it was agreed to revitalise the SES Volunteer Executive Committee and the Review team supports this initiative.

Every second year, Emergency Management Queensland conduct a SES Local Controllers Conference. This conference serves as a broader engagement mechanism than the SES Volunteer Executive Committee. All local controllers are invited to attend and the agenda is focused on key issues. The 2013 conference was attended by more than 70 delegates.
The Rural Fire Service engages volunteers in decision making through the operation of four Joint Working Committees. These comprise operations, training and volunteer support, with the fourth being an overarching Governance and Strategy Committee. Each committee has at least four volunteers, often from a variety of brigade classifications. Volunteers are also part of local Fire Management Groups. Every two years a Volunteer Summit is held which brings together over 200 volunteers, Rural Fire Service staff and other stakeholders over three days to discuss and share matters of mutual concern.

Emergency Service Cadet Program

The Emergency Service Cadet Program was initially raised as the State Emergency Service Cadets in 1994. The SES Cadets changed to the Emergency Service Cadet Program in 2003. Even though the name and the scope were changed, the ESCP remained a largely SES cadet program.

The Emergency Service Cadet Program had the objectives to develop:

- life skills and encourage participation in local communities
- personal strengths, including self-confidence, initiative, leadership and teamwork
- skills and knowledge to enhance community safety
- a potential recruitment pool of emergency services.

In 2012, it was identified that the Emergency Service Cadet Program was not making satisfactory progress with regard to the last objective. In February 2013, the Premier, Minister for Police and Community Safety and his Assistant Minister announced that the Emergency Service Cadet Program would be revitalised ‘under new management’—the PCYC. The revitalisation process was still in its formative stages at the time of writing this Report.

The revitalised cadet program offers a number of advantages in training and development for youth. The program is intended to develop confidence, promote independence and build resilience. In a number of locations it provides an outlet for youths who may not have many other alternatives.
Finding:
A key objective in developing the program is that the volunteering ethos should start from school age.

Finding:
The cadet program offers youths an opportunity to experience a variety of emergency services experiences. Cadets engage with full-time and volunteer emergency services personnel who serve as role models. The revitalised PCYC Emergency Service Cadet Program will place a greater emphasis on guiding youths to emergency services careers.

Recommendation:
That the revitalised PCYC Emergency Service Cadet Program continue to be supported by government.

Traditionally, Emergency Service Cadet Program has been primarily influenced by SES, Queensland Fire and Rescue Service and the Queensland Ambulance Service. Under the PCYC there is the obvious inclusion of the Queensland Police Service. However, Emergency Service Cadet Program should also engage with the Marine Rescue organisations to determine whether there is scope for Emergency Service Cadet Program and maritime activities.

Recommendation:
That the Emergency Service Cadet Program take a full spectrum approach to emergency services
Frontline staff

Fit for task
The nature of emergency volunteering requires that volunteers are fit for task\(^{85}\). Emergency volunteering includes tasks that are physically demanding and/or mentally challenging in environments that can be unpleasant and traumatic. An employer cannot, legally or conscionably, put an employee – whether full-time, part-time or volunteer – in harm’s way if they are not fit for the task.

However, fit for task does not require volunteers to become Olympic athletes. Fit for task is exactly what it means: sufficiently fit to undertake the task. A firefighter will require a different fitness to a flood boat operator who will have a different fitness level to an Incident Coordinator and so on. Fit for task is not about excluding community members from volunteering. It is about respecting those people by not putting them at undue risk

The design of the fit for task criteria must be valid and relevant to volunteering. Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council (AFAC) has research\(^{86}\) currently under way to determine how the concept of fit for task might be implemented. Notwithstanding the findings of the research, it is imperative that volunteers be fully engaged on any implementation of a fit for task policy.

Recommendation
That volunteers should be engaged to assist in determining what constitutes ‘fit for task’ and how that should be implemented.

Spontaneous volunteers
During the 2011 Brisbane Floods the ‘Mud Army’ rose to assist those who had been affected. There was an overwhelming response from the community to help their neighbours. This reaction has occurred elsewhere and since, and is referred to as ‘spontaneous volunteering’. Spontaneous volunteers are volunteers who come together for a short-notice, short-term response to a situation.

\(^{85}\) Also referred to as ‘Fit for Duty’. Fit for duty, as a concept, has been variously interpreted. Most negatively, as an approach to remove volunteers from service.

In Bundaberg in 2013, a police officer brought together a group of spontaneous volunteers to assist people from north Bundaberg to evacuate to facilities in south Bundaberg. Retrospectively, this response has been dubbed the ‘Mud Navy’.

The overwhelming perspective is that spontaneous volunteering is a positive phenomenon. However, for those in disaster management there is some concern around guiding and steering the phenomenon. A given disaster is no less risky for spontaneous volunteers than it is to career professionals or regular volunteers. Therefore the appropriate balance needs to be achieved so the enormous energy of goodwill can be channelled to create the best effect. The area of spontaneous volunteers appears well suited for coordination with organisations such a Volunteering Queensland, Australian Red Cross or the Salvation Army.

The Review team met with Volunteering Queensland and sees this organisation as being best placed to work with the portfolio to "structure" the spontaneous volunteering issue.

**Aging**

The average age of Australians is increasing. The effects of low population growth and better health have contributed to this phenomenon. In the short term this may not be a significant issue for volunteer organisations because the average age of volunteers is relatively high. This means that for several years in the short term there should be enough volunteers to meet demand, however, this should not mask the requirement to nurture and grow the volunteer ethos in young people as previously discussed.

Youth strategies need to be developed to attract and retain younger members. Greater understanding is required of who volunteers are, and why and how to retain those volunteers. It is likely that technology and better systems need to be used to capture the attention of Generation Y.
A Systems view (interoperability)

Rural Fire Service and SES interoperability

The Rural Fire Service currently is organisationally located within the QFRS and the SES within Emergency Management Queensland. The nature of those structures has not facilitated open and frequent exchange between these two most significant volunteer groups within the Police and Community Safety Portfolio. Although their tasks tend to be different, the challenges of volunteering affect both Rural Fire Service and SES.

In recent operations the Rural Fire Service and SES have cooperated more closely. The Review team considers that combined task forces of the Rural Fire Service and SES members could be a workable solution that offers some enhanced benefits. SES and the Rural Fire Service have worked well together when the need arises and their interoperability needs to be facilitated within the portfolio.

The preferred outcome for the Rural Fire Service and SES is that Queensland has a well trained, suitably equipped, available volunteer capability that is supported by intelligent systems. For volunteers, the delivery of capability requires different approaches: volunteers have limited availability, they can train at different times, they are diverse, they bring outside influences into the organisation and they strive for professionalism.

The ongoing capability of both the Rural Fire Service and SES is fundamentally dependent on members of the community being willing to volunteer. Therefore the volunteer experience needs to be an experience which meets the expectation of the volunteer whilst meeting the needs of Queensland communities. The Review team assesses that this is not yet in balance.

Interoperability would be further enhanced by an increase in shared training. As already mentioned, there is common training being conducted, but by separate training regimes. This segregation of volunteers is a key example of duplication and waste as well as a lost opportunity to improve interoperability.
Greater integration of volunteer training and activation may also lead to new initiatives. Neighbourhood Watch currently has what is basically a singular focus on security. However, Neighbourhood Watch offers a network that could be enhanced for neighbour response and assistance in disaster or emergency situations. A closer cooperation between Neighbourhood Watch groups and their local SES Group may contribute to greater resilience.
8. Queensland Police Service

Introduction

The Queensland Police Service was established under legislation on the 1 January 1864 and will celebrate 150 years of serving the people of Queensland on 1 January 2014. The Queensland Police Service currently operates under the Police Service Administration Act 1990 and the Police Powers and Responsibilities Act 2000. The Queensland Police Service also administers several other pieces of legislation relating to child protection, public safety, public order and terrorism.

In addition to legislation administered by the Queensland Police Service, the police have statutory roles in a number of pieces of legislation (for example the Disaster Management Act 2003) and are of course responsible for enforcing a wide range of laws.

At the time of reporting, the Queensland Police Service comprised some 15,000 staff (approximately 11,000 sworn police and 4,000 civilians). The budget of the Queensland Police Service is around $2.0 Billion so it is both a large organisation and it manages a considerable budget on behalf of Government.

Functions of the Queensland Police Service

The role of the Queensland Police Service is defined in Section 2.3 of the Police Service Administration Act 1990 as:

(a) the preservation of peace and good order—

   (i) in all areas of the State; and

(ii) in all areas outside the State where the laws of the State may lawfully be applied, when occasion demands;

(b) the protection of all communities in the State and all members thereof—

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1 2011–12 Annual Report Queensland Police Service p3
88 Op Cit p25
(i) from unlawful disruption of peace and good order that results, or is likely to result, from—

   (A) actions of criminal offenders;

   (B) actions or omissions of other persons;

(ii) from commission of offences against the law generally;

(c) the prevention of crime;

(d) the detection of offenders and bringing of offenders to justice;

(e) the upholding of the law generally;

(f) the administration, in a responsible, fair and efficient manner and subject to due process of law and directions of the commissioner, of—

   (i) the provisions of the Criminal Code;

(ii) the provisions of all other Acts or laws for the time being committed to the responsibility of the service;

   (iii) the powers, duties and discretions prescribed for officers by any Act;

(g) the provision of the services, and the rendering of help reasonably sought, in an emergency or otherwise, as are—

   (i) required of officers under any Act or law or the reasonable expectations of the community; or

   (ii) reasonably sought of officers by members of the community.

**Background—the 2013 restructure**

Around the same time that this review commenced, in January 2013, the Commissioner of Police announced a restructure of the Queensland Police Service. The restructure reduced the number of police regions from eight to five and the number of police districts from 31 to 15. The restructure was to achieve a reduction of up to 110 commissioned officers. As at 30 June 2013, 86 commissioned officers had accepted the redundancy offer and it was not clear how the remaining 24 positions would be treated.
The restructure also envisioned a range of broader business improvements including the development of the following strategies\textsuperscript{99}:

- contact management
- demand management
- client service
- performance management
- mobile data
- infrastructure.

These strategies were in development concurrent to the Police and Community Safety Review (the Review) and it was only in the latter stages of the Review that some of these strategies were at a point where they could be provided in draft form. In addition to the above initiatives there appears to have been a hive of activity to produce reports around issues such as governance and human resource strategy, some of which were developed by external consultants. Although the Review team would not wish to discourage business improvement, the point is that these concurrent activities have made it difficult for the review team to ascertain a current state in many domains of Queensland Police Service business practice.

\textit{Queensland Police Service Review for the Public Sector Renewal Board}

In mid-June 2013, close to the completion of the Review, the Review team was provided with a report—Final Report Queensland Police Service Review – Public Sector Renewal Board, which was dated January 2013 on the cover page. This report contained important information about the variety of reforms being developed within the Queensland Police Service. The Review team also notes that the Public Sector Renewal Board had not, as of late July, been provided with the report from the Queensland Police Service; and we were told that this report had no formal status.

\textsuperscript{99} Overview of the proposed changes to the structure and governance of the Queensland Police Service, 9 January 2013
Our conclusion is that if this report was completed in January, the Queensland Police Service should have provided it to the Review team earlier. Indeed the Review team wrote to individual Commissioners on 4 February 2013 asking for information on a range of issues, including on the key opportunities for organisational improvement. This should have been a clear opportunity for the Queensland Police Service to furnish materials such as this report. Although the review team has been somewhat heartened to read in the media about a range of initiatives being put in place, such as the online crime statistics, a consolidated view of the proposals for reform being developed within the Queensland Police Service, such as the information provided in this report, would have better served the interests of both the Queensland Police Service and the review team than the ‘drip feed’ approach to providing the Review team with information over the course of the review.

The Review team is concerned that this may show a level of disregard for the work of the Review. This would not be altogether unsurprising given our observation that the Queensland Police Service sets itself apart from the public service, including from other portfolio agencies. Acknowledging the independence of the Office of Constable, this sense of separateness is one of the many reasons the Review team has concluded that a new arrangement for corporate service provision is needed. A new arrangement will provide an independent and objective portfolio service arrangement with strong alignment to government objectives of efficiency and transparency. This is discussed in greater detail elsewhere in this report.

Finding:

That the Queensland Police Service regards itself as being somewhat separate from the rest of the bureaucracy, and as a result it is sometimes difficult to achieve conformity with whole of government endeavours.
Demand

As can be seen from its legislative functions, the role of the Queensland Police Service is very broad and very demanding. The Disaster Management Act 2003 and the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012 are two examples of pieces of legislation that are not administered by the Queensland Police Service but that give police additional functions and powers. These pieces of legislation impose demand for police services and, being administered by other departments, this demand can be difficult to manage. It may be difficult for the Queensland Police Service to persuade another department to streamline or eliminate processes given those processes impose no demand on the administering department and may in fact help other departments to manage their own demand. For example domestic violence is one of the biggest categories of demand for police services, although the legislation is administered by the Department of Communities.

The Review team also heard from interviewees that the Queensland Police Service attempts to be “all things to all people”, and perhaps this culture arises from its early history, where the police service was often the only government department in a town.

The Final Report Queensland Police Service Review Public Sector Renewal Board contains a range of ideas about how demand could be reduced and includes options to “deny” service or to “deflect” it to other agencies. The review team noted that this report focused on post event response and did not contain any options to prevent demand. In any case, as explained later in this chapter, without a clear notion of the cost of their activities, it is difficult for the police service to know how cost effective any given strategies would be. For the review team, this information must be at the heart of any effective demand management strategy.

Police manage events ranging from Schoolies which imposes regularly scheduled demand upon resources to sudden unscheduled demand created by public order issues such as the riots in the Brisbane southern suburbs in early 201390. The demand pressures also alter with

demographics, crime trends such as cybercrime and identity crime, and high profile crime such as Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs. The service is continually dealing with new and emerging challenges. For example advanced technology can be converted to a criminal use challenging the police to maintain vigilance and develop capability in new areas such as 3D printing. Such did not exist a few years ago, but can now quickly consume police operational time and budgets.

General Policing Demands

The Queensland Commission of Audit Report summarises service demand and crime rates. Later in this report, we raise a number of questions about the accuracy and reliability of some of the Queensland Police Service data. We also discuss inefficiencies and disincentives created by the Queensland Police Service reporting systems to accurately report and cost activities. However, the data supplied to the Queensland Commission of Audit Report shows that there has been a long term downward trend in some crime types and small increases in other types. The trends are important because they can be influential in determining priorities which in turn can impact upon frontline policing in terms of being reactive or proactive.

There is a direct relationship between effective policing and community safety and confidence. In Queensland, perceived levels of public safety not only affect Queenslanders directly but indirectly through export dollars linked to tourism, which for the year ending June 2011 earned $5.0 Billion.

Community expectation of police remains high as in other jurisdictions across Australia. These challenges face all services with a community policing role, however Queensland has additional challenges. Consideration needs to be given to the demands of the Queensland Police Service in the special challenges of policing the international border in the Torres Strait, the remote communities of the Cape York Peninsula and outback Queensland as well as the highly urbanised centres in the south east of the state.

91 http://www.pcworld.com/article/241605/criminals_find_new_uses_for_3d_printing.html
92 QCAR Pp 3-214 to 220
Focus group meetings were held with frontline police in Far North Queensland, Central and Southern Queensland as well as high profile policing areas such as Logan, the Gold Coast, metro north and metro south in Brisbane. Anecdotally, frontline police told the Review team that their work time is dominated by mental health cases, domestic violence, public order and volume crime such as petrol drive-offs.

The following table lists the top twenty calls to police\textsuperscript{94} for the period 1 July 2011 to 31 May 2012 and the average time taken for each job.

**Table 12 Top 20 calls to police: 1 July 2011 to 31 May 2012**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number finalised</th>
<th>Average time\textsuperscript{95}</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community assistance\textsuperscript{96}</td>
<td>48136</td>
<td>0:44:03</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disturbance/dispute</td>
<td>29624</td>
<td>0:55:52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Break and enter</td>
<td>20017</td>
<td>1:05:22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic violence</td>
<td>12729</td>
<td>2:26:29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Noise complaint</td>
<td>10869</td>
<td>0:21:48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic crash (NPI)\textsuperscript{97}</td>
<td>7941</td>
<td>1:13:30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mentally-ill person</td>
<td>6751</td>
<td>1:18:35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic offence\textsuperscript{98}</td>
<td>6617</td>
<td>1:02:58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wilful damage</td>
<td>6049</td>
<td>1:08:26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Police support\textsuperscript{99}</td>
<td>5815</td>
<td>1:12:20</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{94} Data sourced from CAD: Brisbane Central; Brisbane West; Cairns; Coomera; Gold Coast; Logan; North Brisbane, Oxley, Pine Rivers, South Brisbane; Townsville; Wynnum. The average time was calculated by dividing the total taken for all jobs in that category by the number of finalised jobs in the same category.

\textsuperscript{95} It should be noted that the average time can only be calculated from radio calls ‘on and off’ air unless entered into I-TAS or QPRIME as discussed in this report.

\textsuperscript{96} Community Assistance is a ‘catch all category’ that captures people seeking police assistance where it does not neatly fit into another category.

\textsuperscript{97} NPI – Nil Person(s) Injured

\textsuperscript{98} Traffic Offence includes traffic complaints hence the relatively high average time.

\textsuperscript{99}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Number finalised</th>
<th>Average time</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Drunk</td>
<td>5490</td>
<td>0:45:58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Traffic Crash – with injury</td>
<td>5324</td>
<td>1:47:37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stealing(^{100})</td>
<td>5226</td>
<td>1:23:06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unlawful use motor vehicle</td>
<td>4714</td>
<td>1:42:21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault</td>
<td>4276</td>
<td>1:38:17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missing persons</td>
<td>4251</td>
<td>1:45:10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Street disturbance</td>
<td>3583</td>
<td>0:51:08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport</td>
<td>3533</td>
<td>0:54:07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wanted/suspect person</td>
<td>3531</td>
<td>1:59:26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UIL/UID suspect</td>
<td>2997</td>
<td>1:32:13</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In one policing district the Review team was told that two police officers from a particular station were permanently involved in chasing down “petrol drive-offs”. Police were divided on the use of their resources in this way. Some police thought it was useful in that people who drive off without paying for petrol are often involved in other types of crime. Responding to “petrol drive-offs” was considered to have intelligence value.

Other police, and the Review team, see the problem as easily dealt with if service stations installed ‘pre pay’ facilities for petrol. While industry points out that the profits from a service station come from the shop and not the forecourt, it has to be said that industry holds the key to preventing this crime type. Just as target hardening has occurred with houses to prevent break and enters the petroleum retail industry could adopt target hardening. Other countries have adopted pre-paid system for petrol and some stations in other parts of Australia also adopt this practice.

\(^{99}\) Police Support is where Queensland Police Service supports another agency e.g.: QFRS
As is the case with some other crime types, the Queensland Police Service could also easily make a policy decision to not use resources to respond to drive offs until industry fixes the problem itself. Some progress has been made through online reporting of drive offs but it is considered by many to be a waste of time. The argument from industry is likely to point to the significant investment made into camera installations at retail outlets, however this has not eliminated the crime type.

The Review team acknowledges that the Queensland Police Service have attempted to reduce the time taken to investigate this crime type by having an online report, however we raise this as an example of how frontline resources could be freed up if the decision were taken to not investigate at all. This is a good example where police can work with industry and adopt a better priority system for frontline police.

Finding:
Demand for police services is dependent upon a range of factors that are both within and outside the control of the police. Demand will vary over time requiring a flexible and agile the Queensland Police Service.

The Review team looked at an example in the United Kingdom where collaboration and technology have been used to reduce retail theft through the use of initiatives such as FACEWATCH\(^{101}\). The Queensland Police Service joint venture with the University of Queensland and the Ipswich local government in the ‘Safe Cities’ project is an example of positive steps that share the problem while combining to develop solutions. Engagement with industry and academia is a positive initiative and one which ensures contemporary methodology and risk sharing.

The argument by some frontline police that chasing down petrol drive offs adds intelligence to what is happening in their area might dissipate when you consider that the Queensland Police Service conducts over three million random breath tests\(^{102}\) each year but does not seek driver’s licences or do registration checks on the cars that are stopped. Frontline police

\(^{101}\)Facewatch is the leading online crime recording and reporting system for tackling low level crime in shops, licensed premises, hotels and other businesses.

\(^{102}\)Annual Report 2011/12 p.145
say this is because conducting these checks ‘slows down the process’ which in turn prevents them from reaching their ‘target number’ of random breath tests.

When asked whether random breath tests are intelligence driven, the general response was that they are sometimes done for that purpose but in the main they are done for statistical reasons as targets are set nationally on a state by state basis.

Most police in Australia now use automated number plate recognition103 in conjunction with random breath tests to provide better targeted results from the random breath tests. At the time of this review Queensland had only 12 mobile ANPRs to be used state wide and the system is limited to the DTMR data downloads.

The Review team looked at the use of automated number plate recognition in other Australian jurisdictions and its use with regard to licensing and registration. The Review team considered that there is an opportunity to change driver behaviours by promoting the use and capability of automated number plate recognition. This is especially the case should Queensland eliminate registration labels as is the case in some other Australian jurisdictions.

The Queensland Police Service should be looking seriously at a mobile version of automated number plate recognition that is portable and can be operated across all aspects of policing. Better access to up to date Department of Transport and Main Roads data should enable smart phone or tablet capability. When the Review team looked at the automated number plate recognition business case from Queensland Police Service it was limited in its application across crime types. The Review team looked at the New South Wales Police model and would support Queensland Police Service adopting a similar system where every highway patrol car has been deployed with automated number plate recognition.

Government will need to address non-compliance and fine defaulters otherwise the effectiveness of automated number plate recognition and road traffic policing could diminish.

103 Automated Number Plate Recognition system
The Queensland Government may see an increase in revenue – not so much from an increase in infringement notices – but from an increase in compliance once the public becomes aware that they can be more easily detected for not registering their motor vehicles. There is also the issue of non-compliance with compulsory third party insurance. If these vehicles are involved in accidents, this non-compliance has the potential to impact on the broader community, who then have to share the burden in person injury cases.

**Finding:**

The Queensland Police Service have apparently interpreted consultations with the Privacy Commissioner to intend limiting the use of automated number plate recognition so that its use is less value than what might otherwise be the case.

**Recommendation:**

That as the Queensland Police Service moves to a digital platform the strategy around effective targeting and alternative automated number plate recognition models should form part of the design architecture.

**Recommendation:**

That the Queensland Police Service considers adopting the broader use of ANPR in line with other Australian jurisdictions in consultation with the Privacy Commissioner.

Most police stations in Queensland will have a front office that can be staffed by a combination of sworn and unsworn employees. Much of the work of the front office is perfunctory and can be managed by unsworn staff. The Review team found it interesting that within the portfolio of the Department of Community Safety, Queensland Corrective Services had introduced biometric readers or kiosks to efficiently and effectively capture the readout of persons who are on parole.

One of the tasks of front office staff in a police station is to record persons reporting on bail conditions. There is an option here to apply the same technology and examine in some locations whether it is feasible to use the one kiosk for both purposes.
There are a number of other front office tasks such as registration of certain occupations such as prostitutes that are better handled by a regulatory agency rather than a police organisation. Having police do motor traffic regulatory work, such as licences and registration, is an expensive option and needs to be justified from a ‘whole of government’ perspective where no other agency is available to do the work in a given location.

**Recommendation:**
That the Prostitution Licensing Authority be moved to the Department of Justice and Attorney General Office of Fair Trading.

The Review team was pleased to learn that the Queensland Police Service Child Safety and Sexual Crime Group had been provided with seed funding for a trial of a “supervision kiosk” to replace in-person reporting requirements for sex offenders recorded on the ANCOR database. However, rather than rush-in and commence the trial the head of the Child Safety and Sexual Crime group was deliberating about a broader use of the supervision kiosk. For example, if the kiosk trial was commenced, through engagement with other Queensland Government agencies, such as Department of Transport and Main Roads and the Department of Justice and Attorney General, the supervision kiosk could be used for everyday transaction required in other areas.

The use of supervision kiosks has been in place for some time nationally and internationally and is an excellent use of technology using biometrics, GPS and stored data. Portable fingerprint recognition systems are also available and in operation in some Australian jurisdictions as well as overseas.

**Finding:**
General policing demands need to be reviewed in line with alternative service delivery options.

**Recommendation:**
That the Queensland Police Service:

- identify policing matters that only a sworn officer can manage, or

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104 Australian National Child Offender Register
identify matters that can be handled more efficiently through the use of emerging technologies such as biometrics and scanners.

Mental health demands

In the focus group interviews with frontline police there was considerable discussion about the frequency and volume of mental health cases. The need for Queensland Police Service to involve themselves in mental health incidents is guided by the *Mental Health Act 2000* and the Queensland Police Service policy.

As can be seen from Table 1, mental health rates as the seventh most frequent call for service in the Queensland Police Service. Many frontline police believe this is because there is 'no one else to call'. Frontline police also make the point that unless they are successful in obtaining an Emergency Examination Order then they are likely to deal with the same person several times over with no resolution of the problem in the short term. The figure 4 below outlines steps in the assessment process on mental health matters.

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106 Section 35 of the *Mental Health Act 2000* provides for the power to take a person an Authorised Mental Health Service to undergo a mental health examination using an Emergency Examination Order.

Table 12 identifies that the average time taken to deal with a mental health patient is around one hour and twenty minutes. However, it is the volume of these incidents that is the real issue.

In 2011, the Queensland Police Service responded to more than 26,500 calls regarding people experiencing mental health problems. This translates across the state to 510 calls per week or 72 per day.

Once the police attend such an incident, they need to make an assessment about obtaining an Emergency Examination Order. If an Emergency Examination Order is required, the person needs to be taken to an authorised mental health service. In 2012, the Queensland Police Service completed 7,698 Emergency Examination Order which was a 2 per cent increase on 2011. In addition the Queensland Police Service is required to locate and return mental health patients who have absconded from an authorised mental health service. In 2012 there was a 17.5 per cent increase in the requirement for police to locate and return mental health patients to an authorised mental health service rising from 2,908 in 2011 to 3,416.
The Queensland Police Service brief on mental health issues to the Review team was excellent and it certainly reflects the anecdotal evidence obtained during our review from the frontline police. It would be easy to conclude that the diversion of police resources to mental health cases is not sustainable but that would be too easy a supposition.

Significant research has been conducted in this area of law enforcement in Australia and overseas and three issues remain:

- If the police were not to do this given their 24/7 presence, what other organisation could respond more effectively?
- There is likely to be an increase in frequency of both incidents and responses that is out of the control of the police to prevent.
- Many mental health issues can escalate into greater risks to community safety if not dealt with expeditiously and efficiently.

The Review team was briefed by a senior police officer on a trial taking place in Cairns to help deal with this problem. It is a ‘co-responder’ initiative that tries to achieve a joint response at the outset of the request for police assistance with a mental health case. This whole of government focus at the response phase is supported by some excellent strategy and communication at the senior levels of Queensland Health and the Queensland Ambulance Service.

**Finding:**
**Interoperability on the issue of mental health demands of frontline police is of a high standard.**

**Recommendation:**
That collaboration on new initiatives such as the co-responder model in Cairns continue and that if successful, initiatives should be considered for state wide or service wide adoption.

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108 Correspondence received from Queensland Police Service 10 May 2013
Domestic violence demands

In terms of demand pressures however, while mental health is a serious and continuing issue to be addressed by frontline police, the most frequent and time consuming demand on frontline police is that of domestic violence. The role performed by the Queensland Police Service in DV is set out in the Police Service Administration Act 1990 as well as the Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012.

The Queensland Police Service attends approximately 58,000 domestic violence incidents each year. If you extrapolate the data provided in Table 1 (recalling that this data is from a limited sample) where each case took approximately two and a half hours in response time, it equates to 18,125 shifts per year. Specific Domestic Violence Liaison Officers have been appointed to a number of districts however, frontline police say that their role has been eroded by the need to gather statistics as opposed to being proactive and managing some of the repeat offenders or victims to provide an intervention that might reduce demand.

The Review team takes the view that if data recording and processing was made easier for frontline police, then a proactive role in this area could be more effective. As with other crime types, the key opportunity to streamline processes without detracting from the outcomes (e.g. safety of domestic violence victims) lies in the implementation of better information and systems. Maintaining an understanding of the size of the problem is important and the Review team supports the role of the Domestic Violence Liaison Officers in this regard. The impost of domestic violence on the demand for services from Queensland Police Service is significant with most cases involving one or more of the following:

- statements to be obtained from victims and witnesses
- establishing prior contact with domestic violence support agencies
- obtaining forensic evidence where available
- recording other scenes of crime evidence such as photographs
- obtaining medical evidence
- preparing police statements and any brief of evidence

109 Correspondence from Minister for Police and Community Safety 23 May 2013
Where arrests are made the case will take longer to complete. In domestic violence cases there is also the danger of reoffending and so there is a need to protect victims and potential victims after the police response. The legislation provides for orders such as a protection order or ‘ouster conditions’ to protect victims and these can be in place for a number of days. Victims may obtain their own protection orders but in the main, this is done by the police. There is a ‘zero-tolerance’ campaign with domestic violence and currently the Queensland Police Service completes 65 per cent of the total domestic violence applications for protection orders.

The Minister for Police and Community Safety has recognised that the process to resolve domestic violence is convoluted and has sought to work with the police to streamline and improve the response to domestic violence. The Review team also noted reports of initiatives undertaken by the New South Wales Government to overhaul its system of response to domestic violence.\(^{111}\)

In terms of domestic violence policy, most frontline police saw this as difficult and can be more focussed on covering yourself in case the matter subsequently becomes worse. When the figures in Table 1 are extrapolated over a full 12 months, Queensland Police Service responds to nearly 60,000 calls to attend domestic violence matters. The cases can be time consuming and often involve the same people time and again with no real resolution.

The Review team was provided details of a new proposed response to domestic violence that has been championed by the Minister and is being developed in consultation with the departments of the Premier and Cabinet, Justice and Attorney-General, Communities and Queensland Police Service to make improvements. Engaging stakeholders in this manner is a positive initiative to address what is a complex and growing area of concern.

**Finding:**

Domestic violence cases handled by Queensland Police Service are complex and time consuming but a mobile reporting capability based on a digital platform can improve efficiency in this area.

\(^{110}\) The *Domestic and Family Violence Protection Act 2012* sections 101-107 Cooling Down provisions.

\(^{111}\) The Australian 25 June 2013
Recommendation:
That the roll-out of the Queensland Police Service digital technology should take into consideration adopting and facilitating new processes including the police response to domestic violence.

System issues

Cost attribution
The section entitled ‘police numbers’ describes the cycle involving the promise of more police officers at budget or election time. Additional police are commonly seen as a panacea for crime. However, the inability of the Queensland Police Service to attribute costs to its activities and the lack of a unit cost makes this cycle unsustainable. With the Queensland Police Service being unable to determine the real cost of their activities, it is difficult to say whether their resources are applied in a cost effective manner. In turn, it is difficult to know whether more, or in fact fewer, resources should be applied to any given activity. It may even be the case that more police officers are not required to produce evident improvements in public safety.

The Review team questioned the accuracy of the Queensland Police Service cost data, given that it has been based on survey data rather than a reliable activity costing model and system. In response to a request from the Review team about the activities of the Queensland Police Service, we were advised that in order to determine the total cost of each of the Queensland Police Service’s service outputs, the Queensland Police Service undertook what was known as a State-wide activity survey. The State-wide activity survey was used to allocate the Queensland Police Service budget (effectively, to allocate costs) across the services it delivers to Government. In the 2012-13 budget, there were five service areas in the Queensland Police Service budget:

- professional standards and ethical practice
- personal safety
- property security

Response on the Police and Community Safety Review transactional analysis received on 21 January 2013
• traffic policing

• public order and safety

This has now reduced to two services: crime and public safety and road safety. The review team is concerned that the Queensland Police Service has to date relied on a survey sample as a significant part of its calculations to inform Government about the proportion of the state allocation that it expends in the delivery of each of its service areas.

In the Queensland Police Service response it explained how the State-wide activity survey data was obtained:

*State-wide activity survey is an annual one-week survey of 30% of operational and support staff, to determine how they allocate their time. The survey enables the department to determine the amount of time operational police spend on each service area, and allocate costs accordingly....

Completing the survey takes staff over 2800 hours a year, and there is no real benefit for this effort. State-wide activity survey data is at best indicative and needs to be interpreted with caution. State-wide activity survey is not used within the Service to support internal decision making. Its sole purpose is to support external reporting.*

Prior to 2013, the State-wide activity survey process occurred twice a year, thus presumably taking about 5,600 hours a year to complete. After the Review team commenced and in early 2013, the Queensland Police Service dropped the State-wide activity survey. The Review team is concerned that a survey of only 30 per cent of operational staff and staff members who performed an operational role was relied upon for informing government through the Queensland Police Service Annual Report process and the Service Delivery Statement. Our concerns include the small sample size, whether the sample is random and the assessed level of reliability and validity of the data.
Our enquiries to the Queensland Police Service found that the sample size, although called a random sample is more accurately characterised as a sample chosen randomly from a specific segment of the Queensland Police Service population. Amongst other eligibility criteria, the sample was taken from staff of or below the rank of Inspector and of or below AO6 classification. Queensland Police Service indicated that the State-wide activity survey system would generate a participant list based on the criteria and that the State-wide activity survey coordinator would check this list to ensure that only eligible participants had been selected.

Although the Queensland Police Service has not statistically assessed the validity and reliability of the State-wide activity survey, a contractor engaged to examine demand management for the Queensland Police Service in 2009 raised issues with the State-wide activity survey’s ability to inform decision making, including that “survey data may not be sufficiently reliable” and that “the rank, role and duties of surveyed staff may skew survey results”.¹¹³

Finding:
The review team strongly believes that a cost allocation model based on actual rather than survey data would be a better approach to providing Government with information about how the Queensland Police Service expends its budget across its service areas.

The Review team is told that Queensland Police Service is now investigating the utility of the I-TAS (Intelligent Traffic Analysis System) to extract the data required for external reporting. The review team were told that I-TAS is capable of providing data on time associated with activities, and that modifications to the I-TAS system would provide the Queensland Police Service with significant capacity to measure activities and time attributed to them. However, there are a number of issues to be resolved, including that uptake is voluntary and ad hoc and there is no quality control of the data. Although I-TAS offers the only current measure of activity from which such data could be extracted, the use of I-TAS is not mandated across the Queensland Police Service, meaning it would again be a limited sample size.

¹¹³ Response from the Queensland Police Service 26 July 2013
Furthermore, its use as the primary source of informing government and the community on police service delivery could be problematic given that its original design was for another purpose (traffic related activity recording).

Without being too pointed, it seems that Queensland Police Service has no plans to implement a broad based activity costing model, despite the Review team having raised the issue and exposed key senior staff to models that are well embedded in other jurisdictions.

In the absence of a unit cost, a strategic workforce plan, an activity costing model and efficient information and communication technology capability – the delivery of more resources can simply compound any inefficiencies that already exist and ultimately have little impact on frontline numbers. This is made more acute if the data provided by the Queensland Police Service lacks rigor and has simply been provided and accepted on face value.

The Review team found many of these issues are of long-standing concern. The Fitzgerald Inquiry report of 1989\textsuperscript{114} found that:

\begin{itemize}
    \item there has, to date, been little emphasis on \textit{linking spending to performance}. P272
    \item \textit{There is a need to establish a resource plan reflecting such elements or factors as population, ethnicity, area, communications and transport facilities, crime factors and crime statistics and trends.}
    \item Resources are spread more and more thinly across an \textit{ever-widening range of activities}, with \textit{little or no overt policies} to establish and implement enforcement priorities. P 185
\end{itemize}

Both Queensland Police Service and Queensland Fire and Rescue Service are high cost agencies in terms of staffing, capital equipment and complicated industrial awards. More accurate, reliable and valid information about how money is expended in providing services to Government and the community is required.

\textsuperscript{114} Report of a Commission of Inquiry Pursuant to Orders in Council, the Honourable Justice Gerald Edward (Tony) Fitzgerald AC – provided to government 3 July 1989
Finding:
A new, integrated system is needed because there is no current system that connects finance and human resource systems in the Queensland Police Service. The Queensland Police Service should take care to integrate any new approach into its overall business approach, rather than develop a new problem specific solution, as has been the practice.

Recommendation:
That the proposed Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business be responsible for developing a cost attribution model for portfolio agencies, including the Queensland Police Service, as a priority.

Regional inconsistencies
While attempting to reconcile where staff are located across the current Queensland Police Service regional and district structure, The Review team sought clarification about the 417 staff allocated to ‘regional functions’. The Review team was informed that this figure includes anything from persons ‘on transfer’ between regions to scenes of crime officers who provide a service across all districts under a particular region. The risk with this type of description of duties is that it can become a ‘catch all’ for the disposition of large numbers of personnel with no focus on ensuring that they are contributing to frontline duties.

Interviews with frontline police revealed that there are differences in police practices across districts. Examples were given of differences in police practices and procedures between Brisbane’s ‘metro north” and ‘metro south’ districts. Interviews revealed that rostering practices; overtime practices and other everyday activities differ depending upon where you are stationed, giving rise to the observation that the old regional structure created fiefdoms. It is hoped the restructure will break this culture down to enable the Queensland Police Service to operate state-wide with consistency. Having said that, some frontline police were already bemused by the new type of reporting they were undertaking due to the idiosyncrasies of the person in charge of their new district. Whilst the Review team acknowledge that with different cultural and geographical challenges in the various regions there will be a need for some different approaches, it seems that there is no corporate approach or system to guide practice on these issues. It is very much dependent upon where and with whom you are stationed.
The information and communication technology approach

The Review team has been concerned by the extent to which the Queensland Police Service lags behind other jurisdictions in terms of its information and communication technology approach. Early in the review, Government requested that the review consider and provide advice on a submission from the Queensland Police Service for mobile data solutions. This submission formed a key platform of the Queensland Police Service’s proposed changes to the structure and governance (the Queensland Police Service restructure) but was based on old technologies.

The Minister has been supportive of mobile technologies, to the extent that he provided Queensland Police Service with ideas on options to fund a number of resources. Despite this, the Review team observed that the Queensland Police Service response to these proposals was both extremely slow and remarkably uninformative. This incident supported our clear view that the Government requires independent and objective advice about the business of its operational agencies.

Other police organisations in Australia\textsuperscript{115} and New Zealand have moved into the mobile technology space. Indeed, in the United Kingdom the police have adopted iPhones and iPads that are connected to technology in the courts reducing the need for written briefs of evidence and police notebooks.\textsuperscript{116}

The Review team was told about another information management system which has been put into place by the police working in the Townsville district. It apparently is a discreet SharePoint occurrence entry system not linked to the I-TAS mentioned above. The Review was also told that this system has recently also been introduced to the Gold Coast when a key officer was transferred from Townsville to the Gold Coast. Frontline police report that the use of this system by a geographically discreet area of the service can lead to a situation where information is not shared with other regions about a person or suspect who, if travelling to another region, might otherwise have been pursued.

\textsuperscript{115} For example, the AFP proof of concept of the iCops (interactive constable on patrol system)
The example provided to the Review team was that a person wanted in Townsville for questioning over a stealing offence can be spoken to by police in Brisbane who would have no knowledge or suspicion that the person is wanted in Townsville unless the entries in relation to that person have been correctly uploaded onto QPRIME.

The automation of perfunctory tasks such as traffic infringement notices has not been implemented in Queensland Police Service despite the technology having been available for decades. The result is that a council inspector or ranger can be using an automated infringement machine while across the road a traffic police officer is manually writing out an infringement notice.

Some overseas jurisdictions have already moved to issuing infringements notices and accepting payment all in the one transaction using mobile telephones similar to a smartphone

Frontline police interviewed by the Review team reported that QPRIME is extremely limited when it comes to criminal investigation work in that its search capability is poor. An example was given of trying to find a report where a person is listed as having a tattoo on their right leg. A specific search of the system like this can take a number of officers many hours or even days to find – if they find it.

It follows that with such inefficient and inept systems that operational police are using ‘work-arounds’ just to get the job done.

The Review team examined the information and communication technology profile of the Queensland Police Service with the Department of Science, Information Technology, Innovation and the Arts and the Queensland Government Chief Information Officer. It is clear that there has been less investment into information and communication technology by Queensland Police Service when compared to other agencies. I-TAS was itself a work

http://www.trimble.com/publicsafety.shtml
118 Department of Science, Information Technology, Innovation and the Arts March 2013
around system, and although it was a cheap option as it was developed as an ‘in house’ solution, it has limited support capacity.

Figure 5

Figure 5 depicts how well the business of information and communication technology is managed within the Queensland Police Service (blue shading) in comparison to other agencies across the Queensland Government (depicted by the thick black line). There is under performance on information and communication technology strategy and direction as well as financial management and over performance in governance and efficient use of resources while the Queensland Police Service is generally on par in the service delivery category119.

Finding:
The Review team agrees with the Department of Science, Information Technology, Innovation and the Arts analysis that this reflects poor information and communication technology investment decisions by Queensland Police Service, rendering it significantly behind comparable police organisations. The upside of this finding is that there is a significant opportunity to transform the Queensland Police Service through modern information and communication technology.

Recommendation:
That the Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business should overhaul portfolio information and communication technology and appoint a Chief Information Officer with appropriate qualifications and significant industry experience as a first priority.

119 Reproduced with permission from DISITEA March 2013
Ad Hoc solutions

Work-around solutions are common in the Queensland Police Service. For example, some police on the beat or mobile traffic patrols interviewed by the Review team explained that they have taken to purchasing miniature video cameras to record their activities. The cameras have limited data storage capacity. Frontline officers told the Review that they often download the data from these personally purchased cameras onto their home computers or hard drives to be able to access the images for future reference and to clear the camera for further recordings.

The practice is apparently commonplace and is known to senior management. The practice extends to images captured on personal iPhones where, for example, police will capture an image on their personal phone, transmit it to an officer with access to QPRIME or I-TAS and compare the images to identify a suspect.

Other Australian jurisdictions have mobile fingerprint readers to cross match a suspect with central database records which is a much better way to identify a person. It also protects the person’s privacy better than sharing photographs of the person.

The retention and storage of all types of data is a major issue facing both the public and private sectors. Addressing this problem of so called ‘big data’ needs to be done from a portfolio and whole of government perspective.

Finding:
The practice of downloading data for storage onto personal devices may be in breach of privacy legislation and importantly, because the records do not form part of official Queensland Police Service holdings, they are not captured under subpoenas issued to the department.

Recommendation:
That Queensland Police Service bring this practice to the attention of the Privacy Commissioner and discuss a new service wide policy on the retention of data to ensure that their officers are not acting in breach of the law.
**Recommendation:**
That the Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business consider ‘big data’ problems and solutions in line with the outcome of the efficiency review into the Queensland Police Service and ensure alignment with whole of government solutions.

The review team notes that the New South Wales Police faced similar issues and overcame them by corporately purchasing all the relevant equipment so that by owning the device they have better control of its use.

**Systems coordination and interoperability**
During the course of the Review team we were asked by Government to review a Queensland Police Service submission seeking additional resources for ‘in car’ computing. We did not support the submission largely because part of the submission was based on old technology. This simply reinforces the point that systems architecture and implementation is years behind other police jurisdictions in Australia and overseas.

In our Interim Report to the Minister we recommended that the Director-General Department of Community Safety and the Commissioner of Police seek external advice about the strategic and short term delivery of information and communication technology solutions to improve frontline capability, accountability and governance. The Review team was not an isolated review of the Queensland Police Service; it is a review of interoperability across all of the emergency services agencies and corrective services. The intention was that this recommendation would provide a joint review of systems.

The review team’s attempts to understand the complexities and disconnects between what frontline police and what management was telling the Review team led to an ad hoc meeting with a senior police officer. This senior officer provided details about the engagement of an information technology consultant in April 2013 (subsequent to the Police and Community Safety Review Interim Report). Had it not been for the candour of this senior officer, the fact that the Queensland Police Service had engaged this information and communication technology consultancy could have easily been missed during this review. The point is that despite several attempts by the Director-General of Department of Community Safety to engage with Queensland Police Service on an information and communication technology review, no joint activity was commenced.
It is disappointing that the Queensland Police Service did not reveal the engagement of the information and communication technology consultant until the review team sought clarification about the interconnectivity of Queensland Police Service systems. Even more disappointing is that Queensland Police Service engaged the information and communication technology consultant without consultation with the Director-General Department of Community Safety. This is yet another example of Queensland Police Service setting themselves apart and not considering themselves as part of a ‘whole of government’ contribution to the safety of the community.

Finding:
This lack of engagement by Queensland Police Service senior executives on this matter is disappointing. The lack of connectivity of systems operated by Queensland Police Service is costing the Queensland government money and efficiencies. It could cost the Queensland community even more if lives were lost due to poor systems or the lack of interoperability. On this point the Queensland Police Service demonstrated that they are not team players when it comes to some whole of government issues.

Recommendation:
That the Queensland Police Service executive team reassesses its preparedness to collaborate with other agencies to deliver a whole of Government approach to delivering community safety.

It is important to ask how the information and communication technology system developed into such a parlous state. The answer seems quite simple. The Review team was informed that different information and communication technology projects were assigned to senior police who then became the ‘project manager’. The project managers then went on to oversee the design and implementation of an information and communication technology solution. But the development of these systems appears to have taken place in vertical streams rather than across the organisation with little or no consultation with business areas or external stakeholders.
The review team examined the Fitzgerald Inquiry report\textsuperscript{120} and found that these issues were long-standing:

- \textit{The Queensland Police Department spent some $15.2 million on computer equipment over the past five years and introduced a number of new system applications… It is difficult to quantify the extent of any overall positive impact from this investment}… p268

- \textit{Police management of the existing Computer Branch within the Department has not been effective. Systems developed in the past lack necessary documentation, are not integrated, and have not been developed in accordance with a strategic computing plan or consistent standards}… The Branch needs an infusion of computing professionals. P268

- \textit{A civilian computer manager with extensive experience in mainframe applications is needed.} P 270

The fact that the Queensland Ambulance Service and Queensland Fire and Rescue have quite well developed information and communication technology systems including full CAD with automatic vehicle location capability in South East Queensland highlights the lack of interoperability across the emergency service agencies. Responsibility for Queensland Police Service not enjoying a similar posture rests squarely with the executive of the Queensland Police Service.

Yet another example of a lack of willingness to collaborate with partner agencies is seen in the development of the emergency vehicle priority system. The system is being trialled on the Gold Coast and involves the linking of the Department of Transport and Main Roads traffic management systems with Queensland Fire and Rescue Service, Queensland Ambulance Service and the Queensland Police Service.

The concept involves using technology to link the GPS position of emergency vehicles (on urgent duties with lights and sirens activated) with traffic management systems to clear an intersection ahead of the arrival of the emergency vehicle. The system is more elaborate than this simple description but the reader will understand.

\textsuperscript{120}Op Cit Fitzgerald 1989
The Queensland Police Service officers originally chose not to fully participate in development of the emergency vehicle priority project citing a lack of need to access this capability. This is despite the fact that there were in excess of 1,200 code 1 and 2 responses in the Southport division (where the emergency vehicle priority trial was held) in 2012–13\textsuperscript{121}. In Brisbane over the same period there were 81 code one responses and 14,739 code one and two responses.

**Finding:**
The fact the Queensland Police Service does not see advantages in actively engaging with partner agencies in the use of what on the face of it appears to be an efficient and safe technological solution appears to the Review team to be a poor reflection on the Queensland Police Service executive.

**Finding:**
The lack of coordination and disconnect between management and systems calls for a structural change to the corporate services provided to the Queensland Police Service. The duplication of effort and cumbersome systems confronting frontline police calls for an efficiency review, to be lead by the proposed Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business. The band aid solutions where systems have been bolted on to other systems or standalone systems have been created to fix a problem must stop.

**Recommendation:**
That the Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business leads an efficiency review of portfolio agencies beginning with the Queensland Police Service.

However, in fairness to all, the Review team has met many times with personnel in information and communication technology, including both police and the recently engaged consultant. We are optimistic that many of the issues raised during these discussions will result in better systems development and interoperability.

\textsuperscript{121} Code 1 and 2 responses generally require the activation of emergency lights and sirens.
Communications centres

The Review team visited a number of communications centres around the State. Most communication centres contain the same equipment and system and only vary in scale. There are 21 Queensland Police Service communications centres across the state approximately 800 staff. 122

The Review team visited several other centres in New South Wales and Victoria. Importantly, the Review team visited the communications centre of the Yellow Cab taxi company based in Brisbane at Woolloogabba. This communications centre controls incoming calls and job despatches for the whole of its fleet in Brisbane. This communications centre also performs this task for the taxi fleet in parts of Tasmania as well as other regional centres in Queensland. Using largely Commercial off The Shelf products this company dispatches up to 600,000 responses to calls for service every month, with a performance requirement of achieving 85% of these in less than ten minutes.

The Review team believes that there needs to be only one Communications Centre with a second site for redundancy and recommends that this be addressed in any efficiency review. The Public Safety Communications Steering Committee has, as a major part of its remit, been responsible for developing a portfolio position on communication centres. It goes without saying that no such position has been agreed to date. The Review team is aware that the Queensland Police Service has in various forums advocated for seven, four, three or even two communications centres. This level of inconsistency has not been conducive to reaching a final position. Observers of the Committee have commented that the committee has been a charade, and that there has been no will on the part of Queensland Police Service to work together on this issue.

The Review team understands that the Department of Community Safety have now developed a range of strategies to be considered to progress future arrangements and that these are predicated on an understanding between the agencies of having four communications centres.

The review team has elsewhere in this report recommended a new Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business and notes that this role would have accountability for delivery of a restructured communications centres approach.

**Finding:**

The improved governance by having one person accountable to deliver such reforms is expected to provide a far better solution than the current slow and unproductive committee approach.

**Recommendation:**

That the new Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business be accountable for delivering the reformed Communications Centre arrangement by the 2017–18 financial year in time for the Commonwealth Games of 2018.

**Systems issues summary**

As mentioned above, decisions made about expenditure on information and communication technology by the Queensland Police Service are lower when compared with the other agencies across the Queensland government. However, the lack of expenditure in this area is driving up indirect costs and creating both inefficiencies and frustration felt by front line police. Some senior managers in the Queensland Police Service interviewed by the Review team demonstrated a lack of overall knowledge of information and communication technology including the future of digital technologies despite holding managerial positions in the areas responsible for the development and implementation of information and communication technology projects.

Given the state of information and communication technology, the Review team conducted interviews with Queensland Police Service regarding the forthcoming G20 Leaders and associated meetings. Our conclusion is that the challenges regarding QPRIME enhancements, the Government Wireless Network (GWN) radio integration with Queensland Police Service systems and WEBEOC (used by a number of interstate police agencies) are receiving appropriate consideration.
Finding:
The Review team sighted a program summary provided by the Queensland Police Service and while there are significant challenges and milestones to reach in regard to information and communication technology for the G20 on the basis of the briefing provided to the Review team the challenges appear to be deliverable.

The Review team see the most concerning challenges facing the portfolio are the lost opportunities which are characterised by the Queensland Police Service stance on interoperability and capability development. The central causes for the lost opportunities are:

- poor or conflicting investment and business decisions across assets and procurement that have resulted in duplication and/or over-investment
- siloed thinking and a lack of incentive to work together across the portfolio resulting in systems that are not leveraged across the portfolio producing sub-optimal outcomes and increased risk to the community
- an apparent inability to leverage from the advances made in other jurisdictions in a timely manner, for example New South Wales and New Zealand, particularly in relation to mobile data.

Specific examples of lost opportunities include:

- Independent progression of Computer Aided Despatch strategies has resulted in separate systems for Queensland Police Service and QAS/QFRS which, as a direct result, do not have capacity for inter-CAD messaging and do not take full advantage of inherent capabilities of the system.
- Queensland Police Service is not able to automatically identify the current location of resources, other than the last known location (and only where the radio operator has entered this information).
- Queensland Police Service recently embarking on a separate ITC health check without reference to Department of Community Safety.
- Government cannot be confident that they are getting a true picture of crime and the challenges facing the portfolio because of cumbersome crime reporting systems.
• Unqualified people have been appointed to highly specialised corporate positions denying the portfolio the capability to operate as best practice.

• Producing a poor standard of information and briefings provided to the Minister and other entities such as the Review team that have also suffered from poor timing and co-ordination

• Queensland Police Service (and Emergency Management Queensland) not being seen as a team player in the disaster management space.

**Finding:**

The current approach to systems development across the portfolio is unsustainable and ineffective both from a cost and operations perspective.

**Recommendation:**

That a suitably qualified Chief Information Officer with whole of portfolio responsibility is appointed to oversight corporate support and capability development

**Recommendation:**

That systems development in the Queensland Police Service capitalises on the advances made by the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service in recent years.

**Recommendation:**

That the Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business in consultation with the Police Commissioner and the Commissioner Fire & Emergency Services and should provide the direction for future information and communication technology strategies and acquisitions.
Governance

A consultancy, Deloitte, was engaged to provide a review of governance after this was raised with Queensland Police Service during the conduct of the Review\(^{123}\) and following the submission of the *Police and Community Safety Review Interim Report* on 27 March 2013. The review was delivered to the Commissioner of Police on 13 May 2013.

The outcomes of the Deloitte’s review generally accord with the observations and findings of the Review team, for example an inconsistent project framework, lack of a Queensland Police Service strategy and accountability for delivery of that strategy, and a lack of succession planning. As can be seen in Table 13 below, which is reproduced with permission from Deloitte, a significant number of these findings were identified as high priority.

Table 13 *Key Issues Identified while undertaking the current state assessment – Deloitte Review of Governance*\(^{124}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>QPS Objective</th>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Observed Issues</th>
<th>Priorities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Decisions</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>The right level and type of decision is not always taken to BoM and committee meetings, resulting in inefficient use of committee members' time.</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>From observations of committee meetings, it is unclear which committees are decision making and which are consultative.</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>There is overlap in scope between committees, which has resulted in papers requiring decisions being taken to multiple forums to seek advice on different aspects of one issue (e.g. people, financial, projects, ICT).</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>There appears to be little devolution of responsibility for decision making to QPS managers, rather responsibility for decisions rests with executive management at committees.</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>The role and responsibilities of the Chair and Secretariat are not always clear, e.g. who should be driving the agenda; who sets the minimum standard for paper submissions, etc.</td>
<td>High</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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\(^{123}\) Queensland Police Service Governance Review commenced 3 April 2013 and provided to the Review team on 23 May 2013

\(^{124}\) Deloitte. Queensland Police Services Governance Review Report May 2013 pp 16-18
- Secretariats are often regarded as the subject matter experts rather than a governance advisor and often prepare, submit and present papers that are outside of their area of expertise, at committee meetings.
- A bottom up approach is currently taken towards the development of agendas and committee meetings, whereby any QPS personnel can request an item be added to the agenda.

| 1.6 | Matters reserved for the BoM and other governance committees are not explicitly defined. | High |
| 1.7 | Committees are too large to allow for effective decision making. | Medium |
| 1.8 | A lack of clarity has resulted in confusion around the roles of the committees and their members (Chair, Secretariat, committee members, observers and the committee itself; advisory, decision making, information sharing, consultative (to build consensus), etc.) | Medium |
| 1.9 | Individual’s delegations within the financial, HR, procurement and non-financial delegation of authority documents are not consistently applied in practice as individuals are not empowered and held accountable. | High |

- There is significant overlap of membership and the composition of most committees appears to be very ‘top heavy’, indicating poor investment of committee members’ time.

| 2.1 | There is significant overlap of membership and the composition of most committees appears to be very ‘top heavy’, indicating poor investment of committee members’ time. | High |
| 2.2 | While a QPS strategy does exist, there is not a QPS-wide strategy that explicitly details how and who within the organisation will be responsible for delivering the strategy. The lack of a plan diminishes the organisation’s ability to align operational plans and resourcing requirements to strategies. | High |

- Once a QPS-wide strategy is in place, there is should be robust and regular quarterly monitoring and oversight to measure performance against plan.

| 2.3 | Once a QPS-wide strategy is in place, there is should be robust and regular quarterly monitoring and oversight to measure performance against plan. | High |
| 2.4 | There is an inconsistent project framework for governance, planning, approval, assurance, oversight and monitoring of projects across QPS. The Major Projects Framework which is currently in place is not consistently followed and can be circumvented. | High |

- Performance requirements and the accompanying evaluation process for committee chairs and members, and for the BoM and committees themselves, are not clearly defined.

| 2.5 | Performance requirements and the accompanying evaluation process for committee chairs and members, and for the BoM and committees themselves, are not clearly defined. | Low |
| 2.6 | There is limited diversity of opinion at the BoM and limited succession planning for key governance roles. | Medium |

- There is no policy framework which defines the hierarchy of policies, procedures, work instructions and provides guidance on their content. There is no explicit schedule of BoM approved major policies which set the tone and direction for QPS.

| 3.1 | There is no policy framework which defines the hierarchy of policies, procedures, work instructions and provides guidance on their content. There is no explicit schedule of BoM approved major policies which set the tone and direction for QPS. | High |

- There does not appear to be a compliance policy and framework which includes breach escalation and monitoring within the governance structure for compliance with laws, Government

| 3.2 | There does not appear to be a compliance policy and framework which includes breach escalation and monitoring within the governance structure for compliance with laws, Government | Medium |
Although the Review team also made similar observations, our proposed solutions differ. The Review team recommendations propose a portfolio approach to ensure broader alignment and interoperability and to capitalise on the existing structure of corporate services in the current Department of Community Safety. The Review model is also intended to deal with the role to be performed in emergency management as well as a higher level of corporate governance with the creation of a Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Services.

Workforce issues

Prior to the commencement of the Review there was publicity given to the Commissioner’s powers to dismiss officers who were found to be unsuitable for continued employment in the Queensland Police Service. At the time the Review commenced an unrelated review was being conducted by former High Court Judge the Honourable Ian Callinan AC QC and Professor Nicholas Aroney, Professor of Law, University of Queensland into the *Queensland Crime and Misconduct Act 2001*. The disciplinary systems of the various agencies in the Queensland Police Service and Department of Community Safety portfolio were not a term of reference.

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It was also noted by the Review team that considerable policy planning and discussions were being undertaken both as a part of the Queensland move to ‘open Government’ and the ‘open data strategy’. These strategies aim to achieve the elements of integrity identified in the Callinan/Aroney review as being, honesty, fairness and openness.

There have been a number of reviews of police disciplinary systems around the country including the Taylor Report into the Victoria Police disciplinary system and the report of both the Wood Royal Commission into the NSW Police and the subsequent establishment and reviews by the New South Wales Police Integrity Commission.

Although not a term of reference, the Review team does advocate a ‘managerial approach’ to police discipline to enable matters to be dealt with efficiently, effectively and transparently without resort to lengthy delays and processes. Equally, the Commissioner needs to be able to have confidence in those officers employed to discharge their duties under the provisions of the Police Service Administration Act 1990. A move to underpin ‘loss of confidence (in employees)’ provisions for the Commissioner of Police through legislation is supported by the Review team but it will need to be considered in light of the overall Queensland Government reviews of Queensland’s integrity framework.

The Review team did not conduct a review of the 2013 restructure of the Queensland Police Service. It is within the Commissioner of Police’s prerogative to structure the Queensland Police Service organisation under the provisions of the Police Service Administration Act 1990128. The reduction in commissioned officers appears on the face of it to be a positive initiative as the ratio of supervisor to staff appears excessive and is likely to be imposing overheads in terms of efficiency and costs.

Generally, the more ranks that are in an organisational structure, the less efficient it can become and examples were provided by Queensland Police Service frontline officers to the Review team. There are nine ranks in the Queensland Police Service, which is generally in line with other police services around Australia. Other reviews have recommended a reduction in ranks and the Review team supports this. The number holding each rank is also

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127 For example 2003 Review of AFP Disciplinary System by William fisher AO QC
128 Section 4.8
worthy of examination. Figures provided to the Review team show that there are 3,065 sergeants/senior sergeants to 7,108 constables a ratio of only two constables for every supervisor, and although we acknowledge that not all senior officers will have a supervisory role, it still seems to be a high number compared to the rank of constable129.

During the focus group meetings with frontline police, many did not see the value of the role of sergeants employed as brief managers and crime managers. These roles were described as post boxes rather than a value add role. A third group of supervisors identified as ‘XO’s or executive officers were described as being ‘underutilised’.

The Review team recognises that some geographic locations will require the presence of a sergeant or ‘officer in charge’ of a police station to comply with legislation. Such requirements, if unable to be changed through legislation or restructure, can skew the supervisor/member ratio.

The Review team noted that in Australia wide comparisons the Queensland Police Service prefers to separate out each rank level so Senior Sergeants are compared to the number of Sergeants, and Sergeants are compared to Senior Constables, and Senior Constables are compared to the number of Constables. The reality is that the organisation does not work in such a strict working ratio of each supervisory rank to the next subordinate rank. According to frontline police their work groups are more homogenous at the non-commissioned officer levels. Broadening the base of the ratio obviously provides a more favourable data picture.

Finding:
On the face of it the current rank structure does not appear to be efficient.

Recommendation:
That the proposed efficiency review includes a focus on the rank structure of both the Queensland Police Service and the proposed Fire and Emergency Services.

129 Police Positions Table provided by the Queensland Police Service 26 June 2013
The Review team recommends that in any efficiency review, the Queensland Police Service take the advice of its governance consultant and reduce the number of ranks or make them more related to workload/responsibility/accountability.

For example, at the time of writing, about 202 police officers were on long term sick leave and 239 were on return to work programs and another 216 officers on permanent medical restrictions. Therefore at the time of the Review some 650 officers were not available for frontline duties. Approximately 100 staff are ‘out posted’ to areas such as the Crime and Misconduct Commission (80), and various joint agency or joint departmental projects (20). This removes approximately 750 officers from frontline activities.

At the time the Review commenced there was no strategic workforce human resource plan. Human Resource procedures appear to be wedded to entrenched practices of the past. For example, in discussion with front line police the notion of casual employees to meet peaks and troughs in demand appear not to have been considered. Such practice is common place in the private sector security industry and there is no reason why it could not apply to the police service particularly with events such as ‘schoolies’ and major events such as G20 and the Commonwealth Games. The reticence to embark on this type of program was also recognised in the Queensland Commission of Audit Report\textsuperscript{130}.

The Queensland Police Service outsources off duty police for activities such as supervising road works, providing security for sporting events, Drink Safe precincts, wide load escorts and attending Brisbane Traffic Management Centre during peak hour times and other activities.

The Review of Queensland Police Service Presence at the Brisbane Metropolitan Transport Management Centre (BMTMC)\textsuperscript{131} offers an example of the kind of review of functions that could be undertaken.

\textsuperscript{130} Pp 3-229
\textsuperscript{131} Review of Queensland Police Service Presence at BMTMC 1 July to 31 December 2012
Recommendation:
That the proposed efficiency review consider whether special service functions are core business, whether this practice is sustainable, and other options such as the use of casual employees.

Rostering
Rostering is seen by frontline police as lacking in efficiency. As mentioned, not having connectivity between people and finance systems in the Queensland Police Service is a real barrier to efficiency but to not have online rostering can also impact morale.

By comparison, although the imposts of rostering Queensland Fire and Rescue Service staff are vastly different and considerably simpler than Queensland Police Service, the principles are the same. By way of example, Queensland Fire and Rescue Service roster all Brisbane Regional Staff from one central office, other regions are done on an area (district) level by officers who themselves are on shift and performing normal operational responsibilities. Queensland Fire and Rescue Service use an electronic roster systems which staff can access from home if required, it does not however link to any human resource system so the inefficiencies in terms of linkages to payroll are similar.

There are 38 police staff around the state employed as ‘roster clerks’. When the Review team sought details about rostering practices with a view to bringing them online we received correspondence from the Queensland Police Service management that stated:

\textit{Note that the introduction of a rostering solution would not change the number of roster clerks required. Savings, if achieved, would more likely come from Shared Services not having to manually enter overtime/penalties. Roster clerks would still be needed to design the roster to meet operational needs.}

The Review team had not reached the point of examining a solution at the time this correspondence was received but the attitude exhibited in the response is typical of the material presented to the Review team by the Queensland Police Service.
Together with the “Final Report: Queensland Police Service Review Public Sector Renewal Report” and the mobile services program business case\(^{132}\) there was a continual “drip feed” to the Review team from Queensland Police Service which was not optimal in conducting this review.

It is the view of the review that some areas of the Queensland Police Service have a change resistant culture and lack innovative thinking\(^{133}\). There are systems available in other organisations that draw on historical workload information to predict required staffing both in terms of number and skill sets. The Review team believes a review of these systems would support a reduction in the number of clerks or at the very least reduce time impost to prepare rosters thereby producing greater capacity within the existing officers.

**Recommendation:**

That the Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business promote innovation and drive cultural change in terms of business practice.

### Operational shift allowance

An operational shift allowance is paid to sworn staff (currently at a rate of 21% of base salary of dependent upon the operational nature of their duties)\(^{134}\). The allowance is paid as a composite in lieu of certain penalty rates and weekend work and has a number of provisos depending upon the permanent or temporary nature of the position occupied by the officer at a given time. An Operational shift allowance can be paid to persons on recreation leave and sick leave.

An Operational shift allowance is an allowance that is highly sought and can sometimes be easier to pay to work colleagues than to discontinue it depending upon where the delegation to approve its payment rests.

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\(^{132}\) Provided to the Review in August 2013

\(^{133}\) In early June 2013 a Request for Information was sought from the market for an automated roster system

\(^{134}\) Determination 10 provides for an OSA of 21% of an employee’s base salary will be paid to employees in operational shift positions who equitably participate in operational shift rosters, and during periods of temporary absence from an operational shift roster, as provided for by this Schedule:
The Review team terms of reference do not include a review of the operational shift allowance but it is clearly a human resource issue that is in need of constant monitoring given the costs involved. To maintain the integrity of the allowance it should be subject to regular audit to ensure that its intent is not diminished.

The Review team was informed that the only way to gather the evidence about operational shift allowance to place before the Industrial Relations Commission to mount the case in the most recent Enterprise Bargaining round was through manually collecting the rosters and tallying the details for submission to the industrial relations commission.

**Diversity and talent identification**

There appears to be a distinct lack of diversity in the senior ranks of the Queensland Police Service as evidenced by recent appointments to some very senior positions. ‘Like’ appears to promote ‘like’ and in the absence of an objective talent assessment process this trend is likely to continue. There is a perception that people are appointed to positions based on loyalty rather than the skills and ability they bring to the position.

As stated earlier in this chapter the Review team was not asked to conduct a review on the Queensland Police Service but it is easy to see from the table below how diversity in the organisation could stagnate and become characterised by ‘group think’. In the absence of an intervention to change the makeup of the workforce the culture of the Queensland Police Service is likely to remain unchanged.

The breakup of police gender by rank as at 30 June 2013 appears in the following table:

**Table 14**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>% Female</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commissioner</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deputy Commissioner</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
For Sergeant and above only the lack of diversity is even more pronounced, with 586 out of 3,479 officers being female – that is 16.8 per cent. In terms of how diversity is valued in the Queensland Police Service, the Review team observed on a number of occasions senior female police officers (including of commissioned rank) being utilised to make tea for meetings. Clearly, this sends the wrong message about the role of women in the service and how they are valued.

Some senior officers interviewed as part of the Review team are clearly not driving change in the organisation and are therefore impeding constructive change. Police are promoted to positions apparently with little regard for the specialist expertise or skill set required of the position.

An example is in information and communication technology, an area demanding urgent attention as discussed elsewhere in this chapter. It appears that Queensland Police Service has missed an opportunity to appoint a Chief Information Officer with industry knowledge and connections, and instead appointed a police officer with no specialist knowledge, albeit with a good understanding of business systems.
The Review team understands that Queensland Police Service have now engaged a consultant to fill this gap rather than have an expert in the role being given operational advice from Queensland Police Service staff. The practice of having Senior or Executive Police in Command of specialist (non-policing) areas appears common throughout the service and should be questioned as to whether this is the best model.

Having said that, during the Review two very senior officers working in information and communication technology positions were incapable of articulating the move to digital technology and the opportunities it presents. Another senior communications officer was unable to accurately describe how the Queensland Police Service information systems related to one another.

Succession planning based on a strategic overview of the skill sets required to “future-proof” the Queensland Police Service is missing from the current arrangements. The Review team considers that Queensland Police Service needs to reintroduce its ‘assessment centres’ that were dropped in 2006 for reasons not apparently connected with the objectives of the scheme. These centres were used to identify talent and the Review team believes that they are key to supporting the promotion of a diverse workforce and the suppression of any old boy network.

Today, staff development opportunities are currently largely left to the individual and an allowance is paid to individuals to develop themselves in a way that suits them. The lack of a systematic approach to talent identification and development may be also be impacting on the lack of senior women in management of the Queensland Police Service.

**Finding:**

Some human resources practices are not necessarily delivering strategic outcomes.
Recommendation:

- That the Queensland Police Service in consultation with the Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business move to re-establish assessment centres and establish a transparent succession planning model that values diversity and looks at options other than police for key positions; and

- That the Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business adopts such arrangements on a whole-of-portfolio basis (including for Fire and Emergency Services).

Efficacy of demand management

Once you scratch the surface, the Queensland Police Service is not a modern police organisation when it comes to managing its workload. The Review team was surprised and disappointed to find how poorly the frontline officers of the Queensland Police Service are supported when it comes to operating systems and demand management strategies.

The absence of reliable systems has denied the Queensland Police Service the opportunity to quantify demand for its services. It has also limited opportunities for innovation around managing demand, as previously discussed.

The Review team observed a flurry of activity surrounding issues as they were raised at review interviews. It is as if the organisation was attempting to stay ahead of the review. Examples are the development of the mobile services program business case, the Deloitte review of governance, and the decision to abandon State-wide activity survey (with no proposal to develop a robust activity costing model). The Review team also noted that when we were first introduced to I-TAS on 21 February 2013, it was referred to as the Intelligent Traffic Analysis System. By the time we received the mobile services program business case in August it had apparently been renamed the Intelligent Tasking Analysis System.

Frontline officers were candid that some of the hype surrounding media events promoting new strategies are far from the reality of what they face. This type of window-dressing may make the community feel safer, but it doesn't have any significant effect in reducing demand.
The use of special video sunglasses, and new hubs of task force police to deal with outlaw motorcycle gangs looks good in the media. As one officer explained:

*Not only do we have to protect the community but we have to look like we are protecting them too (so promotion in the media even if not a reality is important)*

Outside of the State Crime Command, there is no priority of taskings, there is limited automated cost/time attribution for all the activities of the organisation and there are major disconnects across its operating systems. It was noted by the Review team that the Queensland Police Service quite rightly enjoys a very good reputation in dealing with high profile major crimes. These crimes appear to be effectively prioritised with the State Crime Command apparently processing workload demand differently. The Review team understands the difference between the demands of response police work on the frontline, however the principles applied by the State Crime Command to effectively deal with their workload could easily translate to general and traffic policing.

**Police numbers**

There appears to be some confusion in the senior ranks of the Queensland Police Service about the ability of the Commissioner to determine the mix of sworn and unsworn staff and their deployment. There is a prevailing view that successive governments’ decisions have been the key barrier to creating a mix of staff that sees frontline police at the operational sharp end of the business and staff members appropriately supporting the frontline. Having said that, the Queensland Police Service is in line with national standards in terms of the proportion of sworn/unsworn staff\(^{135}\)

Legal advice sought at the request of the Review team makes it clear that the Commissioner of Police can determine the mix of staff, limited however by budgetary constraints and any legislative issues in terms of police or staff members being able to perform a specific role\(^{136}\). However, the police assert that the power under the legislation is usurped by Treasury whose job it is to ensure that the ‘police numbers’ promised by successive governments become a reality.

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\(^{135}\) ROGS 2013 fig 6.1, p 6.4

\(^{136}\) Letter from Deputy Chief Executive (Resource Management) Queensland Police Service 18 February 2013
The police numbers conundrum is one that faces almost every jurisdiction. Politicians have a penchant for promising more police. Once very low in the policy priorities of governments, police are now a common focus for attention which is reflected in the volume of media dedicated to police activity.

The number of sworn officers has traditionally been important to successive governments and will often be a point of contention during election campaigns with promises made to ‘increase frontline’ police numbers.

The Review team reviewed undertakings given by successive Queensland Governments over the past ten years. Some 260 promises or undertakings were made by governments of both persuasions to increase policing numbers, improve legislation and policy or provide better facilities and equipment. The Queensland Police Service provided the following table as an example of the past approach:

Table 15

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Government commitment</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1996-1998</td>
<td>Increasing the police to population ratio from 193 police per 100,000 population at 30 June 1995, to 225 per 100,000 population by 2005, equivalent to the national average.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998-2001</td>
<td>Reach a sworn strength of 9,100 officers by 2005.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001-2004</td>
<td>Increase the police strength by nearly 1000 to reach the target of 9100 by 2005.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2004-2006</td>
<td>Maintain numbers above the national average and put more than 500 sworn officers back on the beat.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006-2009</td>
<td>Ensure the police-to-population ratio remains better than the national average.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009-2011</td>
<td>Provide 600 new officers in the term of the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012-</td>
<td>Provide an additional 1100 police over 4 years</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The problem is that these increases have not been based on any knowledge of the unit cost of a Queensland police officer or a detailed understanding of the costs or demand pressures, as discussed above. The Queensland Police Service would greatly assist government
decisions by being able to quantify demand, and provide information on the effectiveness of its demand management strategies.

The business of policing is more than just numbers of police – it is about capacity. The capacity to deliver law and order can be a composition of legislation and policy, technology, joint arrangements with related agencies or partnering with the private sector. It will require fortitude to take a fresh approach.

Media will often focus on a particular law and order problem and the government will often feel compelled to respond. The cycle is completed by a promise of more police or a shift in resourcing which can sometimes treat the symptom and not the cause. The services or options provided by other agencies at all levels of government in collaboration with the police can be overlooked in the haste to find quick solution for a rapid media cycle.

This cycle of event/response/promise of more resources is not sustainable and can mask inefficiencies in systems and how policing is conducted. In effect, Queensland Police Service does not need to be able to produce better data and more information on the cost of its services because despite any inefficiency they are likely to be promised more police officers at a budget cycle in the not too distant future. Perversely this can drive a desire not to improve reporting capability, as good data may not support the resource increases being promised.

In turn, by being unable to pinpoint the effects of adding more police resources, the argument for more resources can be made again and again on similar grounds, chiefly the perception by the community about their safety. By subverting a need to think differently about how police deliver their services, this cycle may also masks opportunities to capitalise on the skill sets and diversity of civilians and can prevent a focus on private/public partnerships.
Moving personnel around the State can be problematic. Apart from a constable’s initial posting immediately after recruit training, forced transfers are not common. Legal opinion provided to the Review team from the Queensland Police Service\textsuperscript{137} is that:

The Commissioner has power in the Police Service Administration Act to transfer or deploy police officers and staff members. This power can however be constrained by either Ministerial directions, compliance with Award or industrial provisions, or with provisions of Regulations and the Public Service Act.

The relative ability to transfer officers around the state can inhibit the delivery of service, in that it makes it difficult to transfer police on a permanent basis. The Review team noted and supports a new hubbing arrangement introduced during the course of the review. In this model additional resources are sent to a central location to deal with particular crime problems.

**The sworn/unsworn mix**

The Review team concurs with the Queensland Commission of Audit observation that given the legislation governing the Queensland Police Service\textsuperscript{138} allows for flexibility on sworn/unsworn numbers that a more comprehensive analysis of risk could be undertaken to determine both the size and makeup of Queensland Police Service\textsuperscript{139}.

Policing numbers and location have largely been based on the ratio of police to population\textsuperscript{140} but this creates a conundrum for government. If the police are effective in their work in preventing crime and the community develops a level of resistance to crime then the requirement for police may reduce. The beneficial outcome that could result would be the location of police stations and resources could be based upon risk rather than population as recommended in the Queensland Commission of Audit Final Report\textsuperscript{141}. However, it is well recognised that while it is very easy for governments to open police station, it is near impossible to close them without push back from the community. Part of the conundrum is

\textsuperscript{137} Letter from Deputy Chief Executive (Resource Management) to the Review 18 February 2013
\textsuperscript{138} Letter from Deputy Chief Executive (Resource Management) Queensland Police Service 18 February 2013
\textsuperscript{139} Queensland Commission of Audit Final Report P 3-227.
\textsuperscript{140} Report on Government Services 2012 Volume 1: 6.5
\textsuperscript{141} Op Cit P3-227
that people will feel safer if there is a police presence and if you remove the presence our community tends to react negatively, even where the productivity of those police is well below other parts of the state.

Similarly to the issues identified within the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service chapter, the lack of any approved service delivery criterion leaves the Queensland Police Service and Government exposed to criticism and prevents authoritative debate. In the case of the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service, the Review identified that the organisation and Government can be criticised and pressured to increase the number of stations and staff based on an increase in a community’s population. Particularly for the Queensland Police Service however, the use of population figures alone is not valid and assumes that similar population sizes require similar resourcing, without proper consideration of geographic and demographic factors or crime profile.

Recommendation:
That the CEO Portfolio Business collaborates with the two portfolio Commissioners to:

- develop an analytical tool is to identify the most appropriate level of service
- identify the need for new or enhanced services
- reduce the level of resources where appropriate
- identify current anomalies regarding service delivery and therefore opportunities for rationalisation of stations
- consider collocation with other services as a first principle before committing to new capital projects.

If the Review recommendation of an efficiency review into the Queensland Police Service is accepted then a model looking at police numbers based on risk could be developed along with options for built in surge capacity. It is important however, to not consider a police presence in isolation of the availability of other government and community resources. Further, the efficiency review should include considerable analysis of the expectation of end
users, especially considering the increased use of technology such as Policelink and other e-reporting methods which essentially occur in lieu of any face to face interaction.

**Triple zero and Policelink**

Calling triple zero or Policelink is often a first option for many people because an event may not fit easily into the category of needing an ambulance or fire truck. Some police credit television crime scene programs for raising the expectations of the public that forensic police will attend every crime and that every crime will be solved expeditiously.

The Queensland Commission of Audit Report details the number of calls made to triple zero at the Brisbane Police Communications Centre during a one week period in December 2011:142

- 4 per cent of calls from the public required an immediate urgent police response
- 40 per cent of the calls from the public required an immediate (non-urgent) response
- 46 per cent of calls from the public could be managed through other communications channels, such as Policelink, or did not require a police response
- 10 per cent of calls were redirected from Policelink (6 per cent) and emergency service agencies, such as the Queensland Ambulance Service and the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service (4 per cent)

The adoption of Policelink was an attempt to triage the calls coming to police and to provide better tracking of demand and response.

The QCAR determined that in order to reach its targets in triaging away from triple zero, the Queensland Police Service needed to better promote Policelink to the community. Better use of Policelink will assist in managing the very high level of demand for policing services. Another aspect of demand management and response is the absence of a commercial approach. For example, most insurance companies in Australia provide the public with a means of digital transfer of images and data to report claims. Most claims for insurance involve a police element in the transaction to either provide a ‘police report number’ or to provide verification of some of the detail of the claim.

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142 Queensland Commission of Audit Final Report Pp. 3-222
The Review team looked at a mobile app developed by Suncorp insurance which enables claimants to provide details, including photos of a car accident in which they have been involved. This is an excellent example of the kinds of innovations that can remove a level of burden from the police while also improving their service to the community.

The Review team noted the introduction of the Queensland Police Service ‘Crime Map’ as part of the Government’s open data policy and sees this as an opportunity to directly involve the community with the Queensland Police Service frontline services. We also noted that the current iteration of the iPad Policelink app only deals with perfunctory matters. The current homepage for the Queensland Police Service online reporting merely diverts the public back to the Policelink, thereby limiting its utility.

Finding:

Policelink in its current state can be better promoted and applied; however, serious consideration needs to be given to enhancing a model of Policelink through the creation of a police portal. A police portal will offer the community contemporary connectivity and can offer police the opportunity to apply algorithms and logic to identify crime patterns and problems areas.

Recommendation:

That:

• as a priority, the Queensland Police Service expand its development of a police portal to receive and post information to the public to make it interactive; and

• the Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business develops portfolio wide interactive opportunities for the community to directly deal with portfolio agencies.

On the other side of the demand management ‘coin’ is the issue of how effectively resources are applied to the demands for service. As discussed elsewhere in this report, to enter data onto
Q Prime, police are required to return to the station to type it in, or call Policelink so the data can be entered by an operator. The New Zealand Police service has recently introduced its Policing Excellence Program, which provides 6500 iPhones and 390 iPads to frontline staff. It is estimated that this program will save at least half an hour per person per shift – approximately 520,000 hours per year. This may also reduce the need for some physical assets by reducing the need for police stations and reducing the demand on radio communications.

*While on the move, the devices see frontline staff able to access Police-specific applications that provide job critical information relating to people, vehicles and locations. In turn, by having this data literally in their hands, officers are more situationally aware, improving their option-taking and decision-making when interacting with offenders, victims and law-abiding citizens*\(^{143}\).

The Review team viewed a similar roll-out with New South Wales police involving android tablets, which were ruggedized and portable enabling officers to take the tablet from the car to the scene of the event and directly input data onto the New South Wales police mainframe\(^{144}\).

The Review team was asked by the Queensland Government to comment on a Queensland Police Service submission about mobile data early in the review. Had the submission been approved by government, it would have wasted significant money on old technology. A more sophisticated business case, focussed on smart phones and tablets, has since been developed by Queensland Police Service.

The Review team is also aware that other agencies are interested in and actively pursuing similar capabilities. The Review team visited Roma Street Fire Station to examine the technology being trialled in the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service vehicles. The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service was utilising standard 3G connectivity to enable crews to access organisational systems whilst on the road and directly interface with the CAD system enabling voice free communication of status, thus freeing up valuable ‘airspace’ on

\(^{143}\) Policing Excellence Implementation Overview – New Zealand Police p.9  
\(^{144}\) NSW Police Force OPP and Mobility presentation 22 July 2013
the radio network. The Queensland Ambulance Service have utilised radio network dependant mobile data terminals for some time for despatch and messaging from units. Despite what the Review team considers somewhat obvious benefits to be achieved by a collaborative approach on such issues, there is little evidence of any meaningful collaboration or sharing of information or strategy in this regard. This is particularly important given the time police expend in administration duties as discussed below.

**Administration duties**

Frontline police told the Review team that they are spending up to 60 per cent of their time using the Queensland Police Service information management systems that at the moment can only be accessed by returning to a police station. It should be noted that on the I-TAS data below, the figure is closer to 40% but it needs to be kept in mind that the use of I-TAS is not mandated across the whole organisation and therefore the figures in the charts below do not necessarily represent the total time of all police using ITC systems. That figure is not known to Queensland Police Service despite police reporting being so central to understanding demands and demand management.

The Review team was provided an indicative breakdown of activities by rank using I-TAS data covering the period 1 July 2011 to 31 May 2012.
Chart 1: I-TAS Sum of Total Hours - Rank of Constable

Chart 2: I-TAS Sum of Total Hours - Rank of Senior Constable
Alternative approaches and key performance indicators

Some frontline police activities have not altered over time. We have already mentioned above that the number of police is often determined and benchmarked per head of population. There is no broadly accepted ‘response time’ as there is for the Queensland Ambulance Service and the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service. There are some key performance indicators in places like the police call centres where call answer time is measured but there is a distinct lack of key performance indicators in some of the operational activities.
The Queensland Police Service has forensic crash units to deal with serious and fatal motor vehicle accidents. These incidents can occupy at least a shift to deal with the issues. Added to this, the road is often blocked for many hours. The Review team interviews with the forensic crash units reveal some work practices that could be reviewed beginning with the location of the units. Frontline police say the location of some forensic crash units resources are leading to lengthy delays in the forensic crash units attending the scenes of serious accidents.

Before the forensic crash units is called to attend an accident scene, the communications centre, Policelink and/or ‘000’ Emergency obtain the details. Often there can be a delay of up to an hour or so before someone calls the forensic crash units.

Once at the scene, the forensic crash units will carry out its forensic examination of the scene which on most occasions occurs while the vehicles are ‘in situ’. Decisions about road closures and openings are not made by the forensic crash units. Often, these decisions are made by a more senior officer at the scene. There is a ‘division of labour’ at such scenes according to police which sometimes leads to indecision and confusion. The different agencies (sometimes personnel form the same agency) do not, as a matter of course, develop an agreed outcome with specified key performance indicators. Everyone tends to do their own part of the job without apparent consideration of the overall impact or cost to the community.

Unlike some other organisations, Queensland Police Service does not have any key performance indicators around the clearing of roads after fatal or serious injury accidents. Part of the reason for this could be because the police are internally trained by persons who have been in this profession for a long time, and thus continue to teach it as they performed it. This is the way it has always been done and there is no apparent catalyst for change. However, it is the review team’s belief that busy cities can no longer afford this approach.

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145 British Transport Police KPI for fatal rail accidents is to open the track within 90 minutes.
When police make a decision to close a road or public place, there is often no avenue to question that decision. Such decisions sometimes have an economic impact where those affected have no recourse. For example, during the Review we saw the Story Bridge closed for a fatal accident for nearly six hours and we saw Brisbane’s central business district shut down because of a gunman for several hours.

This not to say that any of the decisions made on the day were wrong and in fact in the case of the gunman what was potentially a highly dangerous incidence concluded safely. What concerns the review team is the lack of transparency with no available recourse for review. Debriefs are not, to our knowledge, held publically or publicised in any open forum. A simple solution may be through social media or similar means that would provide the public with current information. It would also provide a forum for the exchange of information between business, the public and police and therefore help to understand any flow-on impacts. Cross agency debriefs, or debriefs including private and public stakeholders may be of benefit.

While the operational decisions may well be based on sound judgement there are no KPIs and certainly no way the Queensland Police Service can accurately measure the economic impact of those decisions. In the absence of better information systems linking finance, human resource and operational outcomes the situation is unlikely to improve. According to our interview with the Brisbane City Council there is data available on the cost impact of closing a major highway or an arterial road.

In fairness, the Review team observed that this not a matter confined to the police as fire trucks have a significant impact on traffic flow.

Finding:
There is little direct opportunity for the community and business sectors to understand crisis management decisions made by the police and emergency services.

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147 BMTMC Contribution to Network Efficiency Final report, Centre for Transport Strategy University of Queensland January 2008
Recommendation:
That the Chief Executive Officer portfolio business and Commissioner of Police in line with the government’s open data policy consider introducing an improved social media style forum for interaction with the community and stakeholders across the portfolio.

Recommendation:
That the efficiency review of the Queensland Police Service develop options for better management of community expectations and divesting the organisation of historical practices.

As is the case with criminal investigations by the plain clothes branch, a case management and prioritisation model needs to be developed and implemented. One assumes that general duties police are as much in need of such systems as more specialised areas. Once data integrity is assured, then resources can be aligned with risk and demand rather than merely based on numbers or population size.

The Review team agrees with Queensland Commission of Audit Report which espouses a transition towards mobile and digital platforms to drive changes to service delivery models.\textsuperscript{148} The option of policing hubs and mobile police stations is similar to how the Queensland Ambulance Service has implemented its I-Roam capability around hospitals rather than brick and mortar ambulance stations. The Queensland Ambulance Service model provides an almost ‘virtual’ service delivery model.

In contrast to the management of information and communication technology systems used by the Queensland Police Service; other aspects of the frontline work of the organisation in the area of cybercrime and the exploitation of children on line are at the head of their field. The senior managers of both the Fraud and Cyber Crime Group and the Child Safety and Sexual Crime Group have been widely acclaimed for both their innovation and commitment nationally and internationally. They and their teams are a credit to their organisation and deserve to be singled out for praise.

\textsuperscript{148} QCAR P 3-226
Reporting and data issues

Data integrity

This report has made comment on the potential use of I-TAS to inform costing allocation. When the Review team expressed concern about the fact that the State-wide activity survey is described as being unreliable data but was being used to inform government and the community of the outputs of the Queensland Police Service our concerns were initially dismissed. Furthermore, when the Review team sought to look at the I-TAS system we were told that there was no other system like it being used by police anywhere. When the Review arranged presentations on alternative systems in use by other Australian police organisations, some senior Queensland Police Service people working in the statistics area of Queensland Police Service were sceptical and thought that no such system existed.

It was further noted by the Review team that in the Mobile Services Program Business Case document mentioned above and prepared for the Queensland Police Service by a consultant, the I-TAS is now referred to as being the Intelligent Tasking Analysis System\textsuperscript{149}.

The engagement of the consultant who developed the digital business plan should be viewed as a positive step and an indication of what can be achieved when expert advice is sourced.

The Review team was advised on 10 July 2013:

\textit{In early 2013 the Queensland Police Service ceased SWAS which was considered to save at least 2,800 hours of employee time.}

In the same correspondence\textsuperscript{150} the Review team was advised that on 14 June, 2013 the Queensland Police Service Senior Executive resolved to examine the use of I-TAS as the corporate data system for the organisation. It is not clear whether this step was taken as a result of the Review team’s interest in the Queensland Police Service statistical reporting. In

\textsuperscript{149} Op Cit Pp. 13

\textsuperscript{150} Email to the Review team from Queensland Police Service with attachments dated 10 July 2013
the information and communication technology profile report of the Queensland Police Service produced by DISITEA in March 2013, I-TAS is listed in the ‘risks’ category because:

*The servers operate in a single data centre. Need to address limited support capacity for this product*¹⁵¹

The minutes of the Executive Conference do not indicate a ‘return date’ for this examination of the use of I-TAS for this purpose. Nor is it clear to the Review team whether or not the decision by the Senior Executive Conference was made with any reference to the concerns expressed in the Department of Science, Information Technology, Innovation and the Arts report.

Further, in the material provided by the Queensland Police Service in July 2013, as this report was being prepared, there was no indication as to how data would be collected and measured since the dropping of the SWAS and I-TAS was being explored as the alternative. Nor was it clear as to whether the Queensland Police Service will mandate the use of I-TAS and whether the system could accommodate service wide use given the risks identified by Department of Science, Information Technology, Innovation and the Arts.

**Finding:**
Without some type of regular external review provided by either the proposed Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business or a Board, a Director-General or oversight committee, it cannot be guaranteed that the current business and management practices adopted by the Queensland Police Service will not continue.

**Recommendation:**
That the Queensland Police Service Commissioner addresses the situation regarding statistical reporting. The Commissioner, in collaboration with the Chief Executive Officer Portfolio Business and the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service Commissioner should also examine the opportunity to acquire the services of a qualified and experienced Chief Information Officer or Chief Digital Officer in line with other Queensland and Australian government agencies.

¹⁵¹ Department of Science, Information Technology, Innovation and the Arts, March 2013
Operating systems and operational reporting

Senior police executives working in the information and communication technology area gave the Review team a candid description of some of the shortcomings of their operating systems. The frontline police very powerfully and consistently reinforced these shortcomings. We will attempt to explain the process through the use of a scenario, confirmed by both senior police and frontline practitioners.

The central hub of operational information is QPRIME, developed by the Queensland Police Service with implementation beginning in 2006, to replace over 230 siloed legacy systems. QPRIME is based on NicheRMD that is a Canadian system used by more than 100,000 police organisations around the world. It is understood by the Review team that the Queensland Police Service did not buy the full NicheRMD capability, however we did not examine that aspect any further preferring instead to focus on the impact QPRIME is having on frontline staff.

Since developing QPRIME, the Queensland Police Service has developed many other systems some of which are linked to QPRIME while others are not. According the frontline police the organisation is characterised by police developing their own ‘in house’ systems in order to get the job done.

The following scenario depicts a typical window on the current problems:

Citizen ‘A’ returns home from work and discovers that someone has broken into their home. Citizen ‘A’ is encouraged to contact the police through ‘Policelink’ rather than dial ‘000’ unless the intruder is still at the house. This is standard practice across most Australian jurisdictions. Policelink staff will take a report of the matter and go through a format of questions that are entered onto QPRIME\(^\text{152}\) and answers which are also recorded. The job is then sent to a communications radio centre where the radio operator will use the Computer Aided Despatch (CAD) system to allocate the task to a patrol car.

\(^{152}\) QPRIME is the central hub of operational information that replaced over 234 legacy systems and is based on a system used by over 100,000 police organisations around the world.
Unlike the Queensland Ambulance Service and the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service, the Queensland Police Service did not fully activate its CAD system option for automatic vehicle location. This means that the radio operator has no idea where the nearest patrol car might be unless a patrol has recently logged “on or off” the radio network. The radio operator will therefore simply make a call for the nearest car in the particular patrol district.

At this point of the process, the system relies heavily upon the integrity of the patrols to announce that they are the nearest car or for a supervisor to intervene and allocate the job. In any event, without AVL, the radio operator cannot see the nearest car to be able to allocate the job accordingly. It was openly stated by frontline staff that some jobs which might be considered distasteful or not exciting will sometimes not evoke a response from patrols while other jobs are eagerly taken up because of the nature of the incident.

In our example, it could be hours or even days before the police attend the incident depending upon its priorities and the workload of the patrol district. In some very minor matters, it can be weeks before the complainant is interviewed by police.

However, with other types of crime, for example, an armed robbery in progress, both supervisors and the radio operator will cut across the workload of the patrols to ensure a timely response. If the matter is non-life threatening, the general approach is that police will attend when it is possible. This difference in response separates the Queensland Police Service from other agencies in the Police and Community safety portfolio – Queensland Fire and Rescue Service and the Queensland Ambulance Service are driven to perform by the regular and high profile reporting of response times performance measures.

The Review team was advised that until recently, police did not attend break and enters of residences where the offender(s) were not present but that has since changed in favour of gaining the intelligence.
This is not meant to be a criticism of the police but managing their workload is problematic if it is not measured and costed efficiently. Some jobs such as those involving mental health issues or sudden deaths can take extraordinarily long times.

Once the police attend the break and enter in our example above, the police have three options:

- They can use the complainant’s phone and ring the details of the job back to Policelink (a sometimes time consuming process that can take several attempts to complete),
- They can return to the police station and report back to Policelink and either use the telephone or they can use Policelink Intranet Reporting (PIR) to directly input the results onto QPRIME, or
- They can simply take no further action

**Policelink**

The purpose of police officers ringing through to Policelink is that there are expert data entry operators who can efficiently input the data onto QPRIME. Frontline officers say that there is computer based training provided to up skill officers but it is easier for most if they ring through and have someone else input the data.

As an aside, it appears some frontline officers expedite computer based learning modules by sharing responses so they can get through the modules more quickly. The Review team did not examine this any further but there are obviously solutions to this problem, as most online training in the public and private sector is vulnerable to the same fate.

The Review team was told by police officers that trained data entry staff required less than 50% of the time taken by officers themselves to input data. It was also stated that this process serves as a quality control, which is important as this data feeds into the national reporting for crime statistics. However, lengthy delays are often experienced by police trying to telephone through their information. As a result, the intranet direct input capability (PIR) was developed. The development of PIR appears to be another example of an ad hoc, problem specific solution.
Also identified by frontline police and conceded by some senior executives is that of ‘underreporting’. In our example of police being called to a rudimentary break and enter this is very unlikely to be the only job to which the patrol car has been asked to respond. Other jobs of a higher priority will, understandably, push our break and enter example further back in the list of jobs to be done.

Prioritisation generally is determined by competing interests not the least being to have to go through the arduous task of entering data onto the Queensland Police Service systems.

The Review was not asked to specifically review the veracity of data entry but almost all frontline police who were spoken to concede that their workload and the cumbersome nature of their reporting systems was a disincentive to accurately and fully report their work. It is also human nature that the most interesting work will get the most complete report. Anecdotally, much of this reporting is done either on overtime, or in the officer’s own time if for some reason there are overtime restrictions.

**Finding:**

The Review team cannot be conclusive but based on the interviews with staff and having an understanding from consultants about the Queensland Police Service operating systems it is likely that the Queensland Police Service is under reporting incidents. That is not to say that there is any deliberate attempt to not report accurately. It is quite the opposite. Frontline police are frustrated at the way they have to go about this part of their work. The commitment of frontline police in these circumstances is to be commended.

**Recommendation:**

That the roll-out of the mobile service program business case mentioned earlier

- Be specific about gateways and milestones; and
- If the new technology enables improved data, the Queensland Police Service revisit previous statistical reporting and identify any major anomalies.

As the police investigation into our break and enter example described earlier unfolds or more details become available, the police will need to complete a ‘supplementary report’ to update the details of the job in the QPRIME system. Depending upon whether or not someone is charged, the supplementary process can continue for some time.

Quite separate to the eventual attendance of the patrol car in our example of a break and enter above, a decision will be made whether or not to seek the attendance of the scenes of crime officers. These crime scene examiners will ask the complainant similar questions to those asked in the initial phone call to Policelink as well as the questions asked by the patrol team who first attended the incident.

The complainant will therefore have had to explain the break and enter three times to suit the requirements of the Queensland Police Service information management systems.

Areas identified by frontline police that are of concern arising from the above police procedures and practices are:

- Embarrassment associated at having to ask witnesses and complainants for the same details several times over;

- Having to resort to the use of the complainant’s phone to contact Policelink to upload the details of the report (at times of personal grief or trauma this can be an encumbrance so many police choose to use their own phones);

- PIR reporting is seen as being more efficient but it can be cumbersome – there can be up to an 8 hour delay in updating QPRIME from intranet reporting;

- Duplication of effort by different elements of the police service; and

- Cross examination of witnesses which can reduce the probative value of their evidence.
Finding:
The rollout of the Mobile Services Program has the potential to overcome many of the issues raised by frontline police.

Recommendation:
That should the Mobile Strategy in its current form be approved by government the CEO Portfolio Business and the Deputy Commissioner Operations:
- monitor the success of the mobility strategy
- report on a quarterly basis to government on the achievement of the identified saving presented as part of the mobility strategy business plan (1414 FTE $174 million)
- report on the achievement of the increased frontline police numbers from this initiative of 1,587 FTE on a quarterly basis.

Other issues

Interoperability – emergency management
The Queensland Police Service is a major contributor to disaster management arrangements in Queensland as described in the Disaster Management Chapter. This role is supported by the Review team but with reservations as to how it is performed as explained in that chapter.

During the Review several stakeholders expressed concern about a lack of consultation prior to the police restructure. In a convoluted attempt to establish the veracity of those claims it is clear that the majority of the consultation with external stakeholders affected by the restructure occurred after the announcement in early January 2013. In fact the response to this simple question characterises some of the challenges in dealing with the Queensland Police Service.

After asking the question on two occasions it became clear that some senior officers identified that there may have been insufficient prior consultation. A final response to the question was eventually received almost a month after the initial question was asked. The
contents of the final response on this issue did not acknowledge any shortcomings in the consultation process. Instead, it simply outlined the exchanges that occurred after the restructure commenced.

The primary concern of stakeholders is how the restructure fits with local government and other emergency service boundaries. Internally, views were expressed by police affected by the changes that they lacked logic in the final break up of staff/accommodation. However, the Review team acknowledges that resistance to change is quite normal and did not seek to further review the restructure.

**Finding:**
The Review team is of the view that there was insufficient consultation with stakeholders on the restructure and the manner in which the Queensland Police Service chose to not acknowledge that further consultation should have taken place serves to highlight some of the challenges ahead.

**Recommendation:**
Those final determinations of disaster management districts include consultation with the Local Government Association Queensland, the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service and other Government departments.

**Recommendation:**
That in establishing new disaster districts, the first guiding principle must be to align with local government boundaries and that divergence should only occur when there is a need to address a unique local circumstance.

**Interoperability – The justice system**
Increased demand on police services has a downstream effect on the Director of Public Prosecutions, Court Services, Corrective Services and the whole Justice and Attorney General portfolio. The Review team spoke with the Chief Justice, the Chief Magistrate, the Coroner and representative groups from the legal profession about the adoption of technologies to improve the interoperability between the courts, police and corrections.

The Review team also looked at the role of police prosecutors and whether or not that should be handed across to the State Director of Public Prosecutions. A ‘pilot’ scheme of
using the Director of Public Prosecutions rather than the police prosecutions corps commenced some time ago and is ongoing. While many of the persons interviewed agreed that the pilot had been very successful, many also conceded that a severe limitation to completely handing over prosecutions to the DPP is the remoteness of some parts of the state.

It is considered by many interviewed on this topic to not be cost effective to have a Director of Public Prosecutions office outside of the populated areas. In many of the locations there is a police station and hence resort to a police prosecutor is likely to be a more efficient and cost effective outcome. Having said that, there was universal support for improvements initiated in the recent past through access to technology as well as the implementation of the Moynihan reforms\textsuperscript{153} aimed at streamlining and modernising court processes.

The Review team was encouraged by the high level of constructive discussion and action to improve court processes from all parties. These reforms are continuing and are returning benefits both in human rights and costs. The reduction in the requirement for prisoners to be moved around the state, particularly for mention matters in court is the result of excellent collaboration and concessions from all parties.

Support for better and more use of technology in the courts is extremely positive. For example, there appears to be sufficient support to deal with mention matters or matters of consent by email.

Finding:
The Review team identified two aspects of the adoption of new technologies yet to be resolved:

- the ability for a legal representative to obtain signed instructions from a client in matters dealt with via video conferencing
- creating the ability to conduct simultaneous and multiple video conferences for court matters and solicitor/client meetings.

\textsuperscript{153} 2010 \textit{Review of the civil and criminal justice system in Queensland}
Both matters can be simply resolved especially when you consider the capability of electronic signatures transmitted from portable devices to conduct other transactions. The issue of police being used in Watch Houses and also for prisoner transport duties is discussed in the Corrections chapter. Suffice to say, that the Review team agrees with the Queensland Commission of Audit Report that many of the police roles in this space can be outsourced or civilianised to enable police to focus on the demand for frontline services.

**Recommendation:**
That efforts by the courts, the Director of Public Prosecutions, the legal profession, Queensland Corrective Services and Queensland Police Service to adopt technology for court processes should be supported through Government funding in so far as they create efficiencies, result in lower costs and produce better human rights outcomes.

**Special services**
The Review team learned of the involvement of the Queensland Police Service in the provision of ‘special services’ which is a commercial operation involving police working at roadwork sites, sporting events, conducting wide-load escorts, speed camera services and a number of other ‘non-core’ activities.

In the absence of an accurate unit cost for the services of a Queensland Police Officer (at any rank level) it is difficult to understand how the Queensland Police Service can be confident that it is charging an appropriate fee for these services. This situation would presumably also relate to the purchaser(s) of those services. There can be a risk that the Queensland Police Service takes on by providing these services, remembering that the private sector is effectively transferring its risk to the Queensland Police Service. It is unclear whether or not risk is appropriately factored into the price of these special services.

**Finding:**
The Review team supports the Commission of Audit recommendations along the lines that the Queensland Police Service remove themselves from these non-essential roles and free up their resources for their core functions in accordance with the provisions of the *Police Services Administration Act 1990.*
During the Review the Queensland Police Union expressed the view that performing these extraneous activities, often on overtime, produces revenue for individual officers who would suffer financially if the services were withdrawn. The Union also raised concerns about safety of road users if police were not used for wide loads as the use of civilians in this role is often met with contempt by road users if police are not providing their ‘authority’ over activities such a ‘wide load escorts’.

The Union would also have interests related to the ‘normal’ working conditions of serving police. If off duty police resources are used for these services on overtime rates, it means that the police members who already have a demanding role to perform in their normal duties are being called upon for additional work.

**Finding:**
The Review team believes that the reliance on overtime from ‘special services” activities should not be normalised. Other jurisdictions have long divested themselves of these roles. If the Queensland Police Service has spare capacity to perform special services, perhaps there is a need to revisit the service delivery model.

**Recommendation:**
That the proposed efficiency review of the Queensland Police Service examine whether:

- the Queensland Police Service is losing money from indirect costs associated with extraneous activities through sick leave or additional overtime shifts allocated to cover officers undertaking ‘special services’ activities

- there is a degree of transfer of risk to the Queensland Police Service when their services are ‘bought’ for commercial activities such as crowd control for private events.

**Finding:**
Within the Queensland Fire and Rescue Services chapter the Review team has recommended a review of the commercial division of that organisation, with a view to ensuring compliance with all necessary obligations for conducting a business and determining true profitability (or otherwise) of that unit.
Recommendation:
That the review of this Queensland Fire and Rescue Services business unit be done in conjunction with the efficiency review proposed for the Queensland Police Service.

Westgate
One of the promises made in the 2006 State Election was for a new state of the art police academy to replace the existing academy at Oxley. $450 million was originally provided for the Westgate project. The site was formerly the Wacol Institution and is situated between Brisbane and Ipswich. A driver training facility was opened on the site in November 2010.

Questions arise however, whether further investment in a brick and mortar academy will deliver the expectations envisaged in the original business case. Suggestions that the site be used as an emergency services training facility sound plausible but closer examination reveals that QFRS, for example, is unlikely to forgo their current academy site at Whyte Island as it is operates as a private/public partnership. The Whyte Island training facility is also collocated with industry which is mutually beneficial.

In academic institutions and industry around the world, most teaching is now delivered or can be delivered ‘on line’ which needs to be factored into a revised concept and strategic plan.

Finding:
The Review team understands and supports the original vision for the academy but time has moved on and some of the original thinking has been overtaken by events and technology.

Given the alternatives, consideration needs to be given to the costs and benefits of this project for the Queensland Police Service of today. The Review team is aware that there have been significant costs arising from the comprehensive Heritage Listing of the site, for example, and these issues need to be carefully weighed against the benefits that directly arise from this project.
The Review team has researched some of the directions being taken by other Police and Emergency Services internationally and considers that the review of Westgate proposal should examine these in more detail to with a view to identifying possible alternative models for delivery. The review team considers it likely that any such review will reveal a number of options which may require less capital investment from Government and provide partnership opportunities on a long term scale.

The Review team is aware the London Metropolitan Police Service has entered in partnerships with the private sector for fleet maintenance for example and is considering possibilities in the Training (leadership and Learning Services) arena and other traditional in-house services. The Review team has also reviewed the model of the London Fire Brigade which has signed a 25 year contract for the outsourcing of training.

**Recommendation:**

That as the Queensland Police Service moves to a digital platform the strategy around effective targeting and alternative ANPR models should form part of the design architecture considerations.

**Recommendation:**

That a new business case for Westgate project should be prepared by an independent party.

**Recommendation:**

That should the Westgate project proceed, that consideration must be given to opportunities to partner the investment with the private and public sectors. The business case should also consider alternative facilities such as Australian Defence Force sites.

Consideration of Australian Defence Force alternatives is consistent with the emphasis on counter terrorism and Special Emergency Response Team contained in the current project manager’s report.¹⁵⁴

¹⁵⁴ Queensland Police Academy Project Manager’s Report 16 February 2013
Alternatively, the Queensland Police Service could seek broader government interest in the site should the Queensland Police Service divest itself of that part of the site in which they have no further interest. It is acknowledged that there are sunk costs in the site in the form of the driver training track but a new business plan may look at other government department/private sector interest in the driver training facility as well.

As was pointed out in the Queensland Commission of Audit Report, the Queensland Police Service has the highest level of assets both as an agency and on an individual employee basis. Underutilisation of those assets and not seizing opportunities to combine with other agencies is also recognised in the audit report\(^\text{155}\)

The Review team did not review training duration or content of the Queensland Police Service recruit training courses other than to note that there is not a large difference between the Queensland Police Service and other Australian jurisdictions with the exception that some jurisdictions:

- have different arrangements for engagement of recruits who pay their way through the police academy and can get higher education subsidies
- access the recruit resources more quickly through greater acknowledgment of recognition of prior learnings\(^\text{156}\)

### Alignment with Government priorities

#### Ministerial direction

Under the provisions of the *Police Service Administration Act 1990* the Minister is entitled to provide a general direction to the Commissioner on the administration and priorities of the police service\(^\text{157}\) based upon advice from the Commissioner. That advice should, however, be based upon empirical evidence. Currently, this evidence is not available due largely to a lack of cost allocation ability.

\(^{155}\) QCAR Pp 3-231 to 3-236  
\(^{156}\) Recognition for Prior Learning  
\(^{157}\) *Police Service Administration Act 1990* S4.6
4.6 Communications between Minister and commissioner

(1) The commissioner—

(a) is to furnish to the Minister reports and recommendations in relation to the administration and functioning of the police service, when required by the Minister to do so; and

(b) may at any time furnish to the Minister such reports and recommendations as the commissioner thinks fit with a view to the efficient and proper administration, management and functioning of the police service.

(2) The Minister, having regard to advice of the commissioner first obtained, may give, in writing, directions to the commissioner concerning—

(a) the overall administration, management, and superintendence of, or in the police service; and

(b) policy and priorities to be pursued in performing the functions of the police service; and

(c) the number and deployment of officers and staff members and the number and location of police establishments and police stations.

(3) The commissioner is to comply with all directions duly given under subsection (2).

The provisions of Section 4.6 are reinforced by the provisions of Section 4.7
4.7 Recording and publication of communications

(1) The commissioner is to keep a register in which are to be recorded—

(a) all reports and recommendations made to the Minister under section 4.6(1)(a); and

(b) all directions given in writing to the commissioner under section 4.6(2); and

(c) all reasons tabled by the Minister under the Crime and Misconduct Act 2001, section 64.

(2) Within 28 days following 31 December in each year, the commissioner is to have prepared a copy of the register, which copy, being certified by the commissioner as a true copy of the register is to be furnished forthwith to the chairperson of the Crime and Misconduct Commission, with or without comment of the commissioner.

(3) Within 28 days following receipt of the certified copy of the register, the chairperson is to give the copy together with comments of the commissioner relating thereto, and with or without further comment of the chairperson, to the chairperson of the Parliamentary Crime and Misconduct Committee of the Legislative Assembly.

(4) The chairperson of the Parliamentary Crime and Misconduct Committee of the Legislative Assembly is to table in the Legislative Assembly—

(a) the certified copy of the register; and

(b) all comment relating thereto; within 14 sitting days after the chairperson’s receipt thereof.

The Review team was advised that the Queensland Police Service use the above provisions and the Fitzgerald Inquiry more generally,\(^{158}\) both as an excuse to keep at arm’s length from the Minister and the Queensland government as well as an excuse or reason for not engaging with government on other matters.

This was not a term of reference for the Review but it was of sufficient concern to see the Fitzgerald recommendations used in this way that we sought clarification.

Former Judge, Tony Fitzgerald AC QC generously gave of his time to discuss the above dilemma. Nearly 25 years on from Mr Fitzgerald’s seminal work on corruption in Queensland, there remains a genuine desire not to ‘throw the baby out with the bathwater’ and revert to a situation where improper influence is brought to bear on the police organisation by its political masters.

The Review team has carefully considered the recommendations of the Fitzgerald Inquiry, and do not consider any of this report’s recommendation to be in conflict with that report. The Review team would not wish to provide any recommendation that would in any way diminish or otherwise displace the recommendations of Mr Fitzgerald.

The Review team found it intriguing that when we first questioned the ratio of supervisors to frontline staff we were told it is because of ‘Fitzgerald’ and the requirement to have added supervision. Unfortunately, as outlined in the previous sections neither the supervision nor the information and communication technology systems have produced an efficient frontline police model.

We have taken the liberty to conclude that this was not an outcome foreseen by Mr Fitzgerald. In fact modern technology allows for greater oversight of where police are and what they are doing and while it provides better protection for integrity, it is also a better outcome for occupational health and safety. For example, the Review team was interested to learn that while at first resisted by some New South Wales police, the provision of in-car video capability for New South Wales highway patrol officers is now considered by these same officers as an essential tool to protect them against false allegations or to record personal injury.

Finding:
It has become traditional over the course of several governments not to utilise the provision for a Ministerial direction, probably to avoid the perception of impinging on the operational independence of the Queensland Police Service. The Review team believes there are clear circumstances where such a direction is warranted.
Recommendation:
That the current provisions enabling there to be a Ministerial Direction be maintained and actioned as the Minister sees fit.

The independence of the office of Constable is a principle that is well developed and debated over many years.

Recommendation:
That transparency of the Ministerial direction be achieved through publishing and monitoring for effectiveness.

In line with the provision in 4.6(2) this Ministerial direction would address matters of administration and management, giving direction on the government’s policy and priorities but would not interfere with the Commissioner’s operational independence.

The Review team would support an amendment to 4.6(2)(c) which allows direction in relation to numbers and deployment of officers and staff and number and location of police stations. The review team are firmly of the belief that such business decisions should be made on the basis of data and informed by robust business models. The review team would therefore support a more collegiate approach to this matter than a Ministerial direction implies.

Given the current state of governance in the police service, the Review recommends that a Ministerial direction be drafted. The Review team recommends that common sense prevails and that a broad Ministerial Direction be put in place with proper consultation between stakeholders including the Crime and Misconduct Commission. The strategic direction of the Queensland Police Service could then align itself to the government’s priorities. All parties, the community, the police, the CMC and the government could benefit from such a transparent arrangement.
## Annexure 1—outcomes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Providing responsive structural fire services to the urban community</th>
<th>May 2013</th>
<th>Year to date</th>
<th>Target</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Response times</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response time to structure fires 90th percentile all classifications (1)</td>
<td>11:35 (11.59)</td>
<td>11:50 (11.83)</td>
<td>&lt; 14:00 (14.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Response time to structure fires 50th percentile all classifications (1)</td>
<td>7:07 (7.12)</td>
<td>7:26 (7.43)</td>
<td>7:36 (7.60)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time to response permanent urban crews to structure fires within ULB – percentage met under 14 min</td>
<td>98.1 %</td>
<td>98.1 %</td>
<td>90.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time to response composite urban crews to structure fires within ULB – percentage met under 14 min</td>
<td>66.7 %</td>
<td>89.2 %</td>
<td>90.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time to response auxiliary urban crews to structure fires within ULB – Percentage met under 14 min</td>
<td>92.9 %</td>
<td>83.7 %</td>
<td>90.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time to turnout 75th percentile permanent (1)</td>
<td>2:33 (2.55)</td>
<td>2:30 (2.50)</td>
<td>2:00 (2.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time to turnout 75th percentile composite (1)</td>
<td>8:34 (8.57)</td>
<td>7:37 (7.61)</td>
<td>5:00 (5.00)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time to turnout 75th percentile auxiliary (1)</td>
<td>7:02 (7.03)</td>
<td>7:42 (7.70)</td>
<td>7:00 (7.00)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Structure Fires

<p>| Total structure fires | 200 | 2,674 | —— |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Urban Personnel</th>
<th>Rural Brigades</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Structural fires attended by urban personnel</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>2,652</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Structural fires attended by rural brigades</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of accidental residential structural fires</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>807</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of accidental residential structure fires per 100,000 households</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>45.3</td>
<td>&lt; 60.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of building and other structure fires confined to room or object of origin</td>
<td>87.0 %</td>
<td>85.6 %</td>
<td>80.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median dollar loss from structure fire</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$2,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median dollar loss from structure fire attended by urban personnel</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$1,000</td>
<td>$2,000 – $3,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median dollar loss from structure fire attended by rural brigades</td>
<td>$0</td>
<td>—</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Property loss from structure fire per person</td>
<td>$1.67</td>
<td>$33.00</td>
<td>&lt; $35.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**False and Good Intent Calls**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Urban Personnel</th>
<th>Rural Brigades</th>
<th>Others</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of system initiated false alarms</td>
<td>1,713</td>
<td>18,056</td>
<td>&lt; 24,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Unwanted Alarm Activations (UAA) through an automatic fire alarm system</td>
<td>1,628</td>
<td>17,898</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other false calls and good intent calls</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>5,164</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Delivering rescue services across all hazards**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mobile property crashes</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total number of mobile property crashes</td>
<td>1,257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile property crashes attended by urban personnel</td>
<td>1,255</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mobile property crashes attended by rural brigades</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of road rescue incidents</td>
<td>628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of road rescue extrications</td>
<td>194</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rescue and medical assist</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Non–fire rescue calls including road rescue</td>
<td>1,421</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of other Rescues and Medical Emergencies</td>
<td>164</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>All hazards</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of hazardous material incidents</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of hazardous condition incidents</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazardous condition incidents attended by urban personnel</td>
<td>284</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hazardous condition incidents attended by rural brigades</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Managing the risk and impact of landscape fires</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Landscape fires</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2012</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------------------------</td>
<td>-------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total landscape fires</strong></td>
<td>244</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Landscape fire incidents attended by urban personnel</strong></td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Landscape fire incidents attended by rural brigades</strong></td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Number of incomplete rural vegetation fire reports</strong></td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Partnering with the community to mitigate risks through education and fire safety activities**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Community Safety</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of safe-home visits completed</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Year one students participating in fire education (2)</td>
<td>10,893</td>
<td>16,047</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of year one students participating in fire education (2)</td>
<td>18.2 %</td>
<td>26.8 %</td>
<td>95.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of hours spent on safety promotion and public education activities.</td>
<td>5,875</td>
<td>51,596</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of hours per 100,000 population spent on safety promotion and public education activities</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>1,270</td>
<td>&gt; 2,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of households with fire safety measures</td>
<td>42.4 %</td>
<td>42.4 %</td>
<td>43.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of households with operational smoke alarms installed</td>
<td>87.0 %</td>
<td>87.0 %</td>
<td>95.0 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of safe-home requests for inspections completed by Queensland</td>
<td>82.7 %</td>
<td>87.2 %</td>
<td>95.0 %</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Fire and Rescue Service personnel within levied areas

**Supporting risk owners in building and infrastructure safety**

**Building fire safety**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fire and Rescue Service</th>
<th>Other than Fire and Rescue Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Percentage building premises deemed complete and compliant</td>
<td>99.4 %</td>
<td>98.6 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of building approvals processed</td>
<td>404</td>
<td>3,925</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percentage of building approvals processed within agreed timeframe</td>
<td>70.9 %</td>
<td>64.3 %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of premises (other than private dwellings) inspected &amp; deemed compliant with building fire safety standards</td>
<td>515</td>
<td>5,043</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of hours spent conducting fire safety activities per 100,000 population within urban levy areas</td>
<td>89</td>
<td>1,053</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of smoke alarms installed by Queensland Fire and Rescue Service Personnel</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>386</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Operational service summary**

**Incidents**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Fire and Rescue Service</th>
<th>Other than Fire and Rescue Service</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total value ($) of property saved per 100,000 population within urban levied areas</td>
<td>$23.04 M</td>
<td>$275.19 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total value ($) of property lost per 100,000 population within urban levied areas</td>
<td>$2.67 M</td>
<td>$6.34 M</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incident Type</td>
<td>Total Number</td>
<td>Queensland</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of incidents attended</td>
<td>5,140</td>
<td>69,449</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of incidents attended by urban personnel</td>
<td>5,081</td>
<td>64,240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of incidents attended by rural brigades</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>5,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of fires and explosions</td>
<td>923</td>
<td>20,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of fires and explosions attended by urban personnel</td>
<td>889</td>
<td>16,420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of fires and explosions attended by rural brigades</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3,899</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total number of other incidents attended</td>
<td>466</td>
<td>6,718</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of other incidents attended by urban personnel</td>
<td>448</td>
<td>5,570</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of other incidents attended by rural brigades</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>1,148</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Queensland Fire and Rescue Service organisational preparedness

#### Training

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Description</th>
<th>Total Number</th>
<th>Queensland</th>
<th>Australia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Number of hours spent on maintenance and acquisition of skills that meet competency standards per 100,000 population</td>
<td>979</td>
<td>10,430</td>
<td>10,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Annexure 2 – Workforce analysis

### Queensland Fire and Rescue Service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Actual FTE</th>
<th>Frontline</th>
<th>Frontline enablers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Firefighting staff</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firefighters and Station Officers</td>
<td>1993.39</td>
<td>1993.39</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Fire Officers</td>
<td>81.34</td>
<td>81.34</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissioner/Deputy Commissioner/Assistant Commissioners</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Officers</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>138</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary</td>
<td>199.8</td>
<td>199.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-firefighting staff</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>51.25</td>
<td></td>
<td>51.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>116.12</td>
<td></td>
<td>116.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Support Personnel</td>
<td>147.07</td>
<td></td>
<td>147.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Support Personnel</td>
<td>127.58</td>
<td></td>
<td>127.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>2866.55</strong></td>
<td><strong>2528.65</strong></td>
<td><strong>337.9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Total headcount</th>
<th>Frontline</th>
<th>Frontline enablers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Firefighting staff</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firefighters and Station Officers</td>
<td>2063</td>
<td>2063</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rural Fire Officers</td>
<td>224</td>
<td>224</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commissioner/Deputy Commissioner/Assistant Commissioners</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Officers</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>140</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxiliary</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td>1998</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Non-firefighting staff</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenance</td>
<td>56</td>
<td></td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>138</td>
<td></td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Support Personnel</td>
<td>160</td>
<td></td>
<td>160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Support Personnel</td>
<td>146</td>
<td></td>
<td>146</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>4937</strong></td>
<td><strong>4563</strong></td>
<td><strong>374</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Annexure 3 – The Police and Community Safety Review team’s response to the Malone Review’s recommendations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Malone Review recommendation</th>
<th>Police and Community Safety Review position</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>That an operational organisation be established comprising of three streams – a. urban fire service; b. rural fire service; and c. the state emergency service. Each of the three organisations will be led by a Deputy Chief Officer, reporting to a Chief Officer.</td>
<td><strong>Supported in part:</strong> The Review team recommend structural reform of the current Department of Community Safety. This includes an amalgamation of parts of Emergency Management Queensland with the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service to create a new organisation with two distinct streams. These streams being: • Rural Fire and State Emergency Services, with a focus on support for volunteers, and • Urban Fire and Emergency Management. Led by a Commissioner, each stream will be managed by a Deputy Commissioner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>That a separate area of responsibility be established to provide independent oversight and monitor disaster readiness across all hazards.</td>
<td><strong>Supported in principle:</strong> The Review team recommends that a new position of Inspector General of Emergency and Disaster Management be established and that this position be structured and empowered so as to be able to provide an assurance to Government that the disaster management system is both appropriate and capable of dealing with complex events.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Malone Review recommendation</td>
<td>Police and Community Safety Review position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>That a Ministerial Advisory Council be established to inform the Minister of matters relating to Rural Fire Service and SES volunteers.</td>
<td><strong>Not supported.</strong> The Review team recommend that the Commissioner Fire and Emergency Services be responsible for providing advice to the Minister.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4</td>
<td>That corporate support, such as administration and finance, to volunteer services be shared to enable a closer working relationship between the services.</td>
<td><strong>Supported in principle:</strong> The Review team recommend that a new 'joined up' corporate support structure be implemented across the portfolio enabling more focussed and agile approach to ensuring appropriate support to services as required.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5</td>
<td>That, wherever possible, combined training take place between volunteers across a wide range of volunteer organisations.</td>
<td><strong>Supported:</strong> The Review team recommend that a thorough examination be undertaken across the portfolio to identify training and education elements provided by all portfolio agencies and opportunities for collaborative delivery be maximised regardless of employment status of individuals.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6</td>
<td>That a strong emphasis be placed on the establishment and recruitment of PCYC emergency cadets.</td>
<td><strong>Supported:</strong> The Review team recommend that the Department of Education be engaged as a key stakeholder to identify further opportunities for the development of contemporary volunteer development programs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Malone Review recommendation</td>
<td>Police and Community Safety Review position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7</td>
<td>That the Rural Operations division currently sitting within the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service become an autonomous unit called Rural Fire Service Queensland and be led by a Deputy Chief Officer.</td>
<td>Not supported: <strong>SEE Recommendation #1</strong>. The Review team recommend structural reform of the current Department of Community Safety. This includes an amalgamation of parts of Emergency Management Queensland with the Queensland Fire and Rescue Service to create a new organisation with two distinct streams. These streams being: • Rural Fire and State Emergency Services, with a focus on support for volunteers, and • Urban Fire and Emergency Management. Led by a Commissioner, each stream will be managed by a Deputy Commissioner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>That Rural Fire Service Queensland District offices report directly to the Deputy Chief Officer/through the regional Coordinator to the Deputy Chief Officer</td>
<td><strong>Supported in principle:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9</td>
<td>That Rural Fire Service Queensland District offices remain at least at their current number of 14, with consideration given by the Rural Fire Service Queensland to expanding the number of District offices by opening an office in the South Burnett, considering a new office in the southern Central Highlands, and the option of part time</td>
<td><strong>Supported in principle:</strong> The Review team recommend that strong consideration be given to aligning the number and geographic boundaries of districts to those of the Queensland Police Service and disaster districts, maximising available support across portfolio agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Malone Review recommendation</td>
<td>Police and Community Safety Review position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>offices on a risk/need/growth basis, particularly in north–west Queensland.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10</td>
<td>That staffing at Rural Fire Service Queensland District offices remain at current levels within establishment and, if needed, base staffing levels be increased.</td>
<td>See 11.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>That Rural Fire Service Queensland consider service delivery needs with a view to establishing boundary/staff/budget changes according to State standards.</td>
<td><strong>Supported in principle</strong>: The Review team recommend that resourcing allocations need to be based on a robust methodology that takes into account a range of variables including but not limited to number of brigades and services required to be delivered (based on a risk assessment of environmental factors); the identified workload regarding mitigation planning, the identified workload regarding public education and the ability to ‘share’ work across Districts and portfolio agencies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12</td>
<td>That there be three (3) RFSQ regions in Queensland – North, Central and South–East.</td>
<td><strong>Not supported</strong>: The Review team recommend that the formation of the new Department of Fire &amp; Emergency Services includes a reduction in the current number of regions to align with Queensland Police, however recognises that there may be slight differences in regional boundaries due to varying demand drivers. The Review team recommend that, as far as practicable, there should be only one</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Malone Review recommendation</td>
<td>Police and Community Safety Review position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>set of Portfolio administrative boundaries.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13</td>
<td>That the position of Regional Manager Rural Operations be re-designated to Regional Co-ordinator in the North, Central and South-East regions to emphasise the supporting role the position will take.</td>
<td><strong>Supported in principle:</strong> Redesignation is supported, however refer to 12 regarding structure.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14</td>
<td>That the number of Bushfire Safety Officer positions be, over time, increased so that one BSO operates out of each District office.</td>
<td><strong>Supported in principle:</strong> The Review team recommend that the number of BSO's allocated to a particular District or region should be based upon a robust assessment of risk and mitigation strategies identified and approved for implementation, this could mean more than one if substantiated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15</td>
<td>That District offices be located in areas that enhance ease of access for out of town volunteers and the general public and also provide suitable parking, onsite storage and be suitable for operational use.</td>
<td><strong>Supported in principle:</strong> The Review team recommend that District offices should wherever possible be collocated with other portfolio agencies, deviation from this must demonstrate that Government receives adequate return on investment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16</td>
<td>That a Rural Fire Research and Investigation Team be established to coordinate and communicate fire research knowledge, including fire behaviour as well as coordinate fire investigations and complaints for the state.</td>
<td><strong>Supported in principle:</strong> The Review team recommend that care is taken not to duplicate work being undertaken by recognised bodies such as the Natural Hazard and Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre and that further examination is undertaken to establish</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Malone Review recommendation</td>
<td>Police and Community Safety Review position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>the feasibility of a single, multi discipline, multi agency approach to fire investigation and reporting.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17</td>
<td>That a Mitigation Officer position be created to assist the District offices and District Fire Management Groups (refer to recommendations 36 to 40) in developing their fire management plans and to ensure mitigation work is being conducted.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18</td>
<td>That a mobile training program be established for areas with identified above average fire risk to train in fire behaviour and Australasian Inter–Service Incident Management System principles across land tenures.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19</td>
<td>That RFSQ retain responsibility for Air Operations and re–evaluate avenues for cost recovery when aircraft are used by other agencies. The coordination of incendiary tasking to support mitigation should sit with the RFSQ in coordination with other agencies.</td>
<td>Supported in principle: The Review team recommend that caution be exercised in relation to tasking for mitigation work. RFSQ neither own the land nor the responsibility and therefore should not accept costs associated with the mitigation activities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20</td>
<td>That the RFSQ central office undertake a review of Firecom procedures in relation to Rural Fire Service callouts. Each Rural Fire Service Queensland district office should also undertake a review of the Firecom data sets/callout information for their district to establish call out protocols are correct.</td>
<td>Supported: The Review team recommend that the review include representation from the State Communications Command to ensure solutions are able to be implemented.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Malone Review recommendation</td>
<td>Police and Community Safety Review position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21</td>
<td>That Rural Fire Service Queensland designate a position of Lands Procurement Officer to support volunteers by project managing the acquisition of land for Brigade sheds and their construction where required.</td>
<td><strong>Not supported</strong>: The Review Team recommend that responsibility for procurement of land and significant infrastructure sit within the portfolio corporate structure and form part of the Chief Operating Officer's accountabilities.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22</td>
<td>That all land on which rural fire brigade sheds are located be re-evaluated to formalise enforceable lease agreements.</td>
<td><strong>Supported</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23</td>
<td>That all employees of Rural Fire Service Queensland MUST demonstrate a background in, knowledge or experience of land management and volunteering.</td>
<td><strong>Not supported</strong>: The Review team recommends against the use of restrictive practices which may limit the organisations ability to employ the right person for a particular role but does recognise that this should be an Essential Criteria for some roles within RFSQ.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24</td>
<td>That employee selection panels for field staff positions only comprise three members and include a Rural Fire Service Queensland representative, a Rural Fire Brigades Association of Queensland representative and one representative from the District Fire Management Group.</td>
<td><strong>Not supported</strong>: The Review team recommend that recruitment and selection be in accordance with the rules of government of the day as published by the Public Sector Commission.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25</td>
<td>That Rural Fire Service Queensland recognise training and experience in rural fire Brigades as equal to experience gained in other rural fire services when considering candidates for employment.</td>
<td><strong>Supported</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Malone Review recommendation</td>
<td>Police and Community Safety Review position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------------------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>26</td>
<td>That all volunteer training conducted by the Rural Fire Service Queensland will be relevant to employment levels within the Rural Fire Service Queensland.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27</td>
<td>That in recognition of their commitment to the community volunteers employed by the State Government should be released to assist as volunteers for up to five (5) days per year in appropriately identified emergency operations.</td>
<td>Supported: The Review team recommend that the current PSC Directive 2/12 – Special Leave: Section 7 – be amended to include a broader range of ‘emergencies’ and provide some certainty around length of absence rather than refer to departmental convenience.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28</td>
<td>That the Queensland Government liaise with the Federal Government with a view to securing incentives for employers that recognise loss of income and employee time for emergency operations.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29</td>
<td>That Rural Fire Service Queensland to have its own training support coordinators who, in conjunction with external Registered Training Organisations, co–ordinate the training curriculum throughout Queensland.</td>
<td>See 30.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30</td>
<td>That Rural Fire Service Queensland utilise external Registered Training Organisations for the training of volunteers and other stakeholders.</td>
<td>Supported. The Review team recommend that a thorough examination be undertaken across the portfolio to identify training and education elements provided by all portfolio agencies and opportunities for collaborative delivery be maximised.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Malone Review recommendation</td>
<td>Police and Community Safety Review position</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------</td>
<td>------------------------------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>regardless of employment status of individuals. the Review team recommend that the above examination should identify all providers of portfolio training needs and that issues of contestability be considered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>That the requirement for Primary Producer Brigade members to undertake a Firefighter Minimum Skills course be removed and replaced with a ‘Primary Producer Brigade Induction’ course.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>That the current Primary Producer Brigade manual be withdrawn and a working group comprising Rural Fire Service Queensland staff, Rural Fire Brigade Association of Queensland representatives and Primary Producer Brigade volunteers and as a priority produce a new, simpler and less bureaucratic booklet.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>33</td>
<td>That Rural Fire Service Queensland work with the State Emergency Service, Surf Life Saving Queensland and other volunteer organisations to develop training programs which can be recognised by all organisations (E.G. chainsaw training, Four-wheel drive training)</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>34</td>
<td>That the Department of Community Safety review Rural Fire Service Queensland and other volunteer organisation records and consider options to simplify recognition of</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Malone Review recommendation</td>
<td>Police and Community Safety Review position</td>
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<td>training records and competencies, criminal history checks, equipment capacities and other background information for volunteers who belong to more than one volunteer organisation.</td>
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<td>35</td>
<td>That the founding principle of the Rural Fire Service, that Brigades are formed on the principle of neighbour helping neighbour to collectively manage fire events, remains one of the foundations of Rural Fire Service Queensland.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>36</td>
<td>That to assist the Rural Fire Service Queensland and other agencies in managing wildfire risk, a planning system for wildfire management be established in legislation that complements the existing disaster management arrangements.</td>
<td>Supported in principle: The Review team recognises the value of the proposal and recommend that the requirement form part of the Queensland Disaster Management Arrangements. The Review team have recommended an alignment of boundaries to District Disaster boundaries, therefore all bush fire response and mitigation planning should fall under relevant local and district planning processes. Further consultation should occur with agencies across the disaster management environment to endorse or refine those structures described at 37,38,and 39. The engagement and support of landholders and local governments will be pivotal to acceptance of responsibilities generated under such plans.</td>
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<td>37</td>
<td>That the planning system is to have a two tiered structure comprising District</td>
<td>see 36</td>
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<td>Fire Management Groups and linking to the State Disaster Management Group.</td>
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<td>38</td>
<td>That the first tier comprise at least one District Fire Management Group in each Rural Fire Service Queensland District. The District Fire Management Group will be chaired by a person with the necessary expertise and experience, nominated by the community and appointed by Government. Chairs will hold the deciding vote in matters related to fire management at the local level.</td>
<td>see 36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>39</td>
<td>Membership of the District Fire Management Group is at the discretion of the Chair of the District Fire Management Group, however members must have the necessary expertise and experience for the role and membership should include where applicable, the District Inspector – Rural Fire Service Queensland, a representative of relevant local governments and representatives of agencies responsible for parks and wildlife, transport and main roads, forestry and natural resources among other appropriate representatives.</td>
<td>see 36</td>
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<td>40</td>
<td>That annual planning be undertaken at each level that addresses hazard actions across all disaster management phases (i.e.: prevention, preparation, response and recovery), with a focus on vegetation and land management. This planning is to be consistent with the hazard specific planning envisaged under the Queensland Disaster Management Arrangements and be supported by guidelines to be developed and issued by Rural Fire Service Queensland. District plans are to be approved by the Director–General or equivalent for the Department of Community Safety and will inform a State Wildfire Management Plan to be approved by the State Disaster Management Group.</td>
<td>Supported: The Review team recommend that the Inspector General Emergency and disaster Management be engaged through the consultative phase.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>41</td>
<td>That District Inspectors be responsible for consultation with Fire Wardens during the development of District fire management plans.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
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<td>42</td>
<td>That wherever possible, for future appointments of Fire Wardens, where that Wardens’ district is totally covered a by Rural Fire Brigade, consideration should be given that the appointed Fire Warden is a Rural Brigade Member.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
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<td>43</td>
<td>That the Rural Fire Service Queensland needs to provide greater emphasis and acknowledgement of the use of fire as a tool in sustainable land management.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
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<td>44</td>
<td>At the next reprint of the ‘Permit to Light Fire’ book, the requirement to notify neighbours when applying for a permit is reinstated to properly reflect the requirement under the Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>That Section 66 (2) of the Fire and Rescue Service Act 1990 relating to the exemption for issuing of permits to burn in State Forests, National Parks and Reserves is withdrawn and Departments must work within the District Fire Management Plan.</td>
<td>Supported in principle: The Review team recommend that consultation be undertaken with effected entities prior to drafting of legislative amendments.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>46</td>
<td>That the electronic fire permit system used in the Mackay District be made available across the state for Fire Wardens who wish to use it.</td>
<td>Supported in principle. The Review team recommend that the adoption of such system must be considered in the overall context of current ITC capability and should be progressed in accord with the desire to ensure that systems</td>
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<td>implemented are interoperable with others in use and/or integrate to provide better information when and where it is required. For instance, an electronic permit system should at least integrate with CAD so that fire communication centres know a permit has been issued and ideally should integrate with OMS so that staff time can be captured and attributed to the process and/or resultant fire calls.</td>
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<td>47</td>
<td>That Rural Fire Service Queensland instigates a hazard mitigation operational period, (E.G. Operation Cold Burn), at suitable times each year as appropriate by area.</td>
<td><strong>Supported</strong></td>
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<td>48</td>
<td>That on all land where fuel load creates a fire risk, the owner shall be responsible for the construction and maintenance of effective firebreaks. Failure to provide effective and accessible firebreaks will result in the cost of firebreak construction to control a wildfire on this land being debited to the land owner</td>
<td><strong>Supported</strong>: The Review team note that The Fire and Rescue Service Act (1990) Section 69 provides the ability to direct land owners to take measures to reduce the risk of fire and that Part 6 of this section allows for recovery of expenses incurred where the landholder fails to comply and the work is carried out on their behalf.</td>
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| 49     | That the provisions of the Vegetation Management Act 1999 should be clarified to ensure that effective and accessible firebreaks or fire control lines are established in order that assets can be protected. The decision on the construction of these firebreaks and fire control lines is to be made by the landowner in conjunctions with the local Rural Fire Brigade or Fire Warden | It's not clear which part of the Vegetation Management Act is being referred to. This act does allow for clearing of vegetation for construction and maintenance of fire breaks (as in the excerpt below). The type and size of break would be at the discretion of the landholder and could only be determined on a case by case basis dependent on the type of vegetation, terrain, surrounding risk etc., as referred to in the review recommendation. Fire wardens and brigades already have the ability to provide advice on what constitutes an adequate fire break. 22DF Clearing vegetation on adjoining lot for firebreaks and fire management lines  
(1)This section applies if the location of proposed infrastructure for a concurrence agency application would enable the applicant to clear vegetation on adjoining land under the Planning Act, schedule 10, definition essential management, paragraph (a) or (b).  
(2)In assessing and responding to the part of the application giving rise to the referral, the chief executive must consider any clearing of vegetation that may be required on the adjoining land for—  
(a)establishing or maintaining a necessary firebreak to protect the infrastructure; or |
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<td>50</td>
<td>That the extent of forest and plantation fuel load fire risk in South East Queensland requires a designated government resources fire team to manage this risk and proactively conduct fuel mitigation burning; and provide a wildfire response to government land.</td>
<td>There is no single government agency which manages all government controlled land. Each government land owning agency (e.g. DNRM) is already responsible for mitigation and maintenance on the land they manage, to the extent their resources allow.</td>
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<td>51</td>
<td>That the Rural Fire Service Queensland upgrades its subscription to technology for the Brigade Mapping Toolset to make it available to all Brigades who want it.</td>
<td>Supported: The Review team recommend that the adoption of such system must be considered in the overall context of current ITC capability and should be progressed in accord with the desire to ensure that systems implemented are interoperable with others in use and/or integrate to provide better information when and where it is required. For instance, information collated for the Brigade mapping Toolset should be available through the ‘TOM’ system for use at District and State level to better assist in planning to</td>
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<td>52</td>
<td>The Manager of the Geographic Information Systems unit conduct an audit of the Firecom mapping system to ensure that rural Brigade and road addressing is up to date.</td>
<td><strong>Supported in principle:</strong> The Review team recommend that the process for capture and use of data should first be reviewed to ensure efficacy of end to end process and that such review include an audit of current data holdings.</td>
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| 53     | That a memorandum of understanding be developed between RFSQ and other organisations with fire fighting capacity at state level, to establish operational procedures when these organisations may be required for a joint response roles. Specifically, the intent will be:  
**ff a)** Vegetation Fire in a Rural Area: The Rural Fire Brigade in that area (boundary) is in charge and is the first Brigade called by Firecom.  
**ff b)** Structural Fire in a Rural Area: Firecom calls the Urban Brigade first and they control the incident. Local Rural Fire Brigade must also be notified by Firecom at the same time.  
**ff c)** Vegetation Fire in an Urban Levy Area: Firecom call the local Urban Brigade first and they control the incident. At their discretion they may call Rural Fire Brigades for assistance.  
**ff d)** Structural Fire in an Urban Levy Area: Firecom call the local Urban Brigade first and they control the | **Supported in principle:** The Review team recommend that the current directives issued by the Commissioner regarding hierarchy of command be reviewed to ensure that the most appropriate resources in terms of capability and timeliness are responded to all incidents regardless of location to ensure the public receive the best possible service commensurate with the situation. |
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<td>54</td>
<td>That fire groups can only be formed through the agreement of all brigades that will become a part of that group, and the management and operational procedures of the group must be approved by the contributing brigades. Local District Inspectors are to provide mentoring and support when brigades form a group.</td>
<td><strong>Supported</strong>: The Review team support the recommendation on the understanding that this does not mean all brigades within a district, simply that &quot;all brigades that will become a part of that group&quot; need to agree.</td>
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<td>55</td>
<td>That Brigades' financial contributions to groups must be voluntary and approved by a recorded minute at a meeting of that brigade.</td>
<td><strong>Supported</strong></td>
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<td>56</td>
<td>That the Rural Fire Service Queensland consider a less formal uniform which volunteers can better identify with, and that National rank markings be retained.</td>
<td><strong>Supported in principle</strong>: The Review team recommend that this matter be further investigated with a view to establishing a less formal uniform for those areas which are nominated only for responses to bush fire, however where a risk based assessment indicates that brigades respond to road traffic crashes, structural or other</td>
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<td>events the Team recommend that current standards apply.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
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<td>57</td>
<td>That the colour of Rural Fire Service Queensland Brigade operational vehicles remain yellow and that they retain the Rural Fire Service Queensland logo.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
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<td>58</td>
<td>That the reflective livery on Rural Fire Service Queensland staff vehicles be kept to a minimum of a light bar and affixed Rural Fire Service Queensland logo. These vehicles are to be appropriate to the task and location.</td>
<td>Not supported: The Review team recommend a status quo in terms of general markings of vehicles with the understanding that there may be an increase in the 'Rural' emphasis, however any reduction of marking will need to be consistent with a risk based approach.</td>
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<td>59</td>
<td>That where a Brigade supports another community and this involves the use of any brigade equipment it shall be the decision of that brigade in relation to the deployment and use of their equipment and resources.</td>
<td>Not supported: The Review team recommend that assets held by brigades are essentially held in trust for the purpose of service to the public of Queensland. These assets should be able to be deployed across Queensland where there is genuine need and there is negligible and considered impact on that local community. The Review team recommend the development of a legally supported 'use of asset' agreement which contains 'make good' provisions thereby indemnifying the Brigade against loss. The identification and potential use of these assets should be part of the pre–fire and storm season planning process.</td>
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<td>60</td>
<td>That the focus of Rural Fire Service Queensland will be the protection of life, property and the environment from the threat and impact of wildfire.</td>
<td><strong>Not supported:</strong> The Review team recommend that this is too narrow a viewpoint in today's society. This approach would limit the effectiveness of, and value added by volunteers in contributing to disaster recovery efforts such was recently seen in Bundaberg, potentially resulting in significant cost to Queensland. The Commission of Inquiry into the 2010/11 floods, recommended that &quot;5.15 The Queensland Fire and Rescue Service should ensure all rural fire service volunteers and auxiliary firefighters stationed outside areas susceptible to flooding receive Awareness Level swift water rescue training&quot;, the Review team concur with that recommendation. The Review team note that some Rural Brigades have responsibility for road traffic crash attendance and consider that appropriate in a number of locations.</td>
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<td>61</td>
<td>Use of private aircraft to be at the discretion of District Inspector or Incident Control and reimbursement of fuel to be authorised accordingly.</td>
<td><strong>Not supported:</strong> The Review team consider that this approach may result in both a financial and integrity risk to Government. The Review team recommend that operators of all aircraft tasked and controlled by of Queensland Fire and Rescue Service need to satisfy the relevant requirements, however subject to endorsement, financial delegations for use could be passed to District Inspectors in those locations.</td>
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<td>62</td>
<td>That Rural Fire Service Queensland undertake a risk management process for rural fire Brigade profiles across Queensland based on the principles in the Rural Fire Brigade Risk Management Guide, July 1999, and updated as necessary.</td>
<td><strong>Supported:</strong> The Review team recommend that an audit of Brigades be conducted against the current Rural Fire Brigade Classification Descriptors – June 2008.</td>
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<td>63</td>
<td>That the Rural Fire Service Queensland should engage a private provider offsite and outside the Government firewall to establish an email address for each Brigade and Fire Warden. The email address would reflect the Brigade name and Fire Warden district. E.g.: <a href="mailto:GreenbankRFB@msn.com.au">GreenbankRFB@msn.com.au</a></td>
<td><strong>Supported in principle:</strong> The Review team recommend that the adoption of such system must be considered in the overall context of current ITC capability and should be progressed in accord with the desire to ensure that systems implemented are interoperable with others in use and/or integrate to provide better information when and where it is required.</td>
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<td>64</td>
<td>That the First Officer or Brigade Officer retain the ability to seek assistance from any person whose services are available at the fire. Any person appointed to provide this assistance should be protected under relevant Workplace Health and Safety and Workcover legislation.</td>
<td><strong>Supported:</strong> The Review team understand this to be presently the case.</td>
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<td>65</td>
<td>That a volunteer shall not be liable for any act or omission made in good faith provided it is not proven to be reckless, negligent or malicious. This protection is to be afforded in both Criminal and Common law.</td>
<td><strong>Supported:</strong> The Review team understand this to be presently the case under S129 of the Act, however support legal clarification if required.</td>
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<td>66</td>
<td>That each District office establish and maintain a register of suitably qualified Australasian Inter–service Incident Management System trained volunteers who are prepared to undertake the management of operations and provide these to the District Fire Management Group.</td>
<td><strong>Supported:</strong> The Review team recommend that a register is maintained of ALL staff and volunteers within the service which establishes the credential for command by both level of incident and hazard type. The Review team recommend that any system considered must also be considered within the context of other ITC systems.</td>
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<td>67</td>
<td>That members of Primary Producer and Rural Classified Brigades will only require a Criminal History Check if they become an office bearer of that Brigade.</td>
<td><strong>Supported in principle:</strong> The Review team recommend that clear legal advice is sought on this issue to ensure exposure of Government is known and accepted in advance.</td>
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<td>68</td>
<td>That a local committee consisting of Elders and community leaders be formed in remote and Indigenous communities to determine Brigade membership applications.</td>
<td><strong>Supported</strong></td>
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| 69     | a) That members of Village and Izone classified Brigades only be required to conduct a criminal history check when they first join a Brigade.  
       b) Criminal history checks will no longer be required when a Member who has already undergone a criminal history check takes an office bearing role within a Brigade or changes Brigades.  
       c) Criminal history checks are to still be conducted on Rural Fire Service volunteers undertaking interstate deployments.  
       d) Members of other voluntary organisations in Queensland (e.g. State Emergency Service, Volunteer Marine Rescue) who wish to join the Rural Fire Service Queensland will not be required to undertake an additional criminal history check with an internal check to be conducted by the Department of Community Safety. | **Supported:** The Review team support the recommendation however note that criminal history check records are not retained (under Information Privacy Act 2009); nor can they be provided to another party. The check is carried out for the specific purposes of a given role (e.g. Marine Rescue); the scope of the check may not be applicable to a different role (e.g. RFS volunteer). The authority given by an individual to carry out a CHC and provide the result to a third party is specific to the organisation they are applying for. Additionally the conditions under which a person with a criminal history is either accepted or not as a volunteer is at the discretion of the head of each organisation. This matter will need to be resolved in order to adopt this recommendation. |
<p>| 70     | That Brigades that do not have a truck and are currently classified as Rural conduct a self-determination to ascertain if they wish to be reclassified as a Primary Producer Brigade. | <strong>Supported</strong> |
| 71     | That Rural Fire Service Queensland in consultation with the Rural Fire Brigades Association Queensland will undertake a full review of the medical and health protocols to support the new Volunteer organisation. | <strong>Supported:</strong> The Review team recommend that the Division of Workplace health and Safety be invited as part of the review team and provide a conduit to other more specialised entities as required. E.g. Diabetes Queensland. |</p>
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<td>72</td>
<td>That Rural Fire Service Queensland develops a simple data collection system to record the activities of brigades.</td>
<td><strong>Supported:</strong> The Review team recommend that such a system be integrated with core corporate and enterprise systems to ensure an ability to track and report on brigades and individuals.</td>
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<td>73</td>
<td>That the Rural Fire Service Queensland revoke its current 20 year maximum age policy on volunteer Brigade vehicles to allow Brigades wanting to retain their vehicle to do so, providing the vehicle has an annual mechanical certificate. A 30 year maximum age policy for vehicles will replace the 20 year policy.</td>
<td><strong>Supported:</strong> The Review team support the recommendation subject to ensuring annual tests are satisfactory and vehicle remains fit for purpose for the risk in that area.</td>
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<td>74</td>
<td>That an ‘Options Paper’ be developed by District Inspectors on the suitability and supply of PPE and equipment to volunteers for their district.</td>
<td><strong>Supported:</strong> The Review team recommend an immediate audit of required PPE matched to a Brigades risk profile.</td>
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<td>75</td>
<td>That the Rural Fire Service Queensland catalogue accurately reflects the range of equipment available.</td>
<td><strong>Supported</strong></td>
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<td>76</td>
<td>That Rural Fire Service Queensland, in consultation with Primary Producer Brigade volunteers, redesign and reconfigure slip–on units to bring the total cost below the level required for asset registration. The redesign should allow for the foam system to be optional.</td>
<td><strong>Supported in principle:</strong> The Review team support the recommendation on the understanding that all such units need to be accounted for within the system regardless of meeting the threshold for asset registration.</td>
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<td>77</td>
<td>That vehicles are fit for the purpose and the Brigade locality for which they are intended. A group of two volunteers, in conjunction with the Rural Fire Brigades Association Queensland, should be charged with reviewing current models and providing recommendations on vehicle suitability.</td>
<td><strong>Supported</strong></td>
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<td>78</td>
<td>That a policy be developed around the ownership, insurance and safe use and operation of All Terrain Vehicle 4WD vehicles by brigades for fire fighting purposes.</td>
<td><strong>Supported</strong></td>
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<td>79</td>
<td>That Rural Fire Brigades only be required to conduct an audit of finances if the Brigades income exceeds $5,000 for a financial year. RFSQ District offices should investigate options for savings on the costs of auditing Brigades in their district through either an in–house or external provider.</td>
<td><strong>Supported in principle:</strong> The Review team recommend the adoption of the minimum required standards to meet legislative obligations and that these standards should be identified and clearly communicated to brigades by the CFO.</td>
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<td>80</td>
<td>That the State Government recognises the legal status of rural fire brigades as per Crown Law advice and addressed by recommendations from this Review.</td>
<td><strong>Supported in principle:</strong> The Review team recommend the adoption of crown law advice.</td>
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<td>81</td>
<td>That the current Urban Fire Levy be changed to the Queensland Fire Levy.</td>
<td>The Review team recommend that matters in relation to funding be referred to Treasury for investigation and consideration.</td>
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<td>82</td>
<td>When a local Rural Fire Brigade requests an equipment and maintenance levy from a local government authority, that authority will either supply the brigade’s equipment and maintenance costs or raise the requested levy. The amount to be collected is to be agreed between the local Brigade and the local government authority.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
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<td>83</td>
<td>That the State Government contribution towards the construction of Brigade sheds be changed from $10,000 to a maximum of 25 percent, subject to the approval of the Deputy Chief Officer, Rural Fire Service Queensland.</td>
<td>The Review team recommend that matters in relation to funding be referred to Treasury for investigation and consideration.</td>
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<td>84</td>
<td>That the State Government contribution towards the purchase of operational vehicles is to be retained at 80 percent but that the District Inspector can recommend full Government subsidy of vehicles for Brigades experiencing financial hardship.</td>
<td>The Review team recommend that matters in relation to funding be referred to Treasury for investigation and consideration.</td>
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<td>85</td>
<td>That each District Inspector prepare a report on vehicles required over the next ten years based on current age of fleet.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
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<td>86</td>
<td>That Rural Fire Service Queensland and its staff be exempt from the Travel Management System. The Travel Management System does not work in the rural fire operation areas as it is not flexible in the rapid escalation of wild fire events or cater for volunteering</td>
<td>Supported in Principle: The Review team recommend the immediate adoption of any system which simplifies issues relating to travel management for volunteers.</td>
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<td>timeframes. It has been proven to be inefficient and costly.</td>
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<td>87</td>
<td>That District Inspectors retain the discretion to allocate gratuity to Fire Wardens for out of pocket expenses if required.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
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<td>88</td>
<td>That the State Government supply and logistics for Personal Protective Equipment and other equipment be urgently reviewed with a focus on timely and cost effective delivery to volunteer members.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
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<td>89</td>
<td>That RFSQ review local SAP function and delegation to enable effective and timely support for volunteers.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
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<tr>
<td>90</td>
<td>That, as with Recommendation 23 related to Rural Fire employees, all State Emergency Service employees should have a recorded history of volunteering.</td>
<td>Supported</td>
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<tr>
<td>91</td>
<td>The issue of red and blue lights for RFSQ and SES vehicles be further pursued by the Department of Community Safety.</td>
<td>Not supported: The Review team recommend the matter be passed to the Commissioner of Police for consideration.</td>
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Terms of Reference for the Police and Emergency Services Review project

The Review will assess management and operational services of the Queensland Police Service and the Department of Community Safety and make recommendations on:

- The efficacy of current operational structures including cross agency co-ordination and prioritization of operational, training and corporate service delivery.
- The efficiency & effectiveness of capital infrastructure procurement and associated resourcing including governance, transparency and sustainability.
- The appropriateness of current policy and legislation including but not limited to:
  a) Police Service Administration Act 1990
  b) Fire and Rescue Services Act 1990
  c) Disaster Management Act 2003
  d) Corrective Services Act 2006
- The effectiveness of current engagement strategies across portfolio agencies of the rural fire services and community volunteer groups.
- The Review will seek to identify opportunities and recommend improvements on:
  - Improving the efficiency, quality and accessibility to frontline services through benchmark comparisons with national and international jurisdictions
  - Ensuring frontline services for local communities are protected and improved and emergency awareness education provided.
  - Elimination of duplication and waste in portfolio activities including the elimination of incompatible and policies and systems
  - The timeliness and appropriateness of action and response by portfolio agencies
  - Any other matter as deemed necessary by the Minister.

Timeframe and reporting

The Review’s recommendations are to be made by way of an interim report to the Minister for Police and Community Safety by March 2013 and then a final report by mid-2013.
Acknowledgements

This report has been made possible through the extraordinary contributions of a number of people but the main collaborator who remained with the review from start to finish was Mrs Alison Spruce from the Department of Community Safety.

Deputy Commissioner Iain MacKenzie AFSM, whose long experience in the fire service and emergency services more generally was invaluable to the review, provided important assistance and facilitated a significant number of key meetings and site visits.

Valuable contributions were also made by sworn and unsworn members of the Queensland Police Service in particular Assistant Commissioner Bob Gee, Superintendent Tony Fleming, Superintendent Des Lacey and Ms Patsy Jones. Mr Tom Humphries (Queensland Correctional Services) and Mr Peter Jeffrey (Emergency Management Queensland) were co-opted to the review from time to time and we appreciated their input.

Administrative support was also received from Ms Fiona Ferrier (Department of Corrective Services); Ms Kristy Spillman (Department of Corrective Services) and Ms Sarah Mayes (Queensland Police Service).

Constructive and insightful advice was welcomely received from Ms Penny Armytage of KPMG (formerly the Victorian Department of Justice), Professor Simon Bronitt (ARC Centre of Excellence in Policing Studies Griffith University), Mr Ian Mannix (ABC Radio and Mr Greg Hallam (CEO Local Government Association Queensland) and Commissioner Wayne Gregson APM, Western Australian Fire and Emergency Services.

Brigadier Greg Bilton Commander 7thBrigade provided a source of advice to the review from both a strategic and operational perspective which was greatly appreciated.

The Review team received support from many police and fire service agencies in Australia as well as from New Zealand and other countries. In addition we were welcomed by the New South Wales Rural Fire Service and the New South Wales SES at a time of peak operational activity which was extremely helpful to our team. The New South Wales Department of Health allowed us to view their model of integration with NSW ambulance which enabled us to develop a model for Queensland. The Australian Federal Police corporate team provided a workshop for the CFOs of the agencies under review and the Victoria Police, New South Wales Police, Western Australian Police, and Australian Federal Police (Australian Capital Territory Policing) made presentations to the review team which
were highly appreciated. The South Australia Police provided us with a thoughtful and insightful paper on Emergency Management.

The review team would like to acknowledge the many people including professional emergency service workers, union representatives and volunteers who honestly and in good faith enlightened the review team with both positive and negative accounts of the system under which they work.

Charles Sturt University and Westfield Limited are acknowledged for providing me the opportunity to undertake this review.

Finally, this review is aimed at improving outcomes for the people of Queensland who are the clients of the portfolio agencies, workers in the portfolio or financial (and in-kind) supporters of the portfolio of services as taxpayers and/or donors.
## Definitions

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAR</td>
<td>After Action Reviews</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABS</td>
<td>Australian Bureau of Statistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>ADG EMQ</td>
<td>Assistant Director General Emergency Management Queensland</td>
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<tr>
<td>AHMS</td>
<td>Authorised Mental Health Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>AVL</td>
<td>Automatic Vehicle Location</td>
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<td>BoM</td>
<td>Bureau of Meteorology</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAD</td>
<td>Computer Aided Despatch</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBD</td>
<td>Central Business District</td>
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<td>CEO</td>
<td>Chief Executive Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIO</td>
<td>Chief Information Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMC</td>
<td>Crime and Misconduct Commission</td>
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<td>COTS</td>
<td>Commercial Off The Shelf</td>
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<td>CSD</td>
<td>Corporate Service Division</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCS</td>
<td>Department of Community Safety</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDC</td>
<td>District Disaster Coordinator</td>
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<tr>
<td>DDMG</td>
<td>District Disaster Management Group</td>
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<tr>
<td>DFES</td>
<td>the proposed Department of Fire and Emergency Services</td>
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<tr>
<td>DM</td>
<td>Disaster Management</td>
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<td>DM Act</td>
<td>Disaster Management Act 2003</td>
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<td>DPP</td>
<td>Director of Public Prosecutions</td>
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<td>DSITIA</td>
<td>Department of Science, Information Technology, Innovation and the Arts</td>
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<td>DV</td>
<td>Domestic Violence</td>
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<td>ED</td>
<td>Emergency Department</td>
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<td>EEO</td>
<td>Emergency Examination Order</td>
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<td>EMQ</td>
<td>Emergency Management Queensland</td>
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<td>ESMC</td>
<td>Emergency Services Management Committee</td>
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<td>EVP</td>
<td>Emergency Vehicle Priority system</td>
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<td>FCU</td>
<td>Forensic Crash Unit</td>
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<td>FTE</td>
<td>Full Time Equivalent</td>
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<td>GP</td>
<td>General Practitioner</td>
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<tr>
<td>IGEM</td>
<td>Inspector General Emergency Management</td>
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<tr>
<td>I-TAS</td>
<td>Intelligent Traffic Analysis System, also called the Intelligent Tasking Analysis System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ITC</td>
<td>Information Technology and Communications</td>
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<td>JAG</td>
<td>Department of Justice and Attorney General</td>
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<td>KPI</td>
<td>Key Performance Indicator</td>
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<td>Local Ambulance Service Networks</td>
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<td>LDMG</td>
<td>Local Disaster Management Group</td>
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<td>MEDAI</td>
<td>Metropolitan Emergency Department Access Initiative</td>
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<td>NDR</td>
<td>Natural Disaster Resilience Program</td>
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<td>NDRRA</td>
<td>Natural Disaster Relief and Recovery Arrangements</td>
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<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Definition</td>
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<td>NSWPOL</td>
<td>NSW Police Service</td>
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<td>Operations Management System</td>
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<td>Operational Shift Allowance</td>
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<td>Police and Community Safety Review</td>
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<td>Police Intranet Reporting</td>
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<td>POST</td>
<td>Patient off-stretcher time</td>
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<td>PSCSC</td>
<td>Public Safety Communications Steering Committee</td>
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<td>QAO</td>
<td>Queensland Audit Office</td>
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<td>QAS</td>
<td>Queensland Ambulance Service</td>
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<td>QCAR</td>
<td>Queensland Commission of Audit Report</td>
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<td>QCS</td>
<td>Queensland Corrective Services</td>
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<td>QDMA</td>
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<td>QFRA</td>
<td>Queensland Fire and Rescue Authority</td>
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<td>QFRS</td>
<td>Queensland Fire and Rescue Service</td>
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<td>QH</td>
<td>Queensland Health</td>
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<td>QPRIME</td>
<td>Queensland Police Records and Information Management Exchange</td>
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<td>Queensland Police Service</td>
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<td>RDA</td>
<td>Rapid Damage Assessment</td>
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<td>Rural Fire Service</td>
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<td>Report on Government Services</td>
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<td>SDCC</td>
<td>State Disaster Coordination Centre</td>
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<tr>
<td>SDCG</td>
<td>State Disaster Coordination Group</td>
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<td>SDMG</td>
<td>State Disaster Management Group</td>
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<td>SDMP</td>
<td>State Disaster Management Plan</td>
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<td>SES</td>
<td>State Emergency Service</td>
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<td>SIOPP</td>
<td>State-wide Integrated Operational Planning Process</td>
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<td>SITREP</td>
<td>Situation report</td>
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<td>SMS</td>
<td>Station Management System</td>
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<td>SOPs</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedures</td>
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<tr>
<td>STAR</td>
<td>Secondary Triage and Referral</td>
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<td>SWAS</td>
<td>State-wide Activity Survey</td>
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<tr>
<td>WoG</td>
<td>whole-of-Government</td>
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