This paper demonstrates that the philosophical premises underlying biculturalism and self-determination lead to different conclusions about where power properly resides with respect to Crown/Maori relations in New Zealand. It is argued that biculturalism is not the panacea for the realisation of legitimate Maori aspirations that has been assumed by both Maori and Pakeha policy elites over the past twenty years because it makes assumptions about power relationships which limit greater degrees of Maori autonomy — one step towards self-determination is permitted, but the next prevented. Biculturalism can not realise greater autonomy because it is concerned primarily with relationships among people in institutional settings and within and among bureaucratic institutions. Therefore it is less likely to meet Maori aspirations than self-determination which is concerned with creating, to the greatest extent possible, independence and autonomy for groups, not necessarily in isolation from wider society, but certainly apart from controls and regulations imposed from outside the would be self-determining community. Self-determination locates power, at least to some extent, within traditional Maori social units, while biculturalism, although assuming a sharing of power, inevitably gives Maori the status of junior partner in a project designed to modify state institutions to make them more responsive to Maori interests. While in itself this is advantageous to Maori, biculturalism is not a substitute for the affirmation of traditional social structures as the central point in a Maori quest for greater independence from an historically intrusive state.
Philosophical Foundations of Maori-Crown Relations in the Twenty First Century: Biculturalism or Self-Determination?

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Abstract

This paper demonstrates that the philosophical premises underlying biculturalism and self-determination make different assumptions about where power properly resides with respect to Crown/Maori relations in New Zealand. It is argued that biculturalism is not the panacea for the realisation of legitimate Maori aspirations that has been assumed by both Maori and Pakeha policy elites over the past twenty years because it makes assumptions about power relationships which limit greater degrees of Maori autonomy – one step towards self-determination is permitted, but the next prevented. Biculturalism can not realise greater autonomy because it is concerned primarily with relationships among people in institutional settings and within and among bureaucratic institutions. Therefore it is less likely to meet Maori aspirations than self-determination which is concerned with creating, to the greatest extent possible, independence and autonomy for groups, not necessarily in isolation from wider society, but certainly apart from controls and regulations imposed from outside the would be self-determining community. Self-determination locates power, at least to some extent, within traditional Maori social units, while biculturalism, although assuming a sharing of power, inevitably gives Maori the status of junior partner in a project designed to modify state institutions to make them more responsive to Maori interests. While in itself this is advantageous to Maori, biculturalism is not a substitute for the affirmation of traditional social structures as the central point in a Maori quest for greater independence from an historically intrusive state.

Introduction

Biculturalism and self-determination are contrasting policy contexts for Maori development. The philosophical premises underlying biculturalism and self-determination are based on different assumptions about where power properly resides with respect to policy decisions of immediate interest to Maori. Is power to be shared between Maori and Pakeha as easily defined partners in a bicultural project, or might there be, as Maaka and Fleras suggest a relative yet relational autonomy between peoples, each of which is autonomous in their jurisdiction? ¹

Are for example, Maori models of education, justice, housing and primary health care provision and environmental management legitimate and achievable aspirations within the democratic pluralist nation state? If they are, it is proper for Maori, both individually and collectively, to determine matters for themselves without undue reliance or dependence on governments.² Biculturalism demands reliance and dependence because it locates Maori in the junior role of a partnership. Self-determination, in contrast, creates political space for a more independent and less constrained satisfaction of aspiration.

Origins and Emergence of Biculturalism

While biculturalism has helped create a philosophical climate in which greater levels of self-determination are feasible it makes assumptions about power relationships which limit greater degrees of Maori autonomy – one step towards self-determination is permitted, but the next is

prevented. It does not curtail the intrusion of the state into the affairs of Maori communities in the same way that self-determination might allow. Biculturalism does not allow:

The reconstituting of indigenous peoples as relative autonomous political communities [which] is critical in crafting a revised political order based on indigenous rights. Indigenous peoples must be accepted as having their own independent sources rather than being shaped for the convenience of the political majority or subject to unilateral override.3

Biculturalism is based on the erroneous assumption that Maori have developed into a single homogenous identity and that the Crown, although representing the New Zealand population as a whole – including Maori, does so from a single cultural perspective. As the once more culturally homogenous non-Maori New Zealand population becomes increasingly diverse this assumption becomes less credible. Treating Maori as one entity overlooks the importance of iwi (tribes) and hapu (sub-tribes), which are required by the the Treaty of Waitangi to be respected as political units within Maori society. It is the potential for biculturalism to undermine the autonomy and authority of iwi, hapu and whanau (families) in favour of an all encompassing construct – Maori - that contributes to it being a problematic philosophy. That autonomy and authority is properly limited not by fashionable political theory, which is biculturalism, but by the right of governments to govern in the interests of all citizens, and by the interests of the common good of the whole community.

In response to a growing Maori political assertiveness during the 1970s and 1980s and in recognition of the legitimacy of Maori grievance, both Maori and Pakeha political elites, adopted biculturalism as a philosophical framework around which better relationships – reconciliation – between Maori and the Crown, and Maori and Pakeha might be constructed. Biculturalism became a philosophical framework for policy development across the public sector. It is concerned primarily with relationships among people in institutional settings and within and among bureaucratic institutions. In contrast self-determination is concerned with creating, to the greatest extent possible, independence and autonomy for groups, not necessarily in isolation from wider society, but certainly apart from controls and regulations imposed from outside the would be self-determining community. In contrast aspiration to self-determination reflects that:

The politics of indigeneity go beyond the simple expedient of creating cultural space or social equity.4

**Bicultural Distributivism**

Andrew Sharp has argued that there are two types of biculturalism, bicultural reformism and bicultural distributivism.5 Bicultural distributivism would enhance opportunities for self-determination, but at the expense of legitimate Pakeha interest, and is for consequent political reasons an unlikely philosophical framework around which a self-determining Maori society

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4 Ibid . 93
might emerge. Sharp explained that bicultural distributivism arose out of a rejection of the principle of multicultural distributivism, which suggested distribution of things according to the membership size of the group in question.⁶

This would have provided Maori with access to a percentage of the nation’s resources, political influence and positions in the public sector equal to the Maori percentage of the total population. The practical application of this proposition was explained by a Maori Consultative Group’s report on Maori participation in local government in 1988.

In accordance with the principle of rangatiratanga, there should be equal representation of tangata whenua and tauiwi on all units of local government… on the same principles they should also be a Maori local government commission working in parallel with the Pakeha one.⁷

The report then argued a need to restore the principle of one people, one vote in the major institutions of Aotearoa to give recognition to a bicultural heritage…⁸

The Minister of Local Government at the time, Michael Bassett, dismissed this proposition on the grounds that it was inconsistent with the democratic principle of one person one vote of equal value.⁹ As well as being politically unlikely, bicultural distributivism, if it involves Maori structures working ‘in parallel’ with Pakeha ones envisages a Maori copying of Pakeha bureaucracy, rather than a Maori development of Maori social and political structures.

**Bicultural Reformism**

It is bicultural reformism that influences contemporary policy practice. It has been government policy since the acceptance of the Puao-te-atatu report in 1986, which recommended strategies to overcome institutional racism, and to incorporate a Maori cultural dimension into the operations of the Department of Social Welfare. Bicultural reformism accepts the institutions and regulations of the majority culture and assumes that reforms to these can make them responsive to Maori, while surrendering little in the way of the cultural practices and values of the majority. These assumptions are questionable and can tend towards the superficial, as Justice Temm has explained:

A letter written by some civil servant that is culturally offensive is not cured by the fact that it appears under the letter head of a department of state which also describes itself by a Maori name.¹⁰

Biculturalism is advantageous to Maori in that it demands a Maori input into decision-making and accounts for incremental developments towards a society respectful and tolerant of cultural difference, but it can not substantially advance Maori autonomy, nor fully respect the

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⁶ Ibid. (230).
⁷ Ibid. (234-235).
⁸ Ibid.
rangatiratanga of iwi and hapu, which is both possible and desirable from a Maori point of view.

**Self-Determination**

Self-determination is a political and jurisprudential response to contestations of power between states and indigenous peoples in the postcolonial pluralist democracy.

From the side of the ruling peoples, this Goliath-versus-David relation is a political system that underlies and provides the foundation for the constitutional democracies of Canada, the US, Australia and New Zealand. The aim of the system is to ensure that the territory on which the settler societies is built is effectively and legitimately under their exclusive jurisdiction and open to settlement and capitalist development. The means to this end are twofold: the ongoing usurpation, dispossession, incorporation and infringement of the rights of indigenous peoples coupled with various long-term strategies of extinguishment and accommodation that would eventually capture their rights, dissolve the contradiction and legitimise the settlement. From the side of indigenous peoples, it is a political system that overlies and is illegitimately based on making use of their pre-existing governments and territories. It is a system established and continuously modified in response to two distinct types of… resistance and freedom, against the structure of domination as a whole in the name of the freedom of self-determination, and within it, by compliance and internal contestation of the strategies and techniques in the name of the freedom of insubordination and dissent.11

New Zealand’s ratification of the United Nations’ *Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples* has provided a possible mediating framework for contemporary contestations of power between the descendents of colonising and colonised peoples. The Declaration’s working definition of the right to self-determination was that:

By virtue of this right, they [indigenous peoples] freely determine their relationship with the states in which they live, in a spirit of co-existence with other citizens, and freely pursue their economic, social, cultural and spiritual development in conditions of freedom and dignity.12

In the New Zealand context the Declaration’s principles have been developed by Mason Durie into ‘broad aims of self-determination’, which are

the advancement of Maori people as Maori and the protection of the environment for future generations. Economic self-sufficiency, social equity, cultural affirmation, and political power, stand alongside a firm Maori identity strengthened by access to whanau, hapu, and iwi and confirmation that future generations of Maori will be able to enjoy their lands and forests, rivers and lakes, harbours and the sea and the air. These goals underlie the significance of Maori self-determination.13

In 1975 the International Court of Justice upheld the indigenous right to self-determination because, as Tully explains:

the structure and form of government and whether a people are said to be at a lower level of civilisation are not valid criteria for determining if the inhabitants have rights,

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such as the right to self-determination. The relevant consideration is if they have social and political organisations.  

**Self-Determination and the Reproduction of the Social Order**

Another understanding of self-determination argued by Tim Rowse is that it is the responsibility of indigenous people to reproduce their social order with the responsibility of governments to assist them.  

A reproduction of the social order requires considerable autonomy and control over the institutions and practices that most influence that order. Maori challenges to the state’s competence in Maori education reflected a quest for that autonomy so that a social order might be reproduced. The challenges gained momentum throughout the 1980s and 1990s during which time modest but significant incremental developments occurred. In 1981 the establishment of kura kaupapa Maori was given Maori endorsement on the basis that the existing system of education is failing the Maori people and modifications have not helped the situation, nor will they. Therefore we urge Maori withdrawal and the establishment of alternative schooling modelled on the principles underlying kohanga reo.  

The extension of the principles behind kohanga reo to the school sector can be seen as a development towards self-determination if the ultimate objective of Te Kohanga Reo is nothing less than the rebirth of the Maori nation as an equal but separate element contributing to the common good of New Zealand society.  

However, an alternative explanation antithetical to self-determination has been offered by Jenkins with Ka’ai:  

waiting for the benefits of a national education from the state was not only a lost cause… but was also disastrous in terms of the near extinction of the Maori language. A do-it-yourself campaign seemingly offered the only solution. However, the do-it-yourself approach should not be viewed as an attempt by Maori to operate in competition with the state or to try to fulfil the state’s curriculum in another way. Rather, it should be viewed as a desperate drive to save the Maori language. Associated with that drive are cultural imperatives.  

It is legitimate to condemn state attempts to weaken and even eliminate Maori language and by implication and extension Maori culture. However, expecting in contrast that the state should or even could preserve and develop Maori language and culture except in a peripheral fashion within mainstream schooling is effectively a challenge to the desirability of self-determination. The bemoaning of a ‘do it yourself’ approach leaves the transferring of cultural ownership and

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18 Kuni Jenkins with Tania Ka’ai, "Maori Education: A Cultural Experience and Dilemma for the State - a New
responsibility for cultural preservation to an institutional structure based on a completely different cultural framework as the only alternative. The development of kohanga reo and later kura kaupapa can fairly be appraised as a ‘desperate drive to save the Maori language’, a drive made desperate largely as a result of state hostility then negligence. But to carry on to dismiss the possibility that this might also have been ‘an attempt by Maori to operate in competition with the state or to try to fulfil the state’s curriculum in another way’ dismisses the possibility that self-determination was an informing and proper principle motivating the initiators of kohanga reo and kura kaupapa Maori. It is a rejection of cultural ownership and responsibility. Instead, if self-determination is to have substantive meaning the legitimacy and desirability of a ‘do it yourself’ approach is inescapable.

Jones et al have argued that the development of kura kaupapa Maori outside the mainstream of the state system indicates ‘a manifest criticism of state schooling structures’. The right, indeed duty, to make ‘manifest criticisms’ or to avoid passive acceptance of an unwanted situation is an essential element of the right to self-determination. More importantly, however self-determination establishes a right to address the causes of those criticisms, which has been a major feature of kura kaupapa Maori education, for example. Kura kaupapa Maori have also reasserted the ‘legitimacy and validity of Maori language and culture’. The legitimacy and validity of Maori language and culture is the underpinning legitimacy and validity of the right to self-determination. Self-determination legitimises Maori cultural preferences. It is not concerned with conformity with those of the state unless that is the chosen Maori option. Yet, by imposing its curriculum on Maori institutions the state retains unto itself considerable control over the limits to Maori preferences. It continues to demand control even though by its own measure of success its pedagogic preferences have not improved Maori educational achievement. The extent to which kohanga reo, kura kaupapa Maori and wananga can be seen as examples of self-determination is dependent on the extent to which the state in matters of substance, is prepared to relax the notion that it alone is the indisputable incontestable font of all knowledge about what should be taught, how it should be taught, by whom and to whom. Self-determination challenges the Crown’s assumption that it alone is the font of educational knowledge. In education self-determination is more than the right to choose an education exclusively in Maori, exclusively in English, or in whatever combination of both. The right to determine and develop a pedagogy and curriculum or indeed to accept that of the state must also be considered. The absence of a freedom to choose creates a systemic barrier to Maori self-determination in education, and thus to opportunities to reproduce a Maori social order. The extent to which the state’s New Zealand Curriculum makes concessions to Maori culture is immaterial when that curriculum is given the mantle of the one indisputable legally mandated model that all New Zealanders of whatever culture, whatever class and whatever circumstance must make fit their requirements. Even in kura kaupapa Maori this series of documents with

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19 Alison Jones et al. *Myths and Realities: Schooling in New Zealand* (Palmerston North: The Dunmore Press.)
unidentified authors and unestablished theoretical foundations determines what schools must do and determines the criteria against which their performance will be narrowly evaluated by a methodologically rigid Education Review Office. Even in kura kaupapa Maori which are the best example of Maori self-determination in education the state alone presumes to know what should be taught and how it should be taught. Although there is flexibility in the implementation of the *New Zealand Curriculum* the notion that Maori can not determine even the broad parameters of educational practice is the antithesis of genuine, albeit still necessarily limited self-determination. Self-determination would be enhanced by a genuinely flexible, but rigorous, theoretically transparent approach to curriculum and pedagogy.

The state however still retains a legitimate interest in educational outcome for Maori. Both its fiduciary duty to Maori and the suggestion that continued Maori alienation from the education system is injurious to the common good give the state an indisputably important and prominent role. A critical part of that role is to ensure that a system is not so flexible that individual communities are beyond scrutiny or susceptible to capture by factional interest groups within communities. However, these factors do not give the state, regardless of the degree of consultation with Maori professionals or with Maori communities an indisputable expertise in Maori education that justifies imposing a uniform set of requirements. If self-determination is to be maximised within New Zealand’s contemporary political, social and educational context then Maori communities must have the opportunity to establish clear educational goals for themselves. Given the reasons for Maori disquiet with state schooling it is unlikely that those goals will conflict with or compromise the state’s identified goals of enhancing Maori educational achievement, as Durie’s analysis suggests.

> [There is a] wide expectation that education should open doors to technology, to the economy, to the arts and sciences, to understanding others, and to making a contribution to a greater good… Access to music, sport, travel, and the international disciplines of commerce, law and science will be increasingly important for all Maori over the next 25 years.

Once goals have been established through a reconciliation of Maori and state expectations a self-determining people will establish the means by which to achieve those expectations.

**Language Policy and Social Reproduction**

The linguist Richard Benton has explained the significance of linguistic control to reproduction of the social and cultural order. Benton has drawn attention to the possibility of a bicultural language policy altering the social context of the Maori language. Although Benton argued that ‘the Maori language is also part of the heritage of all New Zealanders’, he also warned against

\[\text{[21 Dominic O'Sullivan, "ERO a Part of the Problem," } \text{Education Review 28 January 2000.} \]
a ‘severance of Maori language from Maori culture’. Benton’s remark arose from his consideration of a report advocating the recognition of Maori as an official language of New Zealand, and promoting the greater use of the language throughout the country. Benton supported these objectives, but said that the recommendation that over a twenty year period, that applicants for a wide range of occupations should be required to demonstrate evidence of a conversational facility in Maori or a Polynesian language would seem to embody the worst fears of all opponents of the official support for bilingualism in New Zealand.

Had such a proposal been adopted as government policy it would have undermined political support for efforts to preserve the Maori language. This undermining would have come not just from those who for reasons of prejudice did not wish the language to survive, but also from those who while supportive of Maori retaining their language, did not wish to be compelled to use it themselves. Even more important is Benton’s fear that the policy would alienate Maori language from Maori culture. He suggested that such a language requirement would discriminate almost as effectively against people of Maori ancestry as it would against those from the so-called Pakeha majority. This might make it appear to be fair. However, the majority, if the need arose, would soon prevail in a contest such as this. Even if Maori people proved twice as adept at learning Maori as anyone else, there would still be three or four Maori speaking Pakeha for every Maori who knew the language. In fact, given the control of educational resources exercised by the elite among the majority group, Maori people may well find themselves crowded out of the marketplace by such a requirement, unless they were given time and opportunity to gain a head start in such a race.

Benton’s analysis shows that even when biculturalism is advanced for the best of intentions it can in fact undermine Maori autonomy. If self-determination is a legitimate aspiration for Maori it is important that the Maori language should remain first and foremost Maori, and only secondarily become the New Zealand language.

Self-Determination and Subsidiarity

Self-determination can be seen within the context of Thomas Aquinas’ understanding of subsidiarity. Subsidiarity maintains that it is not the state alone, which is responsible for the common good, the ‘primary tenet’ of which is that ‘everyone in a society should be able to share in its growing quality of life’. In Maori society for example, an iwi should be expected to take a central role in ensuring the common good of its people. However through policies that undermined and reduced the effective functioning of iwi, the State has compromised their ability to meet this responsibility. The common good can only be realised when intentional impediments to it are removed by the state. The principle of subsidiarity protects the Maori opportunity to contribute to their own wellbeing, because it ensures that iwi, hapu, whanau and

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24 Ibid., 13-14.
25 Ibid., 13.
26 Ibid., 14.
27 Ibid.
individuals are not subject to negative or unnecessary state influence. It also protects against hapu being absorbed by iwi and against whanau being absorbed by hapu, because subsidiarity requires that no community or structure should interfere with the affairs of a lower community unless that lower community is hindering the wider common good.

Frank Brennan’s summary of how self-determination might operate in Australia offers an informative comparative contrast.

… self-determination subject to the constitution and laws of the Commonwealth of Australia ought now be seen as a non controversial statement of the legitimate and recognisable aspirations of aborigines seeking maximum community independence while remaining part of the nation state.  

Brennan has further argued that for Australia’s indigenous peoples self-determination establishes the right to manage their communities on their own land ‘as autonomously as possible’. He suggested that this right is properly qualified only by the requirement that indigenous peoples manage their affairs in a fashion that does not disturb the rights of others, or obstruct the common good. Brennan’s further argument is equally applicable in the New Zealand context – self-determination is a legitimate indigenous aspiration because the evils of assimilation and discrimination will be overcome only by indigenous people determining their future, even if it be inevitably as a part of a nation state in which they are a minority.

The contention that indigenous peoples should manage their own affairs as ‘autonomously as possible’ and the argument that such is a ‘responsibility’, and that the state has a duty to assist in the fulfilment of that responsibility – requires more than a policy framework concerned primarily with relationships within the state bureaucracy. It requires a philosophical and policy response more focused on Maori autonomy than can be provided within the bicultural framework that has lately informed Maori relationships with other actors in the education arena.

Opportunities for self-determination for minority indigenous groups within the democratic pluralist nation state are nevertheless limited by the right of the state to govern on behalf of all citizens, by the requirements of the common good and by democracy’s tendency to see the community as an homogenous whole. This is an example of the ‘tyranny of the majority’ identified by the British political theorist John Stuart Mill, who explained that there needs protection also against the tyranny of the prevailing opinion and feeling; against the tendency of society to impose, by other means than civil penalties, its own ideas and practices as rules of conduct on those who dissent from them; to fetter the development, and, if possible, prevent the formation, of any individuality not in

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31 Ibid
harmony with its ways, and compel all characters to fashion themselves upon the model of its own.\footnote{33 John Stuart Mill, \textit{On Liberty} (1869: [cited 27 April 2003]); available from \url{http://www.bartleby.com/130/1.html}.}

But it is inadequate to take the simple entity that democracy assumes and divide it into an homogenous Maori whole and an homogenous Pakeha whole, as is done by biculturalism, which thus diverts attention from the self-determination belonging to iwi, hapu and whanau. Although the restrictions of the democratic pluralist nation state limit indigenous opportunities for self-determination, there remains space within the contemporary New Zealand context for some such advancement. For example, in 1984 the Lange Government’s Hui Taumata – Maori Economic Summit, laid a significant foundation for self-determination because as Durie explained the meeting raised

an expectation that Maori people could realise greater levels of economic self-sufficiency, improved social well-being and less dependency on the state if they took advantage of their own distinctive social institutions such as iwi and hapu and actively developed their own tribal resources.\footnote{34 Durie, \textit{Te Mana, Te Kawanatanga: The Politics of Maori Self-Determination} (7).}

It is also clear from Durie’s description of the main themes of the ‘Decade of Maori Development’, which began with the Hui Taumata, that Maori do not see biculturalism as a simple path to the fulfilment of their aspirations. While biculturalism was acknowledged, it was one of seventeen implications of six themes noted by Durie. Among the more significant for their focus beyond biculturalism were:

the settlement of treaty claims, Maori self-determination, constitutional review, Maori mana motuhake, tribal development, development of an economic base, less reliance on the state, elimination of social and economic disparities, and the development of the Maori language and educational systems.\footnote{35 Ibid (8)}

A desire for the principles of subsidiarity to be recognised was clear. Maori wanted a less intrusive, less controlling and more distant state. That is Maori wanted greater autonomy. The Hui Taumata indicated that Maori also wanted Maori solutions to Maori concerns, not bicultural solutions. This view is reflected in Maaka and Fleras’ later assessment of biculturalism.

The politics of protest bristle with a growing Maori assertiveness over their relational status as ‘junior partners’ in a bicultural project.\footnote{36}  

\textbf{Summary}

James Tully has asked:

What recourses exist in political theory for thinking about the possibilities of a non-colonial relation between indigenous and non-indigenous peoples?\footnote{37}

Biculturalism and self-determination are both forms of resistance to colonial domination, but they differ markedly in underlying philosophical premise. Self-determination creates an
intellectual framework for thinking about non-colonial relationships, while biculturalism rejects the question’s foundational premise. Biculturalism presumes that jurisdiction must exclusively reside with the Crown. It cannot admit, as Tully has argued in the Canadian context, that

the presumption that jurisdiction is exclusive [be] replaced with two (indigenous) principles: free and equal peoples on the same continent can mutually recognise the autonomy or sovereignty of each other in certain spheres and share jurisdiction in others without incorporation or subordination.38

Self-determination is a direct challenge to domination and a framework within which strategies to minimise domination might be developed. Its overarching objective is the greatest possible independence. Biculturalism, in contrast, assumes and accepts an indigenous positioning as a ‘junior partner’. It emphasises unequal partnership over autonomy. Biculturalism is thus enthusiastically embraced by state institutions as a strategy for managing resistance. It validates, to a point, Maori cultural preferences.

Biculturalism arose in part out of a Pakeha questioning of the legitimacy of the form, but not the being, of the post-settler society that had emerged in the 1980s. It was perhaps an attempt to satisfy a guilty conscience – yet it was still informed by firm notions of Pakeha superiority. Self-determination, however, arises from a Maori political context, so its focus can be unmistakably Maori in a fashion that biculturalism can not allow. Although, practical self-determination requires a pragmatic acceptance of the limits to minority power and influence in the democratic pluralist nation state, it can approach questions of politics and law from an unapologetically Maori-centred view. Maori are not constrained by acceptance of a partnership in which they can not be equal. Biculturalism modifies political domination, whereas self-determination challenges, with the aim of minimising political domination.

In summary, the different philosophical premises which inform biculturalism and self-determination offer contrasting understandings of the proper location of power in both policy development and policy implementation. Biculturalism assumes a sharing of power but with Maori inevitably assuming the role of junior partner, while self-determination offers the opportunity for greater levels of autonomy and the residing of greater power within iwi, hapu and whanau. It offers independence and autonomy, not in isolation from wider society, but apart from unreasonable outside interference. In this way Maori communities may be enhanced against their own criteria and self-determination may become a self-perpetuating cycle.
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